COPENHAGEN — The amount and quality of available scientific data on the global impact of climate change is staggering — as I rediscovered at a seminar organized by the Danish foreign ministry in Copenhagen this week. The debate that swirled around the issues of climate change and global warming just two or three years ago has vanished. There is much more certainty now on the nature and extent of the changes to the Earth’s climate that can be attributed to the impact of human activity, mainly the burning of fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases.

The collective technical knowledge of humankind, however, is not yet matched by parallel political will to act early and decisively enough to reduce the consequences of climate change, and nowhere is this more evident than in the countries of the Middle East. The contrast between the actions of European countries — individually or collectively via the European Union — and the relative inaction in the Arab world is staggering.

Equally dangerous is an emerging new trend in global climate change analysis and pre-emptive policy-making that sees climate change consequences as a security issue, rather than only of environmental or economic consequence. Countries hard hit by climate change which do not take early mitigation or adaptation measure will suffer severe consequences and become a menace to themselves and to others. These consequences could include large-scale population displacements, job losses, food and water shortages, social and political strife, unchecked migration, waves of “climate refugees,” and armed conflicts over water or land.

A fine report addressing climate change challenges primarily as security threats was published this year, providing a terrific synthesis of our knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change. This compact but rich 36-page report, entitled Climate Change: Global risks, challenges and decisions — Synthesis Report, summarized the deliberations of 12 leading international scholars who met in Copenhagen in March under the aegis of the International Alliance of Research Universities (www.climatecongress.ku.dk). In it, University of Copenhagen Professor Ole Waever, a leading scholar of international relations security theory, wrote that not only can climate change exacerbate conflicts and increase strains and violence among competing groups, but also that, “When issues are cast in security terms, leaders get increased latitude for dramatic measures. It is crucial that this ‘security-driven empowerment’ in the case of climate change gets ‘channeled’ into strengthening of international institutions, and not unilateral emergency acts. Factoring security into the climate change equation runs the risk of escalating vicious circles. In the parts of the world where health and wellbeing are most negatively impacted by climate change, the liklelihood of conflict will increase most, and these conflicts will further reduce living standards.”

The security/climate change nexus is critical for the Middle East, which is setting itself up for a catastrophe if individual countries do not soon summon the political will and strength of character to acknowledge the likely consequences of climate change and act preemptively to deal with them. In a region that is already fully or semi-arid, with limited arable land for agriculture, and major cities burgeoning out of control due to high birth and rural-to-urban emigration rates, unchecked climate change that raises the average temperature by two degrees Centigrade is certain to aggravate the trends that have already turned our region into a showcase of incompetent public management and poor governance. These trends include declining fresh water resources and degradation of water quality, urban hyper-growth, rising food costs, and widening disparities in terms of income, health and social services, water and sanitation services, food quality, education, and overall quality of life.

Signs to date suggest that most Arab countries in the past generation have been unable to manage public services, the economy, and the equitable distribution of, and access to, resources in a manner that allowed the living standards of most citizens to improve steadily. Rather, a small slice of Arabs has enjoyed significant wealth or very comfortable living standards, while the majority has remained mired in low-income living conditions — conditions not desperate enough to foment social or political unrest, but not allowing the bulk of our citizens to graduate into a middle class of security, hope and wellbeing.

At a recent seminar at the American University of Beirut, climate change researchers from four Levant countries reported that massive quantities of fresh water are pumped out of the ground and used by private interests, without state regulation. Consistent over-exploitation of underground aquifers has seen fresh water supplies decline steadily in many if not most Arab countries. Water sectoral allocation, pricing, re-use, storage and conveyance are widely mismanaged throughout our region. It is difficult to see how a region that has been unable to master the most basic aspects of integrated water resources management can possibly muster the skills and political will to deal with the far more serious challenges of climate change. A resort to climate matters as a security issue is always possible in a region where security agencies dominate society, and lead to severe distortions that partly account for the moribund state of Arab society.

The early warning signs are clear for all to see, and the scientific knowledge needed to deal with the challenges and potential threats is widely available to anyone with an internet connection. In the late 1970s, we were warned about imminent stress resulting from population growth, urban sprawl, arable land misuse, and water shortages. We did virtually nothing about all these issues, and they have blossomed into veritable crises that plague majorities of our citizens — though the leaderships and elites are shielded from the pain. We will look like world class idiots if we again ignore these warnings about climate change issues with the potential consequences much more dire. One generation of amateurish national natural resource management is the most that any people should suffer.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 21 September 2009
Word Count: 964
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NEW YORK — The United State is juggling four critical and increasingly linked foreign policy issues in Palestine/Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. But it seems to be making little headway as we approach critical junctures in all four. A different approach seems worth pondering.

The Obama administration must be given high marks for initiative and courage in its fresh approach to all four conflicts. Yet it is also obvious from both the public debate and private discussions here in New York and at the United Nations that Washington remains hobbled by a structural weakness that may be an occupational hazard or a genetic defect of all superpowers: an exaggerated sense of honor that prevents one from taking that final leap into sensibleness and realism, after starting down the courageous path.

It is striking, for example, how wisely the Obama administration acted in moving quickly to reach out to Iran. It reaffirmed its wisdom this weekend when it announced that it would join the six other world powers that are already talking with Iran on nuclear and other issues. Common sense seems to stir anew in Washington.

Yet, the United States also hobbles itself — and retards the chances of progress in the talks — in two ways. First, it refuses to accept that it has lost the standoff of recent years and now — having vowed never to do so — meets and negotiates with Iran without preconditions, preferring to speak only about “reaching out” or “engaging” Iran.

Second, Washington continues to approach the negotiations by laying down both the expected end results and a series of punishments and sanctions that Tehran can expect if it does not, before the talks start, signal its acceptance of American demands. America’s courage in negotiating with Iran is being totally negated by its diplomatic arrogance and amateurism in conducting the process.

The four conflicts I mentioned above are relevant because they reveal a pattern of failure that should be assessed and absorbed if we hope to achieve any future successes, especially with Iran. It is shocking, but not surprising, to note that after all the effort, money and sacrifice in dead and injured troops that the United States made in Afghanistan and Iraq, its military presence is widely resented and often publicly rejected and violently resisted in both countries. Its approach to Israel/Palestine and Iran generates equally prevalent regional criticism.

This is a consequence of decades of American policies in these four cases and the surrounding Arab-Asian region. My reading is that Washington has interacted there primarily through warfare, pre-emptive regime change, multi-year occupations, threats and sanctions, supporting local dictators, acquiescing in long-term Israeli occupation and colonization, supporting warlords and militias, pressuring foes to change their core positions before it will speak to them. In most cases of providing substantial economic and military aid, it seeks primarily to fulfill US security goals or to transform local societies in America’s image.

These approaches have collectively brought the United States to its current calamity in the region. Persisting in these tactics is likely only to aggravate things all around, and to strengthen those foes in Iraq, the Levant, Afghanistan and Iran who are clearly helping each other master the business of blowing up American military or civilian vehicles, or blowing up American diplomatic initiatives.

It would be a tragic wasted opportunity for the United States now to enter into talks with Iran using the same old approaches. It is particularly juvenile, offensive and counter-productive for American officials and analysts to say, as some do regularly, that the US is talking to Iran only to be able to impose tougher sanctions soon with a clear conscience, based on the fact that it had tried talking but got nowhere. How do you think the Iranians will respond if they sense they are being asked to enter talks whose main aim from the US side is to clear the way to tighten the screws on Iran? Why does the US ask Iran to act like an adult, but treat it like a child?

A more sensible approach that the United States and its six powerful partners should ponder is to say that they have major disagreements with Iran (or Hamas, Hizbullah, Sudan, Cuba, or anyone else) which they seek to resolve on the basis of four principles, with three aims. The four principles should be: conducting sustained, honest and comprehensive negotiations, without the use of military force, on the basis of prevailing international law and conventions, with a view to simultaneously addressing the core, legitimate demands of both sides. The three aims should be: to satisfy the minimum critical demands and rights of both sides, to end the state of enmity or conflict, and to achieve bilateral and regional peace and security for all.

This sounds to me like the American way of doing things. Why is it not being used with Iran?

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 16 September 2009
Word Count: 809
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NEW YORK — I marked the eighth anniversary Friday of the 9/11 terror attack in the United States by flying from Beirut to New York — apt symbols of their wider American and Arab societies that in so many sectors are locked in an ongoing confrontation that includes the use of violence by both sides. This day of remembrance occurred at a time when the United States was refocusing seriously on waging the hitherto inconclusive “global war on terror” in Afghanistan.

This is a moment, therefore, to consider whether the “global war on terror” since late 2001 has achieved its aims, made the United States and the world safer, and reduced the number and capabilities of terror organizations around the world. The war in Afghanistan that is now escalating in many ways closes the circle on two parallel and deeply linked aspects of both global terror and the “global war on terror” that the United States would do well to appreciate more profoundly at this moment of remembering.

The first is the reality that foreign troops that invade another country — even with cause — will always elicit strong local resistance, often a fight to the death. Afghanistan has taught this lesson several times to invaders and the world. Al-Qaeda’s “global jihad” crystallized and spread from Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. When a foreign army attacks a distant land, the home side almost always wins in the end.

The Al-Qaeda group that Osama Bin Laden forged in Afghanistan actually ignited from embers that were first felt in his home country of Saudi Arabia, again in response to the presence of a foreign army, in that case the US armed forces’ lengthy stay there to fight and contain Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party leadership after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.

The second phenomenon that we should consider thoroughly on this eighth anniversary of the 9/11 attack is the structural nature and various linkages of the Al-Qaeda-like movements that continue to develop. We need to ask this question every time we remember 9/11 or civilians killed by Western armies seeking to avenge 9/11: Has the “global war on terror” contained or stimulated the development of terror organizations dedicated to fighting the West and what they consider to be apostate Islamic regimes? Is the global threat from such jihad-inspired terrorism greater or smaller than it was in 2001?

The answers are inconclusive, but lean towards the negative, i.e., attacks against Western targets have stabilized or declined, but the numbers of individuals and groups plotting such attacks or carrying them out in the world seem to be increasing (though many of them are identified and stopped by law enforcement measures before they are carried out). If the United States plans to send more troops to Afghanistan in an attempt to “win” the war there, thinking through the consequences would seem like a useful thing to do.

Defeating terror is a legitimate and compelling goal. Sending your armies half way around the world to do so seems to stimulate not only nationalist resistance, it also instigates sharper motivations, more lethal capabilities, and more effective linkages among jihadist terrorists around the world. Today as compared to eight years ago — according to the best analyses I have seen from European and Arab experts working for international organizations in Geneva, who must remain anonymous due to the neutral status of their organizations — the world of Al-Qaeda and its associates has expanded into three distinct but related tiers that form a single overall network.

Al-Qaeda’s core leadership in the northwest Pakistan mountains now provides global leadership and inspiration, more than operational management. Secondly, a series of Al-Qaeda “franchises,” as in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, or Iraq, carry out operations that are often locally initiated and funded. And a third tier of Islamist militant groups, like Al Shabab movement in Somalia, are inspired by Al-Qaeda but operate totally independently for local goals. Finally, we may be seeing a fourth tier developing, in the form of small groups of individuals in Europe or North America who are radicalized and decide to carry out attacks on their own, without any contacts with the other three tiers.

Afghanistan has demonstrated important things in the last six months: An expanded foreign troop presence will trigger more attacks against the troops. Nationalist appeals to fight the foreign invaders fall on fertile ears and attract Taliban recruits all across Afghanistan. And bomb-making and missile-launching technical skills from Iraq and other places are being absorbed by the Taliban and other groups fighting the Western armies. More US troops and an expanded war in Afghanistan would probably achieve these things again, while also perhaps revitalizing the operational activities of the core Al-Qaeda leaders.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 14 September 2009
Word Count: 802
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HAMBURG, Germany — I had the pleasure in Hamburg this week of sharing a panel discussion with two impressive people — Iranian lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, and former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer. The gathering, sponsored by the Korber Foundation to discuss “The Future of the Middle East,”,confirmed that we have much work to do on the issue of when, and whether, powerful Western countries have the responsibility and/or the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Third World countries.

Our three differing perspectives analyzed the tensions between the West and the Middle East/South Asia, especially in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Iran and Afghanistan. Fischer broadly articulated a common Western view that:
a) much of the problem in the Middle East is due to power-hungry local leaders who sometimes prefer confrontation and conflict to stability, democracy and development;
b) if Arabs and Iranians embraced Israel the region would be less violent; and,
c) the most dangerous threat to regional and global security today is Iran’s nuclear industry, which must be checked before it develops nuclear weapons.

A different, Middle Eastern, perspective that Ebadi and I proposed holds that the authoritarianism, instability and violence of our region reflect:
a) home-grown autocrats who are often supported by Western powers, leaving the masses of citizens disempowered, disenchanted and susceptible to demagoguery;
b) flagrant Western double standards in implementing basic human rights standards and UN resolutions, causing mass skepticism in fostering or respecting the rule of law; and,
c) a continuing tradition of Western armies that enter our region and try to re-order it in their image or to suit their strategic needs, but end up making it more unstable and violent.

Yet we agreed that double standards are not helpful, whoever practices them. The West should not discriminate between, say, Israel and the Arab states in implementing UN resolutions, or Israel and Iran in terms of nuclear technology. Similarly, Arab and Iranian autocrats who deny their own people the rule of law cannot credibly demand that the West observe international law. Much better, we agreed, to find that middle ground — a single standard of law and morality — where Western and Arab-Islamic actors behave according to common rules, thus generating the equal treatment and mutual enjoyment of rights that are the key to resolving conflicts and coexisting in peace and security. Unable to do this, we all persist in using threats, sanctions, attacks, resistance, revenge, terror and all sorts of pre-emptive political violence.

Still, the core dilemma remains unresolved: When should it be permissible for Western countries to intervene in or invade states in our region? Iraq and Afghanistan are two live examples of this, with clear but debatable consequences. Those armies that invaded Iraq are now apparently on their way out, but more NATO troops may be on their way into Afghanistan. A military strike or more severe sanctions against Iran are possible in the months ahead. Others are on a stand-by list for possible NATO and Israeli intervention.

If aggressive or military actions by Western powers are deemed by a majority of citizens in the Arab-Asian region to reflect double standards, they will be met with greater and greater local resistance and political defiance. The circle of violence will expand — as it has been since September 11, 2001.

If the United States, Israel and others view Iran only through the prism of its potential threat as a nuclear armed state, they are likely to hasten that nuclear capability, rather than deter it. More economic sanctions will probably hurt the Iranian people, without significantly bothering the ruling elite.

A better approach, Ebadi suggested, is to maintain dialogue with Iran on the full range of issues that matter to the leaders and people of both sides — nuclear capabilities, human rights, security, economic growth, democracy and others. Talk, negotiate, contain, or pressure as you wish, but do so on the basis that universal human rights standards would be applied consistently across the region, whether in Arab lands, Israel, Iran or Afghanistan.

As Iraq slowly fades from their view, many in Europe and the West remain confused and frustrated about what to do in Afghanistan and Iran: increase the pressure and the troops, or shift into a political dialogue mode? The West says it intervenes in the Middle East to defend itself against new attacks and terror. It’s hard to argue against self-defense; it’s equally hard — NATO is discovering — to perpetuate an interventionist strategy that seems to enhance, rather than contain, the threat of radical militancy and terror from the lands that NATO has invaded.

A healthier and more useful debate would explore how security can be achieved by promoting the application of the rule of law and access to national and human rights for all, simultaneously. The courageous Shirin Ebadi said it succinctly: “If you go to other countries, go to build schools, not military bases.”

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 09 September 2009
Word Count: 812
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BEIRUT — It is at once heartening and perplexing to see growing expectations that US President Barack Obama will make some sort of formal gesture on Arab-Israeli peace-making during his speech at the United Nations at the opening of the General Assembly session later this month. It is heartening because the United States is an essential player in any serious peace-making effort, mainly because it is the only party Israel trusts. So it is important that the United States actively engage in trying to re-start peace negotiations.

Yet, it is perplexing that Obama seeks to do this now, when almost all indicators — including the United States’ own posture — do not inspire confidence in an optimistic outcome. The Palestinians are deeply divided. The Israelis are governed by an extreme rightwing coalition whose ‘peace’ terms would be closer to war crimes in most normal countries. The Arab world remains fragmented and passive, and many other issues seem to attract greater attention from the world — such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Most importantly, the United States seeks to push the negotiations forward while its own credentials and impact reflect mixed fortunes rather than compelling credibility. The US experiences difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan; its counter-terrorism and non-proliferation policies show few successes; its Iran policy remains inconclusive; its sanctioning of major Islamist movements has not reduced these movements’ popularity; its re-engagement of Syria has yet to produce practical results; its on-and-off attempts to promote freedom and democracy in the Arab world are an erratic side show; its pressure on Israel to freeze all settlements unconditionally has generated an ongoing negotiation that will probably see a partial freeze for a short period of time only; its cajoling of Arab states to make confidence-building gestures towards Israel seems to be generating very limited steps which mostly have been tried before (visas, trade offices) without any impact; and the laudable new “hug-a-Muslim” rhetoric of the Obama administration has generated reciprocal hugs, but not much else in real policy terms.

This rickety foundation for US policy-making in the Middle East combines with Obama administration vulnerability on domestic issues and other global matters — meaning that a new US Middle East initiative risks going nowhere because of serious constraints and weaknesses among all the principal players in the region and abroad. Yet, the United States has transformed its image and posture in the Middle East since January — especially its links to Iran, Syria, Iraq, Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The shift in American rhetoric on these issues has been decisive and impressive, and has primarily provided the US with a platform of renewed seriousness. At least people listen now, whereas a year ago the United States was widely ignored in the Middle East.

One can argue that the United States is moving prudently by changing its tone, being more realistically involved by speaking to all governments, taking limited initiatives, and trying above all to re-establish its credibility as a truly impartial mediator who addresses the interests of all concerned, rather than acting mainly as Israel’s protector and ally.

It would be understandable for Obama to continue this limited action approach when he speaks at the UN — perhaps livening it up with a meeting with the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. That would essentially be a replay of the Annapolis process that former President Bush tried nearly two years ago, without success. It would also perpetuate the stalemates and failures of the past.

A radical new approach to Arab-Israeli peace-making is needed, and the United States is in a position to drive such a process if it really wants to help the parties achieve peace. If the UN General Assembly is the platform for Obama’s speech, he could consider going back to the General Assembly’s two key resolutions 181 and 194 which called for the partition of Palestine in 1947 and then addressed the Palestinian refugees’ rights in 1948. Obama could suggest that the core of a credible peace process can be extracted from existing UN General Assembly resolutions, updated to take account of today’s realities.

A serious peace process requires grasping the mutual, simultaneous, equal and legitimate rights of Israelis and Palestinians. Revisiting the principles of these two seminal UN resolutions could be a dramatic way for the United States to push for peace. If we’re going to take a few steps back before moving forward, it makes more sense to go back to the core issues of 1947-48 than to the marginal comedy, diversionary unseriousness, and legacy of failure of phenomena like the Annapolis Process, the Quartet, the Road Map — or anything related to the Middle East doings of Tony Blair. Our approach to Arab-Israeli peace-making, like most other things in the political world Obama has inherited and now tries to shape, needs real change, not cosmetic re-makes or illusory magic shows.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 07 September 2009
Word Count: 801
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If there is a moment, a place, a person, and a legacy that come together to bring sadness to all Arabs, they are upon us this week in the 40th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 revolution that brought Col. Muammar Gaddafi to power. There is nothing to celebrate today in Libya, other than a colossal waste of that country’s human and natural resources over four decades.

This is also a day of calamity for the modern Arab world, not only because of what Libya has suffered and squandered — but also because Libya is only a severe example of the self-inflicted distortions, waste and misfortunes that have defined much of the Arab region since independence. This is also a moment that should spur some quiet reflection by all those in the West who deal with the Arab world with shameless self-interest.

Gaddafi’s Libya is everything we always dreaded we would become, as independent states, societies, governing systems, and leaderships. It is hard to know where to start in listing the reasons that the 40th anniversary of Col. Gaddafi’s rule is a hollow celebration. He and his small circle of ruling partners have managed, remarkably, to accomplish virtually every failure that can possibly be envisaged in the world of statehood and governance.

The biggest failure is probably to strangle the country from within, laying siege to his own people by driving away the best and brightest Libyans, and subjecting those who remain to a life of material mediocrity and political indignity. The core of the calamity in Libya — common to the entire Arab world — is the lack of freedom for the ordinary citizen. Libya is a special case, because it combines authoritarianism with eccentricity, waste of massive wealth, and Arab and international derision.

If much of Libya’s human wealth has been forced to flee abroad, most of its material wealth has been wasted in one of the most shocking cases of national self-squandering in the modern world. If we were to say conservatively that Libya has averaged $10 billion of oil exports per year in the past 40 years — with some single year income figures reaching over $45 billion, like last year, for example — we could reasonably ask: What has the Libyan government to show for the $400 billion or so of income that accrued since 1979?

In the eyes of the world in recent decades, Libya has been most widely associated with terrorism. The Lockerbie Pan Am bombing, the Berlin disco bombing, and the downing of a UTA French civilian airliner in Africa are only three of the most glaring examples of accusations or convictions against Libya, while many Lebanese assume that Shiite leader Moussa Sadr was killed during a visit to Libya in 1978.

Libya has had to pay compensation to the Lockerbie and UTA bombings victims’ families, has been subjected to sanctions, and militarily attacked by the United States (resulting in the death of Gaddafi’s young daughter). Libya has attacked its neighbor Chad several times, and routinely had its borders with its neighbors closed. It tried to develop weapons of mass destruction, and also dropped the idea, throwing away more of its wealth on another wasted whim. The country has tried repeatedly but fruitlessly to unite with immediate neighbors or would-be partners further afield, while providing funds and arms to militant movements across Africa, Europe and Asia. Libya’s presence at Arab summits has made even more of a mockery of those events than they already are, and the leader’s travels abroad generate international media coverage that is more spectacle than serious.

The litany of four decades of failure in Libya is long and thick, and hard to believe were it not true. Now we are asked to believe that Gaddafi’s sons and presumed heirs embrace democracy and liberalism. Somehow that proposition is hard to take seriously, as power continues to be exercised without any real accountability. This is a sad anniversary for a rich land that has mostly experienced derision, indictment, isolation, and underachievement in recent decades.

The Arab world watches silently, knowing that the Libyan tale is not so alien to our region — it is merely the most severe example of a management style that has made underachievement the hallmark of the modern Arab world. The West, meanwhile, looks to Libya for more opportunities to sign lucrative new contracts, oblivious to both the moral legacy of its own history in the Middle East or the desperate quest for simple dignity by the ordinary Arab citizen. There is nothing to celebrate today — 40 years and $400 billion later — there is nothing to commemorate other than monumental sadness.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 02 September 2009
Word Count: 777
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BEIRUT — If you wait long enough, sensible things always happen in America, often among the armed forces’ senior command. One example was Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus’ recent affirmation that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict fairly is “very central” to the mission of American troops and diplomacy in the Middle East. This would create a much more favorable regional environment for the United States and its allies, dampen the appeal of militants and terrorist groups, and remove threats to American troops.

Coming from Gen. Petraeus, this sensible and rather obvious conclusion appears now to be more widely shared among top Obama administration officials — who resist the desire of Israel and its Washington lobbyist-proxies to deal with Iran, and instead focus on promoting Arab-Israeli peace.

A second, more dramatic, example of sensible analysis and courageous honesty is this week’s article in Joint Force Quarterly by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen. He sharply criticized US government efforts at “strategic communication” with the Muslim world, noting that public relations alone will never generate the credibility the United States seeks, if its foreign policy on the ground is perceived as arrogant, uncaring or insulting.

“To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate,” Mullen wrote. “Each time we fail to live up to our values or don’t follow up on a promise, we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are.”

This is sensible and accurate analysis that Americans should listen to carefully, especially given its source. Since September 11, 2001, the United States as a whole — government, media, civil society, and plumbers everywhere — have been blinded by the rage they experienced due to the 9/11 terror attacks. An exaggerated focus on “Islam” and “Muslim extremists” was allowed to define intellectual analysis and foreign policy alike, stressing Islamic religion and culture over the policies practiced by all concerned, including Arabs and Islamic states as well as the United States, Europeans and Israel.

This led to two American wars that have not achieved their aims: military wars that have killed tens of thousands in Iraq and Afghanistan without reducing terrorism threats, and “public diplomacy” campaigns that have mainly succeeded in revealing Americans’ most erratic foreign policy eccentricities, intellectual weaknesses, and ideological vulnerabilities.

The most recent example of that peculiarly American vortex — where ignorance converges with pedantic arrogance and the crass distortions of special interest lobby groups — was the recent creation of a bizarre new post in the US Department of State, the “office of the special representative to Muslim communities.” The first person to fill this position, Ms. Farah Pandith, recently addressed a special Policy Forum at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), to discuss her new role and the US’ approach to “Muslim engagement.”

WINEP is well respected in Washington circles as a mainstay of pro-Israeli thinking and a pillar of what may people refer to as “the pro-Israel lobby.” So for the US government to launch a new office that seeks to engage Muslims by a speech at a leading pro-Israeli think and lobby tank is about as sensible as launching a New York Yankees Fan Club in Fenway Park in Boston, selling Manchester United scarves in Liverpool, or promoting Israel Bonds at a Palestinian Cultural Center in Chicago. Where, oh, where does the US State Department find the wellspring of political imbecility to do this sort of thing?

Everything that Pandith said is exactly what Adm. Mullen seemed to criticize in his article. She listed an impressive list of activities to engage Muslim communities worldwide on the basis of “mutual interest and mutual respect” — break down stereotypes, work with youth at the grassroots level, and build new partnerships via education, technology, business, sports and culture.

All this sounds fine and dandy, but in reality it is splendid nonsense, reflecting a continuing, devastating American confusion about the linkages between religion, nationalism, and foreign policy. Muslims do not need engagement or happy talk from hapless American innocents using pro-Israeli platforms. Muslims — if we are going to conduct this discussion in religious terms — need simply to be treated in a manner that allows them to exercise the same personal and national rights as Jews and Christians. That’s it. Simple.

None of Pandith’s rhetoric has a chance in hell of going anywhere, while the majority of Muslims, Arabs and others in our region broadly perceive American foreign policy as being tilted towards Israeli priorities or the incumbency of Arab autocrats, as has been the case for about four decades now. Tough American patriots like Gen. Petraeus and Adm. Mullen seem to grasp this, probably because they have escaped the diversionary lunacy of American “public diplomacy” and the choke-hold of single-interest lobby groups in Washington.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 31 August 2009
Word Count: 808
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GENEVA — The decision this week by the United States’ top legal officer, Attorney General Eric Holder, to appoint a federal prosecutor to examine abuse of prisoners held by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a small step in a much bigger task that challenges all people and governments around the world: How to apply the rules of war in a reasonable and effective manner?

The decision to examine the CIA’s conduct came around the same time that the US government announced that it would continue sending prisoners to third countries but would monitor their detention to be sure they were not tortured. That last little safeguard against torture carries no serious credibility, and it is widely expected that the United States would continue to send prisoners to other countries where they would be roughed up and abused in an attempt to extract useful information from them in the ‘war on terror’.

The United States also just announced that it would give the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the names of individuals it had detained abroad, but would not allow access to them by the ICRC.

Ironically, I read about the US Justice Department’s decision to probe CIA past behavior while I was in Geneva attending the semi-annual meetings of the international advisory board of the ICRC — the neutral and independent body tasked with ensuring that the dictates of international humanitarian law are observed by all. The ICRC and the world celebrate this month the 60th anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions that, with their protocols, provide the backbone of international humanitarian law (IHL), whose task is to protect civilians and people in need in times of armed conflict.

The American-led ‘war on terror’ has provided a new challenge to those whose task it is to monitor international compliance with the Geneva Conventions and other pertinent laws that seek to protect civilians. The remarkable thing about the Geneva Conventions is that they have been ratified by every country in the world. This provides a critical platform of consensus that is often otherwise missing in attempts to secure state compliance with a legal norm or form of conduct.

The head of the ICRC’s legal division, Knut Dormann, says in a typically understated Swiss way that, “I think it’s fair to say that what happened on September 11, 2001 and its aftermath put IHL to one of its toughest tests so far.”

One of the issues that should be clarified, he suggests, is the existing reference in IHL to conditions for detention of suspects and prisoners, and also the procedural safeguards to which detainees should be entitled.

The technical issues of the applicability of law will continue to be addressed at the international level as well as by individual countries — such as the United States is now doing by investigating the CIA’s conduct on detainees. The man tapped to explore the CIA’s treatment of prisoners, John Durham, has already been investigating whether the CIA should be subjected to a full criminal investigation for the destruction of some CIA interrogation videotapes. Holder responded to criticism that investigating the CIA like this is irresponsible or uncalled for, by saying: “As attorney general, my duty is to examine the facts and to follow the law.”

He added that he also acted because of a recommendation by the Justice Department’s ethics office, and the contents of a 2004 report by the CIA inspector general on the agency’s interrogations, which was released this week. The report provides many details about various torture and abuse techniques that were used in the CIA’s secret prisons around the world, which President Obama has ordered closed. Presumably, such torture will continue to take place in the third country prisons where the United States still sends detainees.

The critical issue in the first instance here is whether legal action will be used to hold accountable those persons or institutions that misbehaved in this domain. National law might be used in some cases to try individual torturers or criminals. In the most severe cases, the world now can investigate and punish war crimes through international tribunals — such as those established for Rwanda, Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia — and the International Criminal Court.

The more difficult task would be to hold governments accountable for their conduct, and this is where legal niceties run up against the brute force of political power. The American government is taking small but significant steps in examining the conduct of its own CIA in recent years, releasing some classified reports, and closing its secret CIA prisons abroad. But there seems to be no possible means of holding the United States and other invading governments accountable for the consequences and costs of their foreign policies, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, we should expect lawlessness and terror to remain a global problem for years to come. Legal protection must be truly indivisible and universally applicable if it is to have any force at all.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 August 2009
Word Count: 827
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BEIRUT — Is it important for Israel and the United States to sit down with Hamas and talk business? Yes, it is — for the same reasons the US is trying to extract itself from its self-inflicted mess in Afghanistan by negotiating with Taliban elements, and from Iraq by partnering with and paying off Sunni insurgents who had spent several years killing Americans.

Ironically, the United States and Hamas do not have a direct confrontation; the conflict is between Hamas and Israel. Yet according to the rules of US policy-making in the Middle East, wherever Israel is concerned the US plays according to Israeli rules, which in this case means the hard Israeli right and its lobbyist proxies in Washington forbid the US from speaking with Hamas. This is another example of how the bizarre relationship between the US and Israel totally distorts American foreign policy principles, and makes hypocrisy a central pillar of how the US deals with the rest of the world.

This is significant because as long as American policy in the Middle East is largely defined by rightwing Israeli extremists and their agents in Washington, the chances of achieving a breakthrough for peace and stability in the region are zero. Israel will have to decide for itself whether coming to grips with the reality of Islamist sentiments and movements in the Middle East is a reasonable thing to do. The United States should have no similar dilemma engaging with Islamist movements like Hamas that have proven beyond a doubt that they represent a large number of people in our region, and are prepared to play by fair rules.

Sarah Palin, in the eyes of many people, is a certified nutcase, and a reckless extremist; but she has to be dealt with because she represents the sentiments of many people, i.e., she has legitimacy and representational credibility. Similarly, many people in the world and even in the Middle East view groups like Hamas as dangerous extremists and terrorists, but these Islamists also have legitimacy and credibility among large swaths of citizens in our region, so they cannot be ignored.

The American government, after some wasted years, has sensibly grasped that it is more realistic to negotiate peaceful coexistence with antagonists or enemies like the Iraqi resistance or the Taliban in Afghanistan. As long as Washington refuses to apply a similar approach to negotiating with Islamists in the Middle East, it will only cement the perception that American policy is totally run by Israel and its Washington lobbyists.

An impressive new report from the US Institute of Peace, by Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid, suggests a more useful and nuanced approach. It recognizes that full peace is unlikely to happen between Israel and Hamas, but also that Hamas, in practice, has “moved well beyond its charter…Indeed, Hamas has been carefully and consciously adjusting its political program for years and has sent repeated signals that it may be ready to begin a process of coexisting with Israel.”

The June 2009 special report available on the USIP.org website, entitled Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility, starts with the important acknowledgment that Hamas fights Israel because it sees Israel as an occupier of land that is inherently Palestinian and Islamic. So while Hamas cannot and will not officially recognize Israel, “it has formulated mechanisms that allow it to deal with the reality of Israel as a fait accompli. These mechanisms include the religious concepts of tahadiya (short-term calming) and hudna (truce) and Hamas’ own concept of “Palestinian legitimacy,” that is, its willingness to consider a permanent, comprehensive peace agreement such as envisioned by the 2002 Arab Peace Plan, if it is ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum. Hamas has made it clear it could participate in such a process by being part of a national unity government in Palestine.

The authors conclude: “Although a peace process under such circumstances might, for Israelis and Westerners, seem involved, arcane, and of dubious utility, it is necessary to consider the possibility of such a process because there is no realistic scenario under which Hamas will disappear. Understanding the Islamic bases of Hamas’s policies and worldview will be essential for the success of any process in which it is engaged.”

The authors — Paul Scham is executive director of the University of Maryland’s Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, and Osama Abu-Irshaid is completing his Ph.D. thesis on Hamas at Loughborough University in the UK — represent a rare ability by sensible individuals on both sides of this conflict to transcend surface antagonisms and fears, and instead delve into the more complex and nuanced worldviews of the actors in this long-running conflict. Such honest attempts to reconcile the driving principles and real national interests of both Israelis and Palestinians are more likely to move us towards peaceful coexistence than the ravings of Zionist maniacs or Arab extremists — or American simpletons, who allow themselves to get caught in between.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 24 August 2009
Word Count: 820
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BEIRUT — In the past week, the respected watchdog organization Human Rights Watch has issued two reports criticizing Hamas and Israel for violating the rules of war. While such accusations are not new, they remind us of a critical missing element in the decades-old attempts to negotiate a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict: By what rules are both sides judged and held accountable?

The two new reports reflect a common tendency by all in the Middle East to use indiscriminate force and justify it by arguing on the grounds of self-defense. The rationalizations mean little in the end, because the violence will continue unabated, driven as it is by the existential fears of Arabs and Israelis who feel they are cornered, targeted, vulnerable and on their own. The question of whether law or moral principles can somehow limit repeated inhuman behavior remains relevant, however, because it may contain the seeds of a mechanism to adjudicate and ultimately resolve this conflict.

The latest Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on August 13, said that Israeli soldiers killed 11 unarmed Palestinian civilians who were carrying white flags during the Gaza war in January. HRW said the civilians, who included five women and four children, were “in plain view and posed no apparent security threat” to the Israeli soldiers who shot them in seven separate incidents. It urged an official investigation, noting that at least three witnesses confirmed the details in each shooting.

HRW also said earlier this month that Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups violated the rules of war by firing thousands of rockets at Israeli civilians, which it described as “unlawful and unjustifiable” behavior. It said Hamas rockets placed about 800,000 Israeli civilians at risk and killed two Israeli girls, and that rockets launched from densely populated locations placed Gaza civilians at risk of return fire by Israel.

So, we have more accusations and some credible evidence from HRW that both sides committed war crimes in a conflict in which some 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed. The situation in the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon is similar. What is the value of this sort of external assessment that holds Arabs and Israelis accountable to a single standard of behavior during war? Does it help reduce such violence, or is it only another reason for people to argue endlessly?

I suspect this sort of accountability to a single standard of law will loom increasingly important in peace-making efforts if we ever enjoy credible, courageous leaders in Israel and Palestine, coupled with a fair and persistent external mediator. That will happen one day, and when it does all sides will need a reference point against which they can measure their conduct, in order to shift from aggressive militarism to more accommodating coexistence.

But is this possible? One of the biggest obstacles to a breakthrough for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement has been the Israeli tendency to demand exemption from the rule of law, global conventions, and UN resolutions that all other human beings on earth are supposed to live by. Whether the issue is discrimination and racism at home to its own Palestinian citizens, or stealing and colonizing Palestinian land, or attacking other countries in the region, or subjecting Gaza to an inhuman siege, Israel consistently argues that its “security” requirements override any other consideration. It demands that Palestinians, Arabs, and now Iranians formally and absolutely guarantee Israel’s security before Israel makes any gesture that acknowledges their rights.

This “Israel first” approach has not worked, because it is universally perceived as being unfair and unreasonable. It has proved a colossal failure many times since serious negotiations started with the Camp David talks between Egypt and Israel 30 years ago. You would think that reasonable people who sincerely seek to negotiate permanent peace would explore a more productive approach — and this is where HRW and others like it play such an important role.

They remind us that we do have at our disposal a set of clear rules for waging military conflict, administering occupation, or treating one’s own nationals or refugees and displaced persons. They also make the important point that both sides in a conflict must be judged and held accountable by the same rules, laws or moral values. Equal treatment is the key to a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli peace-making, whether in assessing conduct in war or crafting a permanent peace agreement that acknowledges the historical traumas of both sides. We in the Arab world should push actively for this kind of even-handed approach, not only for what it generates in our confrontation with Israel but also for promoting the rule of law and decent behavior inside our own countries. Our criminality is just as bad as their criminality. Law only enjoys validity and power if it is applied to all equally.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 17 August 2009
Word Count: 802
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