Publications – Page 148

Lebanon Makes History in Many Ways

December 16, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BEIRUT — It is easy to get so entangled in the day-to-day dynamics of events in Lebanon that one loses sight of the truly new and potentially historic developments that are taking place before our eyes. I think we can already note five distinct political dynamics that have occurred in Lebanon in the past 2 years or so.

All five developments are unprecedented in modern Arab history, and potentially could have historic implications for other Arab countries. Yet all five also comprise actors whose positions remain somewhat fluid — notably, Hizbullah, the Lebanese government and its March 14 backers, Syria, Iran, and the United States — and thus some of these events could turn out to be fleeting developments. My hunch is that they are historic, and will impact trends in the region for years to come. Here is my list, in chronological order.

1. The massive street demonstrations and firm political response by many Lebanese figures immediately after the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri last February resulted in Syrian troops leaving Lebanon, and Damascus ending its direct control of Lebanese internal affairs. International diplomatic support for the demonstrators via the UN Security Council helped push out the Syrians. Yet the spectacle of over a million people on the street on March 14, 2005, was the critical populist base that moved the process forward. We should not be surprised if similar mass protests occur in other Arab countries in the years ahead.

2. The UN Security Council decision last year to open an investigation into the Hariri murder (now expanded to assist in solving the other murders of Lebanese public figures that have occurred in the past 20 months) was followed by a decision this year to form a Lebanese-international tribunal to try those who will be accused of the murders, once the investigation finishes. Suspicion for the killings has focused heavily on Syria, though the government in Damascus insists it is innocent.

The truth will come out soon enough. The important precedent is that the international community has launched an investigative and judicial process to hold accountable those who committed these crimes, delving deep into the inner political and security structures of sovereign countries — mainly Lebanon and Syria in this case. This is an attempt to achieve through legitimate political means what was attempted by Anglo-American military force in Iraq — either changing a regime or changing its behavior.

3. The war between Hizbullah and Israel this summer resulted in an effective draw, as both sides agreed to a cease-fire after 34 days of relentless and brutal fighting, most often against civilian areas. The fact that a non-state actor like Hizbullah forced Israel to accept a diplomatic end to the fighting reinforced the stature of Hizbullah in the Arab world, emboldened the political posture of its allies and supporters — Syria and Iran — and provided a model of resistance, organization, strategic planning and implementation that is already spreading to other militant movements in the region. It reflects a powerful human will and associated technical capacity to defy powerful foes — Israeli, American, or Arab — that may manifest itself in other forms in the years ahead. It also provides a crucial frontline military element that has always been important for those in the region who rally politically against Israeli and U.S. forces.

4. Hizbullah and its allies in Lebanon have taken to the streets to challenge the elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, vowing to topple and replace it with a government of national unity in which the opposition has at least a third of the cabinet seats. Such a blatant but peaceful challenge on the streets is a new development in modern Arab politics, and represents a precedent that could be emulated elsewhere in the region. Most Arab regimes that have been changed in modern history had succumbed to foreign or domestic coups, with the possible exception of the overthrow of former Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiry in 1985, after street demonstrations brought to power his army commander when he was out of the country.

5. Responding to the Hizbullah-led challenge to his government, Prime Minister Siniora and his political allies have fought back energetically, with strong, vocal backing from many Lebanese as well as a host of foreign governments, especially the United States and Europe. Never before has the Arab world witnessed such a determined political stand — as opposed to military attacks and mass arrests — by an incumbent Arab political leadership that has been openly challenged by a strong Islamist-led movement. The spectacle of a Western- and Arab-backed, legitimately elected Arab government staring down a strong domestic Islamist challenge backed by Syria and Iran is noteworthy. Whoever emerges triumphant, or if a negotiated compromise solution is agreed on, the outcome of this historic face-off will impact strongly on political trends throughout this region for years to come.

Each of these five developments is historic in itself, and taken together they mirror the outlines of the prevalent new ideological confrontation that defines the Middle East.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

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Released: 16 December 2006
Word Count: 832
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Revisiting the Israeli Lobby Debate

December 12, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

CAMBRIDGE, MA — Is there a rational, sensible middle ground between those who question or deny the Holocaust against the Jews and threaten to wipe out Israel, and those who maintain that Israel can do no wrong and must receive total, perpetual American support? That middle ground has been thin in recent years. In the United States, in particular, it is almost impossible to discuss in public the issues of Israel’s policies, Israeli-American relations, and how these two impact on America’s degraded ties with the Arab world.

The prevalent tone of public and private discussions remains a questioning of why the Arabs and Iranians hate Israel and America, and make political or military war against them. The dominant litmus test of legitimacy is for Hamas and Hizbullah to recognize Israel’s right to exist, without asking Israel to halt its continuing assaults on Arab lands and rights. That attitude, over decades, has understandably generated a strong reaction against Israel and the U.S. throughout the region and the world.

This cyclical, cause-and-effect nature of Israeli-American-Arab relationships is rarely acknowledged in the United States. A rare exception was the paper published in March by professors John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University. In “The Israel Lobby,” they questioned whether the pro-Israel lobby in the United States served the best purposes of Israel and the U.S., or whether its virtual stranglehold on U.S. policies in the Middle East actually is detrimental to both Israeli and American national interests.

Their original paper in the London Review of Books and the Harvard website generated fierce criticism, to which they initially offered only occasional, partial responses. They were accused of a wide range of terrible deeds and sentiments, including anti-semitism, blaming the Jews for America’s troubles in the Middle East, seeing American Jews as disloyal or even treasonous citizens, cavorting with racists like David Duke and other neo-Nazis, being anti-Zionists who do not feel that Israel’s survival is important, exaggerating the power and nature of the pro-Israel lobby and its control of American foreign policy, and many other major and minor points.

To find out where things stand now and what might happen next in this important debate, I went to see Stephen Walt in his Kennedy School office at Harvard the other day. The authors knew their article would be controversial, Walt told me, because it addressed a set of important issues that few mainstream scholars or journalists had examined. They expected professional criticism and personal attacks, because they challenged some powerful individuals and organizations, and cast doubt on principal American-Israeli historical claims and policy positions. They feel they opened a space for an honest debate on the issue, where the focus should remain.

Walt and Mearsheimer are now completing a full length book on the subject of the Israeli lobby and its impact, to be published in the United States and a dozen other countries next year — a good sign, given that the original American journal that has commissioned their article subsequently declined to publish it. Equally importantly, they have written a detailed 80-page point-by-point essay responding to all the accusations and criticisms made against them by a wide range of people.

Their essay is a calm, specific rebuttal of every criticism made against their original paper, showing the criticisms to be overwhelmingly mistaken and invalid. Where they found some criticisms to be justified, they show why the points raised do not significantly affect their main arguments.

They grouped the many attacks against them into three broad groups: unsupported ad hominem accusations of being anti-semites, liars, or bigots who relied on neo-Nazi websites; clear misrepresentations of their views, by accusing them of arguments they did not make, or ignoring important points that they explicitly made; and, accusations that the original essay was riddled with factual errors and was sloppy scholarship.

Most criticisms aimed to discredit the authors, divert the discussion to tangential issues, or bury the original paper’s core arguments about the questionable impact of the pro-Israel lobby. The rebuttal essay convincingly shreds the arguments of all the critics, whether respected scholars or others. It also reaffirms their original point: any honest discussion of U.S.-Israel relations and policies will often be met with a broadside assault by the pro-Israel lobby to silence the debate.

The authors are respected, established and self-confident enough to withstand such an assault that would have felled lesser folks. Intelligently, they disdain the sort of cheap personal attacks and innuendo that were hurled at them, and instead maintain their sharp focus on the core issue that they feel deserves wider discussion.

“We feel that we have started an important public debate in the United States and abroad,” Walt told me.

“The United States faces many challenges in the Middle East, and Americans need to be able to discuss all of the forces that shape U.S. policy in this region in a candid and serious way,” he added, reflecting the tone of their rebuttal essay.

“We are gratified that this conversation is now occurring, for what America needs is a sober and calm discussion of these issues based on logic and evidence, as opposed to a conversation filled with name-calling and character assassination, or myths and misconceptions.”

Sounds like the American way to me, and very much worth affirming in the United States and emulating around the world. Walt and Mearsheimer were right in March to raise this issue, and they are right again today to move the debate forward in a calm, facts-based manner.

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Does Middle East Modernity Start This Week?

December 8, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

DUBAI — It was raining hard when I arrived in Dubai last week to participate in the Arab Strategy Forum that brings together hundreds of Arab and international business, government, civil society and media professionals for high quality and frank exchanges on issues of common concern. My first thought upon experiencing a fierce Emirati rainstorm was that the snow-making machines in the artificial indoor ski slope inside a massive shopping mall had gone haywire and were generating rain outside instead of snow inside. My second, more accurate, impression was that we should not give much credence to superficial impressions — for my previous one-dimensional image of Dubai as a hot, humid, uncomfortable place was suddenly and irrevocably shattered by the cool autumn rain.

Inside the Arab Strategy Forum, discussions over three days similarly must have changed some participants’ perceptions of the Arab world and its many problems, challenges and achievements. We heard useful analysis of the constraints that hold us back and the human assets and dynamics that drive us forward to modernity, capturing the variety of forces that define the Middle East and its interactions with the world.

Perhaps the most significant trend that emerged throughout the meetings was that the Middle East’s external world was, in fact, expanding and changing. Most importantly, China, India, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Japan, Korea and other Asian powers slowly encroach upon the West’s former stranglehold on the region’s people, politics and resources.

The Middle East will remain the world’s leading energy exporter well into the middle of this century, though its strategic relations have already started to shift eastward towards its major commercial, energy and labor partners in Asia. Political relations are also shifting, as the era of Anglo-American dominance starts to recede in the wake of the Iraq debacle, and Arabs come to terms more realistically with the power of Iran, Turkey and Israel in the neighborhood.

The West seems unable to impose its strategic views or values on the Middle East, but governments in the area also have failed to develop stable systems or coherent regional security regimes. Perhaps the search for a new, more stable, productive order in the Middle East was launched this week, symbolized by several simultaneous developments.

The Baker-Hamilton committee’s recommendations on a new American policy to stabilize and leave Iraq — and push hard for an Arab-Israeli settlement — coincide with the death-knell of two critical American policy trends: the resignation of U.S. representative to the UN John Bolton and the confirmation of Robert Gates to replace Donald Rumsfeld as defense secretary are good markers for the impending end of the short-lived neoconservative era in Washington, and its parallel Defense Department global strategy based on interventions by more mobile American forces.

This sign of change in American policies — the British will follow like kittens — coincides with Iranian ideas on how an Anglo-American withdrawal from Iraq could spark cooperation by Tehran. Lebanon and Palestine remain hostage to these wider regional rivalries, and also to their own local struggles over political power, national identity and regional and global alliances.

Most certainly, we are passing through a moment of historic adjustment in the Middle East, but where we are heading is not clear, because rival narratives and ideologies continue to define the region. As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius aptly put it, wider gaps between elites and masses in the Middle East, who are moving in different directions, risk seeing our societies turn into Davos vs. the militias.

The most optimistic scenario, we heard repeatedly, would see expanding global trading linkages fuelled by the Middle East’s massive youth population (60 percent of population under the age of 20) finally exploiting key positive factors: improved education, higher internet connectivity, liberalized political systems, diversified and entrepreneurial economies, and a mindset of assertive empowerment instead of corrosive victimization.

This occurs, however, simultaneously with a wide range of negatives, including sectarian cleavages and clashes; loss of authority and control by some governments; the legitimization of indiscriminate violence by the state, the opposition and foreign powers alike; the ripples of the Iranian nuclear standoff, while many Arabs fear Iranian hegemonic aims in the region; increased intolerance locally and globally; continued exclusion of some communities, parties or states; and the effective end of collective Arab action, as individual states look out for their own interests.

One of the important dynamics at work, I sensed in the Dubai gathering and elsewhere in the region, is the growing realization that we can no longer speak of Arab, American, European or Asian problems or concerns. The last decade has woven together Middle Eastern and global interests, along with their common fears and their reactive forms of militancy. We all share the same problems and their consequences now, along with our individual traumas and distress. Therefore we must seek common solutions through a quest for joint analysis and better answers than we have received to date from Donald Rumsfeld or Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who, with their ilk, thankfully are no longer on the scene or on the way out.

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Released: 08 December 2006
Word Count: 836
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A Century of Elusive Arab Nationhood

December 5, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

DUBAI — You can physically get away from Lebanon and its turbulent politics for a few days, but you can never move around in this region without the symbols, causes and consequences of Lebanon’s current confrontations following you like a shadow in every discussion. I discovered that this week in Dubai while participating in the three-day meetings of the Arab Strategy Forum. This annual gathering brings together officials, journalists, academics and business leaders from the Arab World, Asia, Europe and North America, for a rich series of panel discussions on trends and conditions in the Middle East.

Without fail, every public panel or private discussion inevitably points to Lebanon as a worrying and perplexing microcosm of a widely troubled region that is in the throes of significant upheaval and contestation. Yet there is little if any consensus on why Lebanon finds itself once again — for the third time in half a century — as a symbol of the stresses and uncertainties of a Middle East region that suffers similar dislocations in half a dozen countries.

The confrontations in Lebanon that broke out into a few scattered clashes Sunday are, at one level, a straightforward local contest between two forces that vie for political power and national ascendancy — the Hizbullah-led camp vs. the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. In Lebanon and Arab politics everywhere, though, this first tier of contestation never explains the entire story. The wider issues and many players in Lebanon reflect, rather, the cumulative consequences of the past century. An increasingly dilapidated state-centered Arab political order is slowly unraveling in places, and reconstituting under the banner of new identities and power centers.

That order has navigated a tortuous path: from post-colonial independence, to government-dominated sovereignties, to security-run state-building endeavors, and now to fragmenting and fracturing societies often dominated by non-state actors with an increasingly Islamist character. The recurring dynamics of this trend include local security systems, foreign interference, regional interventions and patronages, armed militias, ethnic- and religious-based communities, freewheeling economic interests, and, all the while, a spirited but elusive quest for stable statehood and satisfying citizenship anchored in constitutions and law.

All you need to do to appreciate this living legacy of political dynamics is to run through the litany of personalities that defines and drives the street confrontations in Beirut and other parts of the country: the legitimately elected and increasingly American-backed Prime Minister Siniora, the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Shiite leader of Hizbullah Hassan Nasrallah, the former army general and presidential aspirant Michel Aoun, Saudi-backed Saad Hariri who carries the mantle of his assassinated father and the Sunni community, Druze leader Walid Junblatt, the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, and assorted Christian community leaders like Semir Geagea, Amin Gemayel and Suleiman Franjieh, to mention only the most prominent.

Here in this lineup of local and national leaders is a catalogue of half a century of Middle Eastern political movements that continue to confront each other in the street. Lebanon is not alone in suffering this bitter and frustrating legacy of nation-building that remains hostage to narrow local community interests alongside the sustained intervention of external powers, including Syria, Iran, Israel, the United States, France and occasional others.

Lebanon’s stressed and discordant nationalism is now joined by others in the region who suffer similar pressures and fractures. Iraq, Sudan, Palestine, Somalia, Yemen and Algeria have experienced similar bumpy rides on the challenging road to national stability, coherence and prosperity. Other lands — Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait — have suffered and survived lesser traumas of strained statehood, denominated in the brutal currencies of civil wars, terrorism, violent challenges to state authority, and ethnic and communal tensions.

Everywhere we see the same signs that we witness in downtown Beirut: The post-Ottoman, post-European, independent Arab state is constantly confounded and occasionally shaken by erratic relations with the Western great powers, irresolute views of Israel as neighbor or nemesis, inconsistent perceptions of the role of religion in public life, imprecision on the limits of state power and the rights of ordinary citizens, and deep ambiguity on the need for clarity, transparency and accountability in managing the power and finances of the state.

Consequently — Beirut reaffirms — non-state actors become strong and trusted guardians of citizens’ interests and aspirations. Hizbullah, Hamas, Muqtada Sadr, Mohammad Dahlan, and dozens of others like them become strong at the neighborhood level, and compete for national power because they affirm indigenous identities while offering a range of day-to-day services that ordinary citizens need to live a reasonable life. They do this in many realms, including ideology, religion, culture, security, identity, economy, health care and social services — and armed struggles against colonialism, imperialism, and Israeli occupations.

Nearly a century after the end of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of nominal Arab sovereignty and independence, stability remains elusive, prosperity a distant dream, constitutional and democratic governance a teasing mirage. A mighty modern battle for power and national identity continues to be waged in the streets of many Arab cities, by frightened, vulnerable but determined citizens on both sides of the barricades.

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A Historic and Frightening Moment in Beirut

December 1, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BEIRUT — There is something at once both historic and frightening about the open-ended mass street protest that was launched in Beirut Friday by Hizbullah and its allies, aiming to topple the government headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

The historic element is that this is a rare instance of mass political action that is declared to be peaceful and designed to change a government. We simply do not have this tradition in the Arab World, which has been characterized more commonly by violent coups and long-running police states. It is also relatively positive that Hizbullah is focused on domestic political engagement, rather than fighting regional or internal wars. Its substantial clout and legitimacy, not to mention its armed capability, cannot long remain outside the structures of political governance or on their periphery.

It is historically useful, if slightly unsettling on the nerves, to find out exactly how the government and the opposition line up in terms of popular and political strength. The so-called March 14 forces of the government coalition and the March 8 forces of Hizbullah and its allies have now squared off in, hopefully, a peaceful, democratic, political contest of wills. The important new element here is not just Hizbullah’s aggressive domestic challenge to the government; it is also the government’s resolute resistance to Hizbullah’s challenge.

Never before has a Lebanese government stood its ground before a challenge from Hizbullah and its allies, as the Siniora government is doing now. This is a moment of historical reckoning for Hizbullah, its allies, and its supporters in Syria and Iran, as it is for the Siniora government and its backers in Lebanon, the Arab world, the United States and the West. We are in uncharted territory now.

Lebanon must renegotiate a new political compact based on a realistic rather than an imagined balance of power and demography that safeguards the interests and integrity of all Lebanese. If the current events represent phase two of such a renegotiated power balance — phase one being the adjustments in the Taif accord that ended the civil war in 1989 — then something positive might emerge from these street demonstrations and their associated political confrontations, assuming they lead peacefully to a new government or fresh elections.

The bad news is that this protest and what it may portend in the near future reflect several worrying realities. The Lebanese domestic political system of consensus-building in a multi-confessional society seems to have broken down. The executive cabinet, the parliament, and the special national dialogue of top factional leaders all simultaneously failed to address the political disputes that have plagued Lebanon recently. This is the common predicament of much of the modern Arab world, whose dysfunctional and often dishonest structures of governance do not accurately reflect popular sentiments.

For Hizbullah and its allies to drop the existing political structures and opt for mass street demonstrations, after participating in the government and parliament for years, seems perplexing to many, myself included. If this government is illegitimate, as Hizbullah charges, why did Hizbullah join the government in the first place? If the government’s illegitimacy is mainly a function of its
determination to proceed with the mixed Lebanese-international tribunal that will try those accused of killing the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others since February last year, then we have the bigger and more vexing problem of Lebanese-Syrian tensions. If so, this should be acknowledged and resolved as an act of honest and courageous leadership, rather than camouflaged as a perpetual charade that demeans the self-respect of Lebanese and Syrians alike.

It has always been both a weakness and a strength of Lebanese and Arab politics that honesty and clarity are sacrificed for the sake of an ambiguity that allows all sides to make compromises and achieve a usually unstable consensus. In Lebanon, this has always been referred to as the political system of “no victor, no vanquished.” Unfortunately, it also usually means no resolution of fundamental political disagreements.

This tradition cannot prevail if the real issue at hand is a Syrian-American confrontation in Lebanon through the proxy of Hizbullah and the Siniora government, which seems to be the case (just as this summer’s war was a proxy military battle between Iran and the United States). If Hizbullah wants to bring down the Siniora government mainly to stop or dilute the Lebanese-international Hariri murder tribunal on behalf of Syria, while a majority of Lebanese clearly wants the Hariri killers held accountable, there are no easy or quick solutions.

One option is to perpetuate the political clashes, and probably the assassinations and bombings, in Lebanon until the Hariri murder investigation is finished, the accused are named and tried, and, consequently, the fate of the Syrian regime and Syrian-Lebanese relations both become more clear. The other option is to force Hizbullah and its allies — usually described as “pro-Syrian” — to reveal if their main aim is to serve Syria or serve Lebanon, perhaps by giving them the one-third of the cabinet they want in return for their approval of the tribunal.

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Released: 01 December 2006
Word Count: 837
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This Historic Moment for Peace-making

November 28, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BEIRUT — When the leaders of Israel and Hamas in the same weekend offer each other long-term peace deals, you just know in your bones that we are passing through a potentially historic moment. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said November 26, that Israel was prepared to leave much of the occupied territories, release many Palestinian prisoners, remove many roadblocks and checkpoints, and restore the delivery of withheld tax funds that belong to the Palestinians. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal for his part said in Cairo, the day before, that the Palestinians expect to see serious progress towards a Palestinian state in all the territories occupied in 1967 — which Hamas approves — or else a third intifada would erupt.

It would be easy for both sides to write off the offers that Olmert and Meshaal made as propaganda exercises. It would also be a great shame, because beneath their conditional and tentative public offers to live in peace are some crucial political realities that must be seized and built upon, before they evaporate: Israelis and Palestinians are nearing exhaustion in their existential battle for the land of Palestine/Israel, and both recognize that their prevailing military strategies will not achieve their long-term goals. They understand that the rest of the world is perfectly happy to watch them kill each other for years to come, so consequently they both seem prepared to explore means of achieving their basic national goals through peaceful negotiations.

These men are not spelling out comprehensive, detailed peace plans. They demand of the other side much more than they are prepared to give. Neither will unilaterally offer the concessions demanded of them. Yet, we should recognize what they are doing this week: They are sending important signals of a conditional willingness to coexist, which they manifested in a more limited manner with their agreement to implement a cease-fire in Gaza last weekend. The Palestinians agreed to stop firing rockets into southern Israel, and Israel agreed to pull its troops out of Gaza and halt attacks against the Palestinians there.

This is a significant opening that U.S. President George W. Bush should pounce on when he visits the Middle East this week, so that the Palestinian-Israeli diplomatic flirting could be expanded into a serious negotiation. Such a move would unlock doors leading to calming or resolving other conflicts in the region, including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.

Bush and his Quartet partners should immediately call for an open-ended meeting with an Arab League delegation headed by several Arab heads of state to work on a single agenda item: How can we reconcile the 2002 Arab Summit Peace Plan that offers Arab coexistence with Israel and a Palestinian state with this week’s Olmert and Meshaal offers and Bush’s own vision of peace based on Israeli and Palestinian states living peacefully alongside each other? They should all come to the gathering on the basis of just one inviolable principle: they will all stop their military activities and commit themselves to negotiations to achieve a mutually agreed peace on the basis of UN resolutions and prevailing international law. Nothing else will be demanded or conceded other than this starting point for talks.

This rare moment of Palestinians and Israelis hinting at their mutual right to live in peace and recognition coincides with Bush’s arrival in the Middle East at a decisive juncture in the region’s modern history. Political tensions and active wars plague half a dozen Arab countries, while the region suffers increased interference by non-Arab parties like Iran, the United States and the UK. Our region cannot afford to remain mired in worsening armed conflict, civil wars, and a maelstrom of mindless self-destruction. It can instead move towards a more stable and satisfying future, by rationally and systematically resolving the conflicts that afflict it.

The Palestine-Israel conflict is at the center of the region’s continuing radicalization and militarization. Resolving it peacefully — which is possible — remains the single most useful contribution to lowering tensions throughout the entire area.

The opening we have this week is fragile, but real. The players in the region and the principal actors abroad should not allow their cynicism, pride or narrow domestic political interests to overshadow their sense of responsibility or their basic decency and rationality at this crucial moment. If central characters such as Olmert and Meshaal are unilaterally making imprecise offers for peace and coexistence, even in vague, temporary or open-ended truces, the rest of us should jump on this new constellation of positions.

It would be irresponsible folly to leave this for the United States to handle on its own, given its proven track record as a partisan and unsuccessful mediator. If the Quartet with its roadmap and the Arab League with its peace plan have any life left in them, this is their moment to work together quickly to push Israelis and Arabs towards a structured negotiation anchored in more explicit and mutual national rights for all concerned. Moments like this do not come along very often.

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America’s Enduring Values

November 26, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BOSTON — I’ve just spent seven weeks in the United States and encountered hundreds of students, professors and other ordinary citizens all around the country who share a set of powerful ideas — personal liberty, pluralism, and equal rights and opportunities guaranteed by the rule of law. Yet America also runs into great difficulties when it takes its ideals around the world on the back of its army trucks and air force planes. Consequently, American society is tempered today by some humility, anchored in genuine perplexity.

The militant arrogance and aggressive self-assuredness that often defined American public and foreign policy in recent years have given way in places to a more humble spirit of enquiry. Everywhere I went, Americans asked the same questions: Why does the world resist American attempts to promote democracy? Why do so many people all over the world criticize the US? Why is the American “noble” mission in Iraq going so badly?

Based at Stanford University in northern California and Northeastern University in Boston, I traveled throughout the land and heard citizens everywhere ask honest questions about how the US should best behave in the world. I encountered only the rare wild accusations about Arabs and Muslims or equally jingoistic assertions of America knows best. If the world changed for Americans after 9/11, it seems to be changing again these days, and for the better.

Typical were the questions I had from a class of over 300 students at Northeastern University on globalization and international affairs — itself a sign of the growing interest here in learning about the world, rather than sending the troops abroad to re-arrange it. A few energized students slammed me as a “raving fanatic” and asked how I dared to deliver my “ideologically skewed views in a society with freedom of thought”, and I thanked them for their candor and for keeping me on my toes.

Most students, however, actually engaged on the issues of the United States in the world, asking thoughtful questions: Did I think the Arabs were guilty of the same sort of hypocrisy of which I accused the United States? (Yes, in most cases). How can Arabs and Americans better understand each other if their mass media do a poor job of accurately portraying the other side? (Demand better media as consumers, and seek out people from the other side to meet and talk to.) If Israel acceded to Arab demands on a peaceful settlement, would this be taken as a sign of weakness, and thus exploited? (Not if a peace agreement were anchored in the rule of law, applied to both sides equally, and cemented with strong security guarantees for all.) Is the United States using terror-like tactics in the Middle East by violently coercing the Iraqis to form a democracy? (Probably more intellectual than physical terror, in most cases.) What is the best course of action for the United States to bring order to Iraq now? (Start withdrawing slowly, and let the Iraqis define their governance system and power-sharing consensus, so that their own legitimate government can stop the violence that plagues them.) How can Israel talk to “terrorists” like Hamas? (Calmly, over a cup of coffee at the Notre Dame Center in Jerusalem, in order to implement a truce and move both societies towards coexistence in this generation, and full peace in the next.)

Two brief encounters with elderly and young Americans during my trip clarified again my appreciation for America’s basic strengths. One was a conversation on an airplane trip with a semi-retired, elderly judge on the circuit court of appeals in North Dakota, who has been on the bench since the 1960s. I asked him how the rule of law had evolved in his lifetime, and what he most admired about his work. He replied that judicial appointments had become more politicized, and that the legal system worked best when judges of all political persuasions worked together to interpret the law honestly and fairly. Politics often tips the system one way or the other, he said, but it always rights itself through the self-correcting democratic engagement of ordinary citizens, adding that impartial judges are there to make sure this happens. I nodded my head in agreement, and with more respect than he could ever imagine one human being could offer another.

The second encounter was with a student-soldier at a university in Boston, an earnest young man who was on leave from the armed forces to pursue his degree. He was clearly grappling with many political and ideological issues related to the use of the U.S. military abroad. He cut through the haze, though, with his assertion that he and his fellow soldiers focused always on the basic mission that defined their work and life: We serve to defend the constitution of the United States, he said, not the particular ideology of any political leaders who come and go in Washington.

The judge, I thought, would have been pleased to know that his constitution was in good hands, on its journey to a new generation of young and spirited Americans.

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Gemayel Assassination and the Lebanon Circle of Violence

November 21, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BOSTON — The assassination of Lebanese member of parliament Pierre Gemayel Tuesday sadly does not represent any new direction in Lebanese politics, where targeted killings have scarred the political landscape for years. But it will quickly accelerate and exacerbate existing tensions that reflect a much wider regional and global battle that has been underway for the past year.

The real issue at hand here is Syria’s continued and deeply contested influence in Lebanon — even though Syrian troops left Lebanon three months after Damascus was blamed for the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. The rapid and robust international outcry and accusations against Syria, Iran and Hizbullah similarly indicate that this battle will not be decided only by local forces in Lebanon.

It is telling that the main political forces in Lebanon are still identified today as pro- or anti-Syrian. Immediate anger in Lebanon has been directed against the Syrians and their Lebanese allies — mainly Hizbullah and President Emile Lahoud, but also to an extent Christian leader Michael Aoun. They have all condemned the crime, avowed their innocence, and called for calm in Lebanon.

This crime is in line with half a dozen other attacks and killings of prominent Christian media and political figures in the 19 months after the Hariri assassination. The young Gemayel was not a leading political figure in terms of experience or influence; but, his pedigree Christian and Lebanese nationalist lineage made him a powerfully symbolic target for anyone who aimed to enrage the largely Christian-led anti-Syrian and pro-Western camp in Lebanon.

Many observers find it hard to see how Syria — if indeed it were the culprit — would benefit from committing such a crude crime, given its intense scrutiny by the Security Council-mandated investigation into the recent string of political assassinations in Lebanon. Syrian opponents, on the other hand, say the regime is trying systematically to terrorize and intimidate the Lebanese political class into submission, so that Damascus can revert to its previous status as overlord of all Lebanon.

Culpability and innocence are not the real issue at hand today. Rather, it is the ideological battle for the control of Lebanon’s soul and political system — pitting Arabism and Islamism, on the one hand, against a liberal, Western-oriented cosmopolitanism on the other. That battle will be determined in years to come by events in Syria, Iran and Washington, more than in Beirut.

The fear for Lebanon now is that this assassination completes a terrible circle of violence and tension that threatens to explode into much worse degradation. In recent months, Lebanon has suffered a violent war with Israel, massive destruction of infrastructure and — mainly Shiite — residential areas, internal political threats and confrontations, a nearly crippled cabinet due to the resignation of six pro-Hizbullah members, the specter of massive street demonstrations, a stalled economy, more overt external political interference by Middle Eastern and Western powers, concerns about a growing Al-Qaeda-linked presence in the country, and renewed mutual squabbling about the legitimacy of the president and the cabinet.

The resumption of political assassinations threatens to explode the political situation along its major fault lines: Syria-friendly forces aligned around the core proven power of Hizbullah and its allies, and Syrian opponents centered around Hariri- and US-backed prime minister Fouad Siniora and his March 14 coalition.

Hizbullah in the past month has challenged the Siniora government politically, calling it a U.S. puppet and demanding that it be expanded and revised to give Hizbullah and its allies a greater share of power. Speculation is rife that this aims primarily at emasculating the international tribunal being established now to try those who will be accused of the Hariri and other murders.

The United States and other Western powers forcefully support the Siniora government, just as they supported Israel in its military assault on Hizbullah in the summer. They expect the UN investigation of the Hariri murder and the new international tribunal to shatter or at least moderate the Syrian regime and security system that they blame for Lebanon’s ills.

The real concern now is that the Gemayel assassination will trigger anti-Hizbullah and anti-Syrian anger that will aggravate internal tensions and turn them violent, while simultaneously heightening explicit American diplomatic confrontations with Hizbullah-backers Syria and Iran.

Washington may temper this approach if it decides it needs Syria and Iran to help it exit gracefully from Iraq — in which case Lebanon may get only rhetorical support, while Washington strikes a self-serving deal with Syria to salvage Iraq. This is the great fear of many Lebanese, especially after seeing Washington’s commitment to Lebanese sovereignty and security go into temporary summer hibernation during Israel’s attacks this summer. In either case, this spells rough days ahead in Lebanon and the region.

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When Condi Comes a Courtin’

November 21, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

BOSTON — It is difficult to read a serious news analysis of American options in Iraq without running into the idea that Washington must open a dialogue with Syria and Iran. This means that Iran and Syria have won the first round of their political boxing match with the United States — also that we are likely to witness a spike in regional tensions. Round two of this contest for control of the Middle East sees the antagonists probing all angles of their opponent’s potential weak spots.

The U.S. bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton is expected to include in its recommendations to President George W. Bush the opening of a dialogue with Syria and Iran, seeking their cooperation in stabilizing Iraq and allowing the United States to withdraw. The study group, sensibly, has already met with Syrian and Iranian diplomats in the United States and at the UN.

Currently, this concept of engaging Syria and Iran smacks of a troubling combination of romanticism, desperation and neo-colonialism. Syria and Iran have a combined total of around 10,000 years of cumulative experience in dealing with foreign armies that come into the area with an eye to re-configuring the region and dominating the world. They know how to deal with such phenomena, including by letting the foreigners get hopelessly stuck in the local quicksand, spinning them around a few times to increase their confusion, and then negotiating a deal that gets them out, make them look good, and reverts local hegemony to the local powers.

The United States has used significant diplomatic and economic pressures, and not-so-veiled military threats, in the past three years to attempt changes in the policies of Damascus and Tehran, without major success. So now it seems prepared to try a more rational approach. Syria and Iran are perfectly willing to engage in dialogue. They have a list of issues they would like to include in such discussions, starting with an American commitment to drop regime change as a sword Washington hangs over their head.

Yet Syria and Iran are unlikely to behave like Libya, caving in to pressure and unilaterally giving the United States what it wants. In recent years they have done exactly the opposite, by defying Washington and the world. Both countries feel they are in strong positions for the moment, and will become even stronger when they are courted by Condoleezza Rice. They will demand a high price for cooperating with the United States and helping it leave Iraq.

As part of the negotiating process, they will pressure the United States by pursuing policies that further weaken Washington’s already frayed position throughout the Middle East. Syria and Iran can do this through their control of their long borders with Iraq, their ties with groups inside Iraq, their close working relations with Hamas and Hizbullah, and their capacity for mischief and political violence in Lebanon and throughout the region.

Many Lebanese, in particular, are concerned that Syria and Iran will both demand greater control of Lebanese affairs in return for cooperating on Iraq. This battle is already underway in the streets and political corridors of Beirut.

Damascus and Tehran also know that preemptive cooperation is usually more effective than preemptive regime change as a foreign policy instrument, which is why the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem, was in Iraq earlier this week for discussions on reopening diplomatic ties with Baghdad. A Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian summit of presidents may happen soon.

Washington is in the awkward position of seeking a dialogue and political cooperation with two countries that it has either mainly ignored or actively sanctioned and threatened in recent years. It has diligently disregarded their advice on addressing the Palestine-Israel issue and Israeli occupation of Arab lands as the essential starting point for any revised and more constructive American engagement in the region. So now Washington expects them both to stand at attention and offer cordial assistance, only because the United States cannot figure out how to get out of the mess it created for itself and for Iraq? Neo-colonialism comes in many forms, and this is only the latest and most acute.

The United States is prepared to make reasonable deals — as most superpowers desperate for redemptive exit strategies from foreign military adventures usually are. The problem for Washington is that its recent pressures against Iran and Syria have expanded into international processes. A Security Council-mandated investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri may blame Syrians for the dirty deed, and Iran is being hauled in front of the same Security Council to be sanctioned for its ongoing nuclear industry developments.

Neither of these endeavors can be turned on and off at Washington’s will, nor should they be. Yet they will be high on the Syrian and Iranian lists of issues to discuss with Washington. Expanding roles for Syria and Iran in the region may be the price the United States and the world have to pay for restoring stability in Iraq, which understandably frightens many people in the region.

It is important that in its hurry to find an exit strategy for itself from Iraq, a chastened Washington does not simply embrace new forms of neocolonial behavior and plunge the Middle East into ever more volatile forms of instability or revised configurations of local security states that it warmly embraces.

A democratic, free, stable Middle East remains a good idea, but the lessons of the day would seem to be that it will not be achieved by either American militarism or indigenous autocracy.

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Listening to a Peace Pro

November 17, 2006 - Rami G. Khouri

NEW YORK — When you want to make peace, it is useful to turn to a proven peace-maker. The other day here in New York I had the chance to sit down with one of the successful peace-makers of our time and explore the lessons of his own rich experience, especially in view of current attempts to revive a Middle East peace conference.

The man I mean is former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, who spent years in the Clinton administration as the American envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. He also had brief roles in the Palestine-Israel and Bosnia conflicts, but his great and lasting success was representing the United States over five years in mediating and facilitating the peace talks in Northern Ireland in the late 1990s and beyond.

Few people in the world enjoy his perspective of knowing both the Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine conflicts from personal diplomatic experience. Because of his eminent sensibility and good judgment — he served as a judge in his earlier career — along with his political experience in reaching compromise agreements in American national politics, I thought his views and suggestions on how to approach peace-making in the Arab-Israeli conflict today would be worth exploring. He very quickly proved me correct.

He first cautioned against making too many parallels between the two situations, which have distinct characteristics and contexts, but he also saw some general truisms that pertain to all peace-making attempts. Three in particular were noteworthy. First, he said, all sides in a negotiation must commit to stopping the violence and to reaching an agreement only through peaceful diplomacy. Peace agreements are unlikely to emanate from a context of continuing conflict and lack of trust.

Second, patience and determination are vital. Participants and mediators alike cannot give up when they hit a snag or suffered violent incidents.

Third, one must dispel the notion that some very difficult conflicts are destined to go on forever, and instead affirm that a negotiated resolution can be achieved.

A successful negotiation also needs a fair mediator who is both persistent and impartial; this will help to reinforce the essential perception of the parties that their minimum demands and their basic human dignity can be achieved through peaceful diplomacy.

Senator Mitchell’s experience in the Middle East mainly comprised an international team he led in 2001 after the second intifada had broken out soon after the failure of the Camp David II talks. His team produced a report in 2001 on how to stop the fighting and move back to Israel-Palestinian negotiations. The report was accepted by both sides, with some reservations, but it never achieved its goals because its recommendations were not implemented, due to lack of political follow-up.

Senator Mitchell’s observations are noteworthy today because of the numerous signs in Palestine, other Arab countries, the United States and Europe indicating a growing interest in reviving some sort of international conference to explore movement towards a negotiated, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement.

My own sense is that chances of success remain slim today, in view of Israel’s skepticism and the penchant of most parties with their shallow leaderships to hold onto hard-line positions and remain locked in confrontation and conflict. Yet pressure may build to resume negotiations, especially as an adjunct to progress in Iraq. If so, Senator Mitchell’s experience in Northern Ireland should be studied carefully.

He emphasizes the need to engage all relevant parties in any peace process. The Northern Ireland talks never progressed for years because key parties linked to paramilitary groups were excluded. The better approach — which worked in Northern Ireland — is to bring in all the main players but insist they commit to a non-violent resolution of their conflict.

The implications for the current situation in the Middle East seem clear. Parties that some people want to exclude from the political process, like Hamas, must have an opportunity to make and exchange views, Mitchell said. He did not directly engage the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, but dealt with them indirectly through their political arm, Sinn Fein. The critical breakthrough was to get their commitment, along with the Unionists’, to an end to violence as a precondition to talking, though also without their making any prior commitment on the substance of the negotiations or the end result.

He reminds us that all parties to a long and bitter conflict have to have their say and be taken seriously, in order to help reduce the sense of victimization that often defines their community. Those who use violence and then commit to non-violent conflict resolution will do so only if they are convinced that they will achieve their minimum goals through a peaceful process that is mediated fairly by a truly objective third party. The United States is the only external party today that can help negotiate Arab-Israeli peace, he believes, and it should persevere more in the region for this purpose.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star.

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Lebanon Makes History in Many Ways

Revisiting the Israeli Lobby Debate

Does Middle East Modernity Start This Week?

A Century of Elusive Arab Nationhood

A Historic and Frightening Moment in Beirut

This Historic Moment for Peace-making

America’s Enduring Values

Gemayel Assassination and the Lebanon Circle of Violence

When Condi Comes a Courtin’

Listening to a Peace Pro

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