On May 12, 2018, Muqtada al-Sadr’s list unexpectedly won a plurality in the Iraqi legislative elections. This event shook up the entire political situation in the Middle East. It was greeted in other countries with expressions both of surprise and of dismay — notably in the unusual parallel reactions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

Yet, there was no good reason to be surprised and even less to be dismayed. Muqtada al-Sadr’s victory should have been no real surprise, since it was long in the making. There was even less reason to be dismayed, at least by anyone who wished to see a progressive outcome of the political turmoil in the region. Some of the reactions were amazing. Time magazine even made the bizarre suggestion that Muqtada al-Sadr was Iraq’s “version of Trump.”

The last time I discussed the Iraqi political situation was in my commentary of July 4, 2017, which I entitled “The Two Competing Middle-Run Scenarios for Iraq.” In it, I argued that the expansion of the Islamic State [IS], which was then at its apex, was bound to reach its limits. At that point, the question before Iraq would be to choose between two radically different roads to take in a post-IS situation. We have now reached that moment.

One road was the road of pseudo-ethnic separation (either de facto or de jure) into three states: a “Shi’ite” state located in the center and southeast, a “Kurdish” state in the northeast, and a “Sunni” state in the west. I put each of these names in quotes because, of course, each such region would in reality be multi-ethnic despite accelerated ethnic purging, albeit one dominated by one group.

This kind of division of one state into three has, in the past, transformed a relatively wealthy and powerful state into a much poorer and geopolitically much weaker zone. We have the recent notable examples of Yugoslavia and Libya to see how this scenario plays out. We can easily understand why the United States and western European states might find this outcome desirable. It might also attract pseudo-ethnic leaders in the three zones.

The alternative road, which Muqtada al-Sadr has long been advocating quite forcefully, would be to create an alliance of groups in all three pseudo-ethnic regions, as well as secular pan-Iraqi forces. The last refers particularly to the Iraqi Communist Party, which historically had a significant organizational base despite serious repression.

The unifying policy of this alliance was to be Iraqi nationalism. Its program would be directed primarily against the United States and other “imperialist” powers. It would be directed secondarily against Iranian pretensions to control an Iraqi Shi’ite-dominated government, based on the religious primacy of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei and his successors to come.

The primary opposition to the United States had been continuous since the U.S. invasion in 2003, against which Muqtada al-Sadr fiercely fought. It is the relationship with Iran that is more complicated.

The Shi’ite community in Iraq is deeply split in three different and not totally overlapping ways. The first of these might be termed the existence of two rival clans. Since these clans trace their genealogy far back and still exist, it is easiest to define them by two of their most famous leaders.

One is the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeqh al-Sadr. He was Iraqi by nationality and his organizational base was in Baghdad. After the end of the Gulf war, he pursued rebellious activities against Saddam Hussein and his secularist policies. He was assassinated in 1999, most people believe by agents of Saddam Hussein, who denied this. Muqtada al-Sadr is his son.

The other clan was led at that time, and still is today, by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iranian by nationality, but resident in Najaf, where he is the leading cleric in the religiously very important Imam Ali Mosque. Ali al-Sistani had less hostile relations with Saddam Hussein, and close ties to the collectivity of clerics in Qom in Iran.

A second cleavage is that of class. The clan of Sadeqh al-Sadr was especially strong in those parts of Baghdad (and elsewhere) in which the poorest Shi’ites lived. He championed their demands for a better allocation of material rewards, as opposed to the more middle-class locales, which tended to support Ali al-Sistani.

The third cleavage, less mentioned at present but always present, is the competition between Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. Najaf has arguably the better claim to Shi’ite religious primacy for Shi’ites as the location of the tomb of Ali. However, the Iranian revolution has resulted in the strengthening of the claims of Qom to primacy.

There is a contradiction between Ali al-Sistani’s control of the Imam Ali Mosque and his close links with, some would say subordination to, the clerics in Qom. The Sadrist victory in the elections was the pay-off for his coalition. His list obtained more votes than the list of Ali al-Sistani, despite Iranian support. The list of the present Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, supported by the United States, came in third.

We will have to see whether Muqtada al-Sadr will be able to sustain this level of support in the next few years. He can expect a very vigorous effort by both Iran and the United States to undermine him. On the other hand, to be the bearer of the nationalist standard in a country that has such economic and cultural difficulties is a very powerful political stance.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 June 2018
Word Count: 907
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Since he became president, Donald Trump has insulted just about everybody with whom he has interacted. The one exception seems to have been close family members. They are not insulted, but when in disfavor simply ignored. He also has insulted every country on the globe, with the possible exception of Israel.

Insults seem to be a tool defining Trumpism, one that he uses constantly and with relish. There are two questions for the analyst of Trumpism. Why does he do it? And do they work?

Some analysts attribute these ceaseless insults, which recur with varying targets, as the result of some kind of mental defect. He is a hypersensitive megalomaniac, they say. He can’t restrain himself. He has no self-control.

I disagree. I believe the insults are part of a deliberate strategy, which Trump thinks will best further (1) his dominance of the U.S. and world scene and (2) the implementing of his policies.

What might Trump think he gets out of the game of insults? When he insults a person or a country, he forces them to make a decision. They can either strike back and risk Trump’s willingness to hurt them in some way important to them. Or they can seek to return to favor by making some concession important to Trump. In either case, the relationship centers around Trump.

In his view, this makes him the alpha-dog. Furthermore, he not only wants to be the top of the world power scale, but he wants to be seen to be. Insults serve this purpose.

Faced with choosing between two undesirable responses to the insult, the person or country insulted can try to make an alliance with others being insulted in similar ways or at the same time. It turns out that the potential allies are having the same debate about the way to handle the insults. The potential ally may be making a different choice of response.

At this point, the person or country insulted can try to persuade the potential ally to change tactics. Or he can look for other potential allies. In either case, rather than focusing on how to handle Trump’s insults, they are focusing on how to obtain allies. They are thus diverted from the main issue, to the benefit of Trump.

Trump can then shift tactics. He can offer some partial concession to the person or country being insulted. He can do it in a way that is ambiguous or is time limited. The person or country involved must choose between swallowing the past humiliation and offering gratitude for the concession or considering it insufficient.

If the choice is gratitude, the person or country lives under the sword of Damocles that the insult will nonetheless recur. Or he can suffer the wrath of Trump. In either case, Trump comes out ahead.

He can use this tactic to appease critics to his right or to his left. Indeed, this will help him emerge as the reasonable center, no matter what are the actual policies he pursues.

One last advantage. Since Trump’s tweets are inconsistent, he can claim credit when the outcome is favorable to him (“I deserve a Nobel prize”). But whenever the outcome is not as favorable as he desires, he can blame some or all of his inner circle, asserting that they failed to follow his instructions.

We now must turn to the question of whether the insults work. Do they have the benefits to Trump that he expects to obtain? We have to start with what Trump must find worrying. He has very high unpopularity ratings in the U.S. polls. And in the vast majority of nations, he also rates low in the polls.

He is quite unsure of winning the elections of 2018 and 2020. His conservative base is unhappy, which may lead to abstentions from voting on their part, or at least less effort to get out the conservative vote.

Nevertheless, despite this weak showing, the game of insults seems to have increased, if only slightly, his support level. Is this enough for his primary immediate purpose, getting re-elected? He needs to present to the voters and to other nations some achievements.

He has a few. On the U.S. scene, he has the tax reduction bill. And on the world scene, he has (as of now) the forthcoming meeting with North Korea’s Leader Kim. But he also has failures. He has not been able to get (yet) his planned immigration measures nor the money for the wall. And worldwide his rejection of the Iran agreement has dismayed most nations.

The question is whether the response to the insults will tilt seriously against him. It is hard to say. It could come suddenly. Or he might scrape through the morass. The real point is that the pluses of the insults cannot go on forever. Too many people and too many nations lose too much as a result.

The question therefore is not whether, but when. This is the game we are all now playing day by day, in elections at every conceivable level, in reformulated alliances across the globe. Not whether, but when!

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 May 2018
Word Count: 853
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April 23, 2018 marks the 50th Anniversary of the Columbia student uprising in 1968. Since I was involved in the events in various capacities, I want to offer a testimony to what happened and what seems to me today the most important lessons we can draw.

May 1 is a famous date. It is Mayday, celebrating the Haymarket riots in 1886 and it is the date celebrating the worldwide events of 1968 that most commentators argue began in France. But actually Columbia predates Paris by a week as I often remind my French friends and is a better starting date for the celebrations.

One outstanding lesson of Columbia is how spontaneous the uprising was. We now know that shortly before it started the leaders of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) felt it was virtually impossible to obtain and maintain student support for their objectives.

SDS had listed six demands. There were two crucial ones: The first was that Columbia should withdraw from its affiliation with the Institute for Defense Analyses, which was a mainstay of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The second was that Columbia cease building a new gymnasium in Morningside Park, which was seen as Columbia’s eviction of the Black community in Harlem from land that was rightfully theirs.

The day started at noon in a traditional site of public discourse in Columbia. There were speakers from SDS and from the Student Afro-American Society (SAS). They voiced once again the six demands. At a certain point the group decided to march on Low Library, where the university administration was located. Finding it locked down when they arrived there, some individual shouted that they should go to the gym. We don’t even know who shouted this, but everyone went to the gym site.

Finding the site protected by police, the group decided to go to Hamilton Hall, the center of Columbia College activities. They sought to enter the Dean’s office. And finding this locked too, the group simply sat down and asked non-participants to leave the building. This was defined by the administration as holding the Dean hostage. And thus began the uprising.

A meeting of the professors of Columbia College ensued. They debated what to do: call the police? negotiate? The students “released” the Dean, but otherwise stayed put. Indecisiveness was everywhere. In the night, the SAS students asked the SDS students to leave Hamilton Hall and “seize” their own building, which they did – four buildings in fact.

Someone telephoned me that night and suggested I come immediately to campus. There I found various professors unsure of what to do. We decided to meet in Philosophy Hall, which had the space. The supervisor of the Hall was very opposed to this, but could do nothing. In effect, the professors had “seized” Philosophy Hall. However, they allowed anyone to enter. The professors then constituted themselves as the Ad Hoc Faculty Group (AHFG) and would begin to meet continuously. An executive committee of I think 17 persons was chosen. I was one of them.

This brings me to my second major lesson. SAS had evicted SDS from Hamilton Hall because SDS was undisciplined. Boy, were they right! SAS was in contrast incredibly tightly disciplined. It turned out in retrospect that SAS was far more important in transforming the university and the larger U.S. situation than SDS, although no one seemed to understand that at the time.

Various Harlem politicians offered themselves to Columbia as mediators, about which Columbia was very reluctant. At the same time, the AHFG had voted to send emissaries to discuss with both SDS and SAS their demands. I was asked to be one of those who discussed with SAS. Others went to see SDS.

I went to see David Truman, the Vice-President, and asked him if he would welcome my playing this role. He was delighted, seeing it as a way of cutting out the Harlem politicians. SAS also agreed that I play this role on condition that I discuss matters only with a four-person group they had constituted.

I thus went in and out of Hamilton Hall several times and was allowed to speak only with the four-person group. Each time, we spoke in coded indirect language. I cannot say that I could report back to the AHFG any significant change in position. SAS seemed to wish to maintain contact but that was all. I at least did better than those who went to see SDS, who reported back total stalemate.

After seven days or so, the Columbia administration decided to call the police. David Truman came to the meeting of the AHFG to tell us that they were going to do that. He simply reported this; he didn’t discuss it. Various professors made different personal decisions. There were many who decided to surround the entrance to the occupied buildings. Most of them surrounded Fayerweather, the building occupied by the graduate students. A smaller group, of which I was one, decided to surround Hamilton Hall.

And that brings me to my last surprise. When the police arrived where I was, they gently wiggled their way past us. The group surrounding Fayerweather was treated quite differently. They were beaten, some of them badly, as well of course as the students occupying the building. What we learned later is that SAS had made a deal with the police. They would leave quietly through a back door and not be arrested. This was why those of us who surrounded Hamilton were treated so gently.

My final conclusion is that the real winner of the Columbia events was SAS. The Columbia administration was devastated and David Truman never became President as had been expected before this. SDS fell apart and was destroyed. The Harlem politicians lost their authority. And SAS had shown the power of discipline. SAS was the winner but of course only as part of a long ongoing struggle against racism in the United States.

As for 1968 as a whole, I have written on this many times and have no space here to repeat the argument. In one sentence, what happened was the ending of the geocultural dominance of centrist liberalism and the reopening of a three-way ideological struggle between the Global Left and the Global Right with centrist liberalism struggling to maintain some support as a real alternative.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 May 2018
Word Count: 1,054
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BEIRUT — The tripartite Anglo-American-French missile strikes against targets in Syria that aimed to punish the Syrian government and deter it from using chemical weapons should briefly stop the use of these barbaric instruments of war, as has happened previously. Despite this achievement, in the context of the wider, older, and continuing American and European militarism in the Middle East, these attacks generate mixed feelings, because they fail four critical tests of efficacy, legitimacy, credibility, and the wider Syrian war context.

They seem to be political acts that are isolated from the defining local and regional dynamics in Syria and the Middle East; as such they seem mainly to tell domestic audiences in the West that the three attacking powers value human life and international law more than do the Syrian and Russian governments — a questionable point, given how much killing these three states have done in the region for decades. The strikes’ consequences are likely to perpetuate the turmoil and new forms of violence that plague the region, which is the recurring legacy of such foreign military actions.

The Saturday attacks fail the efficacy test. Twenty years of non-stop U.S. and other attacks against terror groups and militant governments since the 1998 missile strikes against Al Qaeda in Sudan and Afghanistan have not deterred Al Qaeda and other terrorists that now flourish. These groups only come to life in zones that have been ravaged by local and foreign military attacks, such as Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, most notably.

The many governments and militant forces that stand up to the United States and other foreign powers have steadily expanded in recent years. Ironically — but not surprisingly — Iranian, Russian, Hezbollah, and Turkish influence in Syria and other Arab lands has grown recently, in large part thanks to the consequences of the persistent militarism of the United States and other foreign and Arab powers who have tried to “roll back” such influence.  Nikki Haley and her posse may be “locked and loaded”, as she says; if so, then Washington’s military performance in the Middle East since 1998 to defeat terror and roll back Iran has mostly shot itself in the foot, actually strengthening the foes it seeks to weaken.

The attacks also fail the legitimacy test because the UN and other international bodies that are authorized to verify who conducted the chemical attacks before any punitive measure are taken have not done their work, which was to start Sunday on the ground. The tripartite attackers cannot credibly claim legitimate self-defense because they were not under threat of imminent attack and were not attacked themselves, as happened in 9/11. Western powers who say they seek to uphold international law and norms by breaking or ignoring them have a serious legitimacy problem on their hands.

The attacks fail the credibility test because Western concerns about deaths by chemical weapons lose some of their acuity, for two reasons. The Syrian government and opposition forces have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, often through inhuman means such as barrel bombs and starvation sieges, which seem not to have generated much action by Saturday’s tripartite attackers, even though their consequences are far greater. Their moral outrage at the deaths of innocent civilians is also clouded by the reality that the United States, France and UK between them have been directly responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Middle East over many decades of their direct military and political actions across the region, including in Yemen today.

The supreme irony here is that Great Britain was the power that introduced chemical weapons in their arsenal in the region around World War One, which they wanted to use if needed to put down an anti-colonial uprising in Iraq (but did not actually deploy them in the end). The Western attackers’ focus on averting more innocent deaths due to cruel means also would be more credible, for example, if the United States and UK stopped actively assisting the Saudi and Emirati war against Yemen, where tens of thousands suffer from  cholera and thousands have died from this scourge, malnutrition, and other impacts of the war.

All deaths by cruel means of war are abhorrent and must be stopped by the collective actions of all countries that value all human life equally; that will not happen by the occasional actions of a few countries that appear selective in their revulsion at human suffering and death, and episodic in their adherence to international law and norms.

The attacks, finally, fail the test of accounting for the wider realities of the war in Syria and its many regional and global linkages. In specific military operations like this — or the Anglo-American attack against Iraq in 2003, or even the recent two-year war against Islamic State (ISIS) — short-term gains tend to wither away due to lack of linkages to a wider policy that addresses the underlying causes of the war and possible ways to end it. More comprehensive and realistic approaches are required to stop the fighting, stabilize Syria, and redress other tensions that now surround it, including Kurdish, Iranian, Israeli, Turkish, and Russian interests, for starters.

These attacks continue a Western tradition of nonstop warfare in the Arab region that started with Napoleon more than two centuries ago, and only seems to escalate further today with drones, Cruise missiles, electronic warfare, and contracted mercenaries. The results are also the same: resistance from local powers, destruction of Middle Eastern societies, and the birth of radical forces and governments that defy the foreign attackers. This is even more dangerous now because of the direct military intervention in Syria of non-Western and regional powers, like Iran, Russia, Turkey, Israel, and Hezbollah.

Only political and socio-economic solutions to the deteriorating human foundations of Arab states will end the violence, rid us of our long serving dictators and banned weapons of mass destruction, and achieve peace, equal rights, and prosperity for the bludgeoned people of the region.

Rami G. Khouri is senior public policy fellow, adjunct professor of journalism, and Journalist in Residence at the American University of Beirut, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative. He can be followed @ramikhouri

Copyright ©2018 Rami G. Khouri — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 16 April 2018

Word Count: 994

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For rights and permissions, contact:

rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.212.731.0757

Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, The Arab Weekly, and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.

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On April 7, 2018 in Brazil Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva was arrested and taken to prison in Curitiba to begin a twelve-year sentence. He was Brazil’s president from January 2003 to January 2011. He was so popular that when he left office in 2011, he had a 90% approval rate.

Soon afterwards, he was charged with corruption while in office. He denied the charge. He was however convicted of the charge, a conviction that was sustained by an Appeals Court. He is still appealing his conviction to the Supreme Court.

However, under one interpretation of Brazilian law, he can be imprisoned once an Appeals Court has affirmed his sentence without waiting for the judgment of the Supreme Court. He asked nonetheless for a habeas corpus, which would have kept him out of prison until he had exhausted all possible appeals. The demand was rejected by a vote of 6-5. Thereupon, the judge who charged him initially and who was particularly hostile to Lula, Sergio Moro, moved swiftly to put Lula behind bars.

What was the reason for this harsh treatment, which was not applied to many others facing much more serious charges? To understand that, we must review recent Brazilian history and Lula’s role.

Lula was a trade-union leader who founded a workers’ party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). It was the party of the underclass and one that stood for fundamental change both in Brazil and in Latin America as a whole.

Lula ran for president in several successive elections. He was probably cheated out of his election at least once. He finally won in October 2002.

The Brazilian electoral system leads to a profusion of parties, none of which has ever been able to obtain a plurality of more than twenty-odd percent of seats in the legislature, much less a majority. In order to govern therefore, the party with a plurality has to make deals with other parties of quite different ideological leanings.

Despite this limitation, Lula was able to form a government and obtain legislative support for significant transfers of resources to Brazil’s poorest third of the population, which explains his popularity. He was also able to lead Latin American states to forge new interstate structures that did not include the United States and Canada.

The internal redistributions and the geopolitical realignments displeased greatly both the United States and Brazil’s right-wing forces. One thing that made it difficult for them to counter Lula was the fact that the state of the world-economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was very favorable to the so-called newly-emerging economies, also known as the BRICS (B for Brazil).

However, the winds of the world-economy turned, and suddenly revenue for the Brazilian state (and of course many other states) became scarcer.

The right found a renewed opening in the financial squeeze that ensued. They blamed economic difficulties on corruption and fostered a judicial drive called lava jato (car wash), which evoked the issue of laundering money, something that was indeed widespread.

In 2011, Lula was succeeded as president by Dilma Rousseff, a more conservative leader in the PTB. When some PTB cabinet members were convicted of corruption, the right launched a move to impeach Dilma. She was not charged with corruption herself but charged with inadequate supervision of her subordinates in leadership positions.

This was a thin excuse. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos put it, the one impeccably honest politician in Brazil was being successfully impeached for corruption by votes of all the most corrupt officials in the land.

The reason the right engaged in this farce was that the Vice-President who would succeed Dilma after her impeachment was Michel Temer, who had been placed on Dilma’s ticket as part of an electoral coalition.

Temer assumed office immediately and rejected the idea of early elections which he would almost surely have lost. One of the first things he did instead was to arrange that the substantial charges against him for corruption be dropped.

The motive for impeaching Dilma seems clear. It was to prevent Lula from running in the next election for president. The consensus view was that Lula would win again. The only way to stop him was to charge him with corruption. And the charge could only be sustained if Dilma was impeached. The strength of the PT was closely linked to Lula’s charisma. Any other candidate would probably be unable to command support anywhere near the level that Lula could obtain.

Once Lula was threatened with immediate imprisonment, Brazil’s two major popular forces expressed their strong opposition to what they asserted was a political coup d’état. One was the Central Ùnica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), which Lula had once led, and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), Brazil’s largest rural organization.

The leader of the MST, João Pedro Stedile, explained the reasons for their support. The MST had had many disagreements with Lula and had been disappointed with his refusal to break with many neoliberal policies. But those who were trying to prevent Lula from running were truly antagonistic to all the positive things Lula had achieved and would institute severe retrogressive measures.

The MST and CUT organized significant mobilizations against his imprisonment. But, faced with the threat of the armed forces to intervene (and possibly restore a military regime again), Lula decided to present himself for arrest. He has now been imprisoned.

The question today is whether this right-wing coup can succeed. This no longer depends on Lula personally. History may absolve him but the current struggle in Brazil and in Latin America as a whole depends on political organization at the base.

The Temer government will pursue neoliberal policies fiercely. And Temer will no doubt present himself as a candidate for election. Temer knows no shame nor any limits. He risks going too far too fast.

One of the principal characteristics of the structural crisis of the modern world-system in which we find ourselves is the high volatility of the world-economy. Should it run even further downward than it is at present, there may well be an upsurge of popular sentiment against the regime. If it began to include large parts of the professional strata, an alliance with the underclasses is quite possible.

Even then it will not be easy to change the political realities of Brazil. The army stands ready probably to prevent a left government from coming to power. Nonetheless one should not despair. The army was defeated once before and evicted from power. It could be again.

In short, the outlook for Brazil and for Latin America as a whole is highly uncertain. Brazil, given its size and its history, is a key zone of the middle-run struggle for a progressive outcome of the struggle between the global left and the global right for resolving the structural crisis in their favor.

Brazil merits our collective close attention and our active solidary participation.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 April 2018

Word Count: 1,152

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For rights and permissions, contact:

rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.212.731.0757

Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, The Arab Weekly and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.

—————-

On April 7, 2018 in Brazil Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva was arrested and taken to prison in Curitiba to begin a twelve-year sentence. He was Brazil’s president from October 2002 to January 2011. He was so popular that when he left office in 2011, he had a 90% approval rate.

Soon afterwards, he was charged with corruption while in office. He denied the charge. He was however convicted of the charge, a conviction that was sustained by an Appeals Court. He is still appealing his conviction to the Supreme Court.

However, under Brazilian law, he can be imprisoned once an Appeals Court has affirmed his sentence without waiting for the judgment of the Supreme Court. He asked nonetheless for a habeas corpus, which would have kept him out of prison until he had exhausted all possible appeals. The demand was rejected by a vote of 6-5. Thereupon, the judge who charged him initially and who was particularly hostile to Lula, Sergio Mora, moved swiftly to put Lula behind bars.

What was the reason for this harsh treatment, which was not applied to many others facing much more serious charges? To understand that, we must review recent Brazilian history and Lula’s role. Lula was a trade-union leader who founded a workers’ party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (PTB). It was the party of the underclass and one that stood for fundamental change both in Brazil and in Latin America as a whole.

Lula ran for president in several successive elections. He was probably cheated out of his election at least once. He finally won in 2002.

The Brazilian electoral system leads to a profusion of parties, none of which has ever been able to obtain a plurality of more than twenty-odd percent of seats in the legislature, much less a majority. In order to govern therefore, the party with a plurality has to make deals with other parties of quite different ideological leanings.

Despite this limitation, Lula was able to form a government and obtain legislative support for significant transfers of resources to Brazil’s poorest third of the population, which explains his popularity. He was also able to lead Latin American states to forge new interstate structures that did not include the United States and Canada.

The internal redistributions and the geopolitical realignments displeased greatly both the United States and Brazil’s right-wing forces. One thing that made it difficult for them to counter Lula was the fact that the state of the world-economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was very favorable to the so-called newly-emerging economies, also known as the BRICS (B for Brazil). However, the winds of the world-economy turned, and suddenly revenue for the Brazilian state (and of course many other states) became scarcer.

The right found a renewed opening in the financial squeeze that ensued. They blamed economic difficulties on corruption and fostered a judicial drive called lava jato (car wash), which evoked the issue of laundering money, something that was indeed widespread.

In 2011, Lula was succeeded as president by Dilma Rousseff, a more conservative leader in the PTB. When some PTB cabinet members were convicted of corruption, the right launched a move to impeach Dilma. She was not charged with corruption herself but charged with inadequate supervision of her subordinates in leadership positions.

This was a thin excuse. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos put it, the one impeccably honest politician in Brazil was being successfully impeached for corruption by votes of all the most corrupt officials in the land.

The reason the right engaged in this farce was that the Vice-President who would succeed Dilma after her impeachment was Michel Temer, who had been placed on Dilma’s ticket as part of an electoral coalition. Temer assumed office immediately and rejected the idea of early elections which he would almost surely have lost. One of the first things he did instead was to arrange that the substantial charges against him for corruption be dropped.

The motive for impeaching Dilma seems clear. It was to prevent Lula from running in the next election for president. The consensus view was that Lula would win again. The only way to stop him was to charge him with corruption. And the charge could only be sustained if Dilma was impeached. The strength of the PTB was closely linked to Lula’s charisma. Any other candidate would probably be unable to command support anywhere near the level that Lula could obtain.

Once Lula was threatened with immediate imprisonment, Brazil’s two major popular forces expressed their strong opposition to what they asserted was a political coup d’état. One was the Centrale Ùnica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), which Lula had once led, and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), Brazil’s largest rural organization.

The leader of the MST, João Pedro Stedile, explained the reasons for their support. The MST had had many disagreements with Lula and had been disappointed with his refusal to break with many neoliberal policies. But those who were trying to prevent Lula from running were truly antagonistic to all the positive things Lula had achieved and would institute severe retrogressive measures.

The MST and CUT organized significant mobilizations against his imprisonment. But, faced with the threat of the armed forces to intervene (and possibly restore a military regime again), Lula decided to present himself for arrest. He has now been imprisoned.

The question today is whether this right-wing coup can succeed. This no longer depends on Lula personally. History may absolve him but the current struggle in Brazil and in Latin America as a whole depends on political organization at the base.

The Temer government will pursue neoliberal policies fiercely. And Temer will no doubt present himself as a candidate for election. Temer knows no shame nor any limits. He risks going too far too fast.

One of the principal characteristics of the structural crisis of the modern world-system in which we find ourselves is the high volatility of the world-economy. Should it run even further downward than it is at present, there may well be an upsurge of popular sentiment against the regime. If it began to include large parts of the professional strata, an alliance with the underclasses is quite possible.

Even then it will not be easy to change the political realities of Brazil. The army stands ready probably to prevent a left government from coming to power. Nonetheless one should not despair. The army was defeated once before and evicted from power. It could be again.

In short, the outlook for Brazil and for Latin America as a whole is highly uncertain. Brazil, given its size and its history, is a key zone of the middle-run struggle for a progressive outcome of the struggle between the global left and the global right for resolving the structural crisis in their favor.

Brazil merits our collective close attention and our active solidary participation.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 April 2018
Word Count: 1,150
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People everywhere make claims and complain regularly about corruption and about national security. There is virtually no country in the world where this does not occur. If no one inside the country — whether citizen, resident, or transitory visitor — speaks publicly using such language, it is only because those in power respond with exceptionally harsh repression.

Otherwise, these themes are central to the politics and geopolitics of all countries in the world. The situation of a particular country is subject also to discussion about it by persons outside its boundaries. Citizens of the country in exile talk about it. Social movements in other countries talk about it. Other governments talk about it.

However, this long list of persons who discuss these issues publicly say very different things about them in the case of any particular country. It behooves us to look more closely at the language people use and the descriptions of reality they make in order to understand what is going on and how we should evaluate the claims and complaints.

Corruption is virtually inescapable. As a general rule, the richer the country the larger the amounts that can be accumulated via corruption. We learn all the time in the headlines of the press about some very high-level political figure or some very high-level corporation executive who is accused of corruption and is prosecuted for it or even imprisoned. We learn the same thing about lower-level persons as well. But the press is less likely to speak of these persons.

How does one practice corruption? The answer is quite simple. One has to be situated in a location where the money flows from one person in the chain to another. No doubt there are some individuals whose internalized values keep them from playing the game. But they are more rare than we publicly admit.

What is the purpose of denouncing some miscreants for corruption? It can be the desire for a change of government. Public criticism can lead to street demonstrations or other organized forms of anti-government efforts. Such efforts may succeed or fail, but this remains their objective.

At the same time the government or other persons in dominant positions may accuse the anti-government demonstrators of being corrupt and therefore in no position to denounce those in the government of this.

When we look at governments speaking of other governments, the accusations of corruption reflect primarily geopolitical interests. Again as a general rule, one government does not accuse another government of corruption if it is an ally or it is a government that one prefers to see remain in power. However, one government may denounce another government of corruption when it considers the other government to be an enemy or at least prefers to see the other government removed from power. Or a government may refrain from accusing publicly another government of corruption, while suggesting privately that such restraint is temporary and its continuance depends on some shift in position of the other government.

The theme of national security has a similar gamut of meanings. Governments hope to restrain, even eliminate, public discussion of corruption or of geopolitical alliances by invoking the theme of national security. This is a relatively effective method of achieving various ends. Governments may make the claim of national security without having to prove its validity. They can argue that giving the evidence itself violates national security.

The way someone can counter such blockage of public debate is through leakage by insiders who hope that the press will spread the word that the claim about national security is an invention whose purpose is to silence the opposition. And such leakage (also known as whistle-blowing) is countered by the government by prosecution for endangering national security.

A language allied to national security is that of espionage. Espionage is also universal. It is however expensive and difficult. Therefore, it is done more extensively and probably successfully by richer governments. And the spies may be punished more severely.

The reader may have noticed that I have refrained from using the name of any particular country in this commentary. That is because the article is not about the political or geopolitical situation of any particular country. The essential point I am making is that there is almost nothing but “fake news” as the current expression goes. But one must remember that invoking fake news about accusations is itself a mode of trying to suppress public discussion.

Are we then helpless to see what is really going on? Is there no way of discerning reality? Of course not. We can each of us engage in the necessary detective work to sift through the use of these recurrent themes vis-à-vis a particular situation in order to make a relatively plausible analysis.

The point is that it takes work, lots of work, to be a detective. Few of us have the taste, the money, and the time to do this work. We therefore subcontract this work to others: one or more particular social movements, one or more particular newspapers, one or more particular individuals, etc. To do this, we have to have confidence in the subcontractor(s), and to have it renewed regularly. A big job. But unless we do this work ourselves or rely on one or more first-rate subcontractors, we are doomed to be swamped by the use of these recurrent themes. We are rendered powerless.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 April 2018
Word Count: 895
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Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.
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Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif’s proposal for moving towards new security arrangements in the Middle East is an important gesture that should be read in two contrasting ways, for it faithfully reflects the Arab region’s double perception of Iran as a noble friend, or a deceitful menace.

There is little new in the broad principles or worthwhile goals that Zarif mentions in his effort to jump-start an Arab-Iranian process of dialogue, mutual understanding and widespread engagement.

But one new dimension of his text does deserve serious exploration: his concluding idea that one day Arabs and Iranians could sign non-aggression pacts, after taking mutual confidence-building steps in sensitive arenas, such as nuclear power and military visits, spending, and exercises.

I have spent my whole life working with words in the Middle East, and I know that words can matter, especially if they are a signal of intent and a first step towards action.

Zarif’s concluding words, “all the way to signing non-aggression pacts” certainly reflect the principle of finishing with statement that will keep ringing in the ears of readers for some time, because it captures the heart of the message.

Zarif’s message coincides with the celebration of the annual festival of Nowruz. This pre-Islamic celebration that marks the advent of a new year includes a traditional cleaning of one’s home; Iranians also say it is about friendship, reconciliation, and lighthearted fun, leaving anger and vengefulness for another day.

We might use this guide to engage with Zarif’s thoughts and suggestions — and also to challenge him and the Arab states alike to do the same in their policies and actions, if they sincerely seek actual, not rhetorical, reconciliation and peace.

I have never met Foreign Minister Zarif, but I have encountered many senior officials like him across the Middle East during my half-century of reporting here. Several lessons I draw from such encounters seem relevant in how we should deal with his words:

We should read and ponder such a hopeful statement with care, and then delve beyond the engaging rhetoric and smooth personality, to identify if there are any genuine openings for diplomatic breakthroughs.

Zarif’s alluring vision of Arab-Iranian non-aggression pacts makes me wonder if Arab and Iranian leaders could now turn off their childish propaganda machines, sit down for a serious contest of who brews the best tea, actually talk to each other like adults, and most importantly call each other’s bluff — to find out once and for all if we are destined for perpetual warfare, or peace and mutual prosperity.

On paper, no reasonable person could object to any of Zarif’s points, focusing as they do on moving towards “stability, security, peace, and development,” which he says could occur on the basis of a few consecutive steps: A propaganda truce, dialogue, confidence-building measures, exchanges of people and goods and accelerating cooperation across sensitive areas that include military spending and exercises, and nuclear industries.

He rejects any state’s hegemonic ambitions in the region as both unfeasible and a source of new tensions.

Many Arabs would ask him, though, what Iranian troops, funds, weapons, surrogates, technology, trainers, engineers, and advisers are doing in several Arab states, including in situations of war?

Most Arab governments and many citizens do not take him seriously because they do not see his words matching his country’s actions across the Middle East. This is Zarif’s insurmountable obstacle, which he cannot overcome even with the finest vibes of a Nowruz crescent moon and its reaffirmations of peace, love, happiness and coexistence.

Yet deeper demons haunt the Arabs, because most Arab countries — no, all Arab countries — have failed to harness their human, financial, cultural, geographical and natural resources to be able to adequately preserve their national security and well-being.

All Arab states embarrassingly depend on foreign patrons, financiers, protectors and armourers against real and imagined foreign threats, but also against the turbulent agitation of their own justifiably disgruntled citizens.

In the modern struggle for statehood and sovereignty in the Middle East, Iran has broadly out-performed most Arab states. As some Arab countries suffer internal wars and fractures, Iran, Turkey Israel, Russia, the United States hover above them, like vultures waiting to grab a piece of the imminent Arab carcass below, with Syria being today’s most distressing example.

In tandem, Iran has patiently advanced its own strategic military and political alliances within some Arab countries, steadily filling the openings created by internal Arab turmoil, dilapidated statehood, ravaged citizenship, and wars, notably in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, Palestine and Yemen.

This is what all strong states routinely do; they harness their resources to preserve their strategic interests, even if others complain.

But the Arab states have been unable to do this. Driven by their many internal and regional vulnerabilities and consequent understandable fears, many Arabs point to Iran as their existential and hegemonic threat.

They simultaneously seek protection in Washington, London, France, Russia and even Tel Aviv. Iran’s protestations of innocence or legitimate self-defense seem insincere to most Arab ears, as do its arguments that it seeks only to protect itself against regular warnings, sanctions, and threats of military attacks from western, Israeli, and Arab governments.

Iranian officials can sing Fairouz or Umm Kalthoum love songs all night long, but most Arabs will not believe them. The existential fears of both Iranian and Arab leaders are intense and genuine. Speeches at the UN, debates on television, and media commentaries only exacerbate mutual mistrust. Only drastic acts can break through the rising mutual fears and parallel hardening of positions.

Zarif’s proposal for direct dialogue leading to serious engagements and conflict-reduction measures on key issues could offer a historic opening towards that happy future he paints of a region in peace and prosperity — but only if he is serious, and seriousness here is measured by only one criterion: Pursuing policies that match the rhetoric.

Which is, of course, precisely what Iran says about the Arab countries who say they seek regional calm but spend hundreds of billions of dollars on arms and scramble amateurishly to create anti-Iran coalitions with bizarre groups of Arab, Israel, and American partners that never seem to achieve their aim.

The historic nuclear agreement that Iran signed with world powers three years ago should shape our search for ideas on how to stop the escalation towards confrontation or war against Iran, especially since the election of Donald Trump.

If few Arab officials believe Zarif’s words, perhaps they would react more positively to actions that create an opening for serious diplomatic engagement. An Arab official of equal stature could respond to Zarif with words of equal magnitude, mentioning precisely and honestly the issues that concern the Arab world.

A serious mediation effort could move them both towards a credible negotiating process, initial tension-reduction steps, and ultimately long-term moves towards genuine non-aggression and a region that spends hundreds of billions of dollars on improving human well-being and protecting our fragile environment.

If Zarif wants to be taken more seriously in the Arab region, he might consider unilaterally taking one or two measures on his list of de-escalation actions.

This could entice Arab states to take notice, and perhaps to follow suit. This could happen via backdoor contacts with Arab leaders, to facilitate negotiations and their suggestions for initial confidence-building measures that would reciprocate Zarif’s list.

Strong, confident, peace-loving states do such things, without risking their national security or demeaning their dignity. In fact, the opposite happens: The world respects them for taking bold, unilateral moves towards peace and mutual security. Then, their Arab foes also might wake up and explore more serious and productive policy options beyond foreign arms and protection.

If both sides decide to grow up and act like adults, this may be an opportunity to start walking down that enticing path to a peaceful and prosperous Middle East, shaped heavily by mutually respectful Arabs and Iranians.

Rami G. Khouri is a journalism professor and public policy fellow at the American University of Beirut, nonresident senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and an internationally syndicated columnist.Follow him on Twitter: @ramikhouri This article first appeared in The New Arab.

Copyright ©2018 Rami G. Khouri — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 March 2018
Word Count: 1,311
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Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.
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Two extremely unexpected events occurred regarding the Korean Peninsula in the first week of March 2018. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, offered to meet with President Trump, withdrawing some previous conditions. And President Trump agreed to meet with Leader Kim, withdrawing some previous conditions.

Maybe someone somewhere predicted this would happen. But, if so, I never read it. Now that it has occurred, everyone everywhere is scrambling to interpret it and then to counsel how to react to it. The pundits and politicians are debating: (1) why the two leaders did it, (2) what are its consequences, and (3) will the meeting actually take place?

In the world outside North Korea, some say Kim retreated before Trump’s many voluble threats. A smaller number say the opposite, that Trump retreated before Kim’s many voluble threats. And quite a large number say the threats played at most a secondary role because the real reasons are different.

Some suggest that Kim felt strong enough to reduce his preconditions in order to gain the legitimation his regime has sought and that a meeting would give him. Some suggest that Trump felt strong enough to reduce his preconditions in order to gain him the worldwide recognition as a statesman and great president that he has sought and that a meeting would be likely to gain him.

Of course, some say simply that each thinks he will be able to con the other and has no intention of being serious about a deal. These are views of persons outside North Korea. We really do not know what kind of internal debate is going on in North Korea. I suspect that it is more or less the same debate.

The debate about consequences depends very much on the answers as to the motivations of Kim and Trump. Some see it as the tactical genius of Kim. For these analysts the consequences are negative for the United States because Trump would have surrendered his biggest card to play, non-recognition. Some see it as the tactical genius of Trump. For these analysts the consequences are very positive because they would reduce the opposition of other countries and movements to further punitive actions by Trump.

Finally, the debate on whether the meeting will take place at all depends on the answers given to the previous two questions. If one or the other or both are not serious, then one or the other will call off the meeting. Even if one or the other or both are serious, the meeting still might not take place, as one or the other realize the tactical errors he has made.

Of course, even if the meeting does take place, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the two sides could reduce significantly their very wide differences such that a deal would be consummated. And even if a deal were signed formally by the two, it would remain to be seen how one would verify that the other side was living up to the terms of the deal. Many persons who have been involved in previous negotiations have pointed out how immensely difficult it is to verify compliance.

President Ronald Reagan famously said of a deal with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union “trust but verify.” But there is virtually zero trust between the United States and North Korea. And if on top of that one can’t verify, a so-called deal would be a fool’s paradise.

I have written this text using parallel phrases for Kim and Trump because I believe they are behaving in mirror image of each other. My own guess is that a meeting is unlikely to come to pass, and that each side will draw negative conclusions from this fact.

In that case, this process would then have made the quest for stability of the Korean peninsula more difficult, not less. In my view this would be disastrous, as it might well lead to the war most of us do truly fear.

I do not however think a nuclear war is inevitable by any means. An increased stability (a more accurate phrase than peace) of the Korean peninsula is most likely to result from pressures from below, from all the rest of us. Such pressures need desperately to be organized, which is not yet happening on a large enough scale.

There is in addition one other element that might work in the same direction — the very unpredictable personal decisions of Kim and Trump. They have surprised us this month, and frequently before this. Maybe they will surprise us again.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 March 2018
Word Count: 759
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For rights and permissions, contact:

rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.212.731.0757

Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.
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