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Patrick Seale, “The Collapse of Turkey’s Middle East Policy”

September 4, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

The Arab Spring will undoubtedly go down in history as an important moment in the liberation of the Arab peoples from tyranny. But, like most major political upheavals, it has had a number of unfortunate and largely unforeseen consequences.

The economies of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen have suffered serious damage; Syria’s on-going civil war has resulted in heavy — and mounting — civilian casualties and material destruction; in the Sahel, violence and chaos have followed the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar al-Qadhafi, especially in Mali where Touareg rebels backed by Islamist groups have seized a great chunk of the country; sectarian tensions have sharpened across the region causing all minorities to feel less secure; the Palestine cause has been consigned to the margins of international attention, while Israel, fully backed by the United States, proceeds undisturbed with its land grab.

Turkey is yet another victim of the unforeseen consequence of the Arab Spring: Its ambitious Middle East policy has collapsed. Two years ago, Turkey could claim to be the most successful country in the region. Its economy was booming. Its charismatic Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in power since 2002, enjoyed popularity at home and respect abroad. The Turkish combination of democracy and Islam was hailed as a model for the region. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, an academic turned statesman, was credited with devising a peaceful regional order, based on the principle of “zero problems with neighbours.”

A key pivot of Davutoglu’s new regional order was a Turkish-Syrian partnership, both commercial and political, which soon expanded into a free-trade zone embracing Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Visas with these countries were abolished. Meanwhile, Turkish construction companies were active in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as well as in Qadhafi’s Libya (where contracts were estimated at some $18bn for roads, bridges, pipelines, ports, airports and much else besides.)

Buoyed by these successes, Turkey set about seeking to solve some of the region’s most obdurate conflicts. It tried hard to bring Syria and Israel to the negotiating table. Together with Brazil, it made what seemed a promising advance towards solving the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme. In Afghanistan, Turkish troops were the only foreign forces welcome, which seemed to presage a role for Ankara in negotiating a settlement with the Taleban. In addition, Prime Minister Erdogan had hopes of reaching an entente with Turkey’s old rival, Greece, and of making peace at last with Armenia (a country still smarting from the harsh treatment of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks.) Above all, the Turkish Prime Minister seemed ready to make major political concessions to the Kurds of eastern Anatolia in a bid to end, once and for all, the long and violent struggle with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has claimed tens of thousands of lives.

Then the whole thing fell apart.

The deal which Turkey and Brazil negotiated with Iran over its nuclear facilities was rejected by Washington. Turkey’s overtures to Armenia got nowhere: The border remains closed. Turkey quarrelled violently with Israel when Israeli commandos boarded a Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, in international waters, and killed nine activists, most of them Turks, who were trying to break Israel’s cruel siege of Gaza. Israel has refused to apologise for its brutal behaviour. Turkey’s hopes of better relations with Greece were dashed by Greece’s economic collapse. Moreover, having quarrelled with Turkey, Israel hurried to embrace Greece, as well as the Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus, joining with it in the exploitation of gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean, to the anger of Turkish-speaking northern Cyprus and of Turkey itself.

On the commercial front, Qadhafi’s overthrow put an end to several big Turkish contracts in Libya, while Turkey’s expanding business with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states was dealt a harsh blow by the disruption of road traffic across Syria due to the uprising there. Turkey’s once friendly relations with Iran suffered because they now found themselves on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict, while Turkish relations with Iraq suffered because of Turkey’s close ties with the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq (including providing the KRG with facilities to export oil direct to Turkey, to the fury of Baghdad.)

Instead of “no problems with neighbours,” Turkey is now beset with grave problems on almost every front. Inevitably, Ahmet Davutoglu’s star has waned. No longer the master strategist, he is seen as an amateur politician struggling to survive.

The real turning point was Turkey’s impetuous decision to back the Syrian rebels against President Bashar al-Asad’s regime. At a stroke, Turkey’s partnership with Syria collapsed, bringing down the whole of Turkey’s Arab policy. Instead of attempting to resolve the Syrian conflict by mediation — which it was well placed to do — Turkey took sides. It provided house room in Istanbul for the civilian Syrian opposition and camps for the Free Syrian Army and other fighting groups. Under Turkish protection, the Syrian rebels now control a narrow strip of territory of some 70 kilometres along the Syrian-Turkish border.

Turkey and Syria are virtually at war. In retaliation for Turkey’s role in channelling funds, weapons and intelligence to the rebels, Syria seems to be encouraging the PKK — and its Syrian affiliate, the PYD — to turn up the heat on Turkey. The PYD has occupied five largely Kurdish towns in northern Syria, from which Syrian government forces were deliberately withdrawn. If Syria’s Kurds gain anything like the autonomy already enjoyed by Iraq’s Kurds, then Turkey’s own Kurds are bound to press their claims for political rights and freedoms. In eastern Turkey, the PKK’s 28-year insurgency seems to be springing back to life with deadly ambushes against military targets, such as last Sunday’s attack which killed a dozen Turkish soldiers. The struggle to put a lid on Kurdish militancy could once again become Turkey’s most painful and disruptive domestic problem.

A real headache for Turkey is the massive influx of Syrian refugees. To stem the flood, Turkey has closed its frontier with Syria for the time being. Syrian refugees in Turkey are said to number over 80,000, lodged in nine tented camps. Five more camps are under construction, which could house another 30,000 refugees. Turkey says it cannot realistically take in more than about 100,000, without help from other countries and international organisations. Hosting the refugees has already cost Turkey an estimated 135 million euros — and no doubt will cost a great deal more.

Should Turkey revise its Syria policy? Instead of joining in Washington’s (and Israel’s) war against Tehran and Damascus, Ankara might be well advised to revert back, step by step, to a more neutral stance. Lakhdar Brahimi, the new UN peace envoy, needs Turkey’s help in his difficult task of mediating a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict. That would be the way to restore Turkey’s Middle East policy to its former glory. Turkey needs urgently to rethink its relations with all its neighbours — Syria first among them.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 04 September 2012
Word Count: 1,152
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Patrick Seale, “Regaining Egypt’s Independence”

August 28, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Although he has been in office only since June 30 — a bare two months — President Muhammad Morsi of Egypt has already embarked on bold foreign policy initiatives which risk bringing him into confrontation with the United States and Israel. It is a risk he is evidently prepared to take. Indeed, his goal appears to be to recover a measure of independence from the tutelage of these powers. If he succeeds, he will win the plaudits of the vast majority of Egyptians.

The immediate area of possible confrontation is over the extreme pressure which the United States, egged on by Israel, is putting on the Iranian and Syrian regimes, with the evident intention of bringing them down. The U.S. is seeking to cripple Iran’s economy with unprecedented sanctions and is backing the armed Syrian rebels in their attempt to topple President Bashar al-Asad.

President Morsi will have none of it. Braving the displeasure of the United States and Israel, he is refusing to isolate or demonise Iran. On the contrary, he has chosen to attend this week’s gathering of Non-Aligned countries in Tehran — the first Egyptian President to visit the Islamic Republic since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. He broke the ice with Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinjad some weeks ago when they met at an Islamic summit in Mecca. By all accounts, their meeting was extremely cordial.

Again, in direct opposition to Washington, President Morsi evidently prefers to resolve the Syrian crisis by negotiation rather than war. He has proposed that the region’s four main Muslim powers — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey — form a contact group to oversee a negotiated settlement. In other words, he is telling the United States and NATO to keep out of Syria and leave it to local powers. (Morsi’s move poses a tricky dilemma for Turkish diplomacy: Should Turkey, a NATO power, side with the U.S. in channelling arms, funds and intelligence to the Syrian rebels or would it be wiser for Ankara to join in a regional effort to end the conflict by negotiation?)

U.S. President Barack Obama has invited Dr. Morsi to visit Washington in September — no doubt to give him a diplomatic dressing down. But, in yet another assertion of Egyptian independence, Dr. Morsi plans to visit Beijing and Tehran first. It may be his way of signalling that he will not tolerate being lectured to.

An even more serious subject of contention concerns the military annexes of the1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which President Morsi, like most Egyptians, would like to revise. When a band of gunmen surged out of Sinai on 5 August and attacked an Egyptian army checkpoint on the Egyptian-Gaza border, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers and wounding several more, Morsi promptly sent a strong force of troops, helicopters and tanks in hot pursuit of them. But, according to the military annexes, Egypt should have sought Israel’s prior agreement before sending tanks into Sinai, even though it is sovereign Egyptian territory. It would seem that Morsi did not feel the need to do so.

When, last September, I interviewed Amr Moussa, former Egyptian foreign minister and veteran Arab League secretary-general — who was then a candidate for the Egyptian presidency — he called for a revision of the military annexes. “The Peace Treaty will continue to exist,” he told me, “but Egypt needs forces in Sinai. The security situation requires it. Israel must understand that the restrictions imposed by the Treaty have to be reviewed.” President Morsi evidently shares this view.

This sort of talk is not to Israel’s liking. The New York Times reported on 22 August that Israel was “troubled” by the lack of advance coordination and had asked Cairo to withdraw its tanks. But Israel finds itself in a cleft stick: It wants Egypt to maintain order in the lawless and turbulent wastes of Sinai, yet it fears that armed Egyptian deployments might one day threaten its security.

Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute (an outgrowth of the Israeli lobby, AIPAC) used strong words in the Washington Post on 19 August to censure Morsi for moving tanks into Sinai without notifying Israel. “If this behavior continues,” he thundered, “U.S. support, which will be essential for gaining international economic aid and fostering investment, will not be forthcoming.” Known as “Israel’s lawyer” for his decades-long defence of Israeli interests when he was in government, Ross clearly thinks that he still speaks for the American administration. Let us hope he is mistaken.

Another of President Morsi’s moves, which alarmed Washington and Tel Aviv, was his sudden sacking of a clutch of very senior officers — the very men with whom Israel and the United States had established close relations over the years. These remnants of the Mubarak regime include defence minister Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, chief of staff General Sami Anan, the heads of the Navy, Air Force and Air Defence, intelligence chief Murad Mowafi, and other commanders. President Morsi has named Lt. Gen Abdelfattah El-Sisi as the new defence minister, and Lt. Gen Sedky Sobhi as the new chief of staff. Both men, it would appear, share Dr. Morsi’s wish to break free from excessive American and Israeli influence.

The immediate and overriding priority of Dr. Morsi and his team will be to revive Egypt’s economy, now in a dire state. Some 85 million people need to be fed. Job creation will be essential. Government services have to be restored. Massive external aid will be required. In the circumstances, there is no danger of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty being scrapped. No Egyptian can today conceive of war with Israel. Nor will the Egyptian military readily sacrifice the $1.3bn annual subsidy it receives from the United States to keep the peace with Israel.

But President Morsi will undoubtedly seek to forge a new relationship with both the United States and Israel. From now on Egypt is likely to be less tolerant of Israel’s outrageous treatment of the Palestinians, under continued siege and occupation. He has already stressed the need to address the long-neglected Palestine question. He will be less ready than his predecessor to accept Israel’s relentless war-mongering against Iran. Although he will not be able to challenge Israel’s military supremacy — financed, equipped and guaranteed by the United States — he will seek to end the abuse Israel has made of this supremacy, notably its repeated aggressions against its neighbours.

Many Egyptians have a certain feeling of guilt about the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. They know that, by removing Egypt from the Arab military equation, the Treaty gave Israel more than thirty years of unchallenged military dominance — and with it the freedom to strike its neighbours at will, without the risk of being hit back. Lebanon, the Palestinians, Iraq and Syria have all experienced Israel’s assaults.

President Morsi’s evident ambition is to restore some balance to Middle East power relationships. It will be fascinating to see how he goes about this high-risk enterprise, and how the United States and Israel choose to react to Egypt’s new assertiveness.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 28 August 2012
Word Count: 1,166
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Patrick Seale, “Lakhdar Brahimi: A Man of Peace”

August 21, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Half a century ago, in 1962, when I was the Middle East correspondent of the British Sunday newspaper, The Observer, I learned that Algeria, following its hard-won independence from France, had sent an ambassador to Cairo and that President Gamal Abd al-Nasser had put at his disposal one of King Farouk’s palaces. The ambassador’s name was Lakhdar Brahimi. As I was in Cairo at the time, I decided to call on him.

The palace seemed deserted. There was no one at the gate. I walked in and made my way through the gardens towards the great house, hoping to find someone there. Then I saw a gardener digging in one of the flower beds. “Where can I find Ambassador Brahimi?” I asked him. “I am Lakhdar Brahimi,” he replied. This was my first — but fortunately not my last — encounter with this remarkable man.

I have had the privilege of many conversations with him over the years — when he was ambassador to London in the 1970s, deputy secretary-general of the Arab League in Cairo in the 1980s, Algerian Foreign Minister in the early 1990s, or between his many assignments in Lebanon, South Africa, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq. He was also kind enough to receive me at his home in Paris on a number of occasions.

What is the key to his personality? I would suggest that it is his utter conviction that negotiation rather than war is the best way to resolve conflicts — of which the Middle East has more than its fair share.

My guess is that he reached this conclusion because of the torment his country suffered in its nearly eight-year struggle for independence from France, 1954-1962, the most bitter of modern anti-colonial wars. No savagery was omitted in that terrible war. Its catalogue of horrors included numerous acts of terrorism, cruel massacres, barbarous torture, ferocious counter-insurgency and equally ferocious reprisals. Devilish instincts were released on both sides. About 750,000 Algerians died and another two million were uprooted. France lost about 25,000 men. And after the war another 100,000 pro-French Muslims were murdered by the National Liberation Front. The war brought down France’s Fourth Republic, carried General de Gaulle back to power, and anchored the Algerian army and security services in their country’s political life to this day. It was a trauma from which, one might argue, neither Algeria nor France has yet fully recovered. Certainly it has had profound effects on the subsequent history of both countries.

Lakhdar Brahimi has many qualities which prepare him for his difficult task in Syria. First of all, as a man of the Maghrib, he views the turbulent Mashriq with a certain valuable detachment. In other words, he comes to the conflict with no emotional baggage. Secondly, he is well-known and respected by all the Arab leaders, and also by the leaders of the external powers most directly involved in the conflict — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Turkey. All have welcomed his appointment as U.N peace envoy. Thirdly, few people on the international political scene today can match his personal experience at mediating conflicts in different parts of the world.

But are the parties to the Syrian conflict ready for a deal? Can the many different fighting groups on the streets agree to put up their guns, even for a short spell, to allow negotiations to start? Can the squabbling exiles in Turkey and elsewhere agree on a common negotiating position? Can the Muslim Brothers be brought to the table with the regime? Is President Bashar al-Asad prepared to make the painful compromises which must eventually set a term to his leadership?

Lakhdar Brahimi is likely to tell all sides that their Syrian nation — its safety, stability, territorial integrity and the welfare of its population — is far more important than their individual ambitions and hates.

This is what he said in his first statement after his appointment as U.N. peace envoy:
“Syrians must come together as a nation in the quest for a new formula. This is the only way to ensure that all Syrians can live together peacefully, in a society not based on fear of reprisal, but on tolerance. In the meantime, the U.N. Security Council and regional states must unite to ensure that a political transition can take place as soon as possible.

“Millions of Syrians are clamouring for peace. World leaders cannot remain divided any longer, over and above their cries.”

Lakhdar Brahimi has some advantages over Kofi Annan, his unfortunate predecessor as peace envoy. The most notable of these advantages is that the various parties to the conflict are beginning to understand that a clear victory by either side is unlikely, and that a prolonged war will destroy the country and will serve no one’s interest — except Israel.

The Syrian regime does not seem about to fall but nor can it easily win what has become a hit-and-run urban guerrilla campaign, funded and armed from outside. The rebels may be getting better armed and organised but, to their bitter disappointment, they are beginning to grasp that they cannot count on an external military intervention. And without such an intervention they are unlikely to defeat the Syrian army. Washington, in turn, is beginning to worry that, if morejihadis join the fighting, Syria could turn into another Afghanistan. The last thing the United States wants is to find itself on the same side in Syria as Al-Qaida! Saudi Arabia and Qatar know that if a regional war were to break out — say between the United States and Israel against Iran — their economic and political interests could suffer. They might even find themselves in the line of fire.

Key regional leaders — King Abdallah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, President Muhammad Morsi of Egypt, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran — are beginning to assume their joint responsibility to put an end to the conflict. Ahmadinejad attended the recent Islamic summit in Mecca, where he had an apparently cordial exchange of views with the Saudi monarch. Morsi, who was also at the Mecca summit, is to attend the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Tehran later this month, the first visit to Iran by an Egyptian president in decades.

President Morsi is reported to have suggested that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran form a contact group to resolve the Syrian crisis through discussion and reconciliation. This is a promising development since it suggests that major regional powers are beginning to take the destinies of their region in hand, free from the ambitions of outsiders. They face no easy task because, overshadowing the Syrian crisis, is the evident ambition of the United States and Israel to affirm their regional supremacy.

Such is the challenging context of Lakhdar Brahimi’s peace mission. He must be given every chance to succeed.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 21 August 2012
Word Count: 1,127
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Patrick Seale, “The Urgent Need to Prevent a Middle East War”

August 14, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

The Middle East is facing an acute danger of war, with unpredictable and potentially devastating consequences for the states and populations of the region. A ‘shadow war’ is already being waged — by Israel and the United States against Iran; by a coalition of countries against Syria; and by the great powers against each other. A mere spark could set this tinder alight.

The threat of a hot war is coming from three main directions: first, from Israel’s relentless and increasingly hysterical war-mongering against Iran; second, from America’s geopolitical ambitions in the oil-rich Gulf and its complicity in Israel’s anti-Iranian campaign; and third, from the naked hostility of some Sunni Arab States towards Iran — and towards Shi‘is and Alawis in general.

These Arab states are apparently unaware that they are playing into the hands of Israeli and American hawks who dream of re-modelling the region in order to subject it to their will. This same neo-con ambition drove the United States to invade and destroy Iraq in the hope of permanently enfeebling it.

The current Israeli war fever rests on a blatant falsehood: that Iran poses an ‘existential threat’ to the Jewish people. What a joke! The only threat Iran poses is this: Were it to develop the means and skills to build an atomic weapon — without actually doing so — it would thereby acquire a limited deterrent capability. That is to say, Israel might hesitate to attack it. Israel’s freedom to attack its other neighbours would also be restricted — a freedom it has enjoyed for decades, as may be seen from its numerous wars and assaults on the Palestinians, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

Israel wants unfettered military supremacy. This is what the fuss is all about. It wants the freedom to hit Iran and any other country that dares raise its head, without the risk of being hit back. It does not want any Middle East state or movement to be able to protect itself — hence its bitter animus against resistance movements such as Hizballah and Hamas, which have survived Israeli attempts to destroy them, and refuse to be cowed.

Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak are evidently itching to bring down the regime in Tehran — and indeed the whole so-called ‘resistance axis’ of Iran, Syria and Hizballah, which in recent years has been the only credible barrier to Israeli and American ambitions. But the Arabs should reflect that the destruction of this barrier will mean abandoning the Palestinians to their tragic fate and exposing the Gulf States themselves to future Israeli and American pressures and possible assaults.

Israel would, of course, prefer the United States to bring down the Iranian regime by itself — much as it brought down Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Netanyahu may be tempted to strike first, but only if he is sure that President Barack Obama will join in the attack or be compelled to do so, because of his alleged need to win Jewish votes in November’s presidential elections. Obama desperately wants to avoid being dragged into another war. To head off an Israeli attack, he has, in the words of his spokesman, imposed on Iran “the most stringent sanctions ever imposed on any country.”

A solution to the crisis lies in the hands of the two major regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although they are often seen as rivals, they could also be partners, since they share a strong interest in the peace and security of the Gulf. There are small but promising signs that they are reaching out to each other. It is striking that the recent summit in Tehran of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the gathering in Riyadh of members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) reached much the same conclusions regarding the civil war in Syria. Members at both meetings stressed the need for a ceasefire to stop the bloodshed, followed by political negotiations and the formation of a national unity government. A hopeful sign was the presence of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the OIC summit in Riyadh.

Disastrous as it is, the Syrian civil war is only a sub-plot in a far wider contest. Whether President Bashar al-Asad remains temporarily at the head of the regime in Damascus, or is persuaded to quit the scene, is far from being the main issue. Those pressing for war do not care about who rules in Damascus. They simply want Syria enfeebled, preferably dismembered, and its allies crippled.

Issues of profound importance for the Arabs are at stake in this ferocious test of wills. Will the existing pattern of Arab nation states survive the crisis or will it fracture? Can Sunnis and Shi‘is learn to live together in harmony under the banner of Islam or are they doomed to fight each other for another thousand years? Can the security of ethnic and religious minorities, which have contributed for centuries to the rich diversity of the region, be guaranteed? And what will be the outcome for Arab independence itself?

We are witnessing today the latest phase of the struggle for Arab independence. It began a century ago when the Arabs sought to throw off Ottoman rule. But when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the First World War, the Arabs fell instead under the control of Britain and France who divided the Arab world between them. And when these colonial powers were finally forced out, the Arabs were confronted by the even deadlier threat of an aggressive and expansionist Israel.

American influence over the region has long been predominant, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union a generation ago. Today, as the United States wrestles with economic problems and the legacy of catastrophic wars, it is also being challenged by new emergent powers. A further handicap for the United States is that it has allowed Israel to dictate its Middle East policy. The Arabs should reflect that a regional war, driven by Israel, risks robbing them of the little real independence they have so far managed to secure.

Can war be prevented? King Abdallah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia is one of the wisest leaders on the international stage. He alone has the political weight, the resources, and the influence with both the United States and the Muslim rebels in Syria to check the region’s downward rush to disaster. He seems torn between his understandable distaste for some Iranian policies and his instinctive understanding of the need for better Saudi-Iranian relations. Several Gulf officials, in turn, are torn between their fear of a powerful Iran and their understanding that members of the Gulf Cooperation Council share many commercial and strategic interests with the Islamic Republic.

Instead of siding with the United States and Israel in the destruction of Iran and Syria, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies should join with Iran in building a new security system for the region free from external meddling. If they act together, they can spare the region the devastation of war. But they must act soon because time is running out.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 14 August 2012
Word Count: 1,171
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Patrick Seale, “The Kurds Stir the Regional Pot”

July 31, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

While the world’s gaze is riveted on President Bashar al-Asad’s life-and-death struggle with his domestic and foreign enemies, the Kurds have seized the opportunity to boost their own political agenda. In a dramatic development, Kurdish forces have in recent days seized five Kurdish-majority towns in northern Syria, which lie in a strip of territory along the Turkish border. The Syrian Government has allowed them to do so by withdrawing its troops.

These events have aroused ancient fears in Turkey and Iraq, as well as quiet jubilation in Israel, which has long had a semi-clandestine relationship with the Kurds, and welcomes any development which might weaken or dismember Syria.
Kurdish politics are fiendishly complicated but, in the present context, several groups deserve special mention:

• The Democratic Union Party (PYD), formed in 2003 and led by Salih Muslim Muhammad, is by far the strongest single Kurdish group in Syria. It is armed and disciplined, and has not hesitated to use force against rivals and opponents.

• The Kurdish National Council (KNC), formed in October 2011, is a loose (largely unarmed) political alliance of eleven Syrian Kurdish parties or factions.

• The Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, is a militant Kurdish organisation in Turkey, which has waged war against the Turkish state in the interests of Kurdish independence over the past several decades. Ankara considers the PKK a terrorist organisation and has regularly bombed its clandestine bases in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq. The Syrian PYD is closely affiliated to the PKK, some would even say it is a political front for it.

• The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) rules a semi-independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, with a population of about 5 million. Erbil is its capital and its leader is President Massoud Barzani, first elected in 2005 and re-elected in 2009.

This Kurdish autonomous enclave was born out of the long wars which Iraq’s former dictator Saddam Hussein waged against the Kurds. In its present form, the KRG took shape after the first Gulf War of 1991, when the United States protected the Kurds by setting up a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The KRG was then consolidated when the U.S. and Britain invaded Iraq in 2003, overthrew Saddam Hussein, and prepared the ground for the restructuring of Iraq as a federal state of separate Arab and Kurdish entities.

This is the background to the alliance which President Barzani negotiated at Erbil on 11 July between the PYD and the KNC, giving them joint responsibility for the border strip between Syria and Turkey — with the PYD, the stronger partner, in the driving seat. The withdrawal of Syrian troops made this Kurdish take-over possible.

Needless to say, these events have fired the ambitions of some Kurdish militants who imagine that a Kurdish Regional Government might now come to birth in northern Syria, on the model of the one in northern Iraq. The English-language edition of Rudaw (an Iraqi Kurdish periodical), carried a piece on 23 July by a Kurdish journalist, Hiwa Osman, in which he wrote: “The Kurdish Region of Syria? Yes, it is possible. Now is the time to declare it!” A Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, went further still when he wrote that “a mega-Kurdish state is being founded,” potentially linking Kurdish enclaves in Turkey, Iraq and Syria.

Turkey is understandably alarmed by this resurgence of expansionist Kurdish goals. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has accused Syria of giving the PKK ‘custody’ of northern Syria and has warned that Turkey would “not stand idle” in the face of this hostile development. “Turkey is capable of exercising its right to pursue Kurdish rebels inside Syria, if necessary,” he declared. He clearly finds intolerable the prospect of the PKK establishing a safe haven in northern Syria, from which to infiltrate fighters into Turkey. He has sent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Erbil to ask Massoud Barzani — no doubt in forceful terms — what game he thinks he is playing.

There is fevered speculation in the Turkish press that Erdogan is planning a military attack on northern Syria to create a buffer zone, with the twin objectives of defeating and dispersing Syrian Kurdish forces and of creating a foothold, or safe-zone, for Syrian rebels fighting Bashar al-Asad.

What of Syria’s calculations? There are three possible reasons why President Bashar withdrew his troops from the Kurdish border region: He needs the troops for the defence of Damascus and Aleppo; he wants to punish Erdogan for his support of the Syrian opposition; and, he is anxious to conciliate the Kurds, so as to dissuade them from joining the rebels. In fact, he started wooing them some months ago by issuing a presidential decree granting Syrian citizenship to tens of thousands of Kurds — something they had been seeking for more than half a century.

What does Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki think of these developments? He is clearly watching the Syrian crisis with anxious attention. If Asad were to fall and be replaced by an Islamist regime, this could revive the hopes of Iraq’s minority Sunni community — and its Al-Qaida allies — that Maliki and his Shia alliance could also be toppled. Another of Maliki’s worries must be the possible influx into Iraq from Syria of thousands of militant Kurds who would serve to strengthen Kurdish claims to Kirkuk and its oil.

What are the Kurds own objectives? In spite of the concessions Asad has made to them, they have no love for him. But nor do they like the opposition. The PYD is hostile to the Turkish-based Syrian National Council, which it considers a Turkish puppet. More generally, the Kurdish national movement, which is essentially secular, has long been at odds with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and dreads its coming to power in Damascus.

The PYD leader Salih Muslim Muhammad is more philosophical. He was quoted as saying: “The ruling powers in Damascus come and go. For us Kurds, this isn’t so important. What is important is that we Kurds assert our existence.” The Syrian Kurds do not expect to win their independence from the Syrian state. They know that it is not a realistic goal: Kurdish enclaves in Syria are too scattered. They do seek, however, a large measure of autonomy, in which they no longer face discrimination, and in which their rights, both political and cultural, are guaranteed.

Erdogan is no doubt watching how the PYD and the KNC run the Kurdish towns they now control on the Syrian border. If they behave, he will not intervene. But if they start infiltrating fighters into Turkey, he is bound to react forcefully. For its part, the PKK has warned that, if the Turks intervene, it will turn “all of Kurdistan into a war zone.”
A major factor of instability has thus been added to an already volatile region. The Kurdish pot is simmering. If it boils over, it risks scalding everyone within reach.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 31 July 2012
Word Count: 1,141
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Patrick Seale, “The Destruction of Syria”

July 24, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Once one of the most solid states in the Middle East and a key pivot of the regional power structure, Syria is now facing wholesale destruction. The consequences of the unfolding drama are likely to be disastrous for Syria’s territorial integrity, for the well-being of its population, for regional peace, and for the interests of external powers deeply involved in the crisis.

The most immediate danger is that the fighting in Syria, together with the current severe pressure being put on Syria’s Iranian ally, will provide the spark for a wider conflagration from which no one will be immune.

How did it come to this? Every actor in the crisis bears a share of responsibility. Syria is the victim of the fears and appetites of its enemies but also of its own leaders’ mistakes.

With hindsight, it can be seen that President Bashar al-Asad missed the chance to reform the tight security state he inherited in 2000 from his father. Instead of recognising — and urgently addressing — the thirst for political freedoms, personal dignity and economic opportunity which were the message of the ‘Damascus Spring’ of his first year in power, he screwed the lid down ever more tightly.

Suffocating controls over every aspect of Syrian society were reinforced, and made harder to bear by the blatant corruption and privileges of the few and the hardships suffered by the many. Physical repression became routine. Instead of cleaning up his security apparatus, curbing police brutality and improving prison conditions, he allowed them to remain as gruesome and deplorable as ever.

Above all, over the past decade Bashar al-Asad and his close advisers failed to grasp the revolutionary potential of two key developments — Syria’s population explosion and the long-term drought which the country suffered from 2006 to 2010, the worst in several hundred years. The first produced an army of semi-educated young people unable to find jobs; the second resulted in the forced exodus of hundreds of thousands of farmers from their parched fields to slums around the major cities. Herders in the north-east lost 85% of their livestock. It is estimated that by 2011, some two to three million Syrians had been driven into extreme poverty. No doubt climate change was responsible, but government neglect and incompetence contributed to the disaster.

These two factors — youth unemployment and rural disaffection — were the prime motors of the uprising which spread like wildfire, once it was triggered by a brutal incident at Dar‘a in March 2011. The foot-soldiers of the uprising are unemployed urban youth and impoverished peasants.

Could the regime have done something about it? Yes, it could. As early as 2006-7, it could have alerted the world to the situation, devoted all available resources to urgent job creation, launched a massive relief programme for its stricken population and mobilised its citizens for these tasks. No doubt major international aid agencies and rich Gulf countries would have helped had the plans been in place.

Instead, the regime’s gaze was distracted by external threats: by the Lebanese crisis of 2005 following the assassination of Rafic Hariri; by Israel’s bid to destroy Hizballah by its invasion of Lebanon in 2006; by its attack on Syria’s nuclear facility in 2007; and by its bid to destroy Hamas in its murderous assault on Gaza in 2008-9.

From the start of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency, Syria has faced relentless efforts by Israel and its complicit American ally to bring down the so-called ‘resistance axis’ of Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah, which dared challenge the regional dominance of Israel and the United States.

Syria had a narrow escape in 2003-4. Led by the Pentagon’s Paul Wolfowitz, the pro-Israeli neo-cons embedded in President George W. Bush’s administration were determined to reshape the region in Israel’s and America’s interest. Their first target was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, seen as a potential threat to Israel. Had the United States been successful in Iraq, Syria would have been next. Neither Iraq nor the United States has yet recovered from the catastrophic Iraqi war, of which Wolfowitz was the chief ‘architect’.

Syria and its Iranian ally are once again under imminent threat. The United States and Israel make no secret of their goal to bring down both the Damascus and Tehran regimes. No doubt some Israeli strategists believe that it would be greatly to their country’s advantage if Syria were dismembered and permanently weakened by the creation of a small Alawi state around the port-city of Latakia in the north-west, in much the same way as Iraq was dismembered and permanently weakened by the creation of the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of the country, with its capital at Irbil. It is not easy to be the neighbour of an expansionist and aggressive Jewish state, which believes that its security is best assured, not by making peace with its neighbours, but by subverting, destabilising and destroying them with the aid of American power.

The United States and Israel are not Syria’s only enemies. The Syrian Muslim Brothers have been dreaming of revenge ever since their attempt 30 years ago to topple Syria’s secular Ba‘thist regime by a campaign of terror was crushed by Hafiz al-Asad, Syria’s President at the time. Today, the Muslim Brothers are repeating the mistake they made then by resorting to terror with the aid of foreign Salafists, including some Al-Qaida fighters flowing into Syria from Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other countries further afield. The liberal members of the Syrian opposition in exile, including several worthy academics and veteran opponents, are providing political cover for these more violent elements.

Some Arab Gulf States persist in viewing the region through a sectarian prism. They are worried by Iran’s alleged hegemonic ambitions. They are unhappy that Iraq — once a Sunni power able to hold Iran in check — is now under Shia leadership. Talk of an emerging ‘Shia Crescent’ appears to threaten Sunni dominance. For these reasons they are funding and arming the Syrian rebels in the hope that bringing down the Syrian regime will sever Iran’s ties with the Arab world. But this policy will simply prolong Syria’s agony, claim the lives of some of its finest men and cause massive material damage.

America, the dominant external power, has made many grievous policy blunders. Over the past several decades it failed to persuade its stubborn Israeli ally to make peace with the Palestinians, leading to peace with the whole Arab world. It embarked on catastrophic wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It failed to reach a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran which would have dispelled the spectre of war in the Gulf and stabilised the volatile region. And it is now quarrelling with Moscow and reviving the Cold War by sabotaging Kofi Annan’s peace plan for Syria.

There can be no military solution to the Syrian crisis. The only way out of the current nightmare is a ceasefire imposed on both sides, followed by a negotiation and the formation of a national government to oversee a transition. Only thus can Syria avoid wholesale destruction, which could take a generation or two to repair.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 24 July 2012
Word Count: 1,173
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Patrick Seale, “The Challenge Facing the Islamists”

July 17, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

The triumphant emergence of Islamic movements after decades of repression is one of the more striking features of the Arab revolutions of the past 18 months. How these movements behave once they are in government will be closely watched. Each of them has an extremist fringe, apparently determined to abolish the divide between religion and politics, dear to Western opinion. The key question, therefore, is this: Will Islamic leaders now in power be able to tame the radicals in their ranks?

This is the challenge facing Mohammad Morsi, Egypt’s new President, and Rashed Ghannouchi, the historic leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda (Renaissance) party. Their Islamist movements both won democratic elections and are now in the driver’s seat. Islamists have also made gains elsewhere. In Morocco, they wrested a share of power from the King, while in Yemen and Jordan they could score further victories in the coming year. In post-Qadhafi Libya, the Islamists, against all expectations, were defeated at this month’s elections by a coalition of 58 parties led by Mahmoud Jibril, the former head of Libya’s transitional council. But they hope to win at elections next May.

In Syria the contest is fiercest. Islamists are engaged in a life-and-death battle with President Bashar al-Asad, whose regime rests essentially on the secular Ba‘th Party, on minorities such as Chistians and Druze, on some members of the commercial and professional middle classes, and on the military force of his own Alawi community. Both sides are fighting with the utmost ruthlessness. It is kill or be killed. The outcome of the contest is still uncertain, but the wounds in Syrian society are already very deep, and must inevitably shape the nature of any successor regime.

The West may not like it, but in country after country across the Arab world the Islamists’ day has come. Minorities may tremble. The educated middle classes may fear for their Western-style way of life. Liberated women may dread being forced back into purdah. Israel may worry about the survival of its 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, which has guaranteed the regional supremacy of the Jewish state for more than three decades. But these fears may be greatly exaggerated.

Both Mohammad Morsi and Rashed Ghannouchi are highly-intelligent, modernising Muslims whose immediate priority is not to impose the shari‘a but rather to create jobs for their armies of unemployed youths, provide security for all citizens, restore the authority of the state, and generally revive their economies after the ravages of the past year.

Morsi has a doctorate in engineering from the University of Southern California. He spent several years studying and teaching in America. Two of his five children, born in the United States, are American citizens. Ghannouchi has had an essentially Islamic education but his open-mindedness may be seen in the careers of his daughters. One has a doctorate in astrophysics, another is a human rights lawyer who studied at Cambridge and the London School of Economics, and a third is a philosophy graduate and researcher at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London

To fulfil their daunting programmes, the Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia must form coalitions with local allies and keep fanatical extremists down. To calm the fears of women and of Christian Copts — the latter some 10% of Egypt’s population — President Morsi has even suggested appointing a Christian woman as vice-president! Aware of the magnitude of the task facing it in Tunisia, Enahda has formed a governing coalition with two other parties — Moncef Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic, and Mustapha Ben Jaafar’s Ettakatol. Marzouki is now President of the Tunisian Republic and Ben Jaafar is Speaker of the constituent assembly.

At this month’s Ennahda conference — its first since its victory at the polls last October — Rached Ghannouchi went out of his way to project an image of tolerance and moderation, which is essential if foreign investors and tourists are to be attracted back to Tunisia.

The Islamist revival across the Arab world springs from many roots. It is powered by a popular reaction against corrupt dictators and brutal security services. It is a reaction against Western domination and against leaders who seemed to give primacy to Western strategic interests over the aspirations of their people. Both Morsi and Ghannouchi are surely aware that only leaders able to assert their country’s independence vis-a-vis external powers will have the legitimacy to keep their own extremists at bay. The Islamic revival also reflects popular outrage at Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians, and at the West’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to speak of America’s lethal counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere — all widely seen as wars against Islam.

Above all, the Islamists are reacting against decades of cruel repression in their own countries. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, was disbanded in 1948 and scores of its members jailed when they were suspected of plotting a coup against the monarch. A year later, Hasan al-Banna, the movement’s founder, was gunned down at the early age of 42, almost certainly by King Farouk’s security agents. When the Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Egypt’s revolutionary leader Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1954, many thousands were arrested, and half a dozen of its leaders hanged. The movement was dissolved, causing many prominent members to flee abroad. Repression and mass arrests of Muslim Brothers continued under the regime of Husni Mubarak, until he was toppled last year.

In Tunisia, the Ennahda party was driven underground for a quarter of a century by President Habib Bourguiba and his successor Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Rached Ghannouchi himself, sentenced and jailed many times, spent over 20 years in exile in Britain. In Algeria, the army fought the Islamists in a bitter 10-year civil war in the1990s in which more than 150,000 people perished. Some Algerian Islamists, veterans of the civil war, are today behind the insurgency in northern Mali to Algeria’s great concern. In Libya, the late Colonel Muammar Qadhafi hunted down the Islamists whenever he could.

In Syria, an attempt by the Muslim Brothers to kill President Hafiz al-Asad in 1980, and overthrow his regime in a campaign of terror, was brutally crushed in 1982 with great loss of life. The movement was outlawed for the next 30 years and membership was punishable by death. Today, the Islamists dream of revenge.

In Yemen, Ali Abdallah Salih, who ruled from 1978 to last year, made use of the Islamists to defeat the Marxists and secessionists of South Yemen but, when he found himself compelled to join America’s ‘war on terror’, he turned against them. Now that he has gone, they hope to restore their fortunes.

Against this harsh background, it would not be surprising if Islamists embraced extremist, revanchist views. It will demand courage and vision for their leaders to embrace a moderate, tolerant Islam that recognises diversity, accepts modernity, delivers social justice, asserts national independence and sovereignty, and — above all — creates jobs. Only by recognising that their countries live in an inter-dependent world will they succeed.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 17 July 2012
Word Count: 1,168
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Patrick Seale, “The Middle East Needs Dialogue not War”

July 10, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

“Dialogue is the strategy of the brave.” This is the striking phrase I heard from the mouth of Norway’s Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Store, one of the wisest of European statesmen, when I attended the Oslo Forum last month, an annual gathering of would-be mediators of the world’s conflicts. Rarely has dialogue been more necessary than in today’s deeply disturbed Middle East.

In Syria, the present fierce struggle is unlikely to yield a decisive outcome. Even if funds and weapons continue to pour in to the rebels, the latter will not be able to defeat the Syrian army on their own. The opposition prays for an external military intervention, but this is not likely to happen. The mood in the United States and Europe is to withdraw from Middle East conflicts not to get sucked into yet another one. In any event, so long as the Syrian opposition remains deeply divided it will have no hope of achieving its goals.

What then are we left with? More of the present bloody stalemate in which many more people will die or be displaced from their homes. Syria will be destroyed to the delight of its enemies — Israel first among them.

Even if President Bashar al-Asad were to quit the scene, the opposition would still have to reach a negotiated compromise with Syria’s powerful officer corps and security services — the backbone of the regime — as well as with representatives of the various minorities, which are an ancient and essential part of Syrian’s social fabric.

Only a dialogue, preceded by a ceasefire honoured by both sides, could save Syria from the catastrophe of a sectarian civil war, in which there would be no winners, only losers. This is what Kofi Annan, the UN-mandated mediator, is trying to achieve. He should be supported not undermined. The deal now being negotiated in Egypt between the Muslim Brothers and the armed forces could provide a model for Syria.

Dangerous tensions in the Gulf could also be fruitfully contained through dialogue. It is reported that Egypt’s President Muhammad Morsi is soon to pay an official visit to the Saudi monarch, King Abdallah, and has also accepted an invitation to visit Iran’s President Ahmadinejad. Imagine what a formidable diplomatic coup it would be for Egypt if President Morsi were to initiate a tripartite strategic dialogue between Cairo, Riyadh and Tehran. Acting together, these three major capitals could resolve many of the region’s conflicts, and put an end to destabilising interventions by outside powers.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, could, through dialogue and cooperation, draw Iran into the security architecture of the region. That would be a far better recipe for stability and peace than a policy of threats, sanctions and intimidation.

In spite of the propaganda emanating from Israel and Washington, there is no evidence that Iran wishes to acquire atomic weapons. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ai Khamenei declared last February that the possession of such weapons would be “pointless, dangerous and a great sin from an intellectual and religious point of view.” He should be taken at his word. Western intelligence agencies have themselves confirmed that, while Iran wishes to master the uranium fuel cycle, it has not embarked on a military nuclear programme.

Nor is there any real evidence that the Gulf region faces a threat from Iran’s alleged “hegemonic ambitions.” I believe too much is made of Iran’s alleged role in stirring up Shia communities in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The Islamic Republic is at present in no shape to threaten or dominate anyone. It is simply seeking to survive in the face of a campaign of cyber attacks, assassination and sabotage by the United States and Israel, which is just short of outright war. Crippling sanctions have reduced its oil exports by a million barrels a day; its currency has collapsed; and its hard-pressed population is struggling to cope with 30 percent inflation. Under such intense pressure, Iran may well lash out in frustration, triggering a regional hot war, which would definitely not be to the advantage of the vulnerable Gulf Arabs.

Instead of helping to resolve conflicts by promoting dialogue between the states of the region, the United States is reinforcing its armed forces in the Gulf region. It is reported to be bringing additional F-22 and F/A-18 warplanes to local bases, and is doubling its minesweepers from four to eight. A senior U.S. Defence Department official has explained that this deployment of American power is intended to provide “tangible proof to all of our allies and partners and friends that even as the U.S. pivots towards Asia, we remain vigilant across the Middle East.”

Is this really what the region wants to hear? The militarisation of American foreign policy started during the Cold War in response to what was perceived as a threat from the Soviet Union. Militarisation was then greatly expanded under George W. Bush’s administration. The result was two catastrophic wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have devastated these countries, bankrupted America and gravely damaged its reputation. The American historian William Polk has calculated that the United States has spent at least $2.59 trillion on ‘defence’ in the last five years, a large part of it on weapons, and is planning to spend 5% more in the next five years.

Israel and its neo-con allies in the United States are pushing the Obama administration to bring Iran to its knees, in much the same way as they pushed the Bush Administration to destroy Iraq. The Arabs should not lend their backing to this campaign. The conflicts of the region — and especially the dangerous tensions regarding Iran’s nuclear facilities — would best be settled by dialogue and compromise rather than by military force.

No doubt some Gulf countries fear they would be threatened by Iran if the American protective umbrella were removed. But even if the United States were to withdraw its bases from the region, as some U.S. strategic thinkers advocate, it would retain an ‘over-the-horizon’ naval presence which would surely provide adequate protection.

I have long argued in this column that it is not an Arab interest to make an enemy of Iran. The Gulf States and Iran have many commercial and strategic interests in common, not least the security of their vital region. The clear lesson of the present crises is that local powers should be able to protect themselves or reach a satisfactory accommodation with their non-Arab neighbours by means of dialogue and cooperation.

It is Israel that needs to be persuaded that its current policy of seizing Palestinian territory while seeking to weaken and destabilise its neighbours, is not the best way to ensure its own security. On the contrary, Israel’s long-term survival can only be assured if it normalises its relations with the Arabs, as well as with Iran, by allowing the emergence of a Palestinian state. Only a sincere and sustained dialogue can bring this about. That should be the urgent focus of the international community.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 10 July 2012
Word Count: 1,164
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Patrick Seale, “Flaws in America’s Yemen Policy”

July 3, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Yemen, like Pakistan, is a country where America’s counter-insurgency strategy has failed. The Obama administration has this year greatly increased the number of drone attacks in Yemen carried out by the CIA and by the U.S. Military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Some150 militants are said to have been killed as well as unnumbered others who happened to be in the area of the strikes. It appears that any man of military age is automatically considered a ‘terrorist’. Large numbers of villagers have fled in terror from their homes.

The targeted killing of suspected ‘terrorists’ — the centrepiece of current U.S. strategy — has been at great political cost. It has aroused fierce anti-American sentiment among the local populations, largely because missile strikes inevitably cause the death of innocent civilians. Far from defeating the radicals, these cruel and somewhat indiscriminate strikes by unmanned Predator drones drive volunteer jihadis into ‘terrorist’ ranks while discrediting and de-legitimising local political leaders who — since they feel compelled to back U.S. policies in exchange for financial aid — are seen as U.S. stooges.

Pakistan has tended to receive more attention than Yemen, because of its close links to the catastrophic war in Afghanistan, now in its eleventh year. The United States needs the support of Pakistan — and indeed of Iran — if it is to manage something like an honourable withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. But the U.S. cannot cripple Iran with sanctions and expect it to lend a hand in Afghanistan. In turn, U.S. relations with Pakistan have come under great strain because of the drone attacks and a host of other violent incidents in which the U.S. is seen as trampling on Pakistani sovereignty — such as the killing of Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad in May 2011. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry has stated that drone attacks are “in total contradiction of international law and established norms of interstate relations.” The breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan relations, and the corresponding support Islamabad is giving to certain militant Afghan groups, have greatly complicated NATO’s task in Afghanistan.

Yemen is as important as Pakistan for regional peace, not least for the threat which its instability poses to the security of its northern neighbour, Saudi Arabia. Violent ripples from Yemen have also spread to Somalia, where the local Islamic militants, the Shabab, are said to have established close ties with their opposite numbers in south Arabia.

Yemen continues to be in the grip of intense political turmoil. It has by no means recovered from its long struggle to oust Ali Abdallah Salih, its former President, who was in power for 33 years. Earlier this year, he was at last persuaded — and pressured — to step down in favour of the former vice-president, Abd Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi.

The new President inherits a number of tasks of extraordinary difficulty: He must re-launch the collapsed economy, set in train a much-needed process of national reconciliation, tame the sons and nephews of the former ruler who still occupy important commands in the army and security services, while at the same time fight a rebellion in the north, a secessionist movement in the south, and Ansar al-Shari‘a, a militant group aligned with Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This AQAP franchise, if that is what it is, appears to have won considerable local support in and around the southern port of Aden and its neighbouring provinces by administering Islamic justice, helping the poor and giving the locals a taste of clean government.

The man President al-Hadi appointed to fight Ansar al-Shari‘a, Maj. Gen. Salim Ali Qatn, was killed by a suicide bomber, said to be a Somali, in Aden last month after he claimed to have made some headway against the Islamic militants in Abyan province.

These many conflicts apart, Yemen is in desperate need of economic aid. UN agencies say that famine threatens 44% of the population. Nearly one million children are acutely malnourished. UNICEF says that half a million of them are likely to die in the coming months if immediate action is not taken. Water and oil are running out. The government’s budget deficit is estimated at $2.5bn.

At this critical juncture, when President al-Hadi urgently needs international support, a donors conference, which had been due to be held in Riyadh at the end of June, has been displaced to New York and postponed until late September. This is a bitter blow to the new government. It is bound to undermine its legitimacy, increase instability, and play into the hands of the militants.

Instead of encouraging, coordinating and overseeing a large and much needed aid programme for Yemen — which in any event would be largely financed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States — the United States has over the past ten to fifteen years tended to view the country through the narrow prism of counter-terrorism. That remains the fundamental weakness of U.S. policy towards Yemen today. The U.S. preoccupation with terrorism is understandable but wrong-headed. It suffered a severe shock when the USS Cole was attacked in Aden harbour on 12 October 2000. A speedboat piloted by two members of al-Qaida exploded several hundred pounds of explosives into the hull of the vessel, killing 17 U.S. sailors. The United States has pursued the terrorists relentlessly ever since, but with only mixed results.

Regrettably, the United States has failed to ask itself why Islamic militants hate it and want to punish it. Even the devastating attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 failed to stimulate an American national debate of sufficient seriousness and depth into the motives for the assault. Many Americans seem to have contented themselves with the simplistic view that their country was ‘good’ and their Islamic enemies ‘evil’.

In Yemen, the emergence of a militant Islamic movement over twenty years ago was largely the work of the so-called ‘Afghan Arabs’ — that is to say of former mujahidin whom the United States had recruited, armed and trained to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but which it then callously abandoned once the Soviets withdrew. Another grievance which has fed anti-American sentiment in Yemen is the way the United States punished Iraq — a country which had very close ties with Yemen — after the first Gulf War of 1991. Crippling sanctions were imposed on Iraq for thirteen years, much like those now imposed on Iran. Needless to say, the destruction of Iraq by the Anglo-American invasion of 2003 and the horrors of the long occupation that followed have not made America many Arab friends. And then there is that other major factor, which is forever eating away at America’s reputation and standing: its blind support for Israel in its continued oppression and dispossession of the Palestinians.

Far from easing these grievances, drone attacks only make them worse. A radical policy rethink allied to a massive aid programme might go some way to restoring American authority. But, in Washington’s current political climate, this task would seem to be at least as daunting as that confronting Yemen’s new President, the luckless Abd Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 03 July 2012
Word Count: 1,179
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Patrick Seale, “War Clouds over the Greater Middle East”

June 26, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Six conflict-zones of the Greater Middle East are in danger of erupting into fresh violence. In all six, the United States and its allies seem unable — or perversely unwilling — to contribute to a peaceful solution. Instead, in each case, they are adding fuel to the fire.

When President Barack Obama assumed office on January 20, 2009, he had a chance to put an end to America’s 30-year estrangement with Iran. There was even talk of a grand bargain which would have resolved fears about Iran’s nuclear programme and stabilised the Gulf by recognising Iran’s legitimate place and role in it. There was also a chance that U.S. engagement with Iran would calm Sunni-Shi‘i tensions across the region brought to boiling point by the Iraq war.

These hopes have proved vain. Instead, the United States has chosen to wage an undeclared war on Iran. It is crippling its economy by means of sanctions and has joined with Israel in subverting its nuclear and oil installations with cyber-attacks.

Moreover, in this year’s three rounds of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the so-called P5+1), the United States has refused to compromise. A deal was on offer whereby Iran would give up enriching uranium to 20% in exchange for an easing of sanctions and a recognition of its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to master the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. Instead, the United States has hardened its position by embracing Israel’s demand that Iran be forced, by means of further sanctions and military threats, to suspend all enrichment.

In piling on the pressure, the real goal of the United States and its Israeli ally would seem to be regime-change in Tehran, rather than putting an end by negotiation to Iran’s so far non-existent nuclear weapons programme. Israel’s friends in the U.S. Congress are already pressing the Obama administration to suspend the talks with Iran and resort instead to military measures. Just as Israel’s friends in George W. Bush’s administration pushed the United States into destroying Iraq, so the aim now would seem to be to push the U.S. into destroying Iran. Needless to say, if Iran is pressed too hard, the danger of a hot war breaking out is ever present.

The United States has also entered the fray in Syria, where the beleaguered Asad regime is facing a widespread urban guerrilla war together with terrorist attacks — suicide bombings, assassinations, destruction of public buildings — in large cities, including Damascus. All the major U.S. media – Fox News, Time, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal – have reported that CIA officers in southern Turkey are ‘coordinating’ arms shipments from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the Syrian rebels, especially, it would appear, to armed Islamic groups. Needless to say, arming the opposition is undercutting Kofi Annan’s peace plan for Syria.

It is Russia rather than the United States that is calling most urgently for a negotiated settlement of the crisis. In the Huffington Post of June 21, Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov wrote: “We need to bring all the weight to bear on both the regime and the opposition and make them cease fighting and meet at the negotiating table.” He called for the convening of “an international conference of the states directly involved in the Syrian crisis…. Only in this way can we keep the Middle East from sliding into the abyss of wars and anarchy.” Lavrov rightly sees the assault on Syria as “an element of a larger regional geopolitical game.” Indeed, instead of joining Russia in pressing for an evolutionary transition of power in Syria, the United States has adopted as its own the Israeli ambition of bringing down the whole so-called “resistance axis” of Iran, Syria and Hizballah, which has dared make a dent in Israel’s regional hegemony.

Campaigning for re-election and under intense pressure from the Israeli lobby and from a pro-Israeli Congress, Obama is silent when it comes to Israel’s continuing land grab on the West Bank and the unpunished violence of fanatical settlers against helpless Palestinians. Just as he has lost control to Israel of U.S. foreign policy when it comes to Iran, so Obama has collapsed in front of the Greater Israel ambitions of Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.

Some commentators are already predicting the outbreak of a third intifada. Palestinian frustrations are very great. They know that Israel will not grant them a state unless it is forced to do so. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, has protected Israel from Palestinian militants but has received absolutely nothing in return. His Hamas rivals in Gaza have, for their part, been greatly encouraged by the election to the Egyptian presidency of Muhammad Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood. The coming phase could be very bloody.

The fourth, fifth and sixth conflict-zones in the Greater Middle East are in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and increasingly in the Sahel, where NATO’s violent overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi has had the unforeseen consequence of spreading mayhem in Mali, Niger and other countries bordering the Sahara. Hungry violent men, once recruited as mercenaries by Qadhafi, have now returned home with their weapons. In Mali, the northern half of the country has fallen to a Touareg rebellion stiffened by armed Islamist groups close to al-Qaida. Algeria and all the West African states are deeply concerned by these developments but do not quite know what to do about them. It will no doubt not be long before U.S. drones carry out targeted assassinations in the region.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, long-distance killings by U.S. drones have become the instruments of choice in America’s counter-terrorist operations, to the rage of local populations and the loss of legitimacy of their leaders. In American thinking, drones and cyberwarfare are now a substitute for large-scale military operations — and also a substitute for negotiations and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In Pakistan, a Taleban commander has banned polio vaccinations in the tribal belt of North Waziristan until the CIA halts its drone campaign. This is because a CIA agent, Dr. Shakil Afridi, ran a vaccination campaign in Abbottabad, which helped lead the United States to Osama Bin Laden’s hiding place in that city, and his subsequent killing by U.S. Special forces in May last year. Dr Afridi has been convicted by a tribal court in Pakistan to 33 years in prison.

American practices of doubtful legality have provoked a despairing cry from former President Jimmy Carter who, in an article in the International Herald Tribune of 25 June, declared: “As concerned citizens, we must persuade Washington to reverse course and regain moral leadership according to international human rights norms that we had officially adopted as our own and cherished throughout the years.” Is Obama listening? Or is he thinking only of his re-election?

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2012 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 June 2012
Word Count: 1,141
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