I first met Samir in the early 1960s.I had read his early works, and they resonated with me.

I was passing through Dakar and asked if we could meet.
I don’t think he knew who I was or had read any of my writings.

Nevertheless, he graciously invited me to dine with him.
Very few of his admirers worldwide ever mention his graciousness.
For me, it is one of the key elements of his personality.

As soon as we began, we found how close were our views.
We both believed we were living in a capitalist world.
We both felt we had to organize to destroy it.
We both believed that Marxist thought remained essential.
But we both thought it was not a dogma and needed to be updated.

Shortly after that, I met Gunder Frank. He had read a draft of what would become volume I of The Modern World-System.
He was enthusiastic and offered to write a blurb for publication.
Then I met Giovanni Arrighi and found he too shared our views.

Giovanni, Gunder, Samir, and I thus became the so-called Gang of Four. We wrote two books together, in a special format.

Each book contained four individual chapters, giving our views on the topic. The books contained a common introduction that related the premises we shared. There was also a common conclusion indicating our differences.

The intention was to show that we agreed on something important. I’d say this was about 80% of the way. In treating our differences, there were various pairings on all the questions. Samir and I agreed the most.

Samir and I remained in very close contact in the subsequent years. He lived in an airplane circling the globe. I did not have his energy. But I remained always his comrade in the struggle.

There is only one struggle. We must transform the world.

In solidarity\Immanuel

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2018
Word Count: 313
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As long as I can remember, I’ve been a sports fan. As long as I can remember, I’ve been interested in the military. Until recently, I experienced those as two separate and distinct worlds. While I was in the military — I served for 20 years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force — I did, of course, play sports. As a young lieutenant, I was in a racquetball tournament at my base in Colorado. At Squadron Officer School in Alabama, I took part in volleyball and flickerball (a bizarre Air Force sport). At the Air Force Academy, I was on a softball team and when we finally won a game, all of us signed the ball. I also enjoyed being in a military bowling league. I even had my own ball with my name engraved on it.

Don’t misunderstand me. I was never particularly skilled at any sport, but I did thoroughly enjoy playing partly because it was such a welcome break from work — a reprieve from wearing a uniform, saluting, following orders, and all the rest. Sports were sports. Military service was military service. And never the twain shall meet.

Since 9/11, however, sports and the military have become increasingly fused in this country. Professional athletes now consider it perfectly natural to don uniforms that feature camouflage patterns. (They do this, teams say, as a form of “military appreciation.”) Indeed, for only $39.99 you, too, can buy your own Major League Baseball-sanctioned camo cap at MLB’s official site. And then, of course, you can use that cap in any stadium to shade your eyes as you watch flyovers, parades, reunions of service members returning from our country’s war zones and their families, and a multitude of other increasingly militarized ceremonies that celebrate both veterans and troops in uniform at sports stadiums across what, in the post-9/11 years, has come to be known as “the homeland.”

These days, you can hardly miss moments when, for instance, playing fields are covered with gigantic American flags, often unfurled and held either by scores of military personnel or civilian defense contractors. Such ceremonies are invariably touted as natural expressions of patriotism, part of a continual public expression of gratitude for America’s “warfighters” and “heroes.” These are, in other words, uncontroversial displays of pride, even though a study ordered by Republican Senators John McCain and Jeff Flake revealed that the U.S. taxpayer, via the Pentagon, has regularly forked over tens of millions of dollars ($53 million between 2012 and 2015 alone) to corporate-owned teams to put on just such displays.

Paid patriotism should, of course, be an oxymoron. These days, however, it’s anything but and even when the American taxpayer isn’t covering displays like these, the melding of sports and the military should be seen as inappropriate, if not insidious. And I say that as both a lover of sports and a veteran.

I went to a military parade and a tennis match broke out Maybe you’ve heard the joke: I went to the fights and a hockey game broke out. It was meant to poke fun at the fisticuffs in National Hockey League games, though these days there are fewer of them than in the “glory days” of the 1970s. An updated version would, however, fit today’s increasingly militarized sports events to a T: I went to a military parade and a baseball (football, hockey) game broke out.

Nowadays, it seems as if professional sports simply couldn’t occur without some notice of and celebration of the U.S. military, each game being transformed in some way into yet another Memorial Day or Veterans Day lite.

Consider the pro-military hype that surrounded this year’s Major League Baseball All-Star Game. Not so very long ago, when I watched such games I would be transported to my childhood and my fantasies of becoming the next Nolan Ryan or Carl Yastrzemski.

When I watched this year’s version of the game, however, I didn’t relive my youth; I relived my military career. As a start, the previous night featured a televised home-run derby. Before it even began, about 50 airmen paraded out in camouflage uniforms, setting the stage for everything that would follow. (As they weren’t on duty, I couldn’t help wondering why they found it appropriate to don such outfits.) Part of T-Mobile’s “HatsOff4Heroes” campaign, this mini-parade was justified in the name of raising money to support veterans, but T-Mobile could have simply given the money to charity without any of the militarized hoopla that this involved.

Highlighting the other pre-game ceremonies the next night was a celebration of Medal of Honor recipients. I have deep respect for such heroes, but what were they doing on a baseball diamond? The ceremony would have been appropriate on, say, Veterans Day in November.

Those same pre-game festivities included a militaristic montage narrated by Bradley Cooper (star of “American Sniper”), featuring war scenes and war monuments while highlighting the popular catchphrase “freedom isn’t free.” Martial music accompanied the montage along with a bevy of flag-waving images. It felt like watching a twisted version of the film Field of Dreams reshot so that soldiers, not baseball players, emerged early on from those rows of Iowa corn stalks and stepped onto the playing field.

What followed was a “surprise” reunion of an airman, Staff Sergeant Cole Condiff, and his wife and family. Such staged reunions have become a regular aspect of major sporting events — consider this “heart-melting” example from a Milwaukee Brewers game — and are obviously meant to tug at the heartstrings. They are, as retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich wrote at TomDispatch back in 2011, propagandistic versions of “cheap grace.”

In addition, Budweiser used this year’s game to promote “freedom” beer, again to raise money for veterans and, of course, to burnish its own rep. (Last year, the company was hyping “America” beer.)

And the All-Star game is hardly alone in its militarized celebrations and hoopla. Take the 2017 U.S. Open tennis tournament in New York City, which I happened to watch. With John McEnroe in retirement, tennis is, generally speaking, a quieter sport. Yet before the men’s final, a Marine Corps color guard joined a contingent of West Point cadets in a ceremony to remember the victims of 9/11. Naturally, a by-now-obligatory oversized American flag set the scene — here’s a comparable ceremony from 2016 — capped by a performance of “God Bless America” and a loud flyover by four combat jets. Admittedly, it was a dramatic way to begin anything, but why exactly an international tennis match that happened to feature finalists from Spain and South Africa?

Blending sports with the military weakens democracy I’m hardly the first to warn about the dangers of mixing sports with the military, especially in corporate-controlled blenders. Early in 2003, prior to the kick off for the Iraq War (sports metaphor intended), the writer Norman Mailer issued this warning:

“The dire prospect that opens, therefore, is that America is going to become a mega-banana republic where the army will have more and more importance in Americans’ lives… [D]emocracy is the special condition — a condition we will be called upon to defend in the coming years. That will be enormously difficult because the combination of the corporation, the military, and the complete investiture of the flag with mass spectator sports has set up a pre-fascistic atmosphere in America already.”

More than 14 years later, that combination — corporations, the military, and mass spectator sports, all wrapped in a gigantic version of the stars and stripes — has increasingly come to define what it means to be an American. Now that the country also has its own self-styled strongman president, enabled by a spineless Congress and an increasingly reactionary judiciary, Mailer’s mention of a “pre-fascistic atmosphere” seems prescient.

What started as a post-9/11 drive to get an American public to “thank” the troops endlessly for their service in distant conflicts — stifling criticism of those wars by linking it to ingratitude — has morphed into a new form of national reverence. And much credit goes to professional sports for that transformation. In conjunction with the military and marketed by corporations, they have reshaped the very practice of patriotism in America.

Today, thanks in part to taxpayer funding, Americans regularly salute grossly oversized flags, celebrate or otherwise “appreciate” the troops (without making the slightest meaningful sacrifice themselves), and applaud the corporate sponsors that pull it all together (and profit from it). Meanwhile, taking a stand (or a knee), being an agent of dissent, protesting against injustice, is increasingly seen as the very definition of what it means to be unpatriotic. Indeed, players with the guts to protest American life as it is are regularly castigated as SOBs by our sports- and military-loving president.

Professional sports owners certainly know that this militarized brand of patriotism sells, while the version embodied in the kinds of controversial stances taken by athletes like former National Football League quarterback Colin Kaepernick (cashiered by his own league) angers and alienates many fans, ultimately threatening profits.

Meanwhile, the military’s bottom line is recruiting new bodies for that all-volunteer force while keeping those taxpayer dollars flowing into the Pentagon at increasingly staggering levels. For corporations, you won’t be surprised to learn, it’s all about profits and reputation.

In the end, it comes down to one thing: who controls the national narrative.

Think about it. A set of corporate-military partnerships or, if you prefer, some version of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s old military-industrial complex has enlisted sports to make militarism look good and normal and even cool. In other words, sports teams now have a powerful set of incentives to appear patriotic, which increasingly means slavishly pro-military. It’s getting hard to remember that this country ever had a citizen-soldier tradition as well as sports teams whose athletes actually went almost en masse to serve in war. Consider it paradoxical that militarism is today becoming as American as baseball and apple pie, even as, like so many other citizens, today’s athletes vote with their feet to stay out of the military. (The NFL’s Pat Tillman was a noble post-9/11 exception.) Indeed, the widespread (if shallow) support of the military by so many athletes may, in some cases, be driven by a kind of guilt.

“Collusion” is a key word in this Trumpian moment. Even though Robert Mueller isn’t investigating them, corporate-owned sports teams are now actively colluding with the military to redefine patriotism in ways that work to their mutual advantage. They are complicit in taking a select, jingoistic form of patriotism and weaponizing it to suppress dissent, including against the military-industrial complex and America’s never-ending wars.

Driven by corporate agendas and featuring exaggerated military displays, mass-spectator sports are helping to shape what Americans perceive and believe. In stadiums across the nation, on screens held in our hands or dominating our living rooms, we witness fine young men and women in uniform unfurling massive flags on football fields and baseball diamonds, even on tennis courts, as combat jets scream overhead. What we don’t see — what is largely kept from us — are the murderous costs of empire: the dead and maimed soldiers, the innocents slaughtered by those same combat jets.

The images we do absorb and the narrative we’re encouraged to embrace, immersed as we are in an endless round of militarized sporting events, support the idea that massive “national security” investments (to the tune of roughly a trillion dollars annually) are good and right and patriotic. Questioning the same — indeed, questioning authority in any form — is, of course, bad and wrong and unpatriotic.

For all the appreciation of the military at sporting events, here’s what you’re not supposed to appreciate: why we’re in our forever wars; the extent to which they’ve been mismanaged for the last 17 years; how much people, especially in distant lands, have suffered thanks to them; and who’s really profiting from them.

Sports should be about having fun; about joy, passion, and sharing; about the thrill of competition, the splendor of the human condition; and so much more. I still remember the few home runs I hit in softball. I still remember breaking 200 for the first time in bowling. I still remember the faces of my teammates in softball and the fun times I had with good people.

But let’s be clear: This is not what war is all about. War is horrific. War features the worst of the human condition. When we blur sports and the military, adding corporate agendas into the mix, we’re not just doing a disservice to our troops and our athletes; we’re doing a disservice to ourselves. We’re weakening the integrity of democracy in America.

We can afford to lose a ballgame. We can’t afford to lose our country.

William Astore writes regularly for TomDispatch (where this article originated) and is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and history professor who blogs at Bracing Views.

Copyright ©2018 William Astore — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2018
Word Count: 2,117
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BEIRUT — In Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley, fields of lush green spiky-leaved cannabis plants have reached chest height ahead of harvest in September, which will bring in much-needed cash to farmers in the impoverished region who have grown the illegal crop for decades.

Attempts by the Lebanese government to destroy the crops were met with fierce resistance from farmers who show little compunction in taking to arms to protect their livelihoods.

However, Lebanon is mulling the prospect of legalising cannabis cultivation for medicinal purposes, a step that could bring money to the northern Bekaa Valley and reduce lawlessness in the area. It could also deter young Shia men from the Bekaa Valley from joining the Iran-backed Hezbollah if they have an alternative means of earning an income.

While some farmers are optimistic that legalising cannabis would bring much-needed money to the Bekaa, many express cynicism that it will be locals who benefit.

“The politicians will keep the money and we will have nothing. It has always been this way and legalising hashish will not change anything,” said a member of the powerful Jaafar clan and a major hashish farmer from the northern Bekaa.

Lebanon has toyed with the idea of legalising cannabis cultivation for years but it gained traction recently when McKinsey & Company, the global consultancy firm, recommended it as one way of beefing up Lebanon’s cash-strapped economy.

During Lebanon’s civil war years, the plain of the northern Bekaa was awash with cannabis and opium poppies, generating some $500 million a year. After the war ended, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) began an initiative to eradicate drug crops for alternative legal agriculture.

Within a few years, the Bekaa was deemed drug free but pledged funding for the UNDP effort did not materialise in its entirety and the programme fizzled out by 2002.

Lebanon has been beset the multiple political crises and conflicts since 2005 that allowed farmers to return to cannabis cultivation as security forces often had more pressing demands. The northern Bekaa has a strong tribal society in which loyalty to the clan trumps allegiance to the state and farmers do not hesitate to use weapons against the Lebanese authorities.

It is too early to say how the Lebanese government will organise legal cannabis cultivation but it will likely run along similar lines to tobacco in which a farmer is given a licence to grow a certain quantity that will then be purchased by the state at an agreed price.

Much will depend on how the process is governed and policed. The legalisation of cannabis cultivation will likely send black-market prices soaring as the crop is sold to the state at a fixed rate rather than to drug dealers as in the past. While some cannabis is sold domestically, most of it is exported to Europe and the Gulf countries, generating huge profits for the dealers, if not the farmers.

If the price of black-market cannabis escalates significantly due to the reduction of available quantities, it could encourage farmers to grow an additional field of cannabis out of sight to sell to dealers while the authorised crop is sold to the state at a lower rate. It is unclear in a country where corruption is rife whether authorities have the means and will to ensure only licensed crops are grown.

“This is Lebanon. They [the farmers] will find a way to beat the system. A farmer could grow 3 dunams of hashish for the government and around the corner, hidden away, another dunam for himself,” said Abbas, a long-standing cannabis farmer from a village near Baalbek. A dunam is approximately equivalent to 900 square metres.

One party that has yet to publicly comment on the proposal to legalise cannabis is Hezbollah.

The Bekaa Valley is known as the “barracks of Hezbollah” and has been its main recruiting pool since the organisation crystallised in the early 1980s. In recent years, the scale of recruitment has soared as Hezbollah urgently needed combatants to fight in Syria on behalf of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

The traditionally rigorous nature of the recruitment process in which a candidate undergoes an extensive vetting process, intensive religious and ideological studies and thorough military training all lasting more than a year was replaced in some cases with a mere month-long training course at camps in the Bekaa before being dispatched to Syria’s battlefields.

Residents of the Bekaa Valley have long grumbled that Hezbollah uses its political clout to keep the area impoverished so people are dependent on the organisation. A recruit can earn $600 a month and have access to Hezbollah’s extensive social welfare system of schools, hospitals and clinics. That can be a powerful incentive for joining when there is a dearth of other income opportunities.

Hezbollah, however, is beginning to feel a backlash from some quarters of the Bekaa Valley. Although Hezbollah fared well in the elections in May, many Shia residents of the Bekaa refused to vote or chose anti-Hezbollah candidates in a sign of dissatisfaction with the party.

Hezbollah will have to work hard to shore up its support base in the Bekaa, especially with the civil war in Syria beginning to ease and thousands of fighters expected to return to Lebanon.

If — and it remains a big if — cannabis is legalised and a system is introduced that provides comfortable earnings for farmers, it could threaten to chip away at Hezbollah’s recruitment pool and even encourage recently joined fighters to quit the organisation.

Nicholas Blanford is the author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (Random House 2011). He lives in Beirut.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2018
Word Count: 913
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Has Ankara reached an impasse regarding its foreign policy? Once, it had a ‘zero-problems-with-the-neighbours’ policy. That has all but collapsed, leaving Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government with zero options. The overall picture is of a regional power that’s being squeezed by the United States, its NATO ally, and Russia.

The rift in US-Turkish relations over the American Evangelist pastor Andrew Brunson triggered a financial crisis. Now, another crisis looms and this time it involves Russia regarding the Syrian enclave of Idlib. The city, close to the Turkish border, is held by jihadist groups and is targeted by Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime and Russia.

It was only a matter of time for Idlib to be on Moscow’s radar and that of its de facto protectorate, Syria. The Islamic State (ISIS) has been defeated; there have been decisive Syrian advances in Daraa and Eastern Ghouta and a rapprochement is under way between Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime. Assad declared in July that the takeover of Idlib was his next objective.

Idlib, with a population of 2.5 million, has become an urgent issue due to two developments. It is the last bastion of armed jihadist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Jabhat al-Nusra. Many jihadists and their families are in Idlib and some of the foreign jihadists are from Russia. This makes Idlib a priority for Moscow as what it sees as the restoration of Syria speeds up. A joint offensive is likely to be under way before winter.

Idlib is important because any operation there is likely to trigger a massive refugee exodus. Both Russia and Syria — and Iran and the United States, too — see Turkey as the refugees’ inevitable destination. All of them seem to agree that this is largely the result of the Erdogan government’s erratic policies, which paved the way for a jihadist presence in Syria in the first place. If the refugees start to stream out of Idlib, they will add to the nearly 3.5 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey.

Therefore, the Syrian refugee issue is back on the international agenda. Jan Egeland, adviser to the United Nations’ special envoy for Syria, warned Turkey to keep its borders open in the event of another humanitarian crisis. He expressed the hope that Russia, Iran and Turkey would do “their utmost” to avoid a battle in Idlib. So far, no clear signals from Ankara confirm Egeland’s statement.

Moscow is keen on upping the ante against Erdogan. When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visits Ankara on August 13-14, he may remind his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, of the need for Turkey to be part of the Idlib offensive. Indeed, some Arab sources say that Russia has given Turkey a deadline — September — for the disarmament and surrender of HTS in Idlib.

Damascus, on the other hand, is reported to have made clear that it will ask the People’s Protection Units Kurdish militia to help if Ankara doesn’t cooperate militarily on Idlib. This is a cunning diplomatic move.

How will Ankara respond to the pressures from Russia and Syria as the clock ticks down to a denouement? Cavusoglu may try to gain time. He could tell Lavrov that HTS is ripe to be transformed into a more moderate force. There are plans to rebrand the group as the National Liberation Front, to be used in fights against ISIS.

However, the suggestion may not be very convincing and the most that Turkey can expect is to keep its 12 observation posts in Idlib.

Ankara is in a diplomatic cul-de-sac. It is at odds with the United States in the region and now faces a moment of reckoning vis-a-vis Russia. Meanwhile, the Kurds remain a reality near and within Turkey’s borders; a deepening economic crisis makes it increasingly vulnerable and its erratic regional policy makes it difficult to pursue any dialogue that requires trust and steadfastness.

Yavuz Baydar is a senior Turkish columnist, and news analyst. A founding member of the Platform for Independent Journalism (P24) in Istanbul, he has been reporting on Turkey and monitoring media issues since 1980. A European Press Prize Laureate in 2014, he is also the winner of Germany’s ‘Journalistenpreis’ in 2018.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 16 August 2018
Word Count: 647
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“Fair play” has been the motto of FIFA, the world governing body that organises World Cup football tournament — the world’s most popular sporting event.

However, the controversy surrounding Qatar, the host country for the 2022 World Cup, has proven to be anything but fair play. British media reports indicate that Qatari government has bribed FIFA officials and potential host countries’ representatives to swing the vote to host the tournament in Qatar’s favour.

The report published by the Sunday Times in London mentions that Qatar retained the services of top public relations firms as well as former CIA operatives to discredit other contenders, which included the United States, to host the 2022 World Cup.

If Qatar was playing in an active game, it would very likely be issued a red card. Its behaviour towards ensuring it got the 2022 World Cup is bad sportsmanship.

Qatar went through some quite extraordinary hoops to get what it wanted. One of the toughest challenges Qatar faced was the weather in Doha. The World Cup is traditionally played in June and July, summer months. However, in June and July in the Gulf, the temperature averages 45-50 degrees Celsius.

Conditions for the players, constantly running up and down the pitch for the good part of 90 minutes, were unacceptable. Qatari officials convinced FIFA to change the schedule to have the matches take place in November and December, the coolest time of the year in the Gulf.

That presented two immediate problems. First, the weather, while significantly milder in Doha in December than in July, the humidity remains quite high, so the Qataris said they would install air conditioning in all stadiums. Imagine the electric bill on that one.

Second, shifting the tournament to late in the calendar year caused concern for European clubs that will be forced to shift their league schedules to factor in the World Cup. That raises fears that this could affect some of the top league players. However, with the resources allocated to the project, it appears the Qataris can find any solution that money can buy. But for how long? There is mounting pressure for FIFA to revisit the 2022 bid from Qatar.

Football is huge around the world. In many countries it is more than a sport and akin to a religion.

There is much at stake here. FIFA is big business. It is big money and big prestige for the country that wins the nomination to host the most-watched sporting event in the world. The World Cup finals commands an audience that reaches into the billions of viewers.

Figures compiled by FIFA state:

• 5,154,386 people attended FIFA Fan Fests in Brazil during the World Cup 2014, with Rio de Janeiro’s spectacular Copacabana site attracting 937,330 — the highest number in any individual city.

• $7.2 billion in tax revenue shall be received by Brazil through investments in the 2014 World Cup.

• 3,429,873 was the total attendance for the 64 matches, the highest recorded at any World Cup since 1994. The average crowd of 53,592 at one match was the highest in two decades.

• 3,240 footballs, including training and match balls, were used during the tournament.

• 3,127,674 food and beverage transactions took place at the stadiums over the course of the competition.

• 90 countries were visited during the 267-day FIFA World Cup Trophy Tour, with 45 heads of state and 33 previous World Cup winners among those to get their hands on the trophy.

• 1 billion-plus was the attendance on FIFA’s Global Stadium, FIFA.com’s social, online and mobile hub throughout Brazil in 2014.

For the players, playing for their national team is very prestigious notch in their profession belt. For individual countries making it to the World Cup is equally prestigious, as only 32 countries make the final selection, although the World Cup will expand to 48 teams, perhaps as soon as 2022.

For those selected, aside from the prestige, making it to the finals revives a sort of primal sense of tribal loyalty. For the host country, there is the financial reward from the tens of thousands of fans who travel to the host country to watch the matches.

One Peru fan sold his apartment, his car and all his belongings to get enough money to go watch his team play in Moscow.

Making it to the World Cup has important repercussions on the country’s internal politics as has been seen with the multi-ethnic French team.

With all that in mind, it becomes a little clearer as to what might drive the tiny emirate of Qatar. What it may lack size, Qatar makes up in ego.

The ball appears to still be in Qatar’s court, though there is time left on the clock. The sad tales of Qatari unsportsmanlike behaviour are a legitimate source of concern.

Claude Salhani is a regular columnist for The Arab Weekly.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 August 2018
Word Count: 804
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This is the question that all anti-Trump individuals and groups are asking today, loudly and regularly. They are hoping of course for a positive answer, but they are not sure they will get one.

This is the question that Trump supporters and Republican politicians are asking in private, seeking reassurance that the answer is negative.

This question is debated as well by Democratic politicians, hoping to get a positive answer. They discuss it more publicly however than their Republican counterparts.

This is the question that most analysts seeking an answer un-influenced by political preference find it almost impossible at this point to give an answer that they do not hedge by pointing to multiple uncertainties.

But this is also the question to which individuals, groups, and politicians of all stripes and all levels of activity have to draw a conclusion fairly soon if they wish to achieve their objectives in the relatively short run. Most particularly, as the November 2018 elections in the United States approach, they find it harder and harder to evade a firm answer.

Finally, this is the question about which decision-makers in other countries also have to make a choice, or risk having the choice made for them and, as a result, one not to their liking.

In short, this is an impossible, but also inescapable question. In fact, the month of July 2018 has been a very bad month for Donald Trump, and leads me to suggest the ways in which his future is far less rosy than he would expect and wish. The person who probably agrees the most with this statement, but very privately, is Donald Trump himself.

One public issue for a long time now has been whether the Russian government intervened in some way in the U.S. elections of 2016, acting to aid him to become president. And, if they did, did Trump know of this and did he “collude” with their actions?

Several things in July made the situation worse for Trump. There was a very negative reaction to the fact of Trump’s one-on-one meeting; that it occurred at all, that Trump’s description of Russia’s President Putin seemed so sympathetic, and that Trump seemed to believe Putin more than he believed his own intelligence personnel.

The reaction was so strong and so swift that Trump backtracked on what he said and how he said it. He then undid the backtracking by inviting Putin to visit the United States. He again got a strong popular reaction because he seemed to be re-asserting confidence in Putin.

He then backtracked on the invitation, remitting discussion about it to a post-2018 electoral moment. The confusion caused by these back and forth statements increased the numbers within various constituencies who had previously been ready to give Trump the benefit of the doubt to cease doing so.

Worse yet, Trump’s repeated claim that a collusion with the Russians was fake news was suddenly confronted by hard data. Trump’s formerly ultra-loyal lawyer, Michael Cohen, secretly taped his conversations with Trump.

They seem to show Trump’s awareness of payoffs to prostitutes who have asserted he slept with them over a long period. Cohen is no longer willing to pay the price of a loyalty that is not reciprocated.

In this same month, Trump attended the NATO meeting of heads of state and government. He attacked openly almost all U.S. traditional allies. He threatened withdrawal from NATO if they didn’t conform to his demands.

Once again, uncertainty abounded as to what he would do. The European Union (EU) responded by entering into a very large common market arrangement with Japan, formerly one of the surest allies of the United States. Similarly, Canada responded to Trump’s tariffs with counter-tariffs, as did various West European countries. This exacerbated tensions within the EU between the “old” members and the now very nationalist East European members. But the East Europeans were not sure they could rely on Trump to defend them against perceived threats from Russia.

The tariffs also upset two U.S. groups of importance. One was the farmers whose products were directly affected by the counter-tariffs and also by the increased price of their products where they were still allowed to be sold without tariffs.

Trump was forced to allot funds to aid the farmers. This however was seen by the farmers as a short-run measure that would not hold over the longer run. And the short-term payments upset the ultra-right factions in the Republican Party. Trump was finding himself besieged on several fronts at once. And these various groups were less sure than ever that they could count on Trump to emphasize their primary concerns.

At this point, Trump very unexpectedly met with Jean-Claude Juncker speaking for the EU. They agreed to postpone any and all new tariffs until after the 2018 elections.

In effect, Trump abandoned for the moment the most serious action he had intended to make. In return, he received a very minor concession by the EU on soybeans. Trump proclaimed victory. To me it reads like a defeat, one that Trump had to paint in a different color.

If all this were not worry enough, a federal judge allowed a suit dangerous for Trump to continue in court. This suit argued that the so-called emoluments clause of the Constitution designed to counter corruption was being violated by the profits and advantages Trump was receiving through his properties, when these properties were used by foreign governments.

The suit will go on for many years. But the effect of this will be to force Trump as part of his defense to reveal much of his personal income, as well as that of his family. It could also force the release of Trump’s tax returns.

Meanwhile, he maintains that the denuclearization of North Korea is proceeding well. However, all that he has to show for it is the return of some remains of bodies lost during the war.

In Iran, Trump is still threatening war, and says he intends to renounce the agreement signed by the United States, despite the fact that the terms of the agreement are less porous than anything he hopes to get North Korea to sign.

Will Trump actually engage in military action? Even the Israelis are doubtful, as they attempt to create a situation that will force him to cease waffling. Bluffing in foreign policy is not a winning proposition. It reveals weakness, something Trump abhors.

The most positive result for Trump may be a negative one. He decided to enter the Republican primaries and endorse candidates, who then had to compete for Trump’s favor. His endorsement has made it possible for some ultra-right candidates to win. Many analysts, including it seems Republican establishment figures, worry that, as a consequence, the Democratic candidate for senator or representative or governor will win.

The bottom line is that the real actions of all the actors will be based on an appreciation of Trump’s strength and not his rhetoric. In July 2018 Trump was loud in rhetoric and hesitant in action. In another month or two, if this continues (and there is every likelihood it will), the negatives will overwhelm the pretense.

The final question then will be: if Trump is indeed in trouble, who will benefit?

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 August 2018
Word Count: 1,209
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The streets of Amman today appear calm and everyone seems to be going about their business as usual. But just two months ago, the country faced massive protests which mirrored others it had seen before. The script of the May-June events developed along the usual lines: public protests over price increases made the king dismiss the government, freeze price increases, name a new prime minister, and ask for fresh reforms.

For the past 40 years, such events have recurred regularly, while Jordan’s major problems remained the same: corruption, unemployment, poverty, poor government services, and increasingly difficult living conditions for middle and lower-income Jordanians who make up the majority of the population.

In that time, the state adjusted its fiscal policies to accommodate growing public spending. It reduced subsidies and raised taxes and fees, which the citizenry grudgingly accepted, even after short-lived protests. This time, though, the situation is very different, and the same old government response will not work, because the scale, depth, and consequences of Jordan’s economic stresses are unprecedented.

The May-June events represent a broad-based, nationwide popular tax rebellion that, unlike past demonstrations, brought together all sectors of society — poor and middle-income people, professionals and private businesspeople, men and women, young and old, rural and urban folk, and Jordanians of all ethnic and geographic origins.

After former Prime Minister Hani Mulki had proposed in early May reforms to address a multiyear economic adjustment plan agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors, it became clear that the government had pushed past the limit of what citizens could bear financially or accept politically.

Jordanians are and feel poor after years of gradual austerity, according to the soon-to-be-published 2016 data from the Arab Barometer survey. This shows that only 35 percent of Jordanians can meet their families’ needs without difficulty, while 64 percent face difficulty or cannot meet their expenses. At the same time, the state has exhausted existing ways to raise enough revenue to cover its core current expenses of salaries and loan interest payments.

The Mulki government had to increase taxes for 2019 because the country faced bankruptcy if no extra income were found to bolster state coffers. This reflected Jordan’s tighter situation the past few years when it could not easily obtain the high levels of foreign grants, loans, and guarantees that it had secured over previous decades.

Yet the state’s recent fiscal performance has been impressive in many ways. Between 2012 and 2017, according to IMF data and interviews with several former officials who dealt with these issues, domestic income from taxes and fees increased from covering 67 to 95 percent of current expenditures (this covers loan interest payments, but does not cover loan principal repayments, which annually require billions of grant dollars).

The May tax measures and price rises aimed to close that last five percent gap, and set Jordan on a sustainable growth path that would see new jobs created and incomes increase – or so the theory of economic adjustment said. But the theory did not account for falling standards of living, recent slowing down of economic growth, and rising expenses which have brought the general population to the brink.

The Jordanian people made it clear that they refuse to accept more austerity, when they feel they have no say in political decisions, corruption remains unchecked, and the political elite continues to enrich itself.

How to introduce meaningful changes The new Jordanian government must respond with simultaneous meaningful changes in four areas: expand real citizen participation in the top-heavy political system, jolt the weak economy onto a growth path, reduce polarisation between rich and poor, and reduce the chronic need for large-scale foreign aid grants (which is the basic aim of the IMF plan that is being implemented).

New Prime Minister Omar al-Razzaz’ government got the message. In its policy statement it promised the parliament to act in its first 100 days on a wide range of issues, including corruption, a national dialogue on “tax justice”, improving health, water, transport, and other public services, and opening direct electronic communication channels with citizens.

The $3bn emergency aid that came into the treasury this summer gives Razzaz some breathing space to formulate new policies that bridge the massive gap between the state’s fiscal needs and the citizens’ demand for political dignity and material well-being.

One of his biggest challenges is citizens’ large distrust in his government and the system, in general. Recent polls by the respected local NAMA Consultants and the University of Jordan Strategic Studies Center indicate a steady decline in how citizens view the government’s track record in serving the people — from around 65 percent in 2011 to just 35 percent today. Equally troubling are Arab Barometer findings that a large majority, 79 percent, feel that corruption exists in state institutions, and the two biggest concerns of Jordanians are the economy and corruption.

The demonstrators from all walks of life took to the streets because they all felt that none of these issues were being equitably addressed in the Mulki government proposals. Rebuilding citizen trust in political institutions will require both economic and political measures in a genuinely consultative context, rather than the usual top-down edicts from the government or benevolent gestures from the monarchy.

What would ordinary citizens see as signs of success that promise to improve their lives? These could include a more egalitarian tax law, social services improvements, more serious anti-corruption measures, and genuine citizen-state consultations that reduce the pervasive polarisation and marginalisation that are among Jordan’s biggest threats today.

The Razzaz government must do this while it reduces the state’s steep fiscal pressures. For example, the national debt-to-GDP ratio has risen in recent years to 95 percent, instead of declining, but should start to drop in 2019, according to the IMF. The economy has slowed to just two percent average annual growth, which is below the population growth rate. Citizens who already suffer low living standards cannot withstand more chunks of their low incomes being grabbed by new taxes (85 percent of Jordanians make less than $720 per month, according to existing wage labour data at state institutions).

Only about five percent of Jordanians pay income tax, which the economic adjustment programme aims to increase to 11 percent, while also lowering the thresh-hold for tax exemptions. The Mulki measures announced in May would have increased the financial burden on most Jordanians, due to the combined tax increases, lower taxable thresh-holds, less tax evasion, higher indirect taxes, fewer subsidies, and other related measures.

Because nearly 80 percent of the state budget covers salaries, pensions, and debt service payments, and about half of all employed citizens depend on the state for their wages and pensions, the state has little room to lower expenditures. The agreed government-IMF programme anticipates the need to raise nearly $2bn every year in foreign loans or grants to cover repayment of debt principal, which requires huge Arab and international aid that is often exacerbated by current political conditions in the region.

This is the most serious challenge of King Abdullah’s reign, because along with the domestic economic/political stresses, several senior analysts and former officials said in interviews, it might include a controversial new foreign policy twist: In return for long-term cash-aid, Saudi Arabia and the US might pressure a vulnerable Jordan to join their “deal of the century” proposal on Palestine-Israel, which Jordan has resisted to date.

The king has not indicated how he plans to reconcile these conflicting demands, beyond broad generalities in his letter appointing Razzaz. The demands of his restless citizens include political reforms based on genuine participation and accountability, which have been rare in the entire Arab region’s recent history.

Jordan is not moving towards a constitutional monarchy — this is not a serious populist demand, in any case — but neither can it continue doing business as usual. Forced by the circumstances of its difficult external shocks in energy imports, war-closed borders, lower transit trade, and erratic Arab budget support, along with its own domestic political and economic mismanagement, Jordan must soon indicate its direction. Will it boldly make the structural political and economic changes its citizens seem to seek, but that all other Arab states have furiously resisted? Or will it remain hobbled in the shaky authoritarian bargain of the corruption-riddled rentier states that dot the Arab landscape?

Decisions made in the coming six months will be crucial to the future of Jordan, and perhaps a sign of the future of other Arab states.

Rami G Khouri is a senior public policy fellow and journalism professor at the American University of Beirut. This article originated at Al Jazeera.com

Copyright ©2018 Rami G. Khouri — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 31 July 2018
Word Count: 1,413
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On July 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known by his initials as AMLO, was elected President of Mexico by a sweeping margin. He won 53% of the votes. His closest rivals were Ricardo Anaya (of PAN) with 22% and José Antonio Meade (of PRI) with 16 percent. In addition, his party alliance, MORENA, won a majority of the seats in the legislature.

His victory has been compared to that of Lula in Brazil and that of Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain. But Lula did not come near having a majority of the votes, and his broad party alliance included reactionary groups. Corbyn is still struggling to maintain control of the British Labour Party and, even if he succeeds, faces a difficult election.

AMLO by contrast has probably the largest margin of victory ever of any contender in a multiparty relatively honest election. He will have no trouble remaining in power in the single six-year term permitted by the Mexican constitution.

So, why only two cheers? A look at Mexico’s history will clarify my reserve. The so-called Mexican Revolution of 1910 overthrew an oppressive and very undemocratic regime, which is why it is seen as the beginning of the modern state in Mexico. It did not, however, result in relative peace and stability. Quite the contrary! The two decades after that saw constant violent struggles between various armed militias, none of which were able to prevail.

However, following the assassination of a major candidate for the presidency, a de facto arrangement was able to bring about a certain degree of stability and greatly reduce the violence. The party that guaranteed this relative stability went through name changes and eventually became called the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI.

The system PRI evolved was based on Mexico’s constitutional requirement of an election every six years on July 1. The incumbent could have only one term. His successor was chosen by a behind-the-scenes negotiation among PRI leaders. The actual election was in effect a formality. With the exception of one politically radical period from 1936 to 1942, the PRI system of arranged elections resulted in governments with highly corrupt elites and ones that had little to offer to the bottom third to half the population.

The PRI system eventually reached a point of high popular discontent. It led to the emergence of a major challenger in the end of the twentieth century called the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). PAN was built on a Catholic base that was reacting to Mexico’s and PRI’s strong anticlerical program.

PAN won the election in 2000, thereby ending PRI’s monopoly of office. In addition to PRI and PAN there emerged also a social-democratic party called the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Mexico had now become a country of competitive elections. How much difference this make? Not all that much.

AMLO ran as the PRD candidate in 2012 but was cheated out of his majority. He fought hard against the “false” winner, but with little support from the PRD. AMLO now built his struggle for power out of a rejection of all three major parties.

Why wasn’t he similarly cheated in 2018? The 2012-2018 PRI government used extreme violence against the opposition. They shot and killed student protestors. This led to widespread uprisings from underneath that made it impossible for PRI to cheat the results once again.

AMLO put forth a truly left program. He ran on a platform of significant increase in material distribution to the very large poor underclass. He called for the ending of the so-called pensiones by means of which enormous sums were paid to ex-presidents. AMLO was advocating instead pensiones for the poor. This is where his program was similar to that of Lula with his Bolsa familiar and his Hambre cero. The difference is that AMLO cannot be ousted from power, as was Lula.

AMLO calls his proposal nini (neither nor). For those that are neither students nor workers, who constitute a very large group of young people. He calls for payments to them to survive while they obtain the skills through government programs that will make them employable.

The Latin American left has hailed AMLO’s election, seeing in his victory a possibility of re-igniting the so-called pink tide in Latin America that had had many reverses in the last decade. The United States is clearly worried and unhappy. Trump is already trying to co-opt AMLO.

I too hail AMLO’s victory. But I worry about the fact that, unlike Lula, he has shown little taste for becoming a Latin American and not merely a Mexican leader. He is in a very strong position in Mexico for the moment, but not one impervious to counter-pressures. He cannot really do it alone. He needs the Latin American left just as they need him. We shall have to see how he navigates negotiations over NAFTA.

Finally, just like all popular leaders who have fought hard and successfully to come to power, I wonder how much he reflects on the limitations of being a charismatic figure. Too much self-assurance has been the downfall of many a leftist populist leader. Nor has AMLO indicated much tolerance in the past for those who question the prudence of some of what he does.

So, two cheers yes — loud ones, with hope for the best.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 July 2018
Word Count: 885
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A prestidigitator is a public actor who seeks to make viewers believe that what they see is what he is really doing, but it is not. In the famous example, he saws the woman in half and then he shows you that she is still in one piece — due, he claims, to his exceptional magical skill.

Donald Z. Trump is an extremely talented prestidigitator. Using his constant flow of contradictory tweets and his ceaseless use of insults, both his core supporters and his fiercest opponents think they know what he is doing. But in fact they fail to observe the actual actions of Donald G. Trump.

He is said to be a megalomaniac who has little self-control. These characteristics are said to account for the fact that Donald V. Trump is constantly reversing his public positions. But this is misleading. Donald B. Trump is pursuing single-mindedly a program of destroying what he does not like and furthering what he does like.

Donald M. Trump tells his core supporters that he is fulfilling his promises to end or curtail very severely all migration to the United States, especially by Muslims and Latin@s. Their belief that he is doing this accounts for the passionate and virtually unlimited political support they give him. He has however accomplished very little about migration and doesn’t really care about it.

He is prestidigitating and is able to use this rightwing support to maintain a significant amount of support from centrist voters by projecting an image of moderation compared to still more outspoken purveyors of rightwing policies. He is however not at all moderate in his actions. He simply seeks to persuade the viewer of his moderate credentials.

Since Donald L. Trump is prestidigitating simultaneously with two strongly opposed bodies of voters, he gives the impression of inconsistency or instability. However, the reality is the opposite.

When Donald W. Trump is uncertain how to play the immediate game, he falls back on his standard complaint about fake news in the media. He shouts that the hostile media cannot even get his middle initial right. This is the utmost in prestidigitation because it is he who constantly uses a different middle initial.

Can this go on forever? He faces the dilemma of every magician — that someone reveals publicly the secret of his magic. He is particularly virulent when he believes exposure is imminent.  When magic is convincingly exposed as trickery, the prestidigitator loses all credibility and must take the first freight train out of town. Until then complaining about fake news sustains the game.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 July 2018
Word Count: 427
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An institution called the G-7 held its annual meeting on June 12-13, 2018 in Charlevoix, Quebec, Canada. President Trump attended in the beginning but left early. Because the views on both sides were so incompatible, the group of Six members negotiated with Trump the issuance of a quite anodyne statement as the usual joint declaration.

Trump changed his mind and refused to sign any statement. The Six then drafted a statement that reflected their views. Trump was angry and insulted the protagonists of signing the statement

This was interpreted by the world press as a reciprocal political snub by Trump and the six other heads of state and government that attended. Most commentators also argued that this political battle signaled the end of the G-7 as a significant player in world politics

But what is the G-7? Who invented the idea? And for what purpose? Nothing is less clear. The name of the institution itself has constantly changed, as have the number of members. And many argue that there have emerged more important meetings, such as that of the G-20 or the G-2. There is also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that was founded in opposition to the G-7, and which excludes both the United States and west European countries.

The first clue to the origins of the G-7 as concept is the dating of the birth of the G-7 idea. It was early in the 1970s. Before that time, there was no institution in which the United States played a role as an equal participant with other nations.

Remember that after the end of the Second World War and up to the 1960s the United States had been the hegemonic power of the modern world-system. It invited to international meetings whom it wished for reasons of its own. The purpose of such meetings was primarily in order to implement policies the United States thought wise or useful – for itself.

By the 1960s the United States could no longer act in such an arbitrary way. There had begun to be resistance to unilateral arrangements. This resistance was the evidence that the decline of the U.S. as a hegemonic power had begun.

To retain its central role, the United States therefore changed its strategy. It sought ways in which it could at least slow down this decline. One of the ways was to offer certain major industrialized powers the status of “partner” in world decision-making. This was to be a trade-off. In return for promotion to the status of partners, the partners would agree to limit the degree to which they would stray from policies the United States preferred.

One could argue therefore that the G-7 idea was something invented by the United States as part of this new partnership arrangement. On the other hand, a key moment in the historical development of the G-7 idea was the moment of the first annual summit of the top leaders, as opposed to meetings of lower ranking figures like ministers of finance. The initiative for this came not from the United States but from France.

It was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then France’s President, who convened the first annual meeting of the top leaders at Rambouillet in France in 1975. Why did he think it so important that there be a meeting of the top leaders? One possible explanation was that he saw it as a way of further limiting U.S. power. Faced with negotiating with the set of other leaders, each of which had different priorities, the United States would be constrained to bargain. And since it was the top leaders who signed off on the bargain, it would be harder for any of them to repudiate it later.

Rambouillet began a struggle between the United States and various European powers (but especially France) over all the major world issues. It was a struggle in which the United States did less and less well. It was seriously rebuffed in 2003 when it found itself unable, for the first time in history, to gain even a majority of votes in the U.N. Security Council when they were to vote on the invasion of Iraq by the United States. And this year, in Charlevoix, it found itself unable even to agree to a banal joint statement with the other six members of the G-7.

The G-7 is for all intents and purposes finished. But should we mourn this? The struggle for power between the United States and the others was basically a struggle for primacy in oppressing the rest of the world’s nations. Would these smaller powers be better off if the European mode of doing this won out? Does a small animal care which elephant tramples on it? I think not.

All hail Charlevoix! Trump may have done us all the favor of destroying this last major remnant of the era of Western domination of the world-system. Of course, the demise of the G-7 will not mean that the struggle for a better world is over. Not at all. Those who back a system of exploitation and hierarchy will simply look for other ways of doing it.

This brings me back to what is now my central theme. We are in a structural crisis of the modern world-system. A battle is going on as to which version of a successor system we shall see. Everything is very volatile at the moment. Each side is up one day, down the next. We’re in a sense lucky that Donald Trump is so foolish as to hurt his own side with a massive blow. But let us not cheer therefore Pierre Trudeau or Emmanuel Macron, whose more intelligent version of oppression is fighting Trump.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 June 2018
Word Count: 947
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