Contributors – Page 3

Patrick Seale, “The New Weapons of War”

January 22, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

One of the first decisions John O. Brennan, America’s new CIA director, will have to make is whether the United States should target leaders of Mali’s Islamic fighting groups with drone strikes — in much the same way as it has killed Islamic militants extensively in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere over the past decade. Before being promoted head of the CIA, Brennan was President Barack Obama’s senior counter-terrorism adviser, responsible for the escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan and in Yemen.

As the Islamist threat to the Sahel has grown over the past year, following the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar al- Qadhafi, President Obama and his security advisers are known have debated whether to deploy armed drones in North Africa. Indeed, an American decision to deploy armed drones may already have been taken — triggered both by the war France launched this month against Islamist militants in Mali and by the reprisal raid which Islamic militants carried out against a major gas plant in south-eastern Algeria.

In today’s highly disturbed international environment, armed drones have become the supreme weapons of war. Pilotless machines, like the suitably-named Predator and Reaper, can stay airborne over hostile territory for more than fourteen hours before striking unsuspecting targets with missiles travelling faster than the speed of sound. The United States is thought to have about 8,000 drones in service, of which one thousand are armed. Israel is also an active manufacturer of drones. According to SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 41% of drones exported between 2001 and 2011 were Israeli-built.

The raid against the Algerian gas plant at In Amenas is thought to have been planned by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former Al-Qaida ‘emir’ who had formed his own militant group, the so-called ‘Signatories in blood.’ Algerian Special Forces flushed them out in a number of operations beginning on January 16, killing most of them. But many Algerian and foreign hostages also perished. Islamist internet sites have since hailed the attack on the Algerian gas plant as a great achievement and have called for assaults on French targets.

Responding to a call for help from the Malian government, France has made no secret of its intention to destroy the Islamist fighting groups in northern Mali and restore the rule of the Bamako government over the whole country. The groups it is targeting are AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) and Ansar al-Din. These are the Islamist groups which routed Touareg insurgents in northern Mali last year, seized major towns including Timbuktu, and then established their own, often violent, Islamic rule. In view of the vast seize of the arid country — Mali is about twice the size of France — it may prove a tough and long drawn-out assignment.

Both the United States and Algeria were, for different reasons, reluctant to be sucked into the Mali conflict, but events may now have made it impossible for them to stay out. Under President Obama, the United States has been seeking to disengage from armed conflicts, such as the long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Algeria, too, was keen to stay out of the Mali conflict as it is still recovering from the wounds of its bitter civil war against Islamist fighters in the 1990s, which is thought to have claimed well over 150,000 lives. The Islamists in Mali are, in many cases, veterans of Algeria’s civil war. The last thing Algiers wanted was to draw them back onto its own territory. But with the raid on the gas plant, this has now happened. Whether it likes it or not, Algeria is engaged in the conflict.

The French Mirage jets bombing the militants in northern Mali are said to be operating out of airfields in both Algeria and Chad. Will they now be joined by American armed drones? Like the Mirages, drones require access to airfields and over-flight rights in neighbouring countries. Drones also need informers on the ground able to pinpoint potential targets, and convey this sensitive intelligence by electronic means to the drone controllers. In Afghanistan, where the United States has used drones extensively, informers such as these have often been caught, tortured and executed by the Taliban, after having made forced video confessions of their espionage on behalf of the United States. It remains to be seen whether the United States can recruit networks of informers in northern Mali for this dangerous task.

Drone strikes are undoubtedly effective, but they are also highly controversial. As well as eliminating alleged terrorists, their victims are often innocent bystanders. Evidence presented in a joint report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and London’s Sunday Times showed that the CIA had deliberately targeted people who had gone to the aid of victims of a strike. Wives of militants had also been struck as they were taking their husbands’ bodies for burial. In 2012, some 470 Pakistanis were killed by drone strikes, of which at least 68 were non-combatants. In a recent poll of Pakistanis, 74% said they viewed the United States as an enemy. Indeed, many experts believe that drone strikes create more terrorists than they kill.

In Yemen, U.S. drone attacks against al-Qaeda militants in the south of the country have also risen steeply in the past year. At least 185 people were killed by drone strikes in Yemen last year. But such lethal counter-terrorist operations have a political cost: They arouse fierce hostility not only against the United States but also against Yemen’s own leaders who allow U.S. drones to operate on their territory. President Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi (who replaced the long-serving Ali Abdallah Saleh last February) is thought to have asked for U.S. help against al-Qaeda.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen counterterrorist operations alone, such as the United States has favoured, have failed to bring peace. On the contrary, they have all too often made matters worse. To be effective, they need to be part of a wider policy of negotiation, compromise and the search for a political resolution of conflicts. Mali will provide the latest test. The error of the Bamako government was very probably not to have conceded a measure of autonomy to the Touareg in the north of the country. Had they done so, the Islamist groups would have had no pretext to intervene.

In a report in the Daily Beast (an offshoot of Newsweek) of November 20, 2012, Cameron Munter, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, was quoted as saying: “The problem [with drone strikes] is the political fallout…Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?”

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

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Released: 22 January 2013

Word Count: 1,101

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Patrick Seale, “Yemen Seeks to Talk Its Way Out of Chaos”

January 15, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

Although politically divided, suffering economic hardship, rent by bitter grievances and burdened by a history of civil conflict, Yemen has chosen to resolve its difficulties by means of a great National Dialogue. It has chosen to talk rather than to fight — a decision of great wisdom. The date for the Dialogue has not yet been announced but it could begin as early as February and last several months, bringing to the capital, Sana‘a, five or six hundred key personalities from all parts of the country. Huge hopes rest on the success of this democratic experiment.

A major incentive which has focussed Yemeni minds is a pledge by the international community to provide $8 billion in aid — if, and only if, the National Dialogue is successful in settling the most glaring inter-Yemeni disputes. The funds are intended to help the government create a climate of security and stability, provide jobs and services, launch economic growth, bring home some at least of the six million Yemenis abroad, and nurture the right conditions to attract much-needed inward investment. But for any of this to happen, Yemen must stay united.

Can Syria learn from the Yemeni experience? One cannot help wondering whether a promise of substantial aid by the international community to rebuild Syria after the colossal devastation of the civil war might not encourage the regime and its opponents to end the horrendous killing and give dialogue a chance.

In Yemen, the principal architect of the National Dialogue is President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who came to power on 27 February 2012 with powerful backing from the Gulf Cooperation Council. He replaced President Ali Abdallah Saleh who had ruled, one way or another, for 33 years – first as President of North Yemen from 1978 to unity with the South in 1990, and then as President of a united Yemen from 1990 to 2012. Although he no longer sits in the presidential palace, Ali Abdallah Saleh remains head of his political party, the General People’s Congress. His sons, half-brothers and nephews have retained powerful positions in the military. It was only very recently, in late December 2012, that President Mansur Hadi issued decrees merging units commanded by Saleh’s relatives and some of their rivals, such as General Ali Muhsin’s 1st armoured division, into a new unified military structure. These commanders have had their wings clipped. But they still remain powerful, if under somewhat tighter control.

The ambitious aim of the National Dialogue is nothing less than to decide what sort of a state Yemen is to be. Should it be a unified country (as was attempted by the 1990 unity agreement) or a federation of North and South — or even a decentralised con-federal state, which might give a measure of autonomy to the many different pieces of the Yemeni puzzle? Should Yemen’s system of government be parliamentary or presidential? Will the army and security services – all too often divided into rival power centres — continue to play a central role, and often a corrupt one, in the affairs of the country? Or will they be tamed and controlled by a civil state?

What relations should Yemen have with its powerful northern neighbour, Saudi Arabia, the hegemonic power in the Arabian Peninsula? Over the years, Yemen has greatly depended on Saudi financial help. In return, the Saudi Kingdom has felt the need to have a say in Yemeni affairs if only to prevent Yemeni violence and instability spilling across its border. In the last couple of years, after a brief war in 2009, the Saudis have greatly strengthened their border defences. Nevertheless, one way or another, Saudi Arabia and Yemen need each other. Their relations will require very careful handling.

Another major concern of the Yemenis is that the United States has designated their country as a frontline state in the battle against al-Qaida. Primarily concerned with protecting its own homeland from terrorist attack, the United States has carried out muscular interventions against alleged Islamist terrorists in Yemen and other countries, notably by means of strikes by pilotless drones. As these strikes inevitably kill innocent civilians as well, they have aroused bitter anti-American feeling in parts of the population — a hostility often directed against the Yemeni government, accused of complicity with Washington. To carry the war to al-Qaida, the United States has also sought to create a local Yemeni counter-terrorist force, separate from the rest of the armed services. But this has deepened divisions within the Yemeni military and within Yemeni society as a whole. The extent to which Yemen should cooperate with the United States in counter-terrorism poses a tricky dilemma for the Yemen government. It needs American aid, but it cannot ignore the hostility of much of its population to American policies.

These are only some of the difficult subjects which the National Dialogue is expected to discuss. The problems are so great that the Dialogue might fail. But the fact that Yemenis have decided to resort to dialogue rather than to violence is very much a step in the right direction — and an example to others.

Perhaps the greatest of all problems facing Yemen is the clashing identities of different parts of the country. Aden and the South — shaped by the British presence from 1839 until 1967 and then by two decades of Marxist rule — were greatly disillusioned by union with the north in 1990. In 1994, the South tried to break loose but was defeated. Today, a powerful southern movement known as al-Hirak, embittered by the corruption, land grabs and aggression of northern tribes, is campaigning for autonomy or even outright secession.

The Hadhramaut, with its capital at Mukalla, is also seething with anger at the central government, which it feels has abandoned it. Law and order has broken down, the cost of living has spiralled out of control, while U.S. drone attacks enrage the population. Many Hadhramis want to break away from Yemen and form their own independent state.

In the north of Yemen, around the city of Sa‘dah, a Zaydi revivalist movement, the Huthis, rose in rebellion against the central government in 2004 and, in the following years, fought several rounds against the government. It remains untamed. Indeed it seems to have expanded its control over the whole Sa‘dah governorate.

Can a National Dialogue reconcile these profoundly different regions? Can it win over the local populations, deal seriously with their legitimate grievances and mould them into a unitary state? This is the huge challenge facing President Mansur Hadi and his colleagues. They will need the support of the international community and of their rich Gulf neighbours because a ‘failed state’ in Yemen could threaten the stability of much of the surrounding Arab world.

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Released: 15 January 2013

Word Count: 1,113

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Patrick Seale, “Obama’s Big Foreign Policy Headaches”

January 8, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

Viewed from Europe, American foreign policy would seem to be in a frightful muddle. President Barack Obama’s new team, which takes office later this month, will be confronted with a host of difficult issues. The team will include John Kerry at State and Chuck Hagel at Defence, if their appointments are confirmed by the Senate.

Hagel, a distinguished independent thinker, is already facing a fierce smear campaign by pro-Israeli sympathisers on the grounds that he is not pro-Israeli enough. The outcome of the battle will show the extent to which the United States can free itself from Israeli shackles, restoring its battered reputation and freedom of action in the Middle East.

The many severe challenges facing America include what to do in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Yemen (as well as whether to continue the ‘targeted killings’ by drone strikes which have aroused furious anti-American sentiment in several countries), not to mention relations with China and Russia. Dealing with these problems will require hard and radical thinking — and no doubt, in some cases, a painful change of course.

Take Afghanistan? Is the United States pulling out after Dec. 31, 2014, or not? Afghan President Hamid Karzai is due at the White House in the coming days. He will want to know what future protection he can expect from the United States. He will certainly have in mind the fate of President Najibullah, butchered by the Taleban when they captured Kabul in 1996 after the Russians departed.

Today, no one can deny that the security situation is deteriorating. Every other day brings news of young Afghan soldiers turning their guns on their Western trainers, of Taleban infiltrators killing Afghan soldiers in their beds. Most Afghans — especially those who live in the countryside — are a conservative people, devoted to their religion and their tribal traditions. They want an end to the wars which have devastated their country. They want the foreign infidels out.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 — somewhat reluctantly — in response to cries for help from local Communists who had seized power and killed President Daud, only to find themselves confronted by an anti-Communist uprising. The Russian occupation lasted ten grim years, 1979 to 1989, causing much loss of life on both sides. It was ended sensibly by President Gorbachev, when the Soviet Union itself faced collapse.

Capturing Kabul in 1996, the Taleban butchered President Najibullah who had presided over the last years of the Russian occupation. Then in 2001 — to avenge Al-Qaida’s devastating attack on New York’s Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 — the United States invaded Afghanistan and drove out the Taleban, who had mistakenly given Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaida house room.

America’s Afghan war has now lasted nearly 12 years. It has claimed tens of thousands of lives, including many innocent victims of indiscriminate bombing, and disrupted life in much of the country. It has cost billions of dollars, contributing to America’s crippling deficits. It is now blindingly obvious that most Afghans do not want the Americans there. Yet President Obama is said to be pondering whether to leave 6,000 or 10,000 or 20,000 troops behind. Their fate would not be enviable.

It would surely be better for the United States to withdraw altogether in 2014, while putting its full weight over the next two years to promoting an inter-Afghan settlement. This would involve bringing together all the local forces and factions in a large Loya Jirga or tribal council. Regional powers with a stake in Afghanistan’s future must be brought in too, notably Pakistan and India, Iran and the Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan, as well as China and Russia. Qatar (which has opened a Taleban office in Doha) and Saudi Arabia may also have a mediating role to play. It would be wise for the United States to stay well in the background, if not out of the Afghan debate altogether.

In his first term of office, Obama missed the chance of negotiating a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran which would have stabilised the vital Gulf region. Instead, blackmailed by demented threats to attack Iran from Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu — which risked dragging the United States in on Israel’s side — Obama imposed on Iran the most crippling sanctions ever imposed on any country. This was surely a grave mistake. It has inflicted pain on ordinary Iranians and aroused great anger against America. It has yet to be proved that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Instead, Israeli warmongering and international sanctions risk triggering a devastating war, which no one in the region wants except for some Israeli fanatics. The heart of the problem is that Israel intends to prevent any of its neighbours acquiring a deterrent capability so as to give itself the freedom to strike them at will. This is not a formula for harmony in the turbulent Middle East. The United States must understand that a regional balance of power rather than Israeli military supremacy is the best way to keep the peace.

America’s gravest problem is that Israel, its closest ally, is turning into a far-right racist statelet, imposing undemocratic laws at home and oppressive policies towards its captive Palestinians. The Israeli election of January 22 is likely to bring to government dangerous religious nationalists — such as Naftali Bennett’s Jewish Home Party — which advocate the immediate annexation of 60 per cent of the West Bank, dooming the two-state solution to final extinction. These policies are in blatant contradiction with U.S. values and interests.

The great question of Obama’s second term is whether he can regain control of America’s wayward ally and rein in its dangerously self-destructive policies. It will not be easy but it must be done for the sake of both the United States and Israel — and for the peace of the entire region.

Syria poses yet another painful dilemma for the United States. Obama committed himself early on to President Bashar al-Asad’s overthrow — largely under Israeli pressure to weaken and isolate Iran. But the United States has belatedly woken up to the fact that Bashar’s fiercest enemies are Islamic extremists close to al-Qaida — the very terrorists the U.S. has been fighting across the world! An extremist victory could turn Syria into another Afghanistan.

The only way out of the dilemma is for the United States to join Russia — as well as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and some excitable European countries — in imposing a ceasefire on both sides as a necessary precondition for a negotiation. This will hopefully lead eventually to some sort of national reconciliation and a peaceful transition of power. There is no other sensible way out of the Syrian tragedy.

The world will be watching to see whether Obama’s team can clear its head of outdated notions and seek to resolve conflicts rather than inflame them.

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Released: 08 January 2013
Word Count: 1,128
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Patrick Seale, “Grim Prospects for the Middle East in 2013”

January 1, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

The coming year is unlikely to be a happy one for the tormented Middle East. Although some dictators have fallen and many Arabs are now demanding their rights, there is no escaping the fact that the balance sheet of the past two years remains profoundly negative. In no country of the Arab Spring is there as yet any convincing sign of peace and reconciliation, of good governance, of a better standard of living for ordinary people, of an enhanced sense of citizenship, let alone of genuine democracy.

Some countries have suffered more than others. In Syria, the cries and tears of the martyred population — the tens of thousands killed, the hundreds of thousands wounded, maimed, starving and displaced — weigh heavily on the conscience of the world. Yet there is no end to the agony. To quote UN envoy Lakhdar al-Brahimi, Syria is in danger of descending into hell, if it is not there already.

Individual Arab countries are not the only casualties. The Arab political order has been dealt massive blows, and remains in great disarray. What does this mean? It means that the ability of Arab states to work effectively together has been greatly reduced. They find it difficult to affirm their independence from predatory foreign powers or defend Arab causes in the international arena. The Arab voice today carries little weight.

Some Arab countries have acquired great wealth, but it is no exaggeration to say that the Arabs as a whole — seen as a block of like-minded people sharing a language, a history and a system of beliefs — are not in much better shape than they were more than sixty years ago when Arab Palestine was lost to the Zionists in 1947-48, and when the Arab world was comprehensively defeated by Israel in 1967.

Why do I hold these pessimistic views? Look at the evidence.

• Two major Arab countries, Syria and Iraq — each of whom once had a critical role in defending Arab interests — today face fragmentation and dismemberment, even the possible loss of their national identity. We are witnessing nothing less than the redrawing of the map which created these states out of Ottoman provinces after the First World War.

• Another curse from which the Arabs are suffering is the flare up of hate between Sunnis and Shi’is. These brothers in Islam — worshiping the same God and honouring the same Prophet — behave today like irreconcilable opponents. Nothing has weakened the Arabs more than this fraternal feud, and nothing has brought greater joy to their enemies.

When, in 2003, the United States disbanded the Iraqi army and outlawed the Ba‘th party — the two key institutions of the Iraqi state — it brought down the state itself, triggering a Sunni-Shi’i civil war in which hundreds of thousands died and millions were displaced. Two results of the conflict were particularly disastrous: First, the poison of sectarian conflict spread throughout the Arab region. Secondly, Iraq, under Shi’a leadership, lost its traditional role of serving as a counterweight to Iran. The resulting upset in the balance of power aroused fears among some Gulf Arabs of Iranian domination.

For independent observers, such as myself, these fears were greatly exaggerated, but they have had the unfortunate consequence of causing many Gulf Arabs to view Iran as an enemy rather than a partner — and to turn to the United States for protection. No doubt, American and Israeli propaganda against Iran have played their part.

• Egypt, the traditional leader and most populous of all Arab countries, lives under the shadow of bankruptcy. Its economy is on its knees. Tourism and foreign investment have dried up. Fertility rates, which should have been controlled from the 1950s onwards, were allowed to soar. Over-population has robbed much of the population of any reasonable prospect of a better life. Dependence on American aid, and on American-controlled institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, has greatly restricted Egypt’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy in the Arab interest.

• The Palestine cause, central to Arab pride and identity, is all but lost. The two-state solution is virtually extinct. The Arabs face the prospect of a devastating defeat, completing that of 1948. Rich Arab states have failed to use their leverage with the United States and Europe to demand justice for the Palestinians. Another reason is Palestinian disunity. A third is the rise in Israel of fanatical religious-nationalists determined to create a Greater Israel in which Palestinians would either be corralled like serfs into isolated bantustans or driven off the land altogether.

Israel has been able to steal Palestinian land, spurn peace, prevent any expression of Palestinian statehood, dominate the region militarily and strike its neighbours at will, for one principal reason: It has enjoyed the limitless support of the United States. Although elected for a second term, President Barack Obama still seems reluctant to confront pro-Israeli forces which have achieved great influence in the United States, not least in the U.S. Congress. Yet the paradox is that many Arabs still turn for protection to the United States! This is folly. The Arabs must break loose from American apron strings and learn to defend themselves.

What New Year resolutions would I dare to recommend to Arab leaders?

First, do everything possible to heal the crippling Sunni-Shi‘i rift, which gravely weakens the Arab world. An early move would be to summon a grand conference in Mecca of ulema of all sects and tendencies — and keep them there until they hammer out their differences.

Secondly, protect what is left of Syria — and its central role in containing Israel. Stop the killing by bringing the regime and its opponents to the negotiating table, whether they like it or not. There is no military solution to the crisis. The only way to end the orgy of destruction is to impose a ceasefire on both sides, halt the delivery of funds and weapons to the regime and the rebels, isolate murderous extremists in both camps, and mobilise the United States and Russia, as well as the European Union, Egypt, Turkey and Iran, in support of a political transition. The key issue is not whether President Bashar al-Asad stays or quits. At stake is the preservation of a unitary Syrian state. This must be done to protect Syria’s unique historical heritage, its state institutions, its ancient minorities, and its vital regional role in defence of Arab independence.

Thirdly, demand justice for the Palestinians even if it means threatening a breach with the United States and the expulsion of American bases from the Gulf.

Fourthly, start a strategic dialogue with Tehran. Enmity between Arabs and Iranians is a profound mistake. Only an Arab-Iranian partnership – a partnership between equals based on mutual trust and mutual interests — can protect the vital Gulf region from the dangers of war and from the ambitions of external powers.

It is probable that only a radical rethink of current policies, attitudes and alliances will rescue the Arab world from the dark pit in which it finds itself. But which Arab leader will dare undertake such a task?

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Released: 01 January 2013
Word Count: 1,164
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Patrick Seale, “The Kurds Seize Their Chance”

December 25, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Many Kurds have come to believe that the present prolonged turmoil in the Middle East — in Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Iran and Turkey — is giving them their best chance of self-determination in modern times. They are determined to seize it. It could be that the map of the region is being redrawn before our eyes.

During the four hundred years of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds enjoyed considerable autonomy and even political unity. Since they lived in largely inaccessible mountains, the Ottomans allowed them to run their own affairs. When the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War, it signed the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 with the victorious allies — a treaty which among its many provisions, seemed to promise the Kurds a state of their own. But the Turks would have none of it. They were determined to create a strong Turkish state out of the ruins of Empire.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkish national movement fought the Sèvres Treaty and, after long negotiations, forced the allies to sign a new treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which recognised the sovereignty and borders of the new Turkish Republic. This was bad news for the Kurds, because the Lausanne treaty made no mention of them. Instead, they found themselves carved up between the new Turkey and the Arab states of Iraq and Syria formed by Britain and France out of former Ottoman provinces. The Kurds have had to live with dispersal and oppression ever since.

Kurdish hopes of a better life have now been revived, largely because of a number of important regional developments:

• In Iraq, the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil seem to be on the brink of war. Both sides have massed large numbers of troops along a contested border in the oil-rich region of Kirkuk. The immediate causes of the dispute are first, a contract the KRG has signed with Exxon Mobil to drill for oil in the Kirkuk area; and secondly, a proposed strategic energy partnership between the KRG and Turkey. This would involve a government-backed Turkish company drilling for oil and building export pipelines from the KRG to Turkey to transport Kurdish oil and gas to international markets. Needless to say, if these projects were to go ahead, they would bring Iraqi Kurds a big step closer to independence.

Baghdad is now fighting back. Sami Alaskary, an aide to Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has said that “if Exxon lays a finger on this territory… we will go to war for oil and for Iraqi sovereignty.” Baghdad has put Lt. Gen. Abd al-Amir al-Zaidi in command of Iraqi troops confronting the KRG. This officer is thought to have played a role in Saddam Hussein’s 1988 Anfal campaign against the Kurds. Showing defiance, KRG’s President Massoud Barzani paid a high-profile visit to Peshmerga front lines on December 10.

At this delicate moment, the stroke suffered by Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, 79 — himself a Kurd — has removed from the scene a potential mediator between Baghdad and Erbil.

Fearing that a close KRG-Turkish partnership will cause Baghdad to ally itself even more closely with Iran, the United States has urged the KRG to go slow in its oil deals with Turkey. But Washington has been rebuffed. The Kurds smell independence.

It will be recalled that the autonomous Kurdish enclave emerged under Western protection in northern Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. With its own flag, national anthem, presidency and parliament, the KRG has since acquired several characteristics of independent statehood, in particular its own powerful armed forces — the Peshmerga, meaning “those who face death” – are believed to number some 200,000 men. Although Iraq’s new constitution of 2005 defined the country as a federal state of Arabs and Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan, increasingly dynamic and prosperous, has virtually broken free from Baghdad’s control.

• In Syria, the prolonged civil war is destroying the once strong and united country. Vicious fighting between the beleaguered Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad and numerous groups of rebel fighters is increasingly taking on the appearance of a sectarian war between the Sunni majority and the minority Alawi community, the latter well represented in the army and security services. The fighting seems to be leading inexorably to the fragmentation and partition of Syria, with each sect and ethnic group looking to its own defence.

Last summer, Syrian government troops were deliberately withdrawn from Kurdish-majority towns along the Turkish border in the north of the country. By handing this strategic border region over to the Kurds, the Syrian regime evidently sought to punish Turkey for its support of the Syrian rebels. It may also have withdrawn its troops because it needed them to fight the rebels elsewhere. The area is now being governed by the Kurds themselves — by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), an armed and disciplined movement formed in 2003, closely allied to Turkey’s militant Kurdish organisation, the Kurdish Workers Party or PKK.

Also on the scene in northern Syria is the Kurdish National Council, a loose grouping of eleven Syrian Kurdish factions, formed in 2011. On December 11, Shirku Abbas, chairman of the Kurdish National Council, declared in an interview that the United States and its European allies had agreed to provide finance and logistics for an independent Kurdish army strong enough to keep Islamist and Salafi fighting groups out of the Kurdish regions of Syria. Shirku Abbas made no secret of his ambition to create an independent Kurdish enclave inside a federal Syria on the model of the KRG in northern Iraq.

• Turkey, in turn, is being forced to make concessions to its own militant Kurds. A mass hunger strike by thousands of Kurdish political prisoners was brought to an end last November after an appeal by the PKK leader Abdulla Ocalan from his island prison of Imrali. Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself acknowledged the role played by Ocalan. Indeed, there are suggestions that Erdogan may now be contemplating a political negotiation with Ocalan — and further concessions to the Kurds.

• Always anxious to weaken and subvert its neighbours, Israel has for years armed and trained the Kurds of Iraq against Baghdad. Since the 2003 war, its relations with the KRG have grown still closer. Israeli drones are said to be operating against Iran from bases inside the KRG, while Mossad is said to have launched cross- border intelligence missions from the KRG against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel is also said to be backing a Kurdish guerrilla group inside Iran, the PJAK (or Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) to carry out armed attacks against Iranian targets.

The misfortunes of one are the blessings of another. The more the Arabs sink into disunity and warfare, the more its enemies will triumph – and the more the Kurds will believe that their dream of independence may at last be realised.

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Released: 25 December 2012
Word Count: 1,146
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Patrick Seale, “Can the United States Strike a Deal with Iran?”

December 18, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

In recent weeks, there has been talk in the media — in both the United States and Iran — of the possibility of direct bilateral talks between Washington and Tehran over the many subjects in dispute between them. If such talks on a comprehensive package were to take place, they could break the deadlock in U.S.-Iranian relations which has existed ever since Washington’s ally, the Shah, was overthrown by the Islamic revolution of 1979.

Needless to say, hardliners in both capitals oppose direct talks. In Washington, the ‘war party’ does not want to talk to the Mullahs, it wants to bring them down. In Tehran, the instinct is not to give an inch in the belief that the United States is seeking nothing less than Iran’s abject capitulation. Mutual mistrust is so deep that it would require a miracle, or some truly inspired diplomacy, for the United States to strike a bargain with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the meantime, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the so-called P5+1) are said to be considering holding a new round of high-level negotiations with Iran on the nuclear question — the first since last June. Reports suggest that it might be held in Istanbul in January. But real progress by the P5+1 seems unlikely unless Washington and Tehran give an indication that they are prepared to be more flexible. Without a push from both capitals, a breakthrough seems unlikely.

The prospects are far from bright. The spectre of a war against Iran — waged by Israel with reluctant American tolerance — has overshadowed the region for much of the past two years. To head off the danger of an Israeli strike which might have compelled the United States to join in, President Barack Obama imposed on Iran the most crippling sanctions ever imposed on any country. War was thus averted. But it will again be on the agenda of Israel’s hard-liners and their American supporters in 2013, if no progress is made towards a settlement.

A war against Iran — which could easily spread to the whole region — is the very last thing the turbulent Middle East needs. On the contrary, a lowering of tension is urgently required to create a climate in which compromise is possible – not only in resolving the dispute with Iran but also the many other violent regional disputes, such as the civil war in Syria and the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to claim its victims and spread its poison.

The Iranian case is particularly difficult to resolve because it is more about geopolitics than about nuclear technicalities. In other words, it is less about Iran’s alleged ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons — for which there is as yet no convincing evidence — than about the nature of the region’s political order.

The United States views the Islamic Republic as a challenge to American hegemony over the oil-rich Arab Gulf. Israel, in turn, wants military supremacy over all its neighbours. In 2003, it and its friends put relentless pressure on the United States to destroy Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Once this was achieved, the same pro-Israeli forces turned their attention to the Islamic Republic of Iran, because its nuclear programme was seen as a potential threat to Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Israel has long conspired with Washington to bring down the whole so-called ‘resistance axis’ of Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah, seen as a challenge to U.S.-Israeli dominance. It has made repeated attempts to crush Hizballah and Hamas, and has not hesitated to assassinate Iranian atomic scientists. In league with the United States, it has also waged clandestine cyber-warfare against Iranian industrial facilities.

For their part, Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbours view Shi‘ite Iran as a hostile power which is seeking to challenge Sunni supremacy in the region and undermine the Arab political order.

These are among the underlying geopolitical reasons why a breakthrough in relations with Iran seems unlikely — whether in bilateral talks with the United States or in the wider framework of P5+1 negotiations. And yet it would require only a modicum of goodwill for a deal to be struck.

What is Iran seeking in these discussions? First, it wants recognition of its right to enrich uranium on its own soil for peaceful purposes. Its right to do so is spelled out in Article IV of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory. Peaceful purposes include nuclear power generation. Iran is planning to build several nuclear power plants in addition to the one at Bushehr. Iran has, moreover, agreed to regular monitoring of its nuclear activities over the past decade by the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Israel, which has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, refuses to sign the NPT or allow monitoring of its nuclear plants by IAEA inspectors.)

Secondly, Iran has repeatedly offered to cease 20% enrichment of uranium if it is allowed to purchase fuel rods from abroad for the Tehran Research Reactor, which makes medical isotopes for close to a million Iranian cancer victims. It is prepared to restrict its uranium enrichment to below 5% — thus posing no threat of weapons proliferation — if, in return, it is given relief from the sanctions which have targeted its oil exports, its financial transactions and its nuclear industry, and which are imposing great hardship on its population. Thirdly — and more generally — Iran wants recognition of the legitimacy of its Islamic regime which emerged from its 1979 revolution. It wants to be recognised as an important regional power and not be treated as a pariah state.

Iran’s chances of achieving these goals do not look good. On the contrary, the U.S. Congress is pressing for even stiffer sanctions. Under Israeli pressure, the United States insists that Iran end all uranium enrichment, not merely 20% — and that it must do so before securing any significant concessions in return. In making this extreme demand, the United States has brushed aside Iran’s rights under the NPT and ignored its long compliance with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Instead, the United States has based itself on politically-motivated UN Security Council resolutions, beginning with Resolution 1696 on July 2006, which demands that Iran halt all uranium enrichment on the grounds that the unproven suspicion that it intends to go nuclear poses a threat to international peace and security.

Is it not time for other members of the P5 — notably Russia and China — to rebel against the American-led punitive sanctions against Iran, and themselves engage in sounding out Iran’s intentions? In May 2010, Brazil and Turkey reached an agreement with Iran to ship out to Turkey 2,500 pounds of low-enriched uranium, but the U.S. shot it down, reverting instead to imposing still more sanctions. If Russia and China were now to take the lead in striking a bargain with Iran, it might induce Washington to think again, and even to follow suit.

But, shackled by a pro-Israeli Congress, how much freedom does President Barack Obama have to break America’s long and dangerous stalemate with Iran?

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Released: 18 December 2012
Word Count: 1,164
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Patrick Seale, “How to Bring Peace to Mali and Avoid War”

December 11, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

French President François Hollande’s visit to Algeria, scheduled for 19-20 December, is unlikely to be an easy mission. High on his agenda will be the situation in Mali, where armed Islamist groups seized control of the north of the country after a military coup last March in the capital Bamako. France has been pressing for an international force to oust the Islamists, but Algeria, the major regional power which borders on Mali to its south, is firmly against any such intervention. While it defends the principle of the integrity of Mali, it believes the crisis is an internal problem which should be settled by negotiation, not by force.

The dispute between France and Algeria is likely to be sharpened by the news last Monday that Cheick Modibo Diarra, Mali’s prime minister — a passionate advocate of international intervention against the Islamists — was arrested as he was about to board a plane for Paris. The order for his arrest came from Captain Amadou Sanogo, leader of the coup last March, who is fervently opposed to foreign military intervention.

Northern Mali — an arid area the size of France — is the home of nomadic Touareg tribes who for decades have struggled to win autonomy, if not full independence, from Bamako. The military coup last March gave them their chance. But they had barely seized the main northern towns from a demoralised Malian army when they in turn were defeated and ousted by armed Islamists, who set about imposing on the local population a harsh version of Sharia law. Their exactions — stoning for infidelity, amputations for theft, as well as the destruction of ancient World Heritage shrines – have aroused much anxiety in world capitals.

The fear is that these extremist Islamist movements — AQMI (al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamic), MUJAO (Movement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest) and Ansar al-Din — could turn the vast area of northern Mali into a regional base for international terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, threatening the security of neighbouring states, and posing a danger to Mali’s neighbours, to Europe and even to the United States. Some evoke the spectre of ‘another Afghanistan’.

On 12 October, France persuaded the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of an intervention to oust the Islamists. A month later, West African leaders at an emergency summit in Abuja discussed the military means and strategy which such an intervention would require. ECOWAS, the 15-nation West African organisation, was reported to be ready to contribute a force of 3,300 men. France and other European states were said to be preparing to train several Malian battalions which, with intelligence from the United States, logistics from France and stiffening by ECOWAS forces, would recapture Timbuktu and Goa from the Islamists and then stabilise the area to prevent the Islamists’ return. Military operations were expected to begin in January 2013 before the heavy spring rains of March-April. War seemed imminent.

The last few weeks, however, have seen a change of mood. The task has come to seem daunting. The sheer size of Northern Mali’s desert terrain; the weakness of local West African armies not trained for combat abroad and often preoccupied with security problems at home (such as the Boko Haram rebellion in Nigeria); the impressive military arsenal of the Islamists, much of it seized from Libya after Muammar al-Qadhafi’s overthrow; the months it would take to bring the Malian army up to scratch; the widespread and widely-shared fear of being sucked into an interminable conflict, all these have tamed the ardour of those who pressed for military action.

A real damper has come from Algeria — the only country in the region with a powerful army and a capable intelligence service. The Algerian Minister of Interior and the Algerian army chief of staff have both come out firmly against intervention. Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Mourad Medelci, has been canvassing support for a political solution to the crisis, winning the backing of Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu; of Mauritania’s head of state, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz; and of the former Italian premier Roman Prodi, now the UN special envoy to the Sahel (‘My mission,’ Prodi declared, ‘is to do everything possible for peace and to avoid war.’)

In an article on November 23, the Algerian daily, Al Watan, mocked France for pressing for military intervention in northern Mali, saying that it was behaving like a bull in a china shop.

Algeria’s doubts about the wisdom of making war on the Islamists in Mali spring from its own bitter experience of civil war in the 1990s, which is said to have claimed up to 200,000 lives. Abdelmalek Droukdel, the present head of AQMI, is none other than a former Islamist who fought the Algerian army for several years. Anxious to avoid any possibility of a renewed Islamist uprising in its exposed southern region, Algeria’s policy is to press for negotiations with all those in northern Mali who reject terrorism and international drug trafficking.

The assassination of the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi last September has focussed American attention on the Islamist threat to North Africa and the Sahel. American drones are no doubt already monitoring the area. Yet some of the most sensible remarks about the situation in Mali have come from General Carter Ham, head of AFRICOM, the command HQ of American forces in Africa. In an interview with Le Monde on 17 November, he declared that a purely military approach to the situation in northern Mali was doomed to fail. It was necessary, he said, to place the possibility of military action within a wider strategy. The first requirement was a political negotiation together with humanitarian assistance. The borders of Mali’s neighbours, such as Algeria, had to be made secure. The world should prepare for military intervention but it was by no means inevitable.

Instead, he proposed that the Bamako government respond to the political aspirations of the Touareg and of other groups in northern Mali. ‘If the population in the north came to believe that the government would give due attention to its demands, it might then act in such a way as to make AQMI leave the region — perhaps even without resorting to force,’ he declared.

The Sahel has been neglected by the international community for far too long. It is a poor part of the world made poorer by drought, violence, and the corruption of local elites. Rather than military intervention, Mali needs political reconciliation underpinned and promoted by massive development aid, sustained over several years. This may be the only way to persuade young men, desperate for a better life, to leave the Islamist groups and give up hostage-taking and drug smuggling which so far have been their only way to make a living.

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Released: 11 December 2012
Word Count: 1,120
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Patrick Seale, “Courting Danger in the Middle East”

December 4, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

U.S. President Barack Obama is behaving in the Middle East as if unaware of the dangers his policies are provoking. It is often said that big ships cannot easily or swiftly change course, but the U.S. ship of state is steaming headlong towards an iceberg. The collision could make 9/11 seem like a traffic accident. To protect America, its interests and its allies will require bold corrective measures — and the earlier in his second term the better.

Recent figures have caught the world’s attention — 162 Palestinians killed and a thousand wounded in Gaza compared to six Israelis killed and a dozen wounded; 138 votes cast at the UN General Assembly in favour of Palestine’s upgrade to the status of a non-member observer state, with only nine votes against — Israel, the United States, Canada, the Czech Republic, Panama and four small Pacific Island states.

Striking as these figures are — illustrating the disproportionate casualties in the recent Gaza conflict and the increasing international isolation of Israel and the United States — they do not tell the whole story. Bubbling beneath the surface like molten lava lies something which cannot be counted. It is hate. In my more than four decades of writing about the Middle East and talking to Arabs, I have rarely encountered such detestation of Israel, such thirst for revenge and such rage at its superpower patron.

When populations are oppressed, occupied, besieged and murdered, their land stolen, their rights and national identity denied, brute force may manage to quell and subdue them momentarily. But when they eventually rebel, as they must, the eruption is bound to be violent.

The whole world knows that Israel’s right-wing leaders want land not peace — a view enthusiastically shared by settlers and other fanatics. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and those like him have done everything possible to avoid a negotiation with the Palestinians since any negotiation carries the risk of checking progress towards their goal of a ‘Greater Israel’. Such right-wingers loathe Palestinian moderates like Mahmud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, because moderates want peace and an end to Israel’s land theft. Israeli right-wingers far prefer Palestinian militants like Hamas, whom they can dismiss as terrorists with whom no talks are possible. “How can you negotiate with someone who wants to kill you?” is a familiar right-wing Israeli cry. Israel’s policy has always been to discredit the moderates and radicalise the militants. A striking recent example was its assassination of Ahmad al-Jabari, Hamas’ military chief, just when he was on the point of agreeing to a permanent ceasefire with Israel. As Reuven Pedatsur wrote in Haaretz, “Israel assassinated the man who had the power to make a deal with Israel.”

Yet the question must be posed: How can a tiny country of seven million people believe that it can permanently defy hundreds of millions of Arabs, Iranians and Turks and the vast Muslim world beyond? Only the United States can save Israel from the suicidal folly of its leaders. But the U.S. must also act to protect itself against what will inevitably be a violent backlash if it fails to rein in the inflated ambitions of its ally. Peace and peace alone will secure Israel’s future and protect the United States from the threat of an Arab counter-blow.

The events of 9/11 were a harsh wake-up call which the United States has still not fully heeded. The current wave of fierce anti-American feeling in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and many other parts of the Muslim world is another red alert which the U.S. should surely note. There have been several such omens in the past. Shi‘i anger at American backing for Israel after its 1982 invasion of Lebanon led to the car-bomb attack which killed 241 U.S. Marines at Beirut airport on 23 October 1983. Another warning was the attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour on 12 October 2000, which killed 17 U.S. sailors, and triggered an American counter-insurgency which is claiming lives to this day. The killing of U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi on 12 September 2012 threw a harsh light on how Islamists view the United States. And was not the recent UN vote on the status of Palestine yet another reminder of what the world thinks of American policies on this highly contentious issue?

Obama’s moment of truth will soon be upon him. He will need to make some painful choices which will profoundly affect America’s security as well as its standing in the world. Are American values really compatible with the deeply-rooted expansionist ideology and Arab-hating world view of Israel’s fanatical settlers and religious nationalists? Does the United States really want to be on the side of racists and fascists who harass and kill Palestinians, torch their fields, cut down ancient olive trees and deface mosques?

Obama has been criticised for not visiting Israel. Early next year would be the time to do so. If both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power cannot be used to persuade Israel to change course, might a dose of ‘smart’ power be more effective? Obama needs to spell out America’s terms for a final closure of the poisonous Arab-Israeli conflict, which has destroyed America’s reputation and brought horrendous punishment to the American mainland. He needs to secure the backing of world powers for an international conference which will dictate to the parties the peace terms of the world community. He must use the powers of the Presidency to impose a two-state solution and bring peace to the deeply troubled Middle East — before it is too late.

Pessimists argue that Obama is tired of the Middle East and that he cannot face a bitter fight with the pro-Israeli Congress, let alone with the powerful ranks of neo-cons and pro-Israeli lobbyists. It is said that he does not want to risk another humiliation such as he suffered at Netanyahu’s hands when he tried to press for a settlement freeze early in his first mandate. In any event, he seems to believe that, whatever he does or does not do, the oil-rich Arabs will always side with the United States. His strong belief is that the real challenge for the United States in the years ahead will be confronting the rise of China. Priority must be given to affirming American power in the Pacific rather than in the Mediterranean and the Gulf.

Optimists, in contrast, persist in hoping — against all the evidence — that Obama will surprise the Middle East and the world with some bold decisions. They believe he is biding his time before showing his hand. He wants first to form his new cabinet — including naming the new Secretaries of State and Defence. And he will no doubt wish to ponder the results of next January’s Israeli elections to gauge just how tough and tricky a problem he will be facing there.

The next couple of months will show whether or not Obama will earn his place in history and deserve his Nobel Prize.

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Released: 04 December 2012
Word Count: 1,158
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Patrick Seale, “More Agony Ahead for Syria”

November 27, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Might the Western powers and their allies be making a mistake in Syria? Several of them — Britain and France, together with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — have recognised the new Coalition of Syrian opposition forces formed in Doha on 11 November. They will now come under intense pressure to provide the rebels with heavier and more sophisticated ‘defensive’ arms, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. That is what is now being discussed in several capitals. But will better weapons be enough to bring down President Bashar al-Asad? Most military experts think it doubtful. The rebels have made significant advances but are still far from landing a decisive blow.

Worried at the rise of Islamist fighting groups — much like those it is fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere — the United States has so far hesitated to recognise the new Coalition, although it played a major role in its formation. This is an illustration of the dilemmas facing the Western powers.

If the rebels get better weapons as seems likely, Asad’s regime is bound to respond by throwing its own more advanced weapons into the battle, such as MIG 29s, heavy battle tanks, missiles and long-range artillery, which have so far been kept in reserve. The military escalation will be a recipe for more bloodshed rather than the beginning of dialogue.

The opposition wants more than weapons. What it really hopes for is a Western military intervention on the Libyan model. But such an intervention does not seem probable — the Russians will veto any UN Security Council Resolution authorising the use of force. In any event, no Western power wants to be drawn into the Syrian conflict. All are happy to hide behind the Russian veto.

By arming the rebels, the Western powers and their allies are in danger of undercutting the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN and Arab League envoy, to halt the bloodshed and prepare the ground for a negotiation — in much the same way as they undercut the efforts of his predecessor Kofi Annan. To pay lip-service to the goal of a ceasefire and a negotiated transition of power while arming the rebels is to guarantee that fighting will continue.

Arab diplomatic sources say that Brahimi has drafted a new roadmap for peace, which he is expected to present to the UN Security Council and to regional powers in the coming days. His plan is said to call for the formation of a national unity government of both opposition figures and regime loyalists, with the task of conducting free and fair elections under international supervision.

According to these sources, Brahimi has left open the contentious issue of the fate of President Asad. The opposition refuses to consider talks so long as Asad remains in power, while regime supporters, both domestic and foreign, believe that he must be part of the transition process. Brahimi, like Kofi Annan, seems to think that the process has to be ‘Syria-led’ — which implies that Asad has to be involved.

But Brahimi’s task is well-nigh impossible. Neither the regime nor the opposition shows any sign of being ready for a deal. Most opposition factions — and certainly the fighting groups — declare that they will continue the struggle until Bashar al-Asad is toppled. He, in turn, evidently hopes to crush them. In a word, both sides believe the time is not ripe for a political settlement. Each believes the military balance must first be changed in its favour before a negotiation can take place. In any event, so much blood has already been spilled, and so much hate generated, that there is at present no room for rational thinking or mood for compromise

The new umbrella Coalition is, however, a distinct improvement on the Turkey-based Syrian National Council (SNC), which it has incorporated and replaced. It is more representative of the various opposition factions. Its President, Moaz al-Khatib, has much in his favour: He is a Damascene (as is the industrialist Riad Seif, one of his two vice-presidents); he is a moderate Muslim, acceptable to many Christians and to part at least of the silent majority. Some regime loyalists may even be prepared to fall in behind him. Above all, he has lived and worked in Syria all his life, and knows the different communities which make up the country’s mosaic. He left his native country only recently — unlike some SNC members who have lived in exile for decades. But al-Khatib is no politician. He is an intellectual and an academic. It may well be that expectations of what he can achieve have been pitched too high.

The Coalition he heads has many failings. It does not represent Syria’s many minorities. No Kurdish group has agreed to join. Needless to say, the Alawites are absent. Above all, this group of civilian exiles will find it difficult to impose its will on fighters inside the country, who dismiss it as a foreign creation. Jihadi groups, in particular — who are steadily gaining in strength and are linked in some cases to al-Qaeda — detest the civilian opposition abroad. They have no time for anyone who is not a jihadi. Their aim is to create an Islamic state by force of arms. One already exists in embryo in that part of Aleppo which the rebels control.

Al-Khatib must also wrestle with the fact that the countries which have chosen to recognise his Coalition are themselves far from united. Each country seems to be backing a different group with a different agenda. Syria has become a battlefield for foreign powers

It is all too easy to predict the likely outcome of current Western policy. It seems set to lead to military escalation; to a higher death toll on both sides; to more material damage; to greater sectarian divisions and hates, with each community taking to arms to protect itself. Even more serious is the fact that a military escalation will fragment the country even more than at present. Each side will fight to defend areas under its control. The struggle over the coming months is likely to be bloody.

A major casualty of the conflict is the loss of Syria’s regional role. Syria has played a pivotal role in Arab politics since the Second World War, in association at different times with Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and, in recent times, Turkey. It used to be said that there can be no war without Syria and no peace without it. It has been the kingpin of resistance to Israel ever since the creation of the Jewish state — a role it has continued to play in recent decades as part of the so-called ‘resistance axis’ in association with Iran and Lebanon’s Shite resistance movement Hizballah. With Syria’s collapse, a new regional configuration of power is likely to emerge in which Islamists of various stripes seem destined to play a bigger role.

As a prominent Arab exclaimed to me this week, ‘Syria, as we know it, is finished!’

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Released: 27 November 2012
Word Count: 1,156
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Patrick Seale, “What Can the Arabs Do about Gaza?”

November 20, 2012 - Jahan Salehi

Faced with the carnage in Gaza, how should Arab states react? Heart-breaking TV pictures of death and destruction — of mauled children being pulled from the wreckage of their homes — must certainly have aroused consternation and stirred the conscience of every family from Cairo to Baghdad, and from Riyadh to Rabat. What will Arabs now expect from their leaders?

To get some sense of Arab opinion, I conducted my own limited poll, phoning and e-mailing contacts in different Arab countries. I tried to understand how they felt about the punishment of Gaza. Was their reaction one of anger and a thirst for revenge? Or did they feel a painful sense of humiliation, coupled with impatience with their leaders?

The reaction of most of my correspondents was robust. Their view was that Egypt and Jordan should freeze their peace treaties with Israel and close the Israeli embassies in Cairo and Amman. “Do Arab leaders not understand,” one of them said to me, “that the new Arab generation, freed from the dictators of the past, will no longer tolerate submissive polices? Arabs and Muslims must now show their muscle.”

Two proposals I heard seem worth conveying to a wider public. One was that President Morsi, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa of Qatar, Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan of Turkey and a very senior Saudi such as Prince Salman should together seek an urgent meeting with President Obama. They should convey to him the clear message that Israel’s siege of Gaza, and its continued occupation and land theft on the West Bank, have become intolerable. Israel’s violent policies were not only destroying the Palestinians. They were undermining the legitimacy of every Arab regime. They were a danger to the whole Arab order. No Arab government was safe from the anger of its people. That was the main lesson of the Arab Spring.

My contacts said that these regional leaders should give Obama a clear choice. They should tell him that if in 2013 — the first year of his new presidential mandate — he failed to bring Israel to the table to negotiate peace and statehood for the Palestinians on the basis of the 1967 lines (perhaps with some agreed land swaps), then the Arabs would be compelled to downgrade their relations with the United States.

Purchases of American arms would be frozen. American bases in the Gulf would be closed. American aid could be dispensed with. American interference in Arab affairs would no longer be tolerated. American protection was worthless and unwanted: It merely exposed the Arabs to Israeli aggression.

Arab oil producers, some of my contacts said, were fully aware that the United States was no longer a major customer for Arab oil. The international oil trade had switched towards Asia. It was time for the Arabs to join with China in protecting the new strategic oil routes. If the United States wanted influence in the Arab region, it had to change its policies and become a truly neutral mediator. If that were not possible, the Arabs would look elsewhere for help. As for the Arab leaders, they too should understand that profound changes were taking place on the international scene. It was time for them to carve out a new place for the Arabs in the world — outside of the American orbit.

Some contacts linked the Arab-Israeli conflict to America’s current undeclared war against Iran — a war driven by Israel. They said that the Arabs should not allow themselves to be squeezed between Israel and Iran. They should know which one of the two was their real enemy. Gulf countries — a senior contact in that area told me — should conclude a non-aggression pact with Iran and draw Tehran into regional security arrangements with the Arabs. If the Arabs allied themselves with Iran and Turkey, they would be strong enough to contain Israel’s aggression and protect the Palestinians. The cruel fate of the Palestinians was a badge of dishonour for every Arab.

Yet another suggestion which I heard from several sources was that Arab oil states, flush with funds, should coordinate and consolidate their financial aid to ailing Arab economies — like those of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. They should make plans for the reconstruction of Syria once a way out was found from the current nightmare in that country. Only when Arab money was used in defence of Arab causes could Arab independence be truly genuine.

Should the Arabs then prepare for war with Israel? I asked. No was the unanimous reply. The solution had to be political, not military. But most of my contacts — in countries as diverse as Yemen, Algeria and Kuwait — blamed the United States for the Gaza slaughter. It was America’s support, they said, which allowed Israel to kill Palestinians with impunity. They complained that Obama had again collapsed in the face of Israel and the Jewish lobby. He had adopted Israel’s argument that Israel had the right to defend itself and that Hamas was a terrorist organisation. This was a slap in the face to the Arabs. No doubt, it was the duty of the Israeli government to defend its people. But had no one else such a right? Was no other country allowed to seek deterrence? Hamas was a democratically-elected government. Was it not also responsible for defending its people?

How did Arabs react, I wondered, when Israel’s Minister of Interior, Eli Yishai, said that “The goal of the operation is to send Gaza back to the Middle Ages?” Or when Gilad Sharon, son of former prime mister Ariel Sharon, said, “We need to flatten all of Gaza. There should be no electricity, no gasoline, no moving vehicles, nothing. Then they’d really call for a ceasefire?”

“Israelis like this are psychopaths,” one of my contacts said. “They are insane killers living in their own closed, fanatical world. They don’t seem to understand that saying such obscene things fuels violent anti-Semitism and puts Jews everywhere in danger.” But another of my contacts said: “Hamas is to blame. Why did it expose its population to attack? Why did it embarrass President Muhammad Morsi? He needs to give his full attention to the Egyptian economy. Why put him in an impossible position?”

One of my interlocutors put the matter in stark terms: “Should the Arabs accept to be beaten into pulp every few years so that Israelis can feel safe and the Israeli-American alliance flourish?”

Another view I heard was that Israel was exploiting the vacuum created by Syria’s internal war. “By smashing Gaza,” one of my contacts said, “its intention is to remind Iran and the United States of its strength. It wants to prove that it can do what it likes when it likes. It wants to show that its freedom of action is total — whatever the world may think.”

The above is a sample of views conveyed to me over the past few days. The coming weeks will show whether Arab leaders heed the voices of their people, or whether they will simply decide to go back to business as usual, however many Palestinians perish.

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Released: 20 November 2012
Word Count: 1,176
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