BOSTON — It has taken only a few days since the strong Democratic Party win in last week’s congressional and gubernatorial elections for political debate here in the United States to focus sharply on a revised, withdrawal-oriented, policy in Iraq as a pressing national priority. Nobody has a clear, credible answer to the question that everyone is asking: What should the United States do in Iraq now?

I have been lecturing and meeting with university students and community groups throughout the United States during the past five weeks, and this is the single most common issue that comes up for discussion, yet always without a satisfactory answer. Precipitously withdrawing the 145,000 American troops would probably plunge Iraq into further chaos, destruction and suffering, while having them remain moves things in the same direction: a Texas-size and -vintage dilemma.

The first obvious conclusion from this predicament is one that few people dare speak openly in the United States: Sending your army half way around the world to break a political order and remake it in your own image is not only imperial behavior, but amateurish and fanciful imperialism at that. Ordinary Americans have acknowledged the mistake to some extent, and may now help their political leaders learn from the experience. For the American citizenry that asked for a change in political tone and policy in Washington, the focus was not primarily Iraq; rather, Iraq was only the most glaring example of the wider problem of arrogance, corruption, incompetence and a brazen, bullying ideological swagger that have come to define this Republican administration, at home and abroad.

Many fine minds and a few lingering dangerous charlatans now focus on how the United States should get out of the mess it has created for itself and the Middle East. I humbly suggest that a more thorough and integrated analysis of the U.S problem in Iraq should assess broad principles as much as immediate particularities. My sense of the principles involved is that five major priority issues must be addressed in Iraq now, and they are all related in one way or another:

1. Security on the ground, meaning regional political terror, the domestic insurgency and common criminality;

2. Economic progress and delivery of basic services to the citizenry, such as clean water, health care and electricity;

3. A constitutional agreement on a legitimate, decentralized national government system that shares power and oil revenues among the country’s main groups;

4. The full security and political impact of the foreign military presence;

5. The role of Iraq’s neighbors, especially Syria and Iran, both of which are threatened, sanctioned, targeted and pressured by the United States these days.

Resolving the Iraq mess with a minimum of further damage requires acknowledging the real relationship among these five issues — rather than working according to the political dictates of now increasingly discredited but still operative neo-conservative ideological zealots in Washington. The order of priorities to bring Iraq back to eventual normalcy over the coming year requires at its core a national constitutional accord that allows a legitimate government to assert itself throughout the land, based on negotiated power-sharing among the principal groups. This will not happen until the key Iraqi political groups have a sense that the foreign troops are starting soon to leave , and that the United States and UK do not plan to maintain long-term military bases in Iraq. The desired operative link between foreign troops and a legitimate, effective Iraqi government is that an effective Iraqi government will emanate from the withdrawal of foreign troops.

A legitimate national government in Iraq is the only force that can quell the insurgency and terrorism, and restore security. The American tendency to throw more troops at the security problem only makes the problem worse, because the insurgency, the terrorism, the criminality and the slow unraveling of the national fabric are largely a consequence of the military assault that shattered the former order — as terrible as that order was. Once the foreign troops are on their way out, even gradually, and a credible Iraqi government based on a constitutional accord asserts itself and reduces insecurity, economic growth and basic services can then be improved.

A newly re-legitimized and reinvigorated Iraqi government — not dizzy White House fantasy-peddlers — could then negotiate mutually satisfying relations with neighbors. One of the current frenzies in Washington is that the United States can get out of this mess by engaging the neighbors of Iraq. How that will happen when the United States simultaneously threatens and sanctions Syria and Iran, and refuses to talk to them, is not clear or coherent, like so many other things in Washington related to the Middle East.

A good starting point for the Washington crowd now actively reassessing Iraq policy is to be humble and honest, and accept the fundamental mistake of romantically using the military to rearrange despotic lands far away. The answer to the American dilemma is not with engaging the neighbors or sending more troops. It’s in understanding the age-old, strained relationship between foreign armies and local hearts.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 15 November 2006
Word Count: 840
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BOSTON — Change is coming soon to U.S. policy in the Middle East. The neo-conservatives in Washington who defined American foreign policy in the past six years were down before the elections November 7, and they are now well on the way out. The common sense of ordinary Americans has reasserted itself over the reckless militaristic bravado of neo-con-driven policies, which manifested themselves primarily in the Middle East.

During my past five weeks of travel, study and work in the United States, it has been obvious from talks with Americans from many different walks of life that the citizenry here is deeply disenchanted with the policies of President Bush, which it finally repudiated in this election. Iraq played the prominent role in the elections, and it will get the most attention. But the changing nature of the Middle East and its many inter-linked conflicts means that any American policy shift in Iraq must necessarily involve other major issues in the region where the United States is involved.

I count at least a dozen major issues that require attention and are related to one another, and to U.S. policies: Palestine-Israel; internal Lebanese politics and the status of Hizbullah; Lebanese-Syrian relations and the conclusion of the investigation and trials related to the killing of Rafik Hariri; Lebanese-Israeli issues and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701; Iraq in all its dimensions; Iran’s nuclear industry; terrorism; weapons of mass destruction proliferation; promoting democracy and the rule of law; improving socio-economic conditions; meeting the political and economic aspirations of the region’s burgeoning youth population; and, engaging the growing Islamist movements throughout the region.

In most of these issues, the self-interested view from within the United States is not a happy one. Washington in recent years has steadily lost influence in the region and, more importantly, has lost friends and allies. The majority of people in the region strongly oppose U.S. policies, and are standing up and making themselves heard by resisting and defying Washington (and Israel) in various ways.

Iran and Syria are the state leaders in the loose anti-American coalition of forces that can conveniently be called the defiance front. Their allies include Hizbullah and Hamas, Islamic Brotherhood-type movements in many countries, and even some Arab nationalist and democratic movements that see Israeli-American hegemony or occupation as their main immediate concerns and long-term threats.

Syria, Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas and associated political forces throughout the Middle East touch on every single one of the 12 issues mentioned above, and can be helpful or obstructive on any and all of them. One of the consequences of U.S.-Israeli policies over the past several decades has been to give birth to this new informal coalition of forces, parties, armed resistance movements and governments that is significant because it transcends the four main divides that define the region and countries within it: Sunni-Shiite, Iranian-Arab, secular-religious, and Arab nationalist-Islamist.

This should come as no surprise, because the laws of politics and physics alike teach us that aggression begets resistance. Israel’s harsh and prolonged occupation policies ultimately gave birth to the anti-occupation resistance movements: Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon. Similarly, the American military move into Iraq, along with associated, neo-con-driven threats and sanctions against Syria, Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas, have sparked the widespread political resistance and defiance to Washington that we witness today.

Any interested foreign country that attempts to address one of the key issues in the Middle East must necessarily deal with the others. For example, Hizbullah’s status as a resistance movement (or “armed militia” in official American parlance), cannot be addressed coherently without considering the interests of Palestine, Syria, and Iran. It would be difficult to try and move quickly on Arab-Israeli negotiated peace agreements without resolving the internal Lebanese situation or Syrian-Lebanese relations.

The Bush administration in the past two years has quietly and gradually sidelined the key neo-conservative personalities who defined foreign policy after 9/11. The United States now moves into a new post-election phase of foreign policy-making that is defined by three significant factors:
• The slightly hysterical and often militant neo-con-driven foreign policy in the Middle East will be more rationally formulated now by the team of Stephen Hadley at the National Security Council, Condoleezza Rice at the State Department and Robert Gates at the Defense Department.
• The United States will look for new approaches to getting out of Iraq without leaving that country and surrounding areas in chronic war, which will necessitate new approaches to Palestine-Israel, Syria, Iran and other key players.
• The Iraq Study Group, headed by the sober team of Lee Hamilton and James Baker, will soon recommend new policy approaches that Bush and his government will be able to adopt without losing face.

The urgency of a new Iraq policy and the inter-linkages with the other big issues in the region mean that change in U.S. foreign policy throughout the region is inevitable in the near future. The alternative would be to continue existing trends, which is the worst option for all concerned, inside the region and abroad.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 10 November 2006
Word Count: 840
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BOSTON — There was an appropriate irony to the fact that the day after Saddam Hussein was found guilty and sentenced to death for his murder and torture of many Iraqis, the former American ruler of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, published a commentary in the Wall Street Journal applauding this show of justice and rule of law in a land once terrorized by Baathist dictators. The irony stems from the juxtaposition of these two very different men who shared a common terrible legacy: Their rule of Iraq resulted in mass human suffering amidst systematic violence.

These American and Iraqi rulers of Iraq are cut from very different cloth, and used very different motives and means to pursue their policies. Bremer’s assertion that “America did a noble deed in liberating Iraq from this evil man” will long be debated around the world, but it will not change the hard realities in Iraq today. The verdict of history and time in due course will be passed on both of these men and their peculiar reigns. In their own very different ways, they reflect the dire convergence of the two most destructive forces that have plagued the Middle East in modern times: Arab despotism and Western militarism. Pain, fear and injustice come in many forms.

Paul Bremer and Saddam Hussein are the epitomes of that tradition, despite their dissimilarities. Bremer drove Iraq into the ground and sparked terrible internal conflict and mass suffering in the name of a noble mission to promote democracy, freedom and the rule of law. His motives and those of his country for Iraq were lofty, idealistic, and slightly romantic, but always well intentioned — if we give them the benefit of the doubt and take them at their word.

Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Party rule in Iraq was an evil display of systematic human cruelty and institutionalized repression. The overthrow of that regime has exposed the full extent of its torture and violence against its own citizens. It is clear that most Iraqis are pleased with the overthrow of that regime and the court trial of Hussein and his top officials.

Yet history is measured in consequence as well as motive. The consequence of the American-led military removal of the Baathist regime in Iraq has been costly indeed, in terms of tens of thousands of dead and injured, and hundreds of thousands of displaced. The country is wracked by chronic violence that is now stoked by internal ethnic and religious feuds.

The coherence of Iraq as a country is somewhat in question, and if it breaks up as a unified state the repercussions in the region could be momentous. The growing strength and influence of Iran is another consequence of U.S. policy in Iraq, with unclear implications for the region and the world. Terror in Iraq merely changed place with the transfer of power from Saddam Hussein to Paul Bremer; instead of the state terrorizing its people as happened under Hussein’s rule, terror is now used by a variety of Iraqi and other Arab factions seeking to throw out the Americans, take control of the government, and hurt rival communities.

Bremer in his commentary this week, like the George W. Bush administration’s policies in recent years, would have us judge the American proclamation of liberty in contrast with the Baathist legacy of despotism and torture. There is no possible debate if the issue is framed in this way. Liberty will always be the preferred choice. But is this the correct frame? Or is it more useful to ask if the consequences of Arab autocracy have been more or less terrible than the consequences of Western militarism?

The more useful question that Bremer and others should ask is: Can Western power be used more effectively and legitimately, working with like-minded Arabs, to gradually erase the tradition of Arab autocracy and police-states? This is more relevant than ever, because many Arab autocrats remain in power and continue to torment their citizens.

It is unclear if incumbent Arab autocrats feel more secure or less secure these days, in light of the Iraq precedent. The American experience in Iraq suggests that more such regime changes are unlikely to occur through the medium of the American armed forces. At the same time, American support for Arab autocrats remains relatively steady.

The inconsistent American record on promoting freedom and democracy in the Middle East has left Arab democracy activists in the awkward position of shunning any associations with the United States, because Washington’s policies are so widely opposed throughout the region. So the United States finds itself in the doubly awkward position of not being able to promote democracy by using its military for regime changes, and unable to connect with partners in civil society to promote democracy through peaceful means. This, too — the immobilization of America as a credible promoter of democracy — is a consequence of Washington’s policy in Iraq.

The important issues related to the trial and conviction of Saddam Hussein are neither the technicalities of the trial’s fairness and legitimacy (as critics say) nor the power of the example of removing an Arab dictator and holding him accountable for his crimes (as supports say). The core issue is about the juxtaposition of Western militarism and Arab dictatorships as twin plagues on the modern Arab world. It is good that Saddam Hussein’s regime is no longer in power to brutalize its people; but it is bad that Iraq remains convulsed by new forms of suffering, death and mass fear that have been sparked by the American invasion.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 08 November 2006
Word Count: 922
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SAN FRANCISCO — If you did not hear it, the bell for the second round of the new Cold War in the Middle East rang on Wednesday, in the form of the United States and Hizbullah trading accusations against each other about assorted sinister aims. There is much that is interesting and important — indeed, historic — about this face-off, despite the silly elements.

Five years or so ago, the world’s most powerful country was firing missiles at men hiding in caves in Afghanistan — and it still fights that battle without full success. Today, that same American global power wages acute political war against a charitable society, albeit an armed and disciplined one.

As Hizbullah and the United States battle one another, they also represent wider forces that now collectively define the new ideological battlefront in the Middle East, and perhaps the world. As in much of what the United States does in the Middle East, there is farce amidst the bombast.

Washington accused Hizbullah of acting on behalf of Syria and Iran to topple the Lebanese government headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and pledged its support for a “sovereign, democratic and prosperous Lebanon.” That ear-shattering noise that you may have heard when the United States made that statement was the collective laughter and knee-slapping, eyeball-rolling incredulity of somewhere between 5 and 6 billion people in this world who are falling over in the aisles — because when they compare Washington’s actions against its words, they can only take this performance as comedy.

The United States has spent the past five years overthrowing governments in the Arab-Asian region, threatening some others, and arming assorted gangs, militias, misfits, charlatans and buffoons who promise to pester and perhaps remove those regimes that Washington does not like, such as in Syria and Iran. Regime change — however acceptable or not it may be — is not an accusation that Washington can make against anyone in this world at a time when it is working overtime to receive a global certification of pioneering excellence in this business.

More obtuse is Washington’s objection to pressures against a democratically elected government, at a time when the United States leads a global attempt to starve and overthrow the democratically elected Palestinian government headed by Hamas. When the world stops laughing for a moment and composes itself just enough to ask a question, it would be the following: How far does the United States expect the world to accept its arrogant insistence on applying one set of rules for the itself and Israel, and another set of rules for everyone else on earth? Just how acute can American diplomatic duplicity get?

Finally, the guffawing going on all around the globe reflects the incredulity the most people feel at U.S. expressions of support for the Siniora government. Just two months ago, the United States provided Israel with the green light, diplomatic time and space, sophisticated weapons, fuel, and ammunition to savagely attack all parts of Lebanon, thus weakening that same Siniora government.

As the enormous gap between Washington’s words and actions in the Middle East grows wider still, many in this region and elsewhere in the world have decided that it is time to fight back, and confront the audacity. Hizbullah’s close relations with Syria and Iran are just one aspect of the new constellation of forces that now confront one another in Lebanon, which has now emerged as the battleground of the new regional Cold War and global confrontation.

Hizbullah in turn accuses Washington of interfering in Lebanese affairs; it says the United States and its friends, including some Lebanese and other Arabs, exploit Lebanon as a weapon in their battle with Syria and Iran. What we have here, in fact, is the continuation in political form of the military war that was waged in July-August by Hizbullah and Israel, on behalf of themselves and their respective allies, partners and weapon suppliers.

Nevertheless, it seems preferable that such battles be waged in the form of a political cold war rather than with arms on a battlefield that has come to comprise mostly civilian targets on both sides. Political contests also offer many opportunities for compromises and reasonable deals, in ways that missiles and tanks do not. In the case of Hizbullah itself, it also seems positive that the organization is so firmly focused on domestic Lebanese political goals, even though it presses its case with threats and ultimatums. But who does not use such means in the political arena? George Bush?

That laughter you hear is… oh, well, just chalk this one up to the fact that it is election time in the United States, when Washington’s normal large quotients of clueless confusion and expedient hypocrisy abroad are aggravated by a whole new universe of insincerity directed at a domestic audience. The combination is devastating for any attempt to foster civility, rationality and win-win conflict resolution outcomes.

Thankfully, the electioneering silly season is over in a week’s time here in the United States. After that, in late November, get ready to hear the bell for round three of the new regional cold war.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 03 November 2006
Word Count: 850
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ATLANTA — I learned important things a few days ago about America’s finest young men and women, and its terrible chosen war in Iraq. In one of those chance human encounters that remain with you for life, I shared a fleeting fast food dinner at an airport with an American soldier, who helped me understand better what makes most ordinary human beings special, and most political leaders disgraceful.

I had a wait of several hours one evening while changing planes at Atlanta airport, and made my way to the restaurants. I chose my usual combination of three kinds of Chinese chicken, with rice and vegetables, for $5.95, marveled again at America’s many contributions to global civilization, and sat at a small empty table. Minutes later a young American soldier in uniform carrying a plate of pizza slices asked if the empty seat across from me was being used. It was free, I said, and he was welcome to use it.

I remembered my university days in the USA during the Vietnam war, when civilians often found it awkward to engage in conversation with soldiers on duty in a controversial war. I also knew that what the soldiers were going through in their own lives and minds was infinitely more difficult and demanding.

I thought that I could learn something from him, and perhaps he would like to chat with a stranger. The young man of Italian-American heritage could not have been more than 22 years old. It turned out he was in the reserves but had been called to fulltime duty because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Was he on his way to or from a war, I asked? No, he had not gone overseas yet, but was expecting to go soon.

Would he be on the front fighting? Probably not, he replied, because his specialty was human resources and personnel affairs, including promotions and nominations of soldiers for awards, commendations and medals. He was now in the midst of several months of training on new management systems his unit has acquired. But if he was sent to Iraq, he had to be prepared to kill and be killed, and would deal with that eventuality if it happened.

I learned that he had dropped out of college in one of the western mountain states after he had started as a journalism student. Instead he enrolled in a part-time college course in athletics education, so he could work and support his young family.

Not sure why, perhaps just an instinctive gesture of human solidarity among those who had experienced war’s ugly dangers, I told him I lived in Beirut, Lebanon, where I also did journalism, though my perspective as a civilian was less harrowing than his as a soldier. We agreed that war was a terrible thing and did not resolve matters in most cases, though he carefully avoided voicing an opinion on the current war in Iraq. I tried to put him at ease by joking that I and others were working overtime to inform people about the futility of wars so that he could get back to fulltime studies and spend more time with his family.

He asked me about how it was “over there” in the Middle East. I told him it was just like America — a great land, full of wonderful, warm people, but often disfigured by the stupid decisions of sleazy politicians. He remained silent, focused on his pizza. He was part of a tradition of obeying orders in a system where the military was under the management of elected civilians. But I took his quiet, almost imperceptible, small nods between pizza bites as tacit agreement.

I became more bold in my questions. Was he scared to go to Iraq or Afghanistan, I asked? You’re always scared in such situations, he said, but you do your duty. That’s what he grew up learning was the American way, the right thing to do. He’d go if sent, and he’d fight if ordered to do so, but he sure wished they could solve their problems “over there” in a more peaceful way.

He finished his two pizza slices before I finished my three chicken varieties, and stood up to go. As he was getting up, almost under his breath, he shook his head in a gesture of unspoken but obvious bewilderment, looking down at the table and not at me, and quietly muttered that the USA had to bring its army back home because they had been there too long, and it was not working out well over there.

I quietly reciprocated his silent little nods, letting him know I agreed, but not saying so explicitly, so as not to make him feel awkward for making a direct political statement on the war he had to fight, and would fight if ordered to do so.

As we shook hands, he looked me in the eye and said sprightly, “a pleasure to talk to you, sir,” and went on his way, catching his flight, doing his duty, for his family and his country, a dignified, hard-working citizen-soldier.

I told him to take care of himself, and to be careful if he went “over there”, adding that it was indeed a pleasure to chat, and he went off. Quietly to myself, I thought that in fact it was not just a pleasure, but indeed an honor to chat with him.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 01 November 2006
Word Count: 901
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SAN DIEGO — One of the depressing aspects of reading, viewing and listening to the mass media in the United States on an extended trip, as I am doing these days, is to suffer the very superficial and often ideologically skewed coverage of important movements such as Hizbullah and Hamas. For various reasons, directly or indirectly related to American government support for Israel over Arab parties, such groups usually are referred to simply as terrorist groups.

It is possible — and desirable — that such accusations of terrorism be determined in a fair court of law one day, because any group or government that engages in terrorism needs to be held accountable for its actions. Yet such a process would only have validity and credibility if it also held accountable other groups or governments — including Israel, the United States, and some Arab regimes — for the accusations of war crimes and other atrocities that have been made against them in turn. This is unlikely to happen any time soon, because of the laws of imperial power and transnational hypocrisy that define our world, where the powerful write their own rules.

So, here in the United States one hears of Hizbullah and Hamas described in the public realm almost always only as terrorist groups. The problem with this one-dimensional focus on the anti-Israeli resistance and military aspects of these groups is that it ignores everything else they represent. The recent war between Hizbullah and Israel, in part a proxy battle between the United States and Iran, revealed that Hizbullah taps into sentiments and political forces across the Middle East that are very much wider and deeper than only its successful quest to drive Israel out of Lebanon.

Whether one likes or dislikes Hizbullah, or admires or fears it, it seems abundantly clear now that its wide support throughout the Arab-Islamic Middle East and other parts of the world reflects its ability to tap into a very wide range of forces, sentiments and political movements. This is noteworthy for two reasons: Such forces and movements have never before come together as they did in the support that Hizbullah enjoyed in recent months; and, collectively they represent a significant new posture of resistance and defiance of the United States and Israel that continues to reshape politics in the region.

I would mention at least the following as the political sentiments and movements that were encapsulated in Hizbullah’s battle against Israel, and indirectly against the United States:
• Lebanese patriotism, including both the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and the desire to keep it free from Western domination.
• Arab nationalism, whose themes and rhetorical symbols are increasingly evident in the speeches of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
• The Islamist political resurgence throughout the Middle East, evident in mostly Sunni-dominated movements like Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish Justice and Development Party.
• Shiite empowerment, a process that has been underway since the mid-1970s in Lebanon and other parts of the region.
• Solidarity with the Palestinians, whose cause continues to resonate widely and passionately among publics throughout the Middle East and the world.
• Strategic and tactical closeness to Iran, which aims to be the regional if not the global leader of anti-American defiance.
• Close working ties with Syria, whose hard-line Baathist secular regime is among the last of the Soviet-style centralized Arab security states that defy the United States.
• Resistance to foreign occupation of Arab lands, whether the Anglo-American armies in Iraq or the Israeli army in Lebanon.
• Promotion of good governance at the local and national level in Arab lands, seeking to replace the corrupt, inefficient and often incompetent regimes that have ruled Arab countries in recent decades.
• Defiance of what they call American-dominated Western imperial aims and hegemonic designs in the Middle East to transform this into a region of compliant governments that fall in line with American-Israeli strategic aims.

These are the most important regional currents that define many aspects of popular sentiments and public opinion and that Hizbullah has been able to tap into. Never before have such different, and often antagonistic, movements and sentiments come together in a single movement, or at least a temporary tactical alliance of convenience. It remains unclear if this represents a fleeting flash of emotions, or a historic new shift of political direction in the Middle East — a new regional Cold War in which Arabs, Iranians, Islamists, nationalists and state patriots join forces to confront the Israeli-American side with its handful of Arab supporters.

What is very clear, though, is that Hizbullah’s political standing in the Middle East represents political forces and sentiments, and national issues, that far transcend the acts of terrorism of which it is accused, and that seem to totally define its perception here in the United States. It is a shame that a global power like the United States should allow itself to have such a provincial view of things in the Middle East. The toll of imperium is deep and blinding indeed, for dead Arabs and blinkered Americans alike.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 28 October 2006
Word Count: 834
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SYRACUSE, New York — I don’t get a chance very often to mix two passions that define my personal and professional lives — American college sports and the quest for justice and peace in the Middle East — but this week I have been able to savor that rare opportunity. This happened at Syracuse University in upstate New York, where in 1966-1973 I spent five years studying, and, cumulatively, probably another year attending or watching sports events, all of which, I am certain, contributed to my personal and professional development.

The linkage with the Middle East is not about place or foreign policy, but rather about the enduring, universal power of principles and human values — the personal values of individuals and the collective values of communities. This week, the university formally, publicly apologized to nine African-American football players who had boycotted the university team’s spring practice in May 1970 to protest racial discrimination and insensitivity on the part of the football program and its nationally respected head coach. Current Chancellor Nancy Cantor formally offered the players the public apology, the Chancellor’s Medal, and their official ‘letterman’ team jackets emblazoned with the ‘S’ for Syracuse. Hail, Syracuse!

Why is this relevant to the Middle East and other parts of the world? For three reasons. First, it reflects the important role that individuals play in a collective struggle for human dignity and rights, which are the bedrock of stable, satisfying societies. Those nine student athletes faced much hostility back then, but their courage proved prescient; they were elements of a wider civil rights movement that ultimately succeeded in changing discriminatory laws and sensitizing an entire society to the feelings and rights abuses that Black Americans suffered then, and many still suffer today. The lesson is that every individual — Arab, Israeli, Iranian, Turkish, American, Portuguese or of any other nationality — should stand up in principle and protest injustice, even at the risk of jeopardizing a professional career. Sometimes, an individual’s principled actions only bear fruit, or are recognized by one’s peers, decades later. The wait is worth it. Justice does not have a shelf life. Those letter jackets warm all of us today, just as much as they do the players who earned and wear them.

Second, it reveals the importance of collective, institutional action to acknowledge the mistakes and abuses of the past, and to make amends, even if only in symbolic ways. Those who degrade, dehumanize, terrorize or otherwise debase their fellow human beings live with a burden that gnaws away at their own integrity, and maintains a low simmer of stress and confrontation in society. An aggressor or predator society can only live a normal and secure life after it sincerely acknowledges its past wrongdoings and offers atonement or apology.

The third relevant aspect of Syracuse University’s honoring its African-American athletes who once boycotted it is the power of forgiveness that it reveals. Several of the players who were interviewed in the news media this week noted that the gesture had recreated a bond with their university that had been torn asunder by the deeds of the past. They seemed genuinely to forgive the university for its insensitivity and discrimination. They were part of a restorative and healing process that applies to individuals as it does to entire communities and sovereign countries that seek peace after years of conflict and tension.

I mention this episode because it reveals one of the best aspects of American culture: the determination to acknowledge the sins, crimes or just the transgressions of the past, as a means to fostering peace and stability in society. A similar process is underway this week at Brown University in Rhode Island, where a university committee called on the institution to make amends for its extensive ties to slavery in the 18th century by building a memorial, creating a center for the study of slavery and injustice and increasing efforts to recruit minority students.

The Committee on Slavery and Justice said that one cannot change the past, but “an institution can hold itself accountable for the past, accepting its burdens and responsibilities along with its benefits and privileges.” This means “acknowledging and taking responsibility for Brown’s part in grievous crimes,” it said. Bravo, Brown!

These are just two examples of similar endeavors to overcome the pain and distortions of the recent past that are underway throughout the United States. The relevance to the Middle East is that the acknowledgement of others’ past suffering and of one’s own insensitive, aggressive or even criminal behavior is crucial to any serious conflict resolution process. It unlocks doors that remain closed to would-be but failed mediators, and it opens pathways to reconciliation based on new opportunities for a normal life, because the agony of one’s own dehumanization has been removed.

Who says we in the Middle East don’t appreciate American values? College football, the compassionate honesty of a great university, and new doorways to racial and communal harmony are three of the best American values that I know of, and have happily experienced again this week.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 24 October 2006
Word Count: 840
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SAN FRANCISCO — One of the endlessly fascinating and frustrating aspects of the convergence of American politics with Middle Eastern realities is evident again this season: the application of special rules of conduct to Israel that are not applied to the United States itself. One of the most common themes heard in discussions of U.S. policy in the Middle East these days is that Washington should be speaking to the key players in the region — like Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah — instead of boycotting them.

Even former Secretary of State James Baker has said something to this effect, which is significant because he heads a team looking into policy options on Iraq for the Bush administration. Yet when it comes to Israel speaking with Hamas in Palestine, the same rational suggestions are not heard. Israel remains a state that enjoys unique standards of behavior in the world, both in terms of what it should and should not do.

It is not held accountable for its vicious policies in Palestine and Lebanon, where its war crimes-like behavior is often noted, but never prosecuted. Impunity continues to define its relationship to global norms of morality and law. In the same manner, it is generally not urged to engage with Hamas and the wider Palestinian political system as a means of resolving its conflict with them. Rather, Israel is told — and the Quartet¹s support for its policy of boycotting Hamas is ample proof of this — that it can unilaterally set requirements and rules of the game that Palestinians and everyone else in the world must adhere to.

This is a shame, because the policies Israel has pursued in this respect are not working very well. Israel¹s physical security as a state may be intact, but its acceptance in the region is as precarious as it always has been. In fact its prospects of being accepted as a good neighbor in the Arab region may be deteriorating, in view of its continued savagery in Palestine and Lebanon and its role in threatening Iran. Most of the Arab world cheered Hizbullah as it rained thousands of rockets on northern Israel last July and August.

While Israel refuses to talk to Hamas, other countries act differently. The United States and UK engage the Irish Republican Army via Sinn Fein; the United States and Europe talk to Iran directly or indirectly; the United States looks for contact points with the insurgents in Iraq; and the United States itself also once negotiated with the Viet Cong when the two were at war in the early 1970s. Israel similarly should find a face-saving way to engage with Hamas now, before the Palestinian situation completely collapses and no diplomatic partner is available for negotiations.

The Hamas leadership in the past year has clearly softened and clarified its diplomatic position on relations with Israel. It will not recognize Israel as a legitimate state, but it is now prepared to have a long-term truce with it, and to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel should jump on this offer and make a counter-offer of equal magnitude. If I were an Israeli leader, I would find it attractive to ensure a long-term truce and a cessation of hostilities, coupled with negotiations to implement the terms of coexistence without mutual recognition.

Three reasons in particular make this an attractive, even a compelling, proposition. The first is that ending mutual violence is a good thing in itself, even without a permanent, comprehensive settlement. Israelis and Palestinians alike deserve the opportunity to live in some normalcy and non-violence for years on end.

The second reason is that a truce would give the Palestinians the opportunity to develop their society with some security and predictability, especially their economy. Hamas may or may not remain at the head of the elected government, but promoting economic growth and stability is a critical factor for the well-being of the Palestinians and the Israelis alike.

Third, a long-term truce would definitely promote an evolution among Palestinian political sentiments. Given a chance to live in peace and quiet and to develop their society, the mainstream Palestinian majority that already affirms its will for a negotiated comprehensive peace with Israel would surely push its government to move quickly to permanent status negotiations. Having experienced the pain and probable futility of current trends, the Palestinian people would clearly not want to return to this situation of being starved, besieged and savagely attacked.

Hamas is the only party now in Palestine that has the legitimacy and the capacity to enforce a truce with Israel. Such a truce would likely generate strong pressures from its Palestinian constituency to keep moving in the direction of a permanent peace agreement. If a majority of Palestinians democratically express this wish, Hamas would have to comply, or else step aside and let others govern.

The world should be telling Israel to engage Hamas on the basis of the currently available terms, not supporting its decision to try and force Hamas out of office and starve the Palestinians into submission.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 20 October 2006
Word Count: 843
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SAN FRANCISCO — This has been a fascinating week for students of conflict resolution who have had one eye on Northern Ireland and the other on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both of these appear to be intractable conflicts, going back many decades, involving similar kinds of dynamics. In both cases we have the use of political violence and terror, communal tensions, charges of occupation by foreign troops, harsh use of police powers, and parties that do not recognize the legitimacy of the other.

Yet Northern Ireland is on a path towards resolution, while the Arab-Israeli conflict remains mired in chronic tensions and eruptions of occasional wars. During the past week the parties to the Northern Ireland conflict met again for a renewed attempt to resume and complete the implementation of the agreement they had reached in 1998, the historic Good Friday Agreement. That accord saw the principal parties, the Roman Catholic Sinn Fein and the Protestant Democratic Unionist Party, agree to share power in a new government in which they both sat in the parliament and the executive branch. The agreement was suspended four years ago, though many of its political goals have been achieved. Northern Ireland has been relatively peaceful, the Irish Republican Army has ³decommissioned² its arms, and large-scale or recurring clashes between the two communities, or between the Irish and the British police, have ceased.

Northern Ireland is more polarized than ever into distinct neighborhoods and villages, and the two principal communities have not mixed happily in a single unified society. But the political violence that plagued them has stopped, as most citizens get on with the business of expanding their economy and improving life prospects for their children. The process is working.

The British and Irish governments convened a meeting of the principal parties last week to complete the process and revive the agreement to share power in national institutions of governance. They put forth a compromise formula that would implement a series of steps to restore the power-sharing government (executive and assembly) in Northern Ireland by next March, and provided for an election or referendum that would allow citizens to endorse the agreement once the leaders signed on.

Why is this relevant to the Middle East? Several important points about the Northern Ireland process stand out. For one thing, it is working, and needs to be studied to grasp precisely why that is the case. It has not been fully implemented, but the region is no longer convulsed by political violence and terror. Any agreement that achieves that through negotiations deserves closer scrutiny.

It appears to be working primarily because of three reasons. First, it brought into the negotiating process all the key parties who were deemed to be legitimate in the eyes of their own communities, regardless of how other communities saw them. So Sinn Fein represented the IRA, regardless of the Unionists¹ revulsion for the IRA. The fact of being inclusive was an important element for success.

Second, the parties recognized that they would achieve, through peaceful negotiations, important gains that could not be achieved through continued militancy. Diplomacy that succeeded and offered a vision of a better future spurred a greater willingness to persist on the path of peaceful negotiations, and so all sides committed to peaceful resolution of their conflict.

Third, the external mediator — the United States — was at once persistent, patient and impartial. It did not take sides, but worked tirelessly to bridge gaps between the parties and offer mechanisms to restore confidence when it was shaken.

None of these elements exists today in the Arab-Israeli situation, and so it is not surprising that our region of the world witnesses destructive wars while Northern Ireland joins the ranks of the world’s wealthy societies. The sad irony is that as the Northern Ireland situation resumes its momentum towards a permanent settlement, its historic lessons for the Arabs and Israelis are ignored, even though many of the broad dynamics of both conflicts seem so similar.

For example, Israel and the United States refuse to deal with a Palestinian government led by Hamas, which was democratically elected. Yet in Northern Ireland the British and the United States had no problem dealing with the IRA, which used terror for many years. Their decision to engage the IRA through Sinn Fein proved wise and productive, because the IRA soon got out of the terror business and decommissioned its arms. That experience suggests that focusing on the substance of the political goals that one desires from a negotiation is more important than allowing oneself to get hung up on whom one should talk to or not talk to.

Israel and Hamas do not like or recognize each other, but they are both acting irresponsibly in continuing to avoid engaging each other in a political process that gives their people the possibility of living normal, peaceful lives. The same can be said of Iran and the United States. It is instructive for these and other parties in the region to ponder the Northern Ireland situation and acknowledge the importance of focusing on how to achieve desired outcomes that respond to the legitimate rights and needs of both parties to a conflict, rather than getting stalemated on false issues of honor and dishonor in engaging one’s adversaries. Northern Ireland has much to teach us all about the business of conflict resolution — and also about acting like adults.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 17 October 2006
Word Count: 897
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DALLAS, Texas — You know you’re in the heartland of the global energy world when the front page of the local newspaper carries daily oil and gas prices. I have had the good fortune this week to be in Texas while following two major global developments — the world¹s major powers returning the Iran nuclear file to the UN Security Council and scampering to contain North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, following its small test explosion this week.

We are passing through a milestone moment in the global energy, diplomacy and nuclear proliferation sectors. Here in the vortex of American energy interests and Bush family political support, the view of the world and its potential or real threats is most instructive. One quickly confirms that which is more or less obvious from discussions with informed parties throughout the United States: Washington has very few realistic or immediate policy options that can stop the forward progress of the Iranian or North Korean nuclear industries without triggering much worse consequences.

The United States is not yet in panic mode on these matters, but urgency is the tone of the day. For the past 15 post-Cold War years since it has been the sole global superpower, and especially since 9/11 five years ago, Washington has taken it upon itself to lead the international effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In cases where the rest of the world’s powers do not agree with it, the US has not hesitated to take unilateral diplomatic or even military action to subdue or eliminate what it perceives as real threats to itself or its allies, including most notably to Israel and Arab oil producers.

That process to date has comprised two principal goals and three main policy tools. The stated goals are arms control and promotion of democracy. The tools are regime change by military means; multilateral diplomacy using sticks and carrots; and, unilateral diplomacy, threats, sanctions and other such means.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and spreading democracy are reasonable goals that few people would object to, and, indeed, many countries around the world have worked hard with the United States to achieve these aims. But the results have been slim. The two most notable failures are Iran and North Korea, who push ahead with substantive nuclear industry programs.

These two countries are especially noteworthy — foolhardy perhaps, only time will tell  for the blunt manner in which they openly defy the United States and its many warnings. They persist because recent and current American-led efforts to freeze their nuclear programs have more bark than bite — at least so far. That may change soon, though it is hard to envisage military action that could end these two nuclear programs without triggering either serious reprisals or significant chaos, including in global energy markets. They flex their muscles and twirl their guns here in Texas — but they also know the difference between a single bullet that cleanly fells the enemy and an urban (or global) rumble that triggers years of retributive gang warfare.

New thinking is needed on how to address Iran and North Korea, and other countries that will seek nuclear industries in due course. Three political science professors at Stanford University in California are floating just such a bold new proposal on how the United States should deal with the Iran nuclear issue. Michael McFaul, Abbas Milani and Larry Diamond are political science professors and also fellows and coordinators of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

In a forthcoming article appearing in the Winter 2006-2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly, they argue that the United States should offer Iran a deal it cannot refuse, one that combines verifiable nuclear safeguards (including suspending enrichment) with restoring full diplomatic ties and promoting trade, investment and democracy. A key part of such an offer would be mutual pledges not to use force against each other or initiate military action against one’s neighbors.

They advise Washington to reverse its policy of sanctioning or threatening Iran — which is not working very well in any case — and instead engage the Iranian government and people fully. Connecting with all quarters in Iranian society would ultimately facilitate the democratic transformation of Iran from within. The authors suggest that developments in Iran could echo the Western engagement of the Soviet Union in the Helsinki process in the 1970s, which included a ³security² basket alongside a ³human rights² basket that ultimately undermined the communist system. The Middle East would benefit from a potential regional security grouping similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that emerged from Helsinki.

Engaging Iran in a manner that affirmed its legitimate nuclear industry and regional security concerns, while also opening its domestic system to democratic and human rights norms that its citizens covet, the authors argue, could simultaneously achieve arms control and democratization goals; these would benefit Iran, the United States, the Middle East region and other interested parties. Sounds like a direction worth exploring.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 15 October 2006
Word Count: 833
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