WASHINGTON — The American-European-led international diplomatic minuet with Iran is the most interesting and significant political dynamic in the world today. What happens on the Iran issue will determine power relations for years to come, far beyond Iran’s immediate neighborhood. Many critical issues are captured in the Iranian nuclear question, including global energy flows; the credibility and impact of the UN Security Council; the limits of economic and political sanctions; the capacity of determined regional powers to defy greater global powers; the interplay between Israeli, Western and global interests; the coherence of political Europe; and, the spirit and letter of international law, conventions and treaties.

Beyond political posturing in Iran, the United States, Israel and Europe, three core issues are at stake here: Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology for verifiably peaceful purposes; Israeli concerns that an Iranian nuclear bomb would be an existential threat, which Israel will never allow to happen; and, Western fears of Iran’s military power, nuclear capabilities, and radicalizing political influence around the Middle East.

The current situation sees the US-led Security Council five permanent members plus Germany (“5+1”) incrementally raising their enticing offers to Iran while simultaneously increasing sanctions on Iran for not heeding the call to freeze its uranium enrichment activities, which are vital for producing nuclear power and/or weapons.

From the last two months I have spent in Washington, and discussions with former and current American officials involved in this matter, my sense is that time is the critical element now. The United States, to its credit, took a decision over a year ago to try and resolve this diplomatically, but without removing the threat of military attack.

Sending the State Department’s third highest official to attend the 5+1 talks with Iran in Geneva last month was a powerful signal of this American preference for a political, peaceful resolution. It gave the Iranians one of the things they covet dearly — sitting at the table with the United States as equals.

This positive American — and 5+1 — move was broadly negated by their persistence in giving Iran an ultimatum, without much room for discussion or even a cup of tea — freeze the enrichment process at current levels, the 5+1 told Iran, or else we increase the heat. Iran replied by calling for more talks. The 5+1 decided a few days ago that this was not acceptable, and announced plans to impose new sanctions on Iran.

But a fascinating thing — very clear here in Washington — is that the United States is also pushing ahead with plans to keep sending Iran signals of a desire to talk. It now seems very likely that the United States and Iran will open diplomatic interests sections in each other’s capitals, and each will be staffed by its own nationals, rather than the third party nationals who now operate these missions. This is the five-star category of diplomatic signals.

The United States seems to have grasped that sanctions and threats will not bring about the change in policies from Tehran that it seeks. But robust, sustained and consistent multinational diplomacy could allow Iran to generate nuclear energy without a bomb, especially if coupled with improvements in bilateral US-Iranian ties. This should be a doable diplomatic deal.

The wild card — and real concern for Washington — is whether Israel would panic and unilaterally attack Iran in coming months, plunging the region, and perhaps global energy flows, into a catastrophe. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz said in Washington last week that Iran could one day use nuclear weapons against the United States and Europe, and not only against Israel. Such Israeli hysteria and scaremongering are common in Washington, and usually effective. But this is a rare case where US and Israeli threat perceptions are not exactly the same. It will be important in coming months to see if the Israeli or American view wins out in defining American policy.

The diplomatic dance will continue for months: Though Iran will not do anything meaningful until the Bush administration retires in January, it does not want to break the talks, meetings, proposals and counter-proposals. Therefore the Bush team’s policy towards Iran is not realistically aimed at finding a solution this year, but rather at expanding the policy options that will be available to the next American administration.

I suspect Iran understands this, and will make just enough gestures in the months ahead to make sure that the United States not only sits at the table with Iran, but that they actually start talking about possible compromises, rather than moving the region towards a nuclear holocaust. The result of all this will be new and unknown power relationships among Iran, the United States, Israel, and Europe. The post-Cold War world may be on the verge of being retired.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 11 August 2008
Word Count: 800
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WASHINGTON — It is painful watching events in Gaza and the West Bank unfold, as Fateh and Hamas factions battle it out like a bunch of armed neighborhood gangs. The mood among Palestinians throughout the world is one of despair and gloom, tinged with embarrassment and occasional shame.

Arab and others supporters of the Palestinian cause throw their hands up in the air in bewilderment. It will not be surprising to see some friends of Palestine quietly walk away, mumbling that if the Palestinians wish to kill each other and destroy their own society they are free to do so. The world will easily forget about them.

These are grim days for the Palestinians, but not unusual ones for the Arab world as a whole. The sight of clan-based political groups in Gaza killing each other is familiar in many parts of our region, sadly. That does not make it any better. It simply recognizes that national dysfunctionality expressed in internecine political violence is a regional Arab ailment, and not a peculiarly Palestinian one.

The Palestinians, especially their political leaders, must assume most of the blame for this round of fighting, which is absolutely incomprehensible at a time when economic pressures and sanctions have reduced Gaza not just to a prison-like encampment, but to a ward of paupers. Israel and other enemies of the Palestinians will be pleased to see them fighting each other like juvenile delinquents. We will hear another chorus from the skinheads and racists in the world who will point to this round of fighting as proof that Israel withdrew from Gaza and all it got in return were rockets fired at it and hooligans running the show inside. They will be right, but at a superficial level.

The rockets fired at Gaza are to be seen in the context of a war that still rages between Israelis and Palestinians, now more or less quiet due to a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. The fighting among the Palestinians is not so easy to understand. It is also not the first time that Palestinians have quarreled or fought each other. They did it in the 1940s, in the 1980s in refugee camps in Lebanon, and now they do it again in their squeezed little landscape in Gaza.

This is the latest and most troubling example of how a once grand and noble Palestinian national liberation movement has allowed itself to degenerate into ineptitude. The consequences of the fighting are unlikely to increase the chance of liberating Palestine, force Israel to negotiate an honorable and fair peace, or provide Palestinians opportunities to live more secure, stable and prosperous lives. All that will emerge from this is the functional equivalent of a little child taking over a tree house, and claiming that as a great victory.

Fateh and Hamas are both slowly relinquishing their once respectable standing among fellow Palestinians. As they fight it out in village streets and refugee camp alleyways, they make it ever more difficult to wage a principled and credible struggle against Israeli colonialism, brutality, and expansionism.

At a global level, the Palestinian cause is the longest running anti-colonial movement of its kind, which is one reason it generates so much support around the world. Ordinary people everywhere understand that Palestinians fight against a Zionist foe whose predatory territorial aims are anchored in the ugly soil of 19th Century European imperialism and colonialism — back when it was permissible to conquer, kill, and dispossess other people, and send them into exile.

The Palestinians have continued to struggle for the integrity of their community and their national rights for over a century, but they have lost at every decisive moment. Poor quality leadership has always been one reason. Political immaturity reflected in fighting within the community is another constant problem. Massive and brutal use of force by Israel has helped fracture Palestinian society and turn some of its groups into desperados who will even fight themselves to maintain a modicum of control over their increasingly restricted and empty lives. Disarray and weakness among Arab supporters has also been a problem at times. The international community’s virtual indifference to the consequences of Israel’s harsh policies makes the entire regional context more conducive to such irrational and self-destructive Arab behavior.

This is a dark day for the Palestinians, but not the end of the line. When they hit bottom — and they are almost there — the Palestinians will find better leadership that can regain their cohesion and credibility, and their self-respect. From the rubble of their own criminal attacks against their own people, the Palestinians will recognize soon that living in a tree house is exciting for a nine-year-old child, but is very unbecoming a national political movement, and is a recipe for oblivion if it is not stopped and reversed soon.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 06 August 2008
Word Count: 804
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WASHINGTON, DC — Discussions of US policy in the Middle East mostly focus on Iraq and Iran these days. Yet Americans who follow their country’s Middle East policy ask about their posture throughout the region. The question comes up regularly in discussions on the Middle East here in Washington and in other parts of the United States: What should the US do differently in the Middle East? I’ve discussed this often with colleagues and friends here in recent months, generating my list of ten principles and policies that I believe should define American policies in the Middle East:

1. Politically engage all legitimate actors: The American tendency to boycott or try and destroy major players in the region, like Hizbullah and Hamas, is childish and counter-productive. All those whom the United States has held at arm’s length have tended to become stronger in the region — partly by garnering public support for defying and resisting the United States.

Legitimacy should be the main criterion for engaging major players in the region, and legitimacy should be defined as emanating from two sources: validation from the people in the Middle East (especially through elections), and adherence to international norms and standards. Where a locally legitimate and powerful player comes up short on one of these (such as Hamas’ occasional terror bombs in Israel) the response should be to bring them into a process that leads to their stopping such deeds and achieving their legitimate goals peacefully, as the United States, United Kingdom and others did with the IRA in Northern Ireland so deftly.

2. Seek peace, security and prosperity for all according to a single standard: Foreign powers in the Middle East must give Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Turks fully equal weight in terms of their rights and interests, rather than giving some countries priority or even exclusivity in areas like security, nuclear technology, etc.

3. Use multilateral engagement mechanisms more than unilateral military means or threats: The UN and its agencies offer useful, legitimate and effective mechanisms to address contentious issues if they are used regularly, and not whimsically or opportunistically.

4. Be consistent on core issues across the region: Double-standards in enforcing UN resolutions or international conventions, or promoting freedom and democracy, badly erode American credibility, respect and efficacy, severely curtailing US impact and influence over time.

5. Appeal to the majority of average people rather than focusing on the minority of extremists: A core and consistent mistake that has driven Washington’s policy since 9/11 has been its tendency to respond mainly to the threat of attacks by Al-Qaeda and other such fringe terror groups. A much more productive approach would be dynamic engagement with the legitimate concerns and rights of the vast majority of average men and women in the Middle East who share American core values of justice and good governance.

6. Define and pursue American national interests — not those of narrow lobbies for Israel, arms traders, oil companies, Arab autocrats or extremist Christian fundamentalists. In particular, the severe tilt in favor of Israel in the past three decades has badly hobbled American policy in the region, and reflects a weakness in the American democratic system as it pertains to foreign policy. Narrow lobbies can heavily influence foreign policy in Washington to the point where America’s foreign policy often hurts rather than helps achieve US national interests. Foreign policy by lobby pressures is a juvenile and counterproductive way to behave.

7. Pursue active, sustained, even-handed peace-making in the Arab-Israeli conflict: Achieving a fair, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is the single most useful thing the United States or any foreign power can do to calm down the many conflicts and tensions in the Middle East. Washington is indispensable for achieving peace because it is the only external power that Israel trusts. The problems of the Middle East are not all due to American policies, of course, but achieving peace among Arabs and Israelis can only happen with strong American engagement. That engagement can only succeed if the United States is seen to be even-handed, which it has not been for many years.

8. Consult the neighbors regularly, not self-servingly: Washington is right to ask for help from “the neighbors” in resolving the violent instability it created by invading Iraq. But “the neighbors” are not simpleton morons who snap to attention and report for duty when America beckons, and doze off when it does not ask for their help. The United States should consult the states of the region more routinely, and take their advice seriously on other issues, such as promoting Arab-Israeli peace.

9. Stay out of local civil wars and domestic battles: The Bush administration tendency to actively support one side in local and domestic political battles in the region has almost always failed nad even backfired — in Lebanon and Palestine most dramatically.

10. Understand the difference between religion and nationalism: The United States too often frames issues and peoples in a religious context, when most contentious issues in the region are driven by nationalism or political tensions.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 04 August 2008
Word Count: 837
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WOODS HOLE, Massachusetts — It is difficult to get an impartially accurate perspective on US-Middle East relations in Washington. This is because people involved with the region are either Middle Easterners who have brought their torrid battles to the United States, or Americans who have exacerbated our region’s own proclivity for extremism with their romantic adventurism, ignorant militarism, or shameless pro-Israeli obsequiousness.

The lack of any knowledgeable and neutral American policy input on the Middle East leaves the United States these days incredulously enjoying dwindling credibility, impact and respect simultaneously, even while it unleashes its armed forces. A smarter approach would benefit from the rich reservoir of knowledge that exists among some of America’s seasoned diplomats who have devoted their entire professional lives promoting US national interests in the region.

I had a chance to experience this last weekend during a working visit to the idyllic town of Woods Hole, on Massachusetts’ enchanting Cape Cod. I spend several days intermittently discussing US-Middle East relations with a man who spent 35 years in that world — Robert Pelletreau, Jr., former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, and ambassador to three Arab countries.

Before retiring, he had spent 36 years in government service in Washington and the Middle East, and was involved in some pivotal moments, such as the opening of the US-PLO dialogue and the Madrid peace conference.

The gist of his thoughts about US-Middle East relations is that the next American president will have to work quickly and intelligently to devise a set of policies to respond to the cross-cutting array of issues and interests that Washington faces in the region. The challenge is particularly acute, he argues, because “each problem is worse today than it was in 2001, when George W. Bush took office.”

He listed for me the following points he had made a few days before in a lecture about US-Middle East issues that he thought had deteriorated under the Bush administration. They are worth pondering because they represent the views of that rare species in Washington these days: the experienced, impartial, patriotic American public servant who knows both Washington and the Middle East, and speaks honestly to both:

“The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is worse because we’ve gone from near-agreement at the end of the Clinton administration to new waves of violence and counter-violence, a deep split in the Palestinian community along with the growth of Hamas, and a weak Israeli government without any political capital to devote to peace.

“The situation in Iraq is worse because we’ve gone from a ruthless but weakened local dictator, who as we now know had no nuclear weapons, to a struggling and divided Shiite-led government, teetering along the edge of civil war, through an invasion of choice not necessity coupled with a costly and continuing American occupation with no clear exit path.

“The situation in Iran is worse because an ultra-conservative government is now in power, led by an outrageous poppy-cock of a president, awash in oil revenues, closer than ever to mastering the nuclear technology that could lead to developing nuclear weapons, and brimming with confidence.

“The situation in Afghanistan/Pakistan is worse because even though we initially overthrew the Taliban and helped set up a friendly leader in Kabul, instability has now spread to Pakistan and the Al-Qaeda leadership is still at large and operational somewhere in the border region, which has proven to be beyond our reach. The Taliban is resurgent in both countries, American military and financial costs are increasing, and neither country’s government has a strategy to deal with the problem.

“The international oil situation is worse because increased demand in China and India plus the weakened dollar and uncertain supply conditions in Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela and elsewhere have driven up prices, and we can’t seem to curb our appetite for the stuff.

“The effort to expand democracy in the region, another Bush administration priority, has been set back by our headlong push for elections in countries with little or no popular experience in political participation. The result has been clerical-led factions being elected in Iraq, Hamas winning parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories, the Muslim Brotherhood gaining ground in Egypt, Hizbullah becoming a stronger political force in Lebanon, and even the word ‘democracy’ now being widely treated in the region as an American implant.”

Other challenges like Syria, Lebanon, Islamic extremism, and Sudan have all deteriorated in this Bush era.

The next American administration will not have the luxury of putting these issues on hold while it gets its domestic house in order. Among its first priorities, he says, should be vigorous engagement in Arab-Israeli peace-making. This would benefit the people of the region, restore Washington’s credibility, dampen other conflicts, improve the United States’ posture and leverage in other Middle East sectors, and bolster moderates and secularists. Sound advice, from an experienced American diplomat with few equals in terms of experience, impartiality and honesty in US-Middle East issues.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 30 July 2008
Word Count: 825
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WASHINGTON, DC — Since 9/11, the United States public diplomacy program has been one of the great self-induced hoaxes of modern American public life. It has been managed for the most part by a frightening combination of misguided lightweights and over-the-top ideological zealots. So when I heard the other day that a new man was put in charge — Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman — I read a speech he made to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, outlining his plans and principles.

I sensed for the first time in recent years that perhaps a new rational element was intruding into the legacy of intemperate arrogance that had been the defining hallmark of Washington’s public diplomacy program since 2002. To test this hypothesis, I visited Glassman for a chat in his State Department office. My conclusion: There is good news and bad news to report.

The good news is that some changes in style and approach are underway in this arena — what Glassman diplomatically calls “a shift in emphasis” in US public diplomacy.

He and his colleagues see their mission less as directly explaining American values or fostering a more favorable international perception of the United States, and more about engaging in what he calls the “war of ideas” in Muslim societies. He explains this as follows: “Our mission today in the war of ideas is highly focused. It is to use the tools of ideological engagement — words, deeds and images — to create an environment hostile to violent extremism. We want to break the linkages between groups like Al-Qaeda and their target audiences.”

The aim is not to persuade foreign audiences to admire or love the United States, but rather “to ensure that negative sentiments and day-to-day grievances toward the United States and its allies do not manifest themselves in the form of violent extremism.”

Glassman importantly acknowledges the need to address the sense among many in the Arab-Islamic world and other lands that “the US does not respect and listen to others, or take them seriously.”

I nearly fell out of my chair when I heard him use the word “respect” for one of the core principles that should define reciprocal American interaction with people in the Middle East and Asia, because that is such a crucial and largely missing element in this domain. It will be important to see if this shift results in changes on the ground.

The bad news is that major aspects of the US public diplomacy program remain very thin in relevance, credibility and efficacy. The biggest problem is the program’s focus on the small number of Al-Qaeda-type terrorists and their potential impact on others in Arab-Islamic societies, especially youth.

Washington sees itself as helping moderate Muslims avoid falling into the Qaeda camp. It hopes to do this by offering “productive alternatives to violent extremism,” to help “divert potential recruits from the violent extremist vision” by using the attractions of entertainment, literature, music, technology, sports, education, and business — along with religion and politics.

Such an approach perpetuates in milder form the dreamy, diversionary strategy of former public diplomacy chiefs. It excessively focuses on Al-Qaeda rather than fostering stronger ties with the masses of ordinary Middle Eastern men and women who already like and perhaps even covet American values and offerings. It leaves as irresolvable the fact that American policies are so pro-Israeli and pro-Arab-autocrats in the Middle East these policies are core drivers of Arab radicalism and terrorism. And thereby, ironically, it exaggerates and bolsters the terrorists who exploit Islamic rhetoric by saying that the battle with Islamic extremists is “the most important ideological contest of our time.”

This policy is gross exaggeration, factually wrong, and politically counter-productive. Moreover, it shows how the trauma of 9/11 in the United States continues to generate political and intellectual distortions.

Perhaps the biggest single tactical error Glassman has made was when he used the heavily pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) as the venue to roll out his policy three weeks ago. If you laud the most pro-Israeli think tank in Washington as a guiding light for your program – one that is primarily aimed at Arabs and Muslims — you will alienate key members of your target audience from the start. WINEP’s analysis of Arab issues is so heavily characterized by misperceptions, sheer ignorance, gross distortions, chronic misdiagnosis and ideologically-driven frenzy that using it as a starting point for any endeavor in Arab-Islamic societies is sure to send you quickly crashing into a brick wall. WINEP knows Washington and Israel intimately, but not the Arab-Islamic world.

Nevertheless, we should not miss the fact that reasonable men and women seem to be reassessing aspects of America’s failed public diplomacy program, which is an adjustment that is as welcome as it is overdue. Arabs and Muslims should engage more directly with this process, so that the sensible folks prevail and the wild men and women are mercifully retired to their ranches.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 28 July 2008
Word Count: 829
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WASHINGTON — It is a sign of the times that Barack Obama made his first two presidential campaign stops abroad in recent days to the two active theaters of war, where 180,000 American troops have been engaged in fighting for nearly the past six years. It would be useful to ask the right questions about these wars, now that a new leadership will take office in Washington. One good place to start is to learn the right lessons from the conduct and consequences of these wars, so that any mistakes here are not repeated elsewhere in the future.

Watching Obama in Afghanistan and Iraq, as I did from Washington, it seemed to be mostly a domestic electoral event, and understandably so. From the start, the center of gravity of these two wars has always been firmly in the United States. The wars were launched after September 11, 2001, to stop terrorists from attacking Americans. The justification for war may have been reasonable. Almost everything else about these wars has not.

How the fighting impacted the countries or their surrounding region has always been something of an afterthought or a footnote for most Americans. The multiple, mostly negative, impact of these wars on their immediate neighborhoods has been significant in many cases, in many ways: refugee flows, economic waste, strengthening dictatorial regimes, expanding lawless territories, weakening the rule of law, attracting new cohorts of Salafist terrorists, or fomenting a greater reliance on narcotics and warlordism as the organizing orders of large segments of society.

It now seems clear that war — at least these two wars — generates the additional threat of increased Salafist terrorism, according to an important and ongoing study by an American scholar.

Stephanie Kaplan’s PhD research at MIT has explored the linkages between war and terrorism, from the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I had a chance to chat with her a few days ago at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, where we are both serving as visiting fellows and writing texts. What she had to say was enlightening, and should be heard by all Americans who care about how their leaders conduct foreign policy, including foreign wars.

Starting from the premise that Iraq had never been a major front in the “Global War on Terror” before the US-led invasion in March 2003 made it so, now five years on, she wanted to explore a critical question for scholars and policymakers alike: Has the Iraq War increased or decreased the jihadist terrorist threat?

She notes that American, European and other officials sometimes offer contradictory assessments of this matter, suggesting both that Iraq is a main driver of global terrorism or that blowback from Iraq is overstated. Assumptions prevail, she says, because empirical data and reliable research on the matter are in short supply. She touched on these issues in a brief article published in the spring 2008 issue of précis, the newsletter of the MIT Center for International Studies. Among the key points she makes:

1. We cannot assume the blowback from the Iraq war will exactly mirror the Afghanistan war. The quality and quantity of combat experience in Iraq are very different from the Afghan precedent, and many more jihadis went to fight in Afghanistan than in Iraq.

2. The Iraq war poses a threat in part through the linkages it has with other centers of jihadist activity, and by its generating and transferring capabilities (bomb-making and suicide bombers, for example) to other conflict zones (Algeria, or European cities where attacks have been launched). Counting the number of attacks globally is not a good measure of how the Iraq war impacts on terror threats elsewhere, because quantitative data alone cannot adequately measure Iraq’s impact on global jihadist movements.

3. “Victory” in Iraq will not necessarily erase the years of damage caused by the war. “That damage,” she says, “will take the form of additional jihadist capabilities generated on and off the battlefield. As an episode of organized violence, wars simulate the terrorist experience and prepare the surviving mujahedeen for a lifetime of post-war terrorist activity… Wars train a new cadre of battle-hardened fighters and leaders who return from the frontlines armed with a rolodex full of the most violent contacts on the planet. And wars serve as a magnet for money and weapons that can be deployed in the war zone and beyond. If the Iraq conflict creates more jihadist resources than it destroys, then the defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq will be tantamount to winning one of many battles but losing ground in the war against Islamist extremism.”

These initial lessons that Kaplan draws from her study to date provide timely material for concerned Americans — including presidential candidates — to read during their trips to active wars around the world.

She concludes: “Arriving at sound judgments about the unintended consequences of the Iraq War is the first step toward reversing the conflict’s unfortunate terrorism legacy.”

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 23 July 2008
Word Count: 829
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WASHINGTON, DC — When Washington decided that the third-ranking US State Department official would join the international talks with Iran in Geneva last Saturday, it was a smart move — not, as some might claim, a humiliating defeat for the United States. Israel for its part swallowed its pride — and its words — last Wednesday when it exchanged Lebanese prisoners for the bodies of its two soldiers whom Hizbullah had kidnapped in 2006 — sparking that summer’s war.

Both the United States and Israel are doing things they had said they would never do — the US sits and talks with Iran before Tehran has suspended uranium enrichment, and Israel does a diplomatic deal to retrieve its soldiers’ bodies after it had failed to achieve that goal by vicious and prolonged warfare. The fact that the US and Israel were both politically humbled during the same week has been widely interpreted as a double defeat, and victories for Iran and Hizbullah. That is too simplistic a reading of the dynamics in the region.

Hizbullah and Iran generate widespread support among Arab public opinion, because they defy and resist the United States and its allies. Iran and Hizbullah have emerged as the vanguards and bookends of a broad, loose coalition of forces — parties, militias, governments, grassroots movements and several hundred million ordinary men and women — who have stood up to US-Israeli military might and diplomatic swagger, and in places successfully faced them down. They have fought the American-Israeli-Arab conservative alliance to a draw, but they have not defeated their ideological foes.

What we have in the Middle East today is a stalemate, not surrender or defeat by either side. All of the main parties that drive politics around the region — the United States, Israel, Syria, Iran, Hizbullah, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, along with supporting actors Hamas and the European Union — have used their military, economic and political power in one way or another, and all of them have learned the same lesson: When your foes stand up and resist, your overwhelming power becomes less frightening, and your deterrence force withers.

Iran, the EU and the United States sat and talked in Geneva this past weekend because their willingness to fight has been matched by their realization that they cannot win. Israel and Hizbullah have experienced the same thing. They are both powerful, but their power is deeply curtailed by two decisive factors: They cannot defeat the other side militarily, and they cannot intimidate the other side politically because the other side does not fear them any more.

This is a classic stalemate, when military advantage is neutralized and power is immobilized. The American decision to join the talks with Iran and the Israeli-Hizbullah decision to exchange prisoners instead of missiles are positive signs that smart people do not want to keep doing foolish things, like fighting and wasting lives and national resources — when such waste serves no purpose other than to reflect macho stubbornness.

The real question we should be asking is not who has won and who has lost, because neither side has won or lost completely. The important issue now is whether the key players can achieve their core goals through diplomacy and politics rather than through confrontation and war. This strikes me as the main reason why so many diplomatic initiatives have sprouted in the past few months, including Israel’s exchanges with Hizbullah, Hamas and Syria, and the upgraded US-Iranian contacts.

Hizbullah, Iran, Syria and Hamas may like to be defiant and may have done well to date in forcing their foes to meet them halfway or even more; but they also understand that there is a limit to their people’s willingness to perpetually fight, suffer, and die. Death cults are not an attractive vocation or a political growth industry in the Middle East or anywhere else. Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Americans would rather make money than make war. They all understand the meaning of the evolving strategic balance in the region, and they are scrambling to position themselves to take advantage of the changes.

Hizbullah, for example, is more powerful militarily and politically now than it was two years ago, but it is suffering three new major vulnerabilities: It does not have room to maneuver in south Lebanon due to the expanded presence of the Lebanese army and Unifil forces; it is directly and vigorously challenged by fellow Lebanese in an unprecedented manner; and, Syrian-Israeli and Iranian-American diplomatic rapprochements will force it to drastically review its regional strategic positioning and its domestic tactical politics.

The stalemate between the Middle East’s two major coalitions of power comes at a time when energy-fuelled regional economic prospects are high — if political tensions can be curtailed. Intelligent people understand that perpetual warfare is about as stupid a strategy as human beings can devise, and perpetual warfare was the arena the Middle East was on the verge of entering in the past year. If the major protagonists can work out their differences and resolve their disputes peacefully, all the people of the Middle East would be winners for a change, instead of victims of chronic political deficiencies among their leaders.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 21 July 2008
Word Count: 853
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WASHINGTON, DC — We stand before a decisive moment today, with the demand July 14, by a prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a warrant to arrest Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, on ten charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, for his policies in Darfur. This is a moment of historical reckoning for the leaders and people of the Arab world. How the Arab world responds to this challenge may well determine whether our region collectively shows its desire to affirm the rule of law as its guiding principle, or instead moves deeper into the realm of dysfunctional, brittle and violent statehood as its defining collective identity.

It is a classic example of how the Arab world is politically tortured and ethically convoluted by its twin status as both victim and perpetrator of various crimes and atrocities. President Bashir is being accused and may be tried — at one level. But at another level, many in the Middle East and elsewhere will ask if this is a new form of racism and colonialism that applies different standards of accountability for different countries.

The critics of the ICC should not be dismissed as hopeless despots, nor should the court’s potential indictment of President Bashir be dismissed as neo-colonialism administered through the UN Security Council that asked for the investigation in the first place.

The ICC’s ten-page summary of Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s request to arrest Bashir is well worth reading as a starting point for considering whether this move is appropriate or inappropriate. (http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Summary-20081704-ENG.pdf)

The chilling details in the prosecutor’s summary of the case revolve around charges that include acts of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape, attacks on civilians, and pillaging towns and villages. They state that Bashir “masterminded and implemented” a plan to destroy three of the largest ethnic groups in Darfur (the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) by using the armed forces, the Janjaweed militias, and the entire government apparatus, to specifically and purposefully target civilians.

The charges state that over 35,000 were killed and 2.7 million displaced, and refugee and displaced persons camps were also attacked and harassed, in a policy aimed at destroying these people as distinct groups or tribes. Rape has been a common tactic, they allege, with one third of rape victims being children.

Some of the charges and the overall analysis of Bashir’s aims have been questioned by respected independent international experts who know Darfur intimately. Others ask if pursuing justice is worth the instability and further violence that will surely follow any ICC indictment of Bashir.

The genocide charge is the most serious in the ICC arsenal. It sends a powerful and needed message about the international community’s determination to act forcefully when despotism, brutality, mass killings and other large scale crimes take place anywhere in the world. It affirms that there can be no complacency in the face of criminality, and that impunity for killers and brutal dictators in the Third World will not be tolerated.

But these criminal charges against Arabs in Sudan have to be weighed against three other realities: massive crimes committed against Arabs by their own leaders in other Arab countries; crimes committed by Israel; and, the mass suffering, death, destitution, refugee flows, and other consequences of invading foreign forces — especially the American-led troops in Iraq.

Will any of the crimes by Arab, Israeli or American leaders be equally investigated in due course? The linear gradations of their brutality, criminality and crimes against humanity demand a nuanced assessment on a case-by-case basis. I suggest, though, that two principles should guide an Arab response to the likely Sudan indictment by the ICC: Criminal acts must be investigated and punished wherever they occur; and, the same standard of culpability and morality should be applied to all situations around the world.

The moral force and political validity of the rule of law emanate from its universality above all other attributes. Investigating and indicting Sudanese leaders while ignoring the crimes of Arab, Israeli, American and other officials are seen as a sickening example of double standards that reek of colonialism and tinged with racism. Yet we cannot ignore crimes by Sudanese in Sudan by arguing that other criminals and killers in the region are not prosecuted.

The Lebanese-international court established by the Security Council to try those who will be accused of killing the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a historic step forward towards ending impunity for political criminality in the Arab world. We should make sure the judicial accountability of the killers, rapists and genocidal ethnic cleansers in Sudan is a second step in this direction.

We should persist on this road to bring to justice all others who use violence as a routine tool of political expression, including any Israelis, Americans, British, Turks, Iranians and Arabs who have made the Middle East the world’s sinkhole of political morality and statesmanship. If the evidence of criminal deeds is available, prosecution in a fair trial should always follow.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 16 July 2008
Word Count: 830
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WASHINGTON — If the tensions in the Middle East between the American-Israeli-led side and the Iranian-Syrian-led side were a baseball game, this would be the fourth inning of a regulation nine-inning game. The players are warmed up, and have had a good look at each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and are now prepared to get to the nitty-gritty core of the contest.

The contest underway comprises arenas and means that transcend the simplistic but prevalent portrayal in Washington of Iran as a “problem” that must be resolved. Things are much more complex, and some of the subtle nuances are emerging for the first time.

In the past four weeks I have been in Washington, I have heard people speak more of Iran than of the local Nationals baseball team, because the Nationals are not playing well and the Iranians are. News coverage and discussions of the Iran-US and Israel-Iran dynamics both shot up this week, due primarily to Iran’s testing of medium- and long-range missiles.

Behind bellicose speculation of “Will the US/Israel attack Iran’s nuclear facilities?” and “How will Iran retaliate if it is attacked?” a much more interesting game of feints, hints and winks is taking place. Earlier this week, the Iranian president said there would be no war with the US/Israel. The Iranian foreign minister said that Iran could consider the opening of a US interests section in another embassy in Tehran. And, senior advisers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — the real power center in Iran — made it clear that the latest offer from the major Western powers could be seen as basis for discussions and pre-negotiations of the nuclear issue and other matters.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the United States would protect its allies and interests — the foreign policy equivalent of being out in left field. Meanwhile, Iranian military officials said that they had their finger on the trigger at all times to protect their country.

What does all this add up to? I’d say it is a display of classic statecraft — fighting and threatening while simultaneously sending signals of a desire to negotiate and make a deal. We are witnessing three simultaneous, important developments: The two loose camps linked to the United States and Iran have recognized that their respective power is limited, the other side will fight back fiercely, and they are roughly matched and tied on the ground throughout the Middle East. So, they both behave like normal countries for a change: fighting and talking at the same time.

An important step in this process was the testimony at a congressional hearing Wednesday by William Burns, the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the Department of State. Speaking on “The Strategic Challenge Posed by Iran” (“challenge” rather than “threat” — nice touch, Bill), he made some important points that should be appreciated in the Middle East.

Noting that Iran was rather isolated and without many friends (among governments, at least) that could offer “strategic reassurance, vital investment, or a secure future in a globalized world,” he said that, “Our goal is to convince Iran to abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions, cease its support for terrorist and militant groups, and become a constructive partner in the region….

“We have made clear that we do not object to Iran playing an important role in the region, commensurate with its legitimate interests and capabilities, but also that Iran is far more likely to achieve its desired level of influence if it works with the international community and its neighbors, rather than if it works against them…. The dual-track strategy to which we often refer in connection with the nuclear file, in fact, applies more broadly. Engaging in a diplomatic process on the broad range of issues at stake between our two states and working toward the restoration of Iran’s relationship with the international community would offer clear benefits for Iran and the Iranian people…

“We should not let the Iranian leadership entrench itself on the false pretext that it is under threat from the outside. We have committed repeatedly and at the highest levels to deal diplomatically with the Iranian regime…. As the recent presentation of yet another P5+1 offer makes clear, we do not exclude engagement. We remain ready to talk to Tehran about its nuclear program and the array of other American concerns about Iranian policies, as well as to address any issues Iran chooses to raise in a diplomatic context. The Iranians are not completely closed off, and neither should the United States be. Careful consideration suggests that in certain contexts, we should have overlapping interests with Iran…”

There is not much new substance here, but a slightly revised style and tone. The traditionally arrogant and insulting American rhetoric has been toned down a touch. Washington seems more cognizant of Iran’s reasonable desire to protect its legitimate national interests in the Middle East, and is willing to discuss issues that Iran brings to the table. Sounds to me like the players are warmed up and this game is just starting to get serious.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 14 July 2008
Word Count: 840
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MONTREAL — I have always known Canada to be an impressive country, but a few weeks ago I elevated my impression of the Canadian people and government to the nationhood equivalent of a real class act. This was sparked by the bold and courageous gesture the Canadian government officially made by issuing a formal, public apology to the tens of thousands of indigenous people, and their families, who as children had been forcibly taken from their families and sent to boarding schools.

For an entire century, ending only in 1996, a total of 132 boarding schools mostly affiliated with churches took First Nations, Inuit and Metis children away from their families and placed them in schools where they would leave behind their native identity and language and essentially be remade into white kids. Many died and thousands suffered mental or sexual abuse, which manifested itself in later life in drug and alcohol abuse or high suicide rates.

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper last month stood up before an overflowing House of Commons, in the presence of many indigenous leaders, and apologized clearly, sincerely, and repeatedly. His words were noble, humble, powerful, moving, and worth repeating for some of their key sentiments. He said, among other things:

“I stand before you today to offer an apology to former students of Indian residential schools [for this] sad chapter in our history.… Today, we recognize that this policy of assimilation was wrong, has caused great harm, and has no place in our country…

“The government now recognizes that the consequences of the Indian residential schools policy were profoundly negative…. The government recognizes that the absence of an apology has been an impediment to healing and reconciliation. Therefore, on behalf of the government of Canada and all Canadians, I stand before you, in this chamber so central to our life as a country, to apologize to aboriginal peoples for Canada’s role in the Indian residential schools system…

“The burden of this experience has been on your shoulders for far too long. The burden is properly ours as a government, and as a country…. You have been working on recovering from this experience for a long time and in a very real sense, we are now joining you on this journey.

“The government of Canada sincerely apologizes and asks the forgiveness of the aboriginal peoples of this country for failing them so profoundly. We are sorry.”

Several aspects of this apology are worth noting, especially by protagonists waging protracted and often barbaric conflicts in various parts of the Middle East, whether within or between countries. The apology was part of a negotiated settlement with indigenous peoples that includes $2 billion in compensation to the abused individuals, and for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission — the first such commission created for an industrialized country. This is a living example of how the excesses of European racism can be acknowledged and redressed in part by a combination of gestures, statements and compensatory mechanisms.

It is a noteworthy moment when the White Man offers humility, truth and apology for historical misdeeds and crimes committed by some, but not all, ancestors. Accepting national responsibility and apologizing on behalf of the entire country and government, as Premier Harper did, was an act of monumental national courage, honesty, self-confidence and fortitude.

By chance, I met with two Canadian friends who both at one time were national political leaders. Each mentioned separately that the negotiated settlement and the apology were very tough experiences, but also the right thing to do.

Also by chance, this occurred while I have been completing research and writing of a text on Palestinian-Israeli ‘moral compensation’, or symbolic restitution — meaning the statements and gestures that Israelis and Palestinians both believe they must get from the other in order for a negotiated peace agreement one day to foster permanent peace and reconciliation.

Material, territorial and political compensation are always necessary in resolving such conflicts, but they are never enough on their own. Dehumanized people can only find solace, and give peace and security to others, when their humanity has been restored. This applies alike to indigenous Canadian children taken from their parents’ arms, black South Africans tortured to death by Apartheid system jailers, or Palestinians who were expelled from their towns and villages and made refugees in order for the state of Israel to be born.

Premier Harper and his government, speaking for all Canadians, gracefully and correctly noted that, “the absence of an apology has been an impediment to healing and reconciliation,” coupling the formal apology with a request for forgiveness, and the creation of the truth and reconciliation commission. Indeed, it is heartening to witness such a class act, in a league of its own — a powerful example that others in the world who care to resolve conflicts, and achieve peace and security, would do well to study closely.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri

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Released: 09 July 2008
Word Count: 813
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