BEIRUT — The sweeping victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s parliamentary election Sunday is historic for Turkey, but it also holds important lessons for others, such as the United States, European Union and other Western governments, and Islamist political parties throughout the Arab world. The lessons revolve around three related issues: the participation of Islamist parties in democratic transformations in the Middle East; the relationship between secularist nationalism enforced by the armed forces and electoral Islamism supported by much of the citizenry; and, how Western democracies should most effectively deal with situations in which democracy and Islamist parties rear their heads simultaneously in the developing Middle East. As always, Turkey has much to teach us all.

Many in the Arab world, and honest men and women in the West and Israel, should now compare and contrast the experience of political Islamists in Turkey and Arab countries, and ask: Why the glaring contrast between how the US-EU democracies engage with triumphant Islamist democrats in Turkey, and how these same US-EU democracies sanction and lay siege to triumphant Islamists in the Arab world, especially Hamas in Palestine?

The trajectory of previous Islamist parties in Turkey, that were twice banned and ejected by the armed forces in the 1990s, ultimately gave way to the pragmatism and realism of the AKP. This has led them not only to victorious incumbency, but also to this week’s strong popular reaffirmation by the most important force in a real democracy — the thinking, voting citizenry.

This week’s victory is especially significant because it is also a slap in the face to the strong-armed tactics of the armed forces, who made it clear in early May that they would intervene to safeguard Turkey’s secular system in the face of any real or imagined Islamist threat. The populace and the AKP both reaffirmed their commitment to Turkish secularism, democracy, rule of law, economic reform, and the desired entry into the European Union. The election, in one fell swoop, telescoped centuries of Orientalist distortions about Middle Eastern governance and political values into a single, clear affirmation of contemporary Turkey’s most important lesson for us all: It is, in fact, easy to reconcile democracy, nationalism, secularism, republicanism, constitutionalism, stability, prosperity and Islam in a single process. That process is inclusive, honest democracy, in which all legitimate players take part and the winner is allowed to govern.

The US-EU wisely engaged Turkey’s political system over the past two decades and gently prodded it towards a combination of liberal human rights norms and economic reforms that have served the country well. The armed forces accepted the need to give way to legitimate elected governments. The AKP and its precursor Islamist parties learned that to be taken seriously they must adhere to reasonable rules defined by the majority of Turks, not by the armed forces or the West alone. Their repeated success reflects their ability to identify and respond to the will of the Turkish majority, which wants to affirm its Islamic values while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of a democratic electoral system, a secular public space, a growing economy, and national Turkish pride. Consequently, the constitutional issues being contested in Turkey are playing out impressively in the arenas of elections, peaceful rallies, court hearings, the media, and the court of public opinion.

Why has this process not happened in any Arab country? One key element is there: the willingness of mainstream Islamists to engage in democratic and electoral politics, as we have witnessed in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt since the late 1980s.

Other key elements, however, are not in place in the Arab world. The armed forces and security systems that rule many Arab countries do not feel the need to meet the Islamists and their citizens halfway. The United States and European Union have not engaged Arab Islamists fairly, as they have the Turks. The Western-Israeli boycott of victoriously elected Hamas has been devastating for the credibility of democratic transformations in Arab lands — though it does not seem to have hurt Hamas’ legitimacy very much. Arab ruling elites are not very inclined to engage Islamist parties honestly, or afford them the opportunity to govern should they win a free and fair election.

The issue of Israel also looms large, because Arab Islamist sentiments are fostered in part as a form of resistance to Israeli occupation and aggression. Islamists who fight Israel in legitimate resistance or self-defense find themselves nullified and rejected as democratic actors in domestic politics — a nullification fervently supported by the United States, with the Europeans dragged behind unimpressively.

Turkey’s lesson is that absolutist governance formulae do not work, and relative political compromises and balances are better options that enjoy widespread popular support. Islamists (as well as nationalists, leftists and others driven by firm ideologies) who are accepted in democratic politics and win elections usually become more pragmatic when they are subjected to the accountability of their entire citizenries. Thank you, Turkey, for reminding us of this.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 25 June 2007
Word Count: 833
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BEIRUT — Iran is at once impressive yet offensive. I want to embrace it, but it keeps pushing me away through its own misdeeds. Iran is widely demonized in the United States, much of Europe, and throughout Arab official circles and pockets of Arab society. Yet, it is also lionized among other quarters in the Middle East and the world. It is difficult these days to hear a nuanced view of Iran, because of the crush of absolute verdicts that see it as either historically virtuous or criminally evil.

I share this dilemma over Iranian policies and behavior. Is it possible — even ideologically permissible — to see both good and bad lurking in the same place? I think that in the case of Iran, we should make the effort. I am not an Iran expert and have never visited the country, so I speak from secondhand knowledge derived from much reading and speaking with Iranians and scholars of that land.

Any thinking citizen of the world must recognize that Iran matters in the Middle East, and increasingly in the world. It matters because of its size, wealth, location, ideological tenor, activist foreign policy, religious and ethnic links with its neighbors, and a continuing insistence on redressing historical grievances (especially Western coups and manipulation, and Arab mistreatment of Arab Shiites as well as Iran itself). It is a dramatic example of the modern legacy of Middle Eastern yo-yo nationalism — sovereign countries that alternate between being close allies and then fervent foes of the United States, European powers and Israel.

Since the Iranian revolution and the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been in the forefront of Middle Eastern resistance to Western power (and its Israeli adjunct), which generates for it much popular support throughout the Arab world and further afield. Iran in this period also has been one of the most dynamic examples of pluralistic and vibrant domestic culture, with a wide range of ideas, periodicals and popular movements that compete for public space and allegiance inside the country. Its ideologically managed local and national elections nevertheless have also been an endless source of national self-expression and surprises, including twice electing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, and the surprise victory of current populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It has defied and challenged international double standards, and persists in building a full, allegedly non-military, nuclear industry on the basis of rights inherent in international conventions. There is much to admire in Iran and its people.

At the same time, Iran has been a model of Third World police state excesses. The bad things that Iran does are really bad. The regime has murdered hundreds of opponents or dissidents, jailed thousands, and driven tens of thousands into exile. Its economic mismanagement blurs the line between comic ineptitude and criminal incompetence. It has been accused of exporting revolutionary zeal, and promoting and practicing terror against civilians in other countries. It has much to answer for.

These days we witness another example of Iran at its most stupid or sinister, or simply as politically crude and cruel: the detention of several Iranian-Americans and their parading on television in an attempt to support accusations that they are fomenting revolution in Iran. Most prominent of the several detained people is Haleh Esfandiari of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the United States. She and the other detainees, like many Iranians also detained in recent years, are accused of endangering Iran’s national security because of their work in the world of civil society, which includes inviting lecturers, holding conferences and promoting research.

I stand with those who admire much about Iran but see these accusations as ludicrous and untenable. For unclear reasons, Iran goes through the charade of manufacturing threats based on long-standing and historically-anchored fears of Western coups against Iranian governments. We should not, however, confuse legitimate complaints against Washington with equally legitimate and honorable civil society and scholarly activities undertaken by individuals and institutes such as those that Iran now accuses of malicious intent.

I can only speak from personal experience of Haleh Esfandiari and the Woodrow Wilson Center, from whom I accepted an invitation to speak on developments in the Middle East a few years ago. I would do so again with pleasure, not only because Dr. Esfandiari is an honest and honorable person, but mainly because for open-minded people to gather and analytically discuss the condition and direction of their world is a vital aspect of pluralistic, democratic societies. Iran has done this on and off throughout its modern history, and now is passing through an “off” period.

Iran’s detentions and accusations against Esfandiari and her colleagues are juvenile and irresponsible acts by an otherwise mature and impressive culture that insists now and then on showing its dark side.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 21 June 2007
Word Count: 795
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BEIRUT — It is hard to know if we should be pleased or terrified that U.S. President George W. Bush Monday signaled renewed American involvement in Arab-Israeli peace-making. It is certainly vital to have direct American engagement in order to move ahead on this issue. So signs of American direct activism are to be welcomed in principle. But if such engagement is biased among the principal parties, half-hearted in spirit, and ideologically motivated by wider American battles in the region, then Washington’s involvement becomes a force for aggravating rather than resolving conflicts.

I fear that Bush’s call for movement on Arab-Israeli peace-making reflects the latter concerns, and will not get very far if current positions prevail all around. Still, this is an opportunity that the Arab world should not simply dismiss out of hand because of Bush’s obvious bias towards Israel and antipathy towards Hamas. We should call Bush’s bluff, and indeed find out if he is bluffing or serious.

We in the Arab world — and reasonable people everywhere — should take this as an opportunity to nudge Washington towards a more balanced and constructive role. A good place to start is Bush’s own remarks on Monday, which reflect the same combination of ignorance and bias that drives America’s ugly engagement in Iraq. Three principal problems need to be cleared up.

The first is the basic issue of the legitimacy of the peace-making process and framework. Bush’s attempt to unilaterally define the ground rules of re-engagement for peace-making in terms of what is convenient for American politicians — because it is acceptable to Israel — is farcical, and perpetuates long-standing constraints in American mediation for peace. He demands much more specific gestures from Arabs and Palestinians than he does from Israelis. He unilaterally and continuously shifts the markers for peace-making. His call for “a territorial settlement, with mutually agreed borders reflecting previous lines and current realities, and mutually agreed adjustments” means that “current realities” of Israeli settlements are a factor to be acknowledged. He blatantly ignores the scores of UN resolutions over the last 40 years that say they are illegal and must be removed.

He dilutes this issue further by saying that “Israelis should find other practical ways to reduce their footprint without reducing their security” — making smaller shoe sizes the new standard for compliance with international law, rather than ending the brutal colonization that Israeli settlements represent. Serious would-be peace mediators and negotiators do not start by mangling the law and leaning to one side among the disputants.

The second problem with Bush’s approach is that he takes sides in the political quarrel among Palestinians — trying to wipe away Hamas and assert the dominance of President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh party. Hamas deserves criticism on some serious counts, no doubt, but its fate must reflect the democratic will of the Palestinians. Attacking Hamas and supporting Abbas through the ideological bias of an American president, prodded by Israeli wishes and pro-Israeli American fanatics, totally contradicts the task of a third party external mediator for peace talks.

Bush is not taken seriously by anyone when he uses the following descriptions, as he did Monday, to demonize Hamas: “terror and death… extremists… a danger… terror and violence… forces of radicalism and violence… killing by Hamas extremism and violence… acts of aggression and terror… extremism and murder… a lawless and violent takeover… chaos and murder… terror and cynicism and anger… extremists… murderers in black masks… summary executions… men thrown to their death from rooftops… chaos and suffering… the endless perpetuation of grievance… betrayed the Palestinian people.”

Still, Bush was correct to say, “This is a moment of clarity for all Palestinians. And now comes a moment of choice.” He needs to recognize that this also applies to him: Washington must decide if it wants to be a cosmic morality warrior, or Israel’s unique guardian above all other values, or a credible mediator to promote equal rights for Palestinians, Israelis, and other concerned Arabs. It cannot be all three at once.

The third problem with Bush’s approach is his tendency to mix up the specifics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the intra-Palestinian political feud with his “global war on terror.” He is understandably obsessed with the real terror threat, but he should not let it totally cloud his ability to think rationally about the causes and solutions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They are very different issues. By combining them in this single worldview, he makes his country appear to be a global intellectual buffoon: a major global instigator of new terrorists via adventures such as Iraq, and a discredited and marginal player in Arab-Israeli peace-making.

These are all correctable problems, as are the corresponding weaknesses in Arab, Israeli, European and Russian stances. We should collectively encourage Bush and the United States to pursue Arab-Israeli peace-making, but on a credible, realistic and honest path, not on a journey through conceptual and diplomatic roller coasters, horror shows, trick mirrors and shoot-outs at the OK Corral.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 17 June 2007
Word Count: 827
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BEIRUT — One of the most important groups on the Lebanese and Middle Eastern political scene these days, Hizbullah in Lebanon, is also one of the most enigmatic. As we are flooded with articles and analyses this week on the first anniversary of the Hizbullah-Israel war of July-August 2006, much attention in Lebanon falls on Hizbullah and its aims, which remain unclear to many people. Hizbullah’s perception inside and outside Lebanon is polarized. Many throughout the Middle East and other developing regions regard Hizbullah and its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah with awe, while many others in the West, in the United States especially, usually refer to it simply as a terrorist group.

It is important to acknowledge what Hizbullah is and is not, because it has become a central actor in a political standoff in Lebanon that itself has become a central battleground in the ideological war of the Middle East today. A useful new book has just appeared that helps interested parties to understand Hizbullah more accurately. It is a small book of 187 pages by the respected American political scientist Augustus Richard Norton, a professor at Boston University, entitled Hezbollah, A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2007).

The many complex and often changing dimensions of Hizbullah are presented in the book in a clear, concise manner that allows for a more accurate and complete understanding of what the group represents and aspires to achieve. It is easier to know where Hizbullah came from than to say for sure where it is headed. A better grasp of its origins and past political positions is crucial for any serious discussion of its future strategy. Norton gives a concise summary of how Hizbullah emerged from the Shiite empowerment movements in southern Lebanon in the 1970s to dominate the political representation of Lebanese Shiites in the 1980s.

He concludes, as do many others, that Hizbullah’s hard-line positions on an Islamic society, or politics in Lebanon, outlined in its 1985 open letter to “the downtrodden in Lebanon and the world,” eased in recent years, as it “pragmatically confronted the shifting political landscape of regional politics, as well as the changing terrain of Lebanese politics.”

One of the best chapters in the book examines “Hizbullah and violence,” exploring both its resistance to Israel in Lebanon since the early 1980s and also the accusations that it has engaged in terrorism, such as suicide bombings against American and French forces in 1983. He concludes, as do many others, that the group did engage in some acts that are clearly defined as terrorism ( such as the 1985 hijacking of a TWA plane) while many of the other acts of violence attributed to it are probably more likely the work of Iran. The bulk of Hizbullah’s military actions, he notes, comprises legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory.

One reason Norton can do this is that he spent several years living in south Lebanon in the 1980s when he worked with the United Nations forces there. And having an American scholar go through the paces of such an exercise — looking with some nuance at the different kinds of actions that Hizbullah has undertaken in its history — is itself a useful process that others would do well to emulate.

The book’s limited size does not allow for a deep treatment of some of the most fascinating dimensions of Hizbullah today, as it focuses more intently on contesting power in the domestic Lebanese political system. The chapter on “Playing Politics” nicely captures Hizbullah’s decision to enter domestic politics in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Norton shows how in domestic politics it has played down its religious themes, while often striking pragmatic political bargains, even with ideological opposites such as secular leftists.

The book concludes with some analysis of Hizbullah’s current challenge to the Fouad Siniora government, noting ironically that the United States supported peaceful street protests in 2005 to topple a pro-Syrian government, but today opposes Hizbullah’s street protests to change or redraw the Siniora government. One reason for this, of course, is the concern of many in Lebanon and abroad about how much Hizbullah merely reflects Syrian and Iranian strategy.

Norton’s straightforward manner of dispassionately describing and assessing Hizbullah is a valuable example and should be emulated by others who seek to understand what is happening in Lebanon today. Hizbullah is a prototype that many in the Middle East will want to emulate, while others in the region and abroad would like to destroy it. Wherever one may stand on this spectrum of views, a vital starting point — offered in this small but rich volume — is an accurate, comprehensive view of why Hizbullah has succeeded as a political party, a sectarian representational group, a social services agency, and a military resistance force — and why it continues to generate so much opposition at the same time.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 14 July 2007
Word Count: 806
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BEIRUT — The designation last week of the modern day seven wonders of the world via a global poll of 100 million people offers a nice break from the usual menu of depressing violence and conflict around the world. We in the Arab world are especially pleased that one site, Petra in Jordan, made the list.

Though all the winners were architectural or other built structures, there may be deeper lessons here than merely the expected rewards of increased tourism. I know that is the case with Petra in Jordan, because I spent many months there some years ago researching and writing a book on Petra and the Nabataeans, who flourished around 2000 years ago.

Behind the hundreds of dramatic stone-carved and built monuments that define Petra’s valleys, mountains and rolling hills is a legacy of human qualities that both sparked its success and should be very relevant to the Arab world today. For there is nothing in the contemporary Arab world that would cause hundreds of millions of voters to acknowledge its achievements many centuries from now. Perhaps Petra’s history can explain why this is the case, and what we might be able to do about it.

I have a soft spot for and much pride in the Nabataeans, an indigenous “Arab” tribe that flourished for less than 500 years. Their architecture is splendid, but not really unique. They used stone-carving techniques that were already well established in the ancient worlds of Egypt, Assyria and Mesopotamia by the time they entered history around the 5th Century BC; and they adopted many design techniques from the Greco-Roman world that they encountered through their extensive trading networks. The natural splendor of the pink-red Nubian sandstone that defines the Petra region is the work of the hand of God, and geology.

What is so special about Petra and the Nabataeans is their human qualities and values, which generated the social, political and economic environment that made possible their magnificent urbanism. The Arab world would do well to reflect upon those attributes that underpin that achievement, and ask if any of those values remain operative and could be reinvigorated in the Arab world today.

My study of Petra and the Nabataeans suggests several core values that help explain how a small tribe of nomadic herders settled down in south Jordan and northern Arabia by the 4th Century BC, and quickly developed into a wealthy, technologically advanced little kingdom that also reached into Palestine, Sinai, and southern Syria. One of the attractions of Petra and the Nabataean people is their enormous mystery, for they left no written records other than architectural and funerary inscriptions. We know them mainly from their archaeological remains, and some mentions of them in Hellenistic and Roman-era texts.

All these sources suggest that the Nabataeans flourished for several reasons, of which I would single out the following that may be relevant to the Arab world today:

1. They used diplomacy wisely to avoid conflict whenever possible, including entering into agreements with the great powers of the day — Greece and Rome — that acknowledged prevailing political realities while allowing the Nabataeans to pursue their critical commercial trading activities.
2. They struck a sensible balance between the spiritual and the secular, acknowledging the power of their deities but also making sure to enjoy life and not focus all their attention on religious matters.
3. They were masters of environmental protection and management, especially the harnessing and use of scarce water resources in an arid region.
4. They generated wealth and security from a balanced economy, not relying too much on one source of income that would be vulnerable to disruptions, but rather balancing their dependence on agriculture, minerals, manufacturing and trade.
5. They apparently governed themselves well, with a combination of an efficient judicial system (where even Roman foreigners could expect a fair trial) and a service-oriented monarchy that behaved humbly before its citizens, and shared meals and drinking bouts with them.
6. They interacted widely and deeply with other cultures, self-confidently absorbing foreign technology, art and even religious values and symbols, a process that enriched their own culture and allowed it to evolve into a strong, rich blend of indigenous and imported norms — one that would be recognized two millennia later by a still awed world.

So, go to Petra and the other modern wonders of the world if you have not been there. As you gaze in amazement at the architectural structures be sure also to notice the galaxy of human values behind them. In the Arab world, at least, Petra and the Nabataeans remind us that values of cosmopolitanism, secular-sacred balance, peace-making, good governance and environmental protection spectacularly generated wealth, respect and stability centuries ago, and there should be no reason why they could not do so again today.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 11 July 2007
Word Count: 802
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FLORENCE, Italy — On a trip through Europe including discussions with a wide range of officials and specialists in Norway, Germany, France and Italy, almost every conversation quickly turns to the question of what role Europe should play in the Middle East today. More and more Europeans seem to feel uneasy about the fact that their increased participation in Middle Eastern issues is not leading to improved security conditions or mutual relations. Unlike most Americans or officials in Washington, who instinctively blame the Arabs and Muslims of the Middle East for the problems of the day, Europeans generally tend to be more analytical in their approach to fixing a clearly bad situation in European-Middle Eastern relations.

The attack against the Spanish UN peacekeepers in south Lebanon last week, and this week’s terror attacks and attempts in the UK and Yemen are only three examples in one week of how Europe remains both linked and vulnerable to complex political dynamics in the Middle East. The question of what Europe should do in the Middle East today is easy to answer. It should do the opposite of what it has done in the past two years: stop moving towards becoming an Israeli-American errand boy, and get back to vigorously playing the role that it had played in a low-key manner in recent decades, as the conscience of the rule of law: of international legitimacy, UN resolutions, and the global will to see Arabs and Israelis living in peace and security in two adjacent states.

A generation ago, in 1980, a smaller but more respected and self-assured European Union issued the Venice Declaration, calling for Palestinian self-determination and effectively demanding a Palestinian state alongside the existing Israeli state, with security guarantees for both. A generation ago, Europe staked out a firm, fair position, affirming justice and compliance with UN resolutions as the means to comprehensive peace and long-term security. Today, Europe has turned into a pile of diplomatic cotton candy — appealing and aesthetic from a distance, but a real mess when you come in contact with it.

Europe’s most foolhardy policy these days is to meekly follow the United States and Israel in boycotting the democratically elected Hamas leadership in Palestine, and instead to pursue the charade of propping up President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh Party, both of which suffer badly frayed credibility. It is sad to see a noble political venture such as a united Europe emasculate and embarrass itself so badly by blindly adopting as its own policy the proven failed approach of the United States and Israel.

I know it is difficult for a much larger European Union to change policy quickly or forcefully, given its own problems closer to home. Continuing on its current course in the Middle East, however, would be folly and an enormous waste of money. Europeans are spending billions of Euros in aid and sending troops on peacekeeping or border surveillance missions in Palestine and Lebanon, yet results remain erratic. The EU’s new Neighborhood Policy, to follow the Barcelona process, seems destined to suffer the same ignominious fate of a noble mission that went nowhere, because the desire to be magnanimous and fair has led only to wishy-washiness.

Europe is increasingly involved in military operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East that appear more and more futile and dangerous, partly due to their genesis in Europe having to help clean up or stabilize the mess that is often created by the imbalanced and aggressive policies of the United States and Israel. This is happening at a time when Europe suffers three other negative trends related to its relations with the Middle East: Terrorism from within Europe, but often inspired by events in the Middle East, continues to occur; Europeans pay more and more for development and reconstruction aid, while Middle Eastern development and reconstruction remain chronically elusive; and, European credibility with publics and governments in the region continues to slip, as the once independent and resolute European position anchored in a sense of justice, balance and law slowly gives way to shameless genuflecting before the corrosive altars of spineless political vulnerability and fear.

This is, indeed, Europe’s worst moment, as its ineffective foreign policies leave it largely lacking in respect or impact, in the Middle East and much of the rest of the world. Nor is Europe promoting security or stability, or even effectively dealing with its illegal immigrants problem. Europe urgently needs to acknowledge what a dire mess it has gotten itself into in the Middle East, and work its way out of this predicament by reverting to its former role as the conscience of the rule of law and international legitimacy, and a bastion of firm fairness.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 04 July 2007
Word Count: 786
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PARIS — A new Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey published this week reveals that public attitudes towards the United States around the world continue to deteriorate, as they have for half a decade now, with particularly strong negative views about the US role in Iraq and American-style democracy. The massive survey of 45,000 people in 47 countries contained few surprises or any major new trends — America is still admired by many around the world, and distrusted by many others. The survey results document the strong opposition to both the substance and manner of American foreign policy, but they also tell us something important about the societies being surveyed around the globe.

The continued and often deepening negative views of the United States on all continents mainly reflect temporary distaste for specific American policies in Afghanistan, Iraq and other lands, but are also a natural reaction against any global power that projects its might, values and interests around the world. The poll also shows similarly mixed favorable/unfavorable reactions to China and Russia around the world, especially as both of those powers start to affect other countries — especially in terms of energy, environment or economy.

The findings on global public views of American democracy are especially interesting. When asked if they “liked or disliked American ideas on democracy,” majorities or pluralities in 33 of 47 polled countries said they disliked American ideas about democracy. Seventy-six percent in France and 92 percent in Turkey expressed dislike — and these two NATO allies are, respectively, a birthplace of modern democracy and a showcase of its taking root in a developing, predominantly Islamic, society. Numerous polls in these and other countries repeatedly show strong commitments to or yearnings for democratic governance. So the problem here is American policy, not democratic principles.

One of the short-term dangers of growing anti-Americanism is precisely that budding indigenous movements promoting democracy in developing countries will be set back because democracy activists do not want to be associated with the George W. Bush administration’s erratic rhetoric and violent wars to “promote democracy.”

In expressing their distaste for the heavy-handed manner in which the United States engages the world, ordinary people in many countries are practicing a kind of anti-colonial or anti-imperial resistance that is common in relations between societies of unequal power. This is most clear in the Middle East, where many Arabs, Iranians and Turks share a common will to resist and defy the United States and its local ally Israel. History may judge this to be a foolhardy or excessively emotional response to the exercise of American power. All we can say for now is that the dominant political movements and public sentiments throughout the Middle East seem to be unified only in their opposition to the combination of American-Israeli policies that they see as threatening to their well-being — and in some cases, to their identity and values. This is the only thing that brings together Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas and ordinary citizens of many different shades and colors, including those who adhere to Islamist, Arab nationalist, progressive, democratic and other political movements in the region.

There is a sad and even tragic dimension to this phenomenon as well in the Arab world, because resisting and defying the United States and Israel is about the only meaningful way that ordinary citizens can express themselves politically in many of these countries. All other normal routes of democratic participation or accountable, participatory governance are monopolized by the security-dominated Arab state and its unchanging ruling elites. Democratic politics are likely to remain frozen for some time in this region. This is because the modern Arab security state does not welcome democratic systems, and also because the American-Israeli-driven Western response to Hamas’ election victory in Palestine last year is likely to further dampen popular enthusiasm for democracy.

Criticizing American policies is common throughout the world, the Pew poll confirms again, but active collective resistance to the United States is emerging in the Arab-Islamic Middle East as probably the defining attitude of a majority of people, and a policy program of many Islamist groups and a few governments. This is partly a response to the immediate threats people perceive from the United States and Israel, but it is also a recurring theme in anti-colonial struggles around the world.

Many people in the Middle East see themselves still engaged in a battle against Anglo-American-Israeli domination and colonial subjugation. The Anglo-American-Israeli push for war in Iraq and their continued pressure on Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah have sparked a whole new level of collective political resistance throughout the Middle East. In part this parallels global criticism of the United States, but it is also a distinct Middle Eastern historical process of mass self-expression and self-determination in the face of local and foreign powers that have never allowed such processes to occur.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 30 June 2007
Word Count: 805
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BERLIN — I was in Europe earlier this week speaking with assorted current and former officials, experts, and diplomats about the general situation in the Middle East, when the news broke of the expected appointment of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as special envoy of the Quartet (US, Russia, UN, EU) for Arab-Israeli peace-making. It is hard to know if this is a joke, an insult, or a possible positive new beginning.

My mixed feelings and those of many others in the Arab world are the result of years of watching both the Quartet and Blair speak lofty rhetoric, but fail to follow up with practical, even-handed deeds. If there is an award for the combined negative credibility of an institution plus an individual, the Quartet and Blair should be its first recipients. Neither of them has much to stand on in terms of a track record of accomplishments in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, and both are tainted by a legacy of lofty aims, nice rhetoric, and meager results.

Blair’s negatives in the Middle East are well known, and are not counter-balanced by his many successes at home or in Europe. His main problem is not only that he has been hypocritical or partial to Israel and the United States rather than truly even-handed; it is also that his policies have contributed directly and abundantly to the precise Arab-Israeli conflict and associated tensions in the Middle East that he is now apparently going to try and resolve. Appointing Tony Blair as special envoy for Arab-Israeli peace is something like appointing the Emperor Nero to be the chief fireman of Rome.

Blair has spoken for years about pushing for peace and two states in Palestine and Israel, yet he has repeatedly come down on the side of the Israelis in demanding that Israel’s security should be guaranteed before any progress can occur. Last summer he declined many opportunities to condemn Israel’s over-reaction in attacks against Lebanon, and instead went along with the American-driven policy of helping Israel to attack Hizbullah and all Lebanon. His speedy support of the Israeli-American boycott of Hamas after its election victory last year was impressive only for its unthinking haste.

His enthusiastic war-making in Iraq on the basis of lies and mistaken assumptions has caused immense suffering and waste in the entire region, and has badly expanded the cycle of terror and brutal counter-violence in the name of fighting terror. He has been a champion of misdiagnosis of the problem of terrorism, and has consistently offended Arabs and Muslims with his Texas-sized exaggeration and mistaken analysis of the relationships among Islam, terror and political trends in the Middle East. He has crowned this legacy of analytical and diplomatic deficiency with an absolute refusal to acknowledge that foreign policies of the US, UK, Israel and others could be contributing factors to the violence, anger and terror that plague the Middle East.

His subservience to the United States in Iraq and Palestine-Israel has been a shameless and humiliating examples of obsequious spinelessness. He repeatedly pledged himself to promote Arab-Israeli peace and to work behind the scenes to influence the United States positively in this direction — consistently without success, perhaps even without sincerity from the start.

We should view this appointment with a great deal of skepticism and with little expectation of any real progress. The institution of the Quartet and the individual Tony Blair are both limping in terms of their political legitimacy and credibility in the Middle East — but neither is beyond repair.

Blair’s own weaknesses and inconsistencies should not detract from the fact that the Quartet was a good idea when it was formed a few years ago, but it has failed because it has not been equitable and fair to both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has lacked a mechanism for applying its principles on the ground, and has tended to succumb to American policies. Europe in particular has been hurt by the exercise, finding itself increasingly perceived as having moved towards the Israeli-American position on most issues, and having largely abandoned its former posture as an impartial supporter of international legitimacy and legality as enshrined in UN resolutions.

The revival of the Quartet, behind Europe’s prodding, since last winter and the expected appointment of Blair suggest a possible opportunity for real change. This could be an opportunity for all those who wish to learn from their mistakes to do so — Arabs, Israelis and Quartet members — and to replace their past deficiencies with a more decisive and even-handed approach to peace-making that has a chance to succeed.

Yet there are no clear signs that the Quartet members seek to change their approach to Arab-Israeli issues. I suspect we are in for some huge new disappointments, as show business replaces the hard work of even-handed peacemaking, and dazzle replaces real diplomacy. I hope I am proven wrong. I am prepared to wager a fish and chips that I am not.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 27 June 2007
Word Count: 823
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OSNABRÜCK, Germany — On my trip this week from Beirut, Lebanon, to Osnabrück, Germany, I feel as if I have experienced modern world history in reverse. The contrast between the two cities is instructive, as Europe and the Middle East both wrestle with a universal concern: What is the ideal relationship among the identity of individuals, the interests of communal groups, and the well-being and security of states?

Osnabrück was one of the two cities, with Münster, where the historic Peace of Westphalia was negotiated then signed in 1648, ending the 30 Years War. This effectively marked the end of the Holy Roman Empire, and ushered in the European system of sovereign nation-states, which was subsequently exported to the rest of the world in the European colonial period.

Much of the contemporary Arab World, with pockets of Africa and Asia, represents the turbulent and problematic legacy of Euro-manufactured statecraft, in the form of countries that remain unstable and violent. Some slowly export their problems to other parts of the world, in the form of terrorism, drugs, criminality, refugees and illegal migrants. To travel as I have this week from the region of the world’s least successful nation-states to the city where the modern nation-state system was born is a humbling but instructive experience.

In talks with the mayor, university professors, businessmen and women, and other citizens of Osnabrück, it became clear that the legacy of the Peace of Westphalia is not just a tourism marketing strategy or a warm source of inner pride. It also offers a live, immensely relevant set of principles that countries struggling with violent instability should re-learn and apply in their own ways.

The parties that negotiated the Peace of Westphalia — Sweden and France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands and other smaller ones — agreed on historic compromises that define key state and personal rights to this day: state sovereignty, religious and personal freedoms, the right of national self-determination, equality among all states, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Calvinism was recognized and disagreements among religious groups were henceforth to be resolved through negotiated compromises, which included some rotating leadership between Protestants and Catholics.

Osnabrück reminds the world that peace is achievable even in the most intractable and violent conflicts if a few core principles are applied, especially equality, freedom, and tolerance. Peace-making and lasting stability also require taking into consideration the legitimate interests of all parties to a conflict. This modern history suggests that boycotting key players while speaking of peace-making is the stuff of fantasy. Realistic compromises among all parties that are treated equally is a more effective approach.

This same spirit is manifested at the local level in the practice of good governance, democracy and accountability, as one is reminded when walking into the very moving Great Council Chamber of the Osnabrück town hall. This is where the peace treaty was negotiated over several years, and has been known since 1648 as the “Peace Hall.” A Latin inscription here since 1605 reminds the city councilors that the well-being of the city and its citizens must come before the personal interests of political leaders. It reads: “Whosoever you are who enter this room to give council, remember that public matters must be placed above private ones.”

Fast forward to Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Algeria and much of the Arab world today, where the principles of freedom, equality, honest government, tolerance and negotiated compromises are increasingly rare phenomena. In particular, Lebanon’s dysfunctional government, tense domestic inter-sectarian relations, simmering violence, and web of increasingly confrontational relations at home and abroad represent everything that the Peace of Westphalia sought to end.

So a journey from Beirut to Osnabrück is both painful and uplifting. The pain comes from experiencing the contrast between an immobilized governance system in Lebanon and the contemporary European legacy of sensible political rule anchored in the Westphalian principles. There is no reason why the Arab world cannot share in the stability and prosperity that defines most of Europe, other perhaps than incompetent and often dishonest Arab leaders who allow their countries to get hopelessly entangled in debilitating conflicts with Israel, the US, and some Europeans. Before 1648, after all, much of Europe suffered similar weaknesses to the modern Arab world, but ultimately pulled out of its troubles.

The trip from Beirut to Osnabrück is also uplifting, though, because of the reminder that the principles of the Peace of Westphalia are universal, not only European. Europe itself continues today to grapple with constitutional issues related to ensuring a fair distribution of power in the expanded European Union. The process of making peace according to Westphalian principles is not only a history lesson, but also a living code of conduct for citizenries that are sensible and political leaders who are realistic and mature.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 23 June 2007
Word Count: 803
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BEIRUT — The separation of the West Bank and Gaza into separate political entities run respectively by Fateh and Hamas is a calamity. The rush by the United States, Israel and Europe to resume aid to the emergency government in the West Bank set up earlier this week by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will turn the calamity into an even greater catastrophe.

The Palestinian people are now divided into six distinct communities: Gaza; the West Bank, and Arab East Jerusalem (under varying degrees of Israeli occupation and control); the refugee camp residents throughout the Arab world; other Palestinians in the Middle East not living in camps; and the global Palestinian Diaspora. This worsening fragmentation of the Palestinians is certain to lead to grater radicalization and more proficient resistance, which will spill over into other societies in the region, and perhaps globally. This trend has been consistent since 1948.

Consequently, on its northern and southern Arab borders Israel today is flanked by two militant Arab movements — Hizbullah and Hamas — that combine powerful ideologies of religion, nationalism, resistance and self-assertion. Neither of these movements existed 25 years ago, but both have achieved power and prominence today. They are the natural consequence of allowing Israel to perpetuate for decades its repeated attacks, dehumanizing occupations and brutal colonization, while the United States and Europe fiddle and the Arabs nap.

Hamas and Hizbullah are among the most effective and legitimate political movements in the Arab world: They have forced unilateral Israeli retreats that no Arab army could induce; won elections democratically without resorting to the gerrymandering or ballot box stuffing that most American-supported Arab regimes live by; provided efficient service delivery and local governance to their constituents; and, demonstrated a spirit of sustained resistance to Israeli occupation that appeals to the desire of ordinary Arabs to restore some dignity to their battered lives and to their shattered, hollow political systems.

We should criticize such Islamists for some of their policies and ambiguities. But it is a big mistake to confront and fight them mainly because they challenge Israel, are friendly to Iran and Syria, and represent vanguards of regional Islamism, for these three attributes precisely define much of their indigenous efficacy and legitimacy. Those who wish to fight Hamas and Hizbullah would do better to help address the indigenous grievances in Lebanon and Palestine that gave birth to them and continue to underpin their popularity.

Such movements are strong also due to the third trend we witness this week: The continued insistence by Israel, the United States and Europe — now an explicit team — to intervene in domestic Palestinian and Arab politics in favor of one side in the regional ideological struggle that defines the Middle East. Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamists generally represent at one level a reaction to foreign interference, a desire by ordinary Arabs to exercise true sovereignty, and to avoid becoming US puppets, surrogates of Israel, or social welfare wards of Europe.

US-Israel-Europe repeat two enormous mistakes when they side blatantly with Fateh and President Abbas, try to destroy Hamas, and crudely bribe the Palestinians with cash. Such approaches will only hasten the long-term erosion of Abbas and Fateh’s already thin credibility and legitimacy. As in Northern Ireland with its shared Protestant-Catholic government, a combined Fateh-Hamas government is the most realistic way to move towards stable, recognized and secure statehood for both Palestinians and Israelis.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Monday sounded even more incoherent and incredible than usual, as she heaped abuse on Hamas and praise on Abbas and his emergency government, and repeated the now impish American commitment to moving towards a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Only simpletons or sinister people can foster domestic strife between Palestinians, ignore the most powerful, democratically-elected mass movement in Palestine, and also speak of promoting a negotiated peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Rice and the United States are neither simpletons nor sinister, so why do they behave as if they were?

Three missing ingredients for Israeli-Palestinian peace remain on display this week: The lack of a single, legitimate Palestinian government with a clear policy on making peace or war with Israel; the lack of an Israeli government that is prepared to negotiate a fair peace that responds to both Israeli and Arab legitimate rights, rather than demanding unilateral Palestinian and Arab submission; and, the lack of an impartial external mediator who can prod both sides towards a fair, negotiated accord anchored in UN resolutions.

All three of these negatives will be exacerbated by the Fateh-Hamas confrontation and by the American-Israeli-European response to events in Palestine. The world miscued when it refused to engage Hamas after its election victory last year, and again after the Hamas-Fateh unity government earlier this year. One must be truly stupid, or brutally malicious, to repeat the same mistake a third time.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 20 June 2007
Word Count: 804
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