The week started with the Trump administration’s ill-judged attempt to lure the Palestinians into throwing away their political aspirations in exchange for the promise of $50 billion over a decade. It ended with the US president attending the G20 summit in Japan, where the host advanced a three-point global cooperation agenda that goes against the views of Donald Trump.

In between, France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, declared himself unwilling to sign off on the G20 communique unless it mentioned the Paris climate agreement, which Trump withdrew from in 2017.

And then there was Trump’s war of words with Iran and the unwillingness of Britain and France to entertain American requests to join in a military operation.

Add to that the news about Russia’s booming stock market and currency, despite facing US sanctions for years. And the fact that Nicolas Maduro is able to stay in power in Venezuela, in defiance of Trump’s attempt to remove him.

All of the above gives the impression of an ineffectual American foreign policy, which is failing to achieve Trump’s goals. Even America’s coercive power seems unable to guarantee results — think Russia and Venezuela, as well as Turkey and India’s decision to buy Russian S-400 missile systems despite US objections. And America’s ability to effect wholesale change in global trends appears to be limited, going by disparate countries’ determination to pursue climate-friendly policies as well as plurilateral free trade deals.

In all sorts of ways then, Trump’s America is less commanding than before. Two-and-a-half years into the Trump presidency, his country is neither able to reliably secure the administration’s goals nor enforce unquestioning and abject obedience to its will.

In fact, the Trump administration’s single biggest initiative — the 96-page “Peace to Prosperity” economic plan for the Palestinian territories — has drawn excoriating criticism and enormous ridicule. “Instead of self-determination,” read one satirical tweet in reference to Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner’s background in real estate and hotels, “could I interest you in our Premium Occupation Plus package?” And Hady Amr, who worked on former US Secretary of State John Kerry’s economic initiative for the Palestinian people from 2013 to 2017, slammed the Trump-Kushner plan’s blindness and insensitivity to the reality of Palestinian lives. Investment would be a “smart” thing “for the economy of an ordinary country,” Amr said. “But the Palestinian people don’t live in an ordinary country or situation. For decades, the Palestinian people have languished in quasi-autonomous areas where their lives are sadly subservient to Israeli needs.”

Altogether, there is a growing sense American foreign policy is discordant. Most countries are working to the principle that Trump administration pronouncements and diktats are best dealt with diplomatic niceties and action only when necessary or in one’s self-interest.

The new mood to sidestep America is not because its real power is waning. The United States is still the world’s richest, most powerful country. And the dollar continues to enjoy what former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing once called the “exorbitant privilege” of serving as the main international reserve currency.

If Trump’s America is failing, it is on another count. This was best described earlier this month by 37-year-old Pete Buttigeg, the youngest candidate in a crowded Democratic field of contenders for Trump’s job. In a speech titled “America and the World in 2054,” Buttigeg offered a long-term view of America’s place in the world. Its “greatest strategic advantage,” he said, is that it “has stood for values shared by humanity, touching aspirations felt far beyond our borders.”

Interestingly, Buttigeg said he picked 2054 as the vantage point to view America’s engagement with the world because it is “the year in which I hope to retire, after reaching the current age (73) of the current president.” Buttigeg missed, by one year, falling into the category of millennial — those born between 1981 and 1996. However, it is his generation that will live with the consequences of America’s rise or fall on the world stage. That is the context of his appreciation of American strength — “more than military power — it’s our power of inspiration.”

With all its other strengths intact, it is failure to inspire that is leaving Trump’s America increasingly powerless.

Rashmee Roshan Lall is a regular columnist for The Arab Weekly. She blogs at www.rashmee.com and is on Twitter @rashmeerl

Copyright ©2019 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 03 July 2019
Word Count: 693
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ISTANBUL — Following a landslide win for the opposition in a mayoral election in the metropolis Istanbul, some Turks wonder whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can recover from the most stinging defeat.

Kadri Gursel, a prominent opposition journalist, called the result of the June 23rd election a “political tectonic shift.” Author Tayfun Atay commented Turkey was “at a point of ‘impending death’ of an exhausted government.” At least one lawmaker from Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) demanded “self-criticism” and called for a return to democratic principles, in reference to Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies.

As the results became clear, parts of Istanbul erupted in celebrations, with people dancing in the streets or honking the horns of their cars.

Opposition politician Ekrem Imamoglu, a 49-year-old former businessman and mayor of the Istanbul district of Beylikduzu, won 54% of the vote in the election on June 23 for mayor of Istanbul, nine percentage points or 800,000 votes ahead of the AKP’s Binali Yildirim, who reached 45%.

Imamoglu’s victory means that Istanbul, a city of 16 million people that is home to a third of Turkey’s economy, will have its first non-Islamist mayor since 1994.

The election was a re-run vote after the electoral commission, under pressure from Erdogan’s government, annulled the regular poll of March 31, which Imamoglu had won with a narrow margin. Critics accused the 65-year-old Erdogan, who started his career in Istanbul when he became mayor 25 years ago, of refusing to give up control of the city, a crucial source of patronage for the AKP.

The decision to repeat the election upset many AKP members as well. Provisional results on June 23 showed that Imamoglu received majorities even in districts of Istanbul known to be AKP strongholds.

Even though Erdogan did not run in the election he was a central figure because he pushed for the annulment decision and took part in the AKP campaign with a last-minute decision to hold rallies in Istanbul when opinion polls started to show Imamoglu’s solid lead in the days before the vote.

The president, who has won almost all elections in Turkey for more than a decade, appeared to be stunned by the result. For the first time since his AKP came to power in 2002, Erdogan did not face the cameras after an election, congratulating Imamoglu via Twitter instead.

Karabekir Akkoyunlu, a Turkish academic, commented on Twitter that Erdogan had suffered a massive setback. “After 31 March, I said Erdogan would either lose Istanbul or legitimacy,” he wrote. “He managed to lose both. Incredible.”

In his first public appearance since the AKP’s defeat, Erdogan vowed on June 25 to listen to the “nation’s lessons” and to find out why the party fared poorly.

A high-ranking opposition lawmaker said that “nothing will be the same” in Turkish politics after the Istanbul election. Speaking on condition of anonymity, the lawmaker said it was hard to understand why Erdogan had insisted on repeating the Istanbul election in the first place.

Deniz Zeyrek, a respected journalist, said in a television interview that former Finance Minister and AKP co-founder Ali Babacan was preparing to set up a new party that could attract AKP lawmakers and voters. Ahmet Davutoglu, a former prime minister, is expected to present his own party before the end of the month, the daily Sozcu reported.

Analysts say the loss could set off a cabinet reshuffle in Ankara and adjustments to foreign policy. It could even trigger a national election earlier than 2023 as scheduled.

Turkey’s economy is now in recession and the United States, its NATO ally, has threatened sanctions if Erdogan goes ahead with plans to install a Russian missile defence system, S-400.

Speaking after meeting his US counterpart Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Japan on June 29, Erdogan said Turkey would stick with the S-400 project. Delivery was expected to start in the first half of July, Erdogan said, adding that Trump had reassured him there would be no US sanctions.

But Trump said after the meeting that US concerns remained. Washington says that if by July 31 Turkey does not give up on the S-400 system, Ankara would be blocked from purchasing F-35 fighter jets and Turkish pilots currently training in the US would be expelled. “It’s a problem, there’s no question about it,” Trump said about Turkey’s plans.

Imamoglu told his supporters that he would work for all people in Istanbul, regardless of their political preferences.

“Today, 16 million Istanbul residents have renewed our faith in democracy and refreshed our trust in justice,” Imamoglu told supporters.

Imamoglu, who waged an inclusive campaign and avoided criticising Erdogan, said he was ready to work with the AKP to tackle Istanbul’s problems, including its transport gridlock and the needs of its more than 500,000 Syrian refugees.

“In this new page in Istanbul, there will from now on be justice, equality, love, tolerance, while misspending (of public funds), pomp, arrogance and the alienation of the other will end,” he said.

Ates Ilyas Bassoy, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) strategist behind the Imamoglu campaign, said in an interview that the party had answered Erdogan’s fierce rhetorical attacks with “smiles.” Bassoy, who calls his concept “Radical Love,” said the CHP won because it took voters’ issues seriously and refrained from aggressive and dividing rhetoric.

The handover of power in the mayor’s office could shed further light on what Imamoglu said was the misspending of billions of lira at the Istanbul municipality, which has a budget of around $4 billion. CHP officials say the AKP’s city administration of Istanbul handed millions of dollars’ worth of subsidies to organisations that are close to Erdogan.

The AKP’s defeat came almost exactly one year after Erdogan and his party scored major victories, winning parliamentary and presidential elections on June 24, 2018. That election ushered in a presidential system that critics say has led to a one-man-rule under Erdogan and could be part of the reason the AKP lost on June 23.

The result could increase tensions within the AKP. Bulent Turan, an AKP lawmaker from Canakkale in western Turkey, said on Twitter those responsible for the defeat should be held to account. Mustafa Yeneroglu, another AKP member of parliament, called for “self-criticism” and a return to policies concentrating on “rationality, the rule of law, the separation of powers and basic rights.”

Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly contributor in Istanbul.

Copyright ©2019 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 July 2019
Word Count: 1,058
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What is the state of Sudan now that activists have called off a general strike and civil disobedience campaign after a 2-month standoff with the military?

It’s not clear if a transition to civilian-led democratic rule has become more likely. There is no certainty the Sudanese military, which removed President Omar al-Bashir from power in April during the popular uprising against his 30-year rule, will be minded to complete the process of wholesale change. All that can be said is that Sudan is in transition. But to what?

Gilbert Achcar, Lebanon-born professor at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, said the best hope is a long-term revolutionary process, albeit with uncertain results. Achcar has written more than a dozen books on the Middle East and North Africa region, focusing particularly on the “Arab spring” and what he calls the “morbid symptoms” of Arab uprisings from 2011.

He said the Sudanese protest is “the most progressive of all the uprisings we’ve seen in the region,” the most advanced in terms of organisation as well as politics. This, because the Sudanese movement includes disparate progressive forces, not least professional and workers associations, leftists, feminists and liberal Muslim groups.

Unlike in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria, Sudan’s Islamic fundamentalists couldn’t hijack the uprising because they had been in collaboration with al-Bashir. The rank and file of the Sudanese Army remains in broad sympathy with the politics of the revolt.

Going by the above, Sudan should technically be a template for the successful exercise of people power in the Arab world but it isn’t, not yet.

Achcar, one of the few scholars to disdain “lazy” evaluations of Arab street protests as a spring analogous to Prague 1968, said the region is “in the midst of a long-term revolutionary process born out of the region’s very deep structural crisis.” This is a “social and economic blockage brought about by the combination of [International Monetary Fund] IMF-sponsored neoliberalism and the rotten authoritarian political systems that impose it throughout the Middle East and North Africa,” he said.

Accordingly, it would be quite wrong to view regional uprisings as a spring, Achcar said, “that would, just like the season, last a few months and end with mere constitutional changes or end in failure.”

By that doleful measure, the region seems doomed to struggle on — quiet if not really peaceful — and with ordinary people occasionally forcing the battle against a uniquely resilient state. Does Sudan 2019 really mean little or nothing, then?

Despite Achcar’s gloomy predictions, three things distinguish Sudan from other regional protests.

First, the protesters’ refusal to empty the public squares after celebrating the ruler’s downfall. Mindful of the lessons from Egypt, the Sudanese have stayed with the script, which seeks the return of political power to civil society through democratic means, including elections. They’re still at it, albeit in a more nuanced way, one that gives the army a chance to collaborate.

Second, the need to maintain the nonviolent character of the movement. In the first wave of protests, starting in 2011, protesters chanted “Silmiyya, silmiyya” (Peaceful, peaceful”) to signify they were peaceful but the Sudanese have been especially careful not to provoke the military powers into justifying a massive crackdown. That it still happened — on June 3 — and the internet was switched off is nothing compared to what might have been.

Third, the Sudanese street is wary of foreign intervention of any kind. This is wise considering the only state to collapse after 2011 was Libya, where foreign intervention by the United States and its allies tried to co-opt the insurgents’ struggle. It led to a many-sided, well-armed conflict that continues, supported at various ends of the spectrum by disparate foreign powers.

That said, it’s not clear how long Sudan will remain a relatively organic struggle, with only the Saudis and Emiratis serving as “foreign” interested parties. On June 12, the US State Department dispatched Tibor Nagy, assistant secretary of state for African affairs to Khartoum. He was accompanied by the newly appointed US special envoy for Sudan, retired veteran diplomat Donald Booth.

American analysts such as Jason Blazakis, former director of the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Designations at the State Department, argue for greater US involvement but the best hope for Sudan and the region is Ethiopian mediation.

Whatever happens, Sudan’s transition will be a lengthy process.

Rashmee Roshan Lall is a regular columnist for The Arab Weekly. She blogs at www.rashmee.com and is on Twitter @rashmeerl

Copyright ©2019 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 17 June 2019
Word Count: 726
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At one stroke Donald Trump’s America has made a Libya out of Venezuela. It is no justification that the South American country was already part of the way to becoming a Caribbean Tripoli. Whatever happens, the United States has introduced a new element of chaos into the tumult that has been the state of Venezuela for several years.

By delegitimising Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and hailing opposition politician Juan Guaido as the rightful leader, Trump plunged the country into deeper crisis. All the signs point to Venezuela becoming the Western Hemisphere’s Libya — a country with more than one government, each supported by armed groups that seek to control the lucrative oil industry.

It did not have to be this way. The United States and Venezuela’s neighbours could have increased pressure on the Maduro government to resign in favour of an internationally approved interim process, backed by the Organisation of American States or the United Nations.

There was never any argument for letting Maduro continue the impoverishment of millions of his people, as well as the autocratic deconstruction of his country’s once-thriving multi-party democracy. On Maduro’s watch, Venezuela has suffered terribly, its once-prosperous economy shot to pieces, its people starving.

Venezuela, which is blessed with the biggest oil reserves of any country on Earth, is reduced to unimaginable inflation rates — 1,300,000% in the 12 months ending November 2018, a study by the opposition-controlled National Assembly stated. In 2017, eight-of-ten Venezuelans surveyed by Encovi, an annual assessment of living standards conducted by Venezuelan universities, said they did not have enough food at home.

It was never in doubt that Venezuela badly needed a fresh start but should Washington decide when and how? More to the point, the lessons of Libya should have been learnt.

In 2011, Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi used disproportionate force to deal with massive public protests and the West’s stated humanitarian concern elicited UN Security Council authorisation for intervention. Russia and China abstained.

The NATO initiative had France and Britain in the lead, participation from Italy, Libya’s former colonial master, and the United States “leading from behind.” Within 3 weeks, the mission went from ostentatious concern for the Libyan people to regime change.

By March 2011, France did for Libya’s flawed government what Trump’s America has done for Venezuela’s in 2019. France cut out the Qaddafi regime and recognised as Libya’s legitimate government the National Transitional Council, a discordant group that agreed only on the need for a post-Qaddafi era. The United States followed suit within a few months.

In October 2011, Qaddafi was captured and killed in a celebration of savagery that appeared to show Libyans to the world as bloodthirsty and lawless.

Subsequently, Libya’s transitional government failed to govern. It handed power in August 2012 to a General National Congress, which pursued Qaddafi’s supporters and refused to call the promised elections.

After polls did take place in June 2014, power was vested in the internationally backed House of Representatives but anti-Qaddafi militias refused to disarm and a new General National Congress appointed itself the legitimate government. From early 2016, there has been a third Libyan administration — the UN-backed Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj.

Despite the proliferation of governments, Libya remains a largely ungoverned space, one ruled by militias.

The similarities between Venezuela tomorrow and Libya past and present go further than the gaggle of leaders. Their oil sectors may soon start to resemble each other.

Eight years after the toppling of Qaddafi’s regime, Libya’s oil output has not fully recovered because of competing militias and administrative breakdown in much of the country. Though it has the world’s ninth-largest oil reserves, Libya is unable to capitalise on its natural wealth. A case in point is Sharara, its largest oil field, which has been occupied by an armed group and has been closed for two months.

In the context of the continuing chaos, the plea of Mustafa Sanalla, head of Libya’s national oil company, is worth noting. On January 29, he said foreign powers should abandon “rushed unsustainable” solutions for his country.

Much the same might be said by Venezuelans for their country. No one, certainly not the people, is likely to win a Libya-style tussle between competing governments.

Rashmee Roshan Lall is a regular columnist for The Arab Weekly. She blogs at www.rashmee.com and is on Twitter @rashmeerl

Copyright ©2019 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 04 February 2019
Word Count: 703
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WASHINGTON – The government of US President Donald Trump fell into chaos as another top administration official resigned over Syria, large parts of the federal government closed and the US stock market suffered its worst weekly losses in a decade.

The cascade of shocking events put Trump further on the defensive over his controversial policies and exasperated his own allies in the Republican Party. Financial experts warned that the US economy might fall into a recession for the first time in 10 years, and diplomats feared that the US was alienating allies throughout the Middle East including its closest ally, Israel.

“We’re pretty much flying here without an instruction book,” Senator Roy Blunt, a Republican from Missouri, told CNN.

The latest fallout from Trump’s surprise decision to withdraw US troops from Syria came on December 22 with the resignation of Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. McGurk held a key role in the US State Department as leader of the coalition of 79 nations that the US brought together in 2014 to defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

McGurk did not announce or comment on his resignation, unlike Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who released a scathing eight-paragraph letter denouncing Trump’s decision in Syria when he announced his resignation December 20. But the New York Times published an email that McGurk sent to his colleagues explaining that he was quitting because of Trump’s latest move in Syria.

“The recent decision by the president came as a shock and was a complete reversal of policy that was articulated to us,” McGurk wrote. “It left our coalition partners confused and our fighting partners bewildered. I worked this week to help manage some of the fallout but — as many of you heard in my meetings and phone calls — I ultimately concluded that I could not carry out these new instructions and maintain my integrity.”

McGurk had been scheduled to leave his position in mid-February to take a job at Stanford University in California. But by deciding to leave early – his resignation is effective December 31 – McGurk brought another round of warnings from Washington diplomats.

“His departure further eliminates experience, judgment & great knowledge from USG [the US government],” Jonathan Weiner, former US special envoy for Libya and current scholar at the Middle East Institute, wrote on Twitter.

Trump tried to downplay McGurk’s resignation, writing on Twitter hours after the news broke:

“Brett McGurk, who I do not know, was appointed by President [Barack] Obama in 2015. Was supposed to leave in February but he just resigned prior to leaving. Grandstander? The Fake News is making such a big deal about this nothing event!”

Several former top US officials blasted Trump for asserting that he doesn’t know McGurk while also pointing out that he worked for President George W. Bush, a Republican.

“The fact that you say you don’t know Brett McGurk speaks volumes about your commitment to fighting ISIS,” Susan Rice, the White House national-security adviser under Obama, wrote on Twitter. “Why don’t you know the man who has done more than any civilian to degrade ISIS? I can assure you Barack Obama knows him well.”

Ben Rhodes, who was Obama’s deputy national-security adviser, wrote on Twitter: “In addition to the fact that Brett McGurk did more than any person to build the coalition that fought ISIS, the fact that you [Trump] don’t even know who your counter ISIS coordinator is proves you are an incompetent, dangerous and narcissistic fraud.”

As much of the United States began vacations in anticipation of Christmas Day on December 25, the US Congress and Trump remained deadlocked over a federal budget for 2019. When the two sides failed to reach an agreement by the end of the day on December 21, the federal government ran out of money, forcing the closure of several major departments including the Department of Homeland Security. Essential employees such as border agents will continue working.

Trump is demanding $5 billion to build a wall along the 2,000-mile border between the US and Mexico, but Democrats in Congress are offering much less money – roughly $1.5 billion. The amount of money in dispute is trivial in the context of a $4 trillion federal budget. But it has become a politically symbolic fight over Trump’s effort to crack down on illegal immigration and Democratic efforts to promote a more tolerant policy

But the partial government closure symbolized the dysfunction in Washington. “The shutdown is a symptom of the fact that our government is simply not functioning to make policy in an orderly, sensible way,” Alice Rivlin, a former White House budget director, told the Washington Post.

Thomas Frank is a correspondent in Washington.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 24 December 2018
Word Count: 776
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The sacking of a German domestic intelligence chief over his public comments on far-right unrest underlines the extent to which the migration debate is roiling Europe. It is turning governments, state agencies, cities, communities and family units into camps — Us versus Them, anti-migrant versus pro-migrant.

The rivalry is over the merits of non-white, non-Christian migration to Europe and the morality of white ethno-nationalism.

In the Us or anti-migrant camp should probably be counted Hans-Georg Maassen, who, until September 18, led Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. It was founded after the second world war to prevent the rise anew of ideologically racist political forces such as the Nazis.

Though Maassen’s job was to surveil the far-right, he seems to have been surprisingly well-loved by them. Alexander Gauland, co-leader of the anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, described Maassen “as a very good top official” and praised him for having the “courage” to criticise German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “misdirected asylum policy.”

The reference was to Maassen’s public contradiction of Merkel, who condemned far-right harassment of dark-skinned people in Chemnitz in eastern Germany. Chemnitz, where the Nazi concentration camp of Flossenburg was located, has been in a ferment since August 26. After a German man was stabbed to death allegedly by an Iraqi and a Syrian, the far-right began protesting, in ever more baleful ways. There have been numerous accounts from Middle Easterners in Chemnitz of vigilantes throwing bottles, firecrackers and insults at them.

The targeting of dark-skinned people in Chemnitz is similar to the rash of attacks on Moroccans, Senegalese and other immigrants in Italy after the far-right League party entered the government. Anti-racism groups in Italy say there were 12 shootings, two killings and 33 physical assaults from June 1-August 1 compared to nine attacks but no shootings or deaths for the same period in 2017.

In Germany, Merkel has been trying to prevent such behaviour from becoming normalised. She criticised the “hounding” of migrants in Chemnitz, only to be contradicted by Maassen, who said such videos were “targeted misinformation.” Maassen earned fulsome praise from the far-right as a “rare, responsible” voice of “truth” while moderate German politicians questioned his neutrality.

Also in the anti-migrant Us camp, for reasons that have everything to do with base electoral politics, is German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer. He has supported Maassen in the public spat with Merkel by finding him a plum new job as his deputy.

Seehofer’s motives are obvious. Migration is a hot-button issue on his Christian Social Union party’s home turf, Bavaria, which goes to the polls October 14. Bavaria was one of the main entry routes to Germany for Syrian refugees in 2015 and 2016 and the AfD is constantly reminding Bavarians of that.

Polls suggest the AfD will do well enough to enter the Bavarian parliament and that Seehofer’s party will lose its legislative majority. This is why Seehofer is determined to talk and act tough on migration, leaning as far to the right as he dares without fusing with the AfD.

It is not just electoral politics that is fundamentally altered — even disfigured — by tensions over migration at every level of society and government.

The raging culture wars in Germany, which have drawn in everyone from the chancellor downward, have dangerous implications. The use of “fake news” as a label to dismiss evidence of far-right criminality erodes citizens’ trust in their government and security services. Merkel’s tenuous coalition gets steadily weaker. The proclivities of senior ministers and intelligence officials in Europe’s biggest economy start to seem suspect. So, too, the sympathies of a key domestic agency meant to prevent the shame and horror of a second Holocaust, this time, say with dark-skinned migrants and Muslims.

In Italy, Carla Nespolo, president of an anti-fascist group, has said it straight off: “Migrants in Italy have taken the place of Jews during fascism. This is one of the most far-right governments since the end of fascism.” As for Germany, Maassen’s AfD admirer, Gauland, has already referred to Nazi rule as a mere “bird poop” in history, an irrelevance.

Germany’s problems, just like those of Italy, cannot be seen in isolation and their response can no longer be dismissed as a temporary slide. Dark-skinned foreigners, whether seeking jobs or asylum, will continue to make for Europe. As a report from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation noted, by 2050, deprivation, violence and insecurity will have become worse in parts of Africa. This inevitably means a continuing, if not greater flow to Europe.

What happens then? Pitched battles in the streets? Concentration camps?

Rashmee Roshan Lall is a regular columnist for The Arab Weekly. She blogs at www.rashmee.com and is on Twitter @rashmeerl

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 24 September 2018

Word Count: 764

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LONDON — The results of the Swedish elections confirm that far-right, anti-migrant sentiment remains a force in Europe. With several important European elections, including in Belgium, Denmark and Finland, as well as European Parliament elections, scheduled for next year, the far-right anti-migrant populist wave has yet to break.

Preliminary results, which were being contested and recounted days after the September 9 election, the far-right Sweden Democrats won more than 17% of the vote, picking up 63 seats in the 349-seat Swedish parliament, the Riksdag.

This means the Sweden Democrats, a party that has roots in fascism and white nationalism and that campaigned on a strong anti-migrant and particularly anti-Muslim platform, is the third-largest party in the country.

The ruling centre-left coalition of the Social Democrats, Greens and Left Party won 40.6% of the vote. The opposition centre-right coalition, including the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party and the Liberals, claimed 40.3% of the vote. The split guarantees the Sweden Democrats a strong role in the negotiations over forming a new government in Sweden.

Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven, leader of the Social Democrats, said he intended to remain prime minister. He called on other “responsible” parties not to engage with the Sweden Democrats, dubbing it “a party with roots in Nazism” that would “never offer anything but hatred.”

The Sweden Democrats’ policies focus on migration and the party campaigned for an overhaul of the immigration system, greatly reducing the number of immigrants entering the country and imposing a strict integration process on those who do. The party has also been outspoken regarding Islam, alarming Sweden’s Muslim community, which makes up an estimated 8% of the country’s 10 million population.

Sweden Democrats Chairman Jimmie Akesson, 39, previously described Muslims as the “greatest foreign threat” Sweden has faced since the second world war.

In recent years, Akesson has sought to clean up the image of the party, expelling members who openly espoused neo-Nazi views and changing the party’s logo from a flaming torch to a friendly blue and yellow flower. While this has paid dividends at the ballot box, Sweden’s mainstream political parties are loth to deal with the Sweden Democrats.

“We have a moral responsibility [not to ally with the Sweden Democrats],” Lofven said after the elections. “We must gather all good forces. We won’t mourn. We will organise ourselves.”

Both the centre-left and centre-right blocs confirmed they would refuse to consider the Sweden Democrats as a coalition partner. However, even if as seems likely the Sweden Democrats remain on the outside of government, the policies the party advocates, particularly regarding migration, have entered the mainstream.

Popular sentiment towards migration has shifted radically in Sweden over the last few years, particularly post-2015 when Sweden took in proportionally more refugees than Germany.

In November 2015, Lofven’s centre-left government-initiated curbs on refugee immigration, citing the unprecedented number of asylum applications it had received and the huge pressures Sweden’s social services were facing.

Prior to the 2014 influx, the party had advocated open borders. During the latest election campaign, the Social Democrats stumbled to articulate a clear message on migration, leaving the door open for the Sweden Democrats to monopolise the issue.

The centre-right opposition has also adopted an increasingly hard-line position on migration since 2015. In late 2014, Moderate Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt called on the Swedish people to “open their hearts” to large-scale immigration. One year later, the party, the largest of the four parties in the centre-right bloc, completely shifted its position, advocating for tough new rules for immigrants, including stricter requirements for family reunification and cuts in welfare benefits.

Whether the far-right Sweden Democrats have become part of the mainstream or not is immaterial, anti-migrant sentiment is becoming increasingly normalised, across Europe.

Mahmud el-Shafey is an Arab Weekly correspondent in London. You can follow him on twitter @mahmudelshafey

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 18 September 2018

Word Count: 622

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LONDON — With reports of a radical neo-Nazi group gaining strength in Nordic countries and recent far-right, anti-migrant protesters in Germany performing a Nazi salute, many expressed fears that neo-Nazism could be on the rise in Europe.

The neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) has seen its profile raised after its protests and marches. The group, founded in Sweden 21 years ago, has chapters in Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark.

Increased scrutiny of NRM comes not just following reports of its members confronting — sometimes violently — migrants and refugees but because the group is to compete in its first elections in Sweden.

The group is open about its admiration for Nazism. NRM Swedish leader Simon Lindberg, in an interview with Russia Today, described Adolf Hitler as a “very, very good person for the German people.”

“He did what was necessary to secure his people’s freedom,” Lindberg said. “We’re National Socialists, as Hitler was, and we do whatever it takes to take our nation back.”

Researchers at the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo said NMR membership was relatively low but has been growing in recent years, possibly because of rising anti-migrant sentiment.

“The NRM has been growing slowly but surely since the group was established in the late 1990s. Until now, the group has not had any ambitions about growing fast. They have been more concerned with recruiting capable and dedicated members,” said Jacob Aasland Ravndal, a postdoctoral fellow at C-REX.

The NRM is to participate in Swedish elections on September 9. Although the party is not expected to pass the 4% threshold to enter parliament, many expressed dismay that a party that openly espouses neo-Nazi views is participating in elections.

“Whether this [recruitment] might change with [its] parliamentary debut is too early to conclude. My prediction would be that [NRM] might still grow a little but that [its] extreme, fundamentalist and highly conspiratorial worldview has limited appeal to a relatively well-educated and rather liberal and modern people,” Ravndal said.

He acknowledged that Swedish authorities faced a dilemma in how to handle NRM because banning the group would drive its members underground, giving them more legitimacy among supporters.

He said Swedish authorities should treat NRM as they would any other political group, as long as it acts within the law. “However, once it moves beyond that, which [the group does] frequently, swift reactions with clear consequences are needed,” Ravndal said.

Germany is on the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of dealing with neo-Nazi groups. Despite that, far-right, anti-migrant protests in Germany have been much larger than similar events in Scandinavia, drawing thousands of supporters, including many who flashed illegal Nazi-era salutes.

Protests in Chemnitz in eastern Germany involved 6,000 people protesting the death of a German national in a fight involving foreign nationals. Two men — a Syrian and Iraqi — are in custody suspected of stabbing and killing a 35-year-old man.

Chemnitz has a strong presence of far-right anti-immigration parties and groups, including the Alternative for Germany party and the Pegida movement, supporters of whom flocked to rallies in the city.

The situation in Germany is far from clear-cut, with much being made about the fact that the victim of the stabbing was a second-generation immigrant of mixed German and Cuban parentage.

A half-Cuban woman who grew up with the victim, Nancy Larssen, complained that many in the media were misrepresenting the crime, fuelling the anti-migrant far-right protest.

“It’s sad that, in the media, they’re just saying that a German has died and that’s why all the neo-Nazis and hooligans are out but the media should describe who died and what skin colour he had because I don’t think they’d be doing all this if they knew,” she told Deutsche Welle.

Germany authorities sought to calm the furore in Chemnitz, including investigating protesters performing the Nazi salute and checking how arrest warrants in the stabbing case were leaked to the media.

A statement August 28 from the office of German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for calm.

“We don’t tolerate such unlawful assemblies and the hounding of people who look different or have different origins and attempts to spread hatred on the streets,” the statement said.

“That has no place in our cities and we, as the German government, condemn it in the strongest terms. Our basic message for Chemnitz and beyond is that there is no place in Germany for vigilante justice, for groups that want to spread hatred on the streets, for intolerance and for extremism.”

However, protests were still raging days later with demonstrators giving the Nazi salute and chanting “Germany for the Germans. Foreigners out.”

Mahmud el-Shafey is an Arab Weekly correspondent in London. You can follow him on twitter @mahmudelshafey

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 03 September 2018

Word Count: 771

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BEIRUT — In Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley, fields of lush green spiky-leaved cannabis plants have reached chest height ahead of harvest in September, which will bring in much-needed cash to farmers in the impoverished region who have grown the illegal crop for decades.

Attempts by the Lebanese government to destroy the crops were met with fierce resistance from farmers who show little compunction in taking to arms to protect their livelihoods.

However, Lebanon is mulling the prospect of legalising cannabis cultivation for medicinal purposes, a step that could bring money to the northern Bekaa Valley and reduce lawlessness in the area. It could also deter young Shia men from the Bekaa Valley from joining the Iran-backed Hezbollah if they have an alternative means of earning an income.

While some farmers are optimistic that legalising cannabis would bring much-needed money to the Bekaa, many express cynicism that it will be locals who benefit.

“The politicians will keep the money and we will have nothing. It has always been this way and legalising hashish will not change anything,” said a member of the powerful Jaafar clan and a major hashish farmer from the northern Bekaa.

Lebanon has toyed with the idea of legalising cannabis cultivation for years but it gained traction recently when McKinsey & Company, the global consultancy firm, recommended it as one way of beefing up Lebanon’s cash-strapped economy.

During Lebanon’s civil war years, the plain of the northern Bekaa was awash with cannabis and opium poppies, generating some $500 million a year. After the war ended, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) began an initiative to eradicate drug crops for alternative legal agriculture.

Within a few years, the Bekaa was deemed drug free but pledged funding for the UNDP effort did not materialise in its entirety and the programme fizzled out by 2002.

Lebanon has been beset the multiple political crises and conflicts since 2005 that allowed farmers to return to cannabis cultivation as security forces often had more pressing demands. The northern Bekaa has a strong tribal society in which loyalty to the clan trumps allegiance to the state and farmers do not hesitate to use weapons against the Lebanese authorities.

It is too early to say how the Lebanese government will organise legal cannabis cultivation but it will likely run along similar lines to tobacco in which a farmer is given a licence to grow a certain quantity that will then be purchased by the state at an agreed price.

Much will depend on how the process is governed and policed. The legalisation of cannabis cultivation will likely send black-market prices soaring as the crop is sold to the state at a fixed rate rather than to drug dealers as in the past. While some cannabis is sold domestically, most of it is exported to Europe and the Gulf countries, generating huge profits for the dealers, if not the farmers.

If the price of black-market cannabis escalates significantly due to the reduction of available quantities, it could encourage farmers to grow an additional field of cannabis out of sight to sell to dealers while the authorised crop is sold to the state at a lower rate. It is unclear in a country where corruption is rife whether authorities have the means and will to ensure only licensed crops are grown.

“This is Lebanon. They [the farmers] will find a way to beat the system. A farmer could grow 3 dunams of hashish for the government and around the corner, hidden away, another dunam for himself,” said Abbas, a long-standing cannabis farmer from a village near Baalbek. A dunam is approximately equivalent to 900 square metres.

One party that has yet to publicly comment on the proposal to legalise cannabis is Hezbollah.

The Bekaa Valley is known as the “barracks of Hezbollah” and has been its main recruiting pool since the organisation crystallised in the early 1980s. In recent years, the scale of recruitment has soared as Hezbollah urgently needed combatants to fight in Syria on behalf of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

The traditionally rigorous nature of the recruitment process in which a candidate undergoes an extensive vetting process, intensive religious and ideological studies and thorough military training all lasting more than a year was replaced in some cases with a mere month-long training course at camps in the Bekaa before being dispatched to Syria’s battlefields.

Residents of the Bekaa Valley have long grumbled that Hezbollah uses its political clout to keep the area impoverished so people are dependent on the organisation. A recruit can earn $600 a month and have access to Hezbollah’s extensive social welfare system of schools, hospitals and clinics. That can be a powerful incentive for joining when there is a dearth of other income opportunities.

Hezbollah, however, is beginning to feel a backlash from some quarters of the Bekaa Valley. Although Hezbollah fared well in the elections in May, many Shia residents of the Bekaa refused to vote or chose anti-Hezbollah candidates in a sign of dissatisfaction with the party.

Hezbollah will have to work hard to shore up its support base in the Bekaa, especially with the civil war in Syria beginning to ease and thousands of fighters expected to return to Lebanon.

If — and it remains a big if — cannabis is legalised and a system is introduced that provides comfortable earnings for farmers, it could threaten to chip away at Hezbollah’s recruitment pool and even encourage recently joined fighters to quit the organisation.

Nicholas Blanford is the author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (Random House 2011). He lives in Beirut.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2018
Word Count: 913
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Has Ankara reached an impasse regarding its foreign policy? Once, it had a ‘zero-problems-with-the-neighbours’ policy. That has all but collapsed, leaving Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government with zero options. The overall picture is of a regional power that’s being squeezed by the United States, its NATO ally, and Russia.

The rift in US-Turkish relations over the American Evangelist pastor Andrew Brunson triggered a financial crisis. Now, another crisis looms and this time it involves Russia regarding the Syrian enclave of Idlib. The city, close to the Turkish border, is held by jihadist groups and is targeted by Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime and Russia.

It was only a matter of time for Idlib to be on Moscow’s radar and that of its de facto protectorate, Syria. The Islamic State (ISIS) has been defeated; there have been decisive Syrian advances in Daraa and Eastern Ghouta and a rapprochement is under way between Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime. Assad declared in July that the takeover of Idlib was his next objective.

Idlib, with a population of 2.5 million, has become an urgent issue due to two developments. It is the last bastion of armed jihadist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Jabhat al-Nusra. Many jihadists and their families are in Idlib and some of the foreign jihadists are from Russia. This makes Idlib a priority for Moscow as what it sees as the restoration of Syria speeds up. A joint offensive is likely to be under way before winter.

Idlib is important because any operation there is likely to trigger a massive refugee exodus. Both Russia and Syria — and Iran and the United States, too — see Turkey as the refugees’ inevitable destination. All of them seem to agree that this is largely the result of the Erdogan government’s erratic policies, which paved the way for a jihadist presence in Syria in the first place. If the refugees start to stream out of Idlib, they will add to the nearly 3.5 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey.

Therefore, the Syrian refugee issue is back on the international agenda. Jan Egeland, adviser to the United Nations’ special envoy for Syria, warned Turkey to keep its borders open in the event of another humanitarian crisis. He expressed the hope that Russia, Iran and Turkey would do “their utmost” to avoid a battle in Idlib. So far, no clear signals from Ankara confirm Egeland’s statement.

Moscow is keen on upping the ante against Erdogan. When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visits Ankara on August 13-14, he may remind his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, of the need for Turkey to be part of the Idlib offensive. Indeed, some Arab sources say that Russia has given Turkey a deadline — September — for the disarmament and surrender of HTS in Idlib.

Damascus, on the other hand, is reported to have made clear that it will ask the People’s Protection Units Kurdish militia to help if Ankara doesn’t cooperate militarily on Idlib. This is a cunning diplomatic move.

How will Ankara respond to the pressures from Russia and Syria as the clock ticks down to a denouement? Cavusoglu may try to gain time. He could tell Lavrov that HTS is ripe to be transformed into a more moderate force. There are plans to rebrand the group as the National Liberation Front, to be used in fights against ISIS.

However, the suggestion may not be very convincing and the most that Turkey can expect is to keep its 12 observation posts in Idlib.

Ankara is in a diplomatic cul-de-sac. It is at odds with the United States in the region and now faces a moment of reckoning vis-a-vis Russia. Meanwhile, the Kurds remain a reality near and within Turkey’s borders; a deepening economic crisis makes it increasingly vulnerable and its erratic regional policy makes it difficult to pursue any dialogue that requires trust and steadfastness.

Yavuz Baydar is a senior Turkish columnist, and news analyst. A founding member of the Platform for Independent Journalism (P24) in Istanbul, he has been reporting on Turkey and monitoring media issues since 1980. A European Press Prize Laureate in 2014, he is also the winner of Germany’s ‘Journalistenpreis’ in 2018.

Copyright ©2018 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 16 August 2018
Word Count: 647
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