ISTANBUL — Turkey’s tempestuous current events are historic in their implications for this country and the entire Middle East, but they are about much more than a tug-of-war between Islamism and secularism. The constitutional stand-off concerning the election of the next president — pitting the ruling, mild Islamist, Justice and Development Party (AKP) against the largely secular opposition backed by the armed forces — is just the pivot of a historic, ongoing Turkish attempt to balance seven different phenomena that have never been fully synthesized into a single state identity. These are: the Islamic religion, Turkish nationalism, political secularism, democratic governance, citizenship rights, pluralism in a multi-ethnic society, and the role of the military vis-à-vis the previous six items in this list.

Turkey is the only country in the predominantly Islamic Middle East where citizens have the opportunity to define their own national values, ideology, governance system and political alliances. This is not new. Turkey is chronically historic because it has been addressing such issues since the reform-minded Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) initiated significant reforms 200 years ago that continue to play out today. This legacy has included moves towards secularization, citizen equality, rule of law affirmation, democratization, political pluralism, economic liberalization and globalization, human rights guarantees, minority cultural and ethnic rights, and periodic interference by the military to stabilize or suspend this process of national and political evolution. Other Middle Eastern and Islamic societies that similarly embarked on such reforms a century or more ago — Egypt, Iran, Syria – have faltered, and succumbed, for now, to the rule of strongmen and security agencies.

But Turkey persists. It stubbornly embraces modernity while trying to define it for itself and perhaps other Islamic lands. Since the AKP took power in 2002, when it won two-thirds of parliamentary seats, many Turks have democratically and proudly manifested their Islamic identity and values. Yet the AKP won just one-third of the popular vote. So, its explicit Islamist principles do not reflect the views of most citizens. Its economic, social, and foreign policies, however, do enjoy majority support, given its commitment to continued economic liberalization and steady growth, negotiations to join the European Union, and a selectively judicious distancing from American policy in the region. Many voters who had supported secular parties voted for AKP in 2002 for its political-economic program, rather than its Islamism.

Cultural Islamism combined with a newly assertive middle class of business entrepreneurs is challenging the traditional secular establishment from two directions at once, and the establishment, naturally, is fighting back. As the Turkish political scientist and columnist Soli Ozel explained to me here in Istanbul amidst the dizzying pace of political developments: “The AKP government represents two important constituencies in this country. They defend the interests of a rising provincial entrepreneurial class, fully integrated into the world economy that is culturally and socially more conservative than the established republican entrepreneurial class. They also serve the interests of the losers of globalization, by catering to their needs, giving them hope of class mobility, and providing basic services. As such they integrate the excluded into the social and political system of the country. In the process inevitably they displace the establishment.”

AKP affirms that the distinction between Islamism, secularism, democracy and liberal economic expansion is not always clear-cut. This is why the Islamic-secular dichotomy is too simplistic and narrow to explain events in Turkey today. The process is also as impressive as the basic issues in dispute. This indubitably Islamic society is waging an agenda-setting national political contest peacefully and democratically, in multiple arenas, including street demonstrations, parliamentary and presidential elections, constitutional court rulings, and media exchanges.

The role of the military hovers over this process like the hundreds of mosque minarets that dominate the skyline of Istanbul — vigilant, indigenous, dominant at times, but ultimately just one element in a rich and varied landscape of power centers and identities. The Turkish citizenry and political system reacted remarkably calmly, even matter-of-factly, ten days ago when the chief-of-staff of the army posted on its website a clear warning that it would step in to preserve the “fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism,” and that, as the “definite defender of secularism,” it would “show its stance clearly when needed.”

The AKP government, equally web-savvy and fortified by its popular mandate, retorted by reminding the army generals that they are government employees who are under civilian control and do not play a role in democratic politics. Dueling emails, rather than palace coups, are Turkey’s latest contribution to the business of how political power is exercised and how national identity is defined in the modern Middle East.

The current contest in Turkey will generate in due course a historic and legitimate new balance among the forces of religion, secularism, nationalism, democracy, citizenship rights, ethnic pluralism, and the role of the military, with important lessons for both Europe and the Middle East.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 08 May 2007
Word Count: 815
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BEIRUT — US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “hello” to the Iranian foreign minister and her brief “businesslike” meeting with the Syrian foreign minister at the international conference on Iraq in Egypt have generated considerable international attention. I join those who see these two gestures as small but significant steps towards a more rational American foreign policy in the Middle East.

It is important to acknowledge when the United States does something sensible in the world, because this happens relatively rarely in the Middle East. In this case, Washington is showing important new strains of maturity, realism and composure that have long been absent from its arsenal. Whatever the reason for the slow revisions in American policy, the change is to be welcomed. Those to whom the United States says hello should respond with a gracious “and hello to you too, Ma’am,” so that simple courtesies can quickly move towards serious dialogue that leads to meaningful diplomatic negotiations for mutually satisfying policy changes on all sides.

The real significance of Rice and her staff’s assorted interactions with the Syrians and Iranians is not mainly about the impact on Iraq, but rather in affirming — in this case, at least — the ineffectiveness and futility of boycotts and sanctions as serious foreign policy tools. The change of policy towards Syria and Iran only highlights the continued nonsensical American-Israeli-European policy towards the elected government in Palestine, which has evolved into a national unity government comprising Fateh, Hamas and some key independents.

Rice met with the Palestinian finance minister in Washington a few weeks ago, but that was not a real change of policy; it was merely a slight of hand magician’s trick that did not change reality, but only fostered an optical illusion. The continued boycott of that part of the elected Palestinian government led by Hamas is not achieving anything useful, and is only making things worse for all, as pressures and resentments build up in Palestine and the tenuous cease-fire with Israel slowly collapses.

One country that has gone against the prevalent Israeli-American-European trend of boycotting the elected Palestinian government is Norway, which has maintained contacts with Hamas and the entire government for years. Norway is a very sensible place, run by thoughtful, reasonable people who are not prone to extremes in any direction. So I thought it was worthwhile finding out more from knowledgeable Norwegians, in and out of government, about their experience with the Palestinians and Hamas, and why they have remained in touch with Hamas and the elected government.

Several relevant points emerge from the Norwegian experience and perspective. In principle, the Oslo mindset says, contacts should be maintained with all relevant parties in a dispute, other than out and out criminals such as Al-Qaeda. Political groups who use violence but also represent real political constituencies should be engaged with a view to changing their policies ultimately, as Norway has done, for example, in mediating between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lanka government. Boycotting eliminates the possibility of prodding militant groups to evolve politically, and thus is not useful in principle.

In the case of Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is also the issue of balance in the demands of both sides. It is reasonable to ask the Palestinians to end the use of armed resistance, political violence and terror against civilians, but such an approach is not very credible or effective if it only punishes the political violence of one side.

In practical terms, the boycott of Hamas and the Hamas-led coalition government has failed, the thinking goes among Norwegians who follow this closely and know both sides intimately. The boycott has destroyed Palestinian institutions, increase poverty and hopelessness, radicalized elements of the population, badly damaged the internal Palestinian security situation, and made the ceasefire with Israel more vulnerable to breach and collapse. The boycott has steadily undercut Palestinian moderates, and is likely to fuel further extremism.

The integrity and credibility of the Palestinian government as a whole has declined, but Hamas as an organization remains strong, and may have become stronger in the past year, especially since forming the unity government that it had called for immediately after winning the elections in early 2006. Those in Norway who support the policy of engaging the Hamas-led government also sense that Hamas officials have moved forward in the past two years, towards an ultimate possible recognition of Israel, but this tentative trajectory would not continue if Hamas were boycotted totally. It would also move more quickly if Israel made reciprocal moves towards recognizing a viable Palestinian state, rather than only recognizing the PLO.

Finally, some Norwegians question the appropriateness of the United Nations’ slightly contradictory position towards the Hamas-led government — adhering to the boycott of Hamas by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and UN) until the Palestinian government accepts the three principles laid down by the Quartet, while also meeting with some Hamas government officials. One problem with the UN adhering to the Quartet position is the fact that the UN Security Council did not take up this issue, nor did the UN make relevant demands of Israel to balance the Quartet demands of the Palestinians.

The Norwegian position is all the more useful to learn from in view of the apparent slow shift in American policy towards speaking with Syria and Iran.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 05 May 2007
Word Count: 885
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BEIRUT — A combination of vindication, disdain, and renewed concerns about Israeli militarism are the dominant reactions in the Arab world to the preliminary report of the Winograd Commission released on 30 April in Israel. The commission harshly rebuked three senior Israeli political and military leaders for their conduct during last summer’s 34-day war with Lebanon’s Hizbullah Party, leaving Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister and Labor Party leader Amir Peretz in dismal shape before Israeli public opinion. The former Army chief of staff, Dan Halutz, had already resigned in disgrace after the war.

The Arab sense of vindication stems from the feeling that Israel had performed poorly in the war, and had not achieved its primary strategic objectives: smashing Hizbullah, removing the armed Lebanese resistance movement from the south of Lebanon, returning the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers in Hizbullah’s hands, reaffirming Israel’s deterrence posture with the entire Arab world and Iran, and ensuring that all wars with the Arabs are fought in Arab lands, not in Israel. Arab analysts were quick to recall Monday that Israel had also been forced to accept a UN-mandated cease-fire in August, after failing to win on the battlefield.

Disdain permeates many Arab reactions to the Winograd report, for two reasons. The first is the long history of such internal Israeli commissions of enquiry that create much political noise and dust, and censure top officials, but without altering Israel’s consistent strategy of militarization and colonization in dealing with Arabs.

Most galling for Arabs are the bitter memories of deeply flawed and inconsequential enquiry commissions that examined Israeli army and policy behavior against Palestinian citizens of Israel within the state’s 1967 borders. The latest followed demonstrations inside Israel in 2000, where Israeli police killed and wounded dozens of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The message of such enquiries — into Israel’s use of arms in Lebanon, the occupied West Bank and Gaza, or in majority Palestinian areas inside Israel itself — seems to be that rule of law punctilio for Israelis will be observed, but Arabs can only expect to remain at the receiving end of the combined Israeli military machine and legacy of political discrimination.

The second reason for widespread Arab disdain is that the prospect of the Winograd Report bringing down the Israeli government and leading to a change in leadership holds out no particular promise of anything positive. While Israelis get themselves deeply entangled in the minutia of Israeli party politics and the entertaining personalities of their leaders, Arabs at the receiving end of Israeli foreign policy tend to see little or no significant difference between the Labor and Likud parties that have dominated Israeli life since the 1960s. The hybrid Kadima Party that Ariel Sharon formed in 2005 to claim a new “center” of Israeli politics is about to disintegrate. Removing Olmert and replacing him with Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, former Labor leader and Prime Minister Ehud Barak or Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni may spur a satisfying sense of cleansing and renewal in Israeli politics, but would be seen as only another massive show of smoke and mirrors in the Arab world.

Arabs see Kadima as an apt symbol of the combined approaches of Labor and Likud, both of which have pursued virtually identical policies towards the Arabs: colonizing and expropriating Arab lands, using massive military overkill in a failed attempt to resolve the political differences with the Palestinians, jailing or killing thousands of Palestinians, injuring tens of thousands of others, institutionalizing Apartheid-like segregation between Jewish Israeli occupiers and native Palestinian Arabs, strengthening the movement to Judaize Jerusalem and diminish its Christian and Moslem character, and refusing to seriously consider any negotiated compromise on the core Palestinian refugee issue which forms the heart of the conflict in Arab eyes.

After 60 years of hard experience with the Jewish state, most Arabs conclude that Israeli national policy is defined by a combination of Zionist ideological zealotry and state military overkill vis-à-vis Palestinians and other Arabs. Political leaders who come and go — Olmert, Barak, Rabin, Begin, Sharon and others — tend to be technical managers of a core, consistent policy, rather than strategic managers who can truly change policy for the same of the well-being of Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Another prevalent Arab attitude to the Winograd Report is renewed concern that an admonished Israeli military and political elite will resort to military adventurism or other extremist moves to reassert its deterrent capability in Arab eyes. The bedrock of Israel’s national strategic policy has always been a fearsome military that can quickly defeat, and therefore preemptively deter, any combination of hostile neighbors — Arab or Iranian. Restoring that shattered image of invincibility is likely to be seen as a priority by any Israeli political and military leadership that takes over from Olmert’s discredited and crippled coalition.

Winograd may make Israelis feel good, but in Arab eyes it portends only more of the same Israeli military overkill policies, or even worse, in the months and years ahead.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 02 May 2007
Word Count: 829
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BEIRUT — We are often so obsessed with the problems and conflicts that define the Middle East-West relationship today that we tend to lose sight of the constructive currents that flow beneath the surface. An unusual week of consecutive conferences and seminars in Amman and Beirut brought that point home to me last week. Honest exchanges with scholars, officials and activists of integrity and insight — especially ones we disagree with — enrich our understanding of this region, its ties to the world, and the core issues that plague and challenge us.

In my rich week of exchanges with colleagues from throughout the Middle East, Europe and North America, we discussed many timely issues: Iraq and its consequences, Arab political reform prospects, the weaknesses and potential of Arab secular political parties, and indigenous agents of change and innovation within the Arab world (such as youth, businesses, women, young Islamists, and the culture and arts sector).

Such gatherings reflect an important aspect of the contemporary Middle East, especially its Islamic-dominated regions in the Arab world, Turkey and Iran — a constant, often intense, analytical probing into the nature and causes of our many shortcomings, along with serious attempts to chart a way out of our predicaments. We no longer spend a lot of time merely bemoaning the chronic cycle of violence, warfare, occupation, neocolonialism and extremism that shatters many of our countries, or romantically pleading for more justice or democratic governance. Today, we seem to have entered a new mindset of working together across borders, to probe deeper into fixing what is wrong, instead of only cursing the darkness.

Civil society, scholars, journalists and business people from the entire world are doing what most of their governments seem unable or unwilling to do: Meet regularly with an open mind, free of threats and sanctions — without banning or boycotting any party — to agree on both the problems and the solutions of our societies. The meetings I attended last week were sponsored by a range of institutions that reflect this global dynamic, including the Heinrich Böll Foundation from Germany, the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American University of Beirut, the Arab Reform Initiative that comprises Arab, European and American research centers, the University of Jordan, and Canada’s IDRC, among others. No clash of cultures here, only an overdose of croissants and coffee, if anything.

Iranians, Turks, many different Arabs, Americans, Canadians and assorted Europeans at these and other such gatherings painstakingly dissect our distortions and deviant behavior. But they also identify the positive forces for stability, self-confidence, creativity and real development that prevent these societies from total collapse. There is plenty to identify on both side of this assets/liabilities divide.

For one important trend that has emerged in recent years, and seems to dominate these days, is the tendency to recognize nuance and shun absolutism — to see the world as a range of shades rather than starkly black and white, good or evil, cowboy or Indian. This may sound slightly simplistic, but it is important to recognize in the face of aggressive attitudes — and occasional organized lobbying campaigns — by some parties in the United States, Israel, and parts of Europe and the Arab-Islamic world that would paint us in single colors, and reduce us to silhouette cartoon figures that deny rather than affirm our humanity and rights.

This tendency to judge others in absolute terms emerges from the discussion of any aspect of the contemporary Middle East — Iraq, Palestine, Hizbullah and Lebanon, democratic change, women’s status, take your pick. The truth is, these and other facets of our region mirror two sides of the same human beings: a tendency to political and intellectual militancy and violence, alongside a heroic, often epic, commitment to reason and humanism in the face of the barbarism and pain inflicted upon them.

The increased number of conferences, study groups and quiet, private meetings that bring together Middle Easterners with colleagues from the rest of the world is a positive sign of the capacity of our societies to engage humbly and seek solutions to our shared tensions rationally and politically, instead of emotionally and militarily. In gathering after gathering that I attend in the Middle East and abroad, I sense this growing commitment and capacity to dialogue across cultures and ideologies — and to go beyond only dialogue, to find realistic solutions that might one day influence our dysfunctional decision-makers.

We meet, talk, learn, and seek a rational consensus on which to build an edifice of tolerance, respect and coexistence — in those interim periods when we are not killing and defaming each other. Take your pick, for there is indeed a choice to be made, for those who care to acknowledge the real world of nuanced human beings, rather than a fantasy world of silhouette cowboys and Indians.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 28 April 2007
Word Count: 796
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BEIRUT — One of the prevalent trends that defines so much of what is both right and wrong about the Arab world today is the convergence of religion, nationalism, and politics. Each is used for unspeakably cruel violence against foes and innocent civilians; yet simultaneously, each is also used to challenge unjust authority, resist foreign military invasions, and build more equitable societies.

The combination of religion, politics, identity and nationalism is inescapable in the contemporary Arab World, which has been unable to thrive as either a fully secular or an explicitly theocratic society. Those movements and leaders who use the combination of modern forces and traditional identities to offer a nation-building program that appeals to the best instincts and basic rights of a large number of their fellow citizens define a better, more peaceful and prosperous, Arab world. There are not many candidates for this mantle of enlightened Arab leadership, but there are some. I had the pleasure of several long discussions with one of them earlier this week: the former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.

His views are worth pondering, given his country’s rich experiences and his own particular credibility. Now in his early 70s, but showing the physical and intellectual vigor of a person half that age, al-Mahdi enjoys a rare combination of assets: religious legitimacy, nationalist credibility, experience in power and in opposition, several stints in jail, and tenure as a democratically elected prime minister. His great grandfather Mohammad Ahmed Al-Mahdi fought against British colonial rule in Sudan in the late 19th century, and he is the leader of the Ansar Sufi order and Al-Ummah political party.

He also encapsulates a modern Sudanese experience that he says has tried every conceivable form of government in the past 40 years: elected democracy, Islamist rule, Communism, authoritarian dictatorship, one-party rule, and non-ideological transitional military rule. None has worked very well. No Arab country has been able to shed authoritarian tendencies and adopt a modern, democratic governance system, he says, because none has been able to strike the required critical balance between political modernity and a traditional Islamic reference in society.

He sees most authoritarian Arab governments as being “under siege” today by their own people, and, in some cases, also by foreign forces. A variety of domestic forces demand change for the better in many Arab lands, including civil society, Islamist groups, reformist movements, new social forces such as women’s movements, student and business groups, and even radical groups like Al-Qaeda that seek a new caliphate that goes beyond the current cyber-caliphate they have already established.

Al-Mahdi suggests that internal Arab reform has lost credibility due to its ineffectiveness, and external demands for change have crashed on the shoals of the Anglo-American Iraqi misadventure, leaving most Arab societies with two immediate alternatives: escape into Western materialism and emigration, or escape to the Islamic past that Al-Qaeda and other such groups offer.

Neither of these are realistic or desirable options, al-Mahdi says, and a third alternative is required: a coalition of humanistic, democratic forces in the Arab world to pressure the existing regimes and force a transition to democratic rule that is also anchored in traditional values and principles. He calls for a coalition of Islamist, Arab nationalist, democratic, human rights, secular, and other groups in society to join forces to transform Arab governance systems into ones that strike a sustainable and realistic balance among several key forces: democratic political governance, modernization, Islamic and other traditional identities, marginalized social forces, credible human development, and international relations that neither blindly follow nor hatefully attack Western and other foreign parties.

Any party, movement or individual that wishes to join such a coalition of forces for Arab modernity and democracy must adhere to two basic values: equal rights among all human beings, and commitment to universal human rights principles. Neither traditional Islam alone nor secular Western democracy can respond to the modern needs of the Arab world for development, dignity and stability. When Islam or modernity alone are attempted as drivers of political governance, Arab societies experience a severe backlash against both.

A combination of the two is needed, and he points out that we might be experiencing something of the sort in our current era in which “post-Muslim Brotherhood movements” are growing and sometimes ruling democratically. He sees the Justice and Development Party that rules in Turkey as an example, along with the party of the same name in Morocco. Egyptian Muslim Brothers show signs of moving beyond Islamic tenets as their foundational principles, and towards ideas which can be adapted to meet the needs of modern life and governance.

Sadiq Al-Mahdi is a rare Arab leader who offers a program of inclusive democracy that affirms the principles of both efficacious modernity and traditional Islamic-Arab values. This is not an easy balance to strike, but it is probably an imperative one to seek, if the Arab world is to find a way out of its modern nightmare of sustained authoritarianism combined with chronic war and erratic human development.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 24 April 2007
Word Count: 835
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AMMAN, Jordan — The debate over democracy in Arab and Islamic countries continues to twist and turn, responding variously to indigenous forces and to erratic perceptions from the West, especially the United States. New evidence of the native Arab commitment to human decency and democratic political norms comes this week from within, in the form of yet another relevant, quality regional poll by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. The findings and their implications are significant, especially in this violence-wracked region where the attempt to promote democracy via foreign armies, as in Iraq, has been catastrophic for local stability, Western credibility, the public relevance of local Arab democratic activists, and the good name of democracy itself.

First, a quick overview of the results. The poll of nationally representative samples of 1200 people in each of Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon (Egypt will follow soon), conducted in the past four months, shows that Arab publics are highly aware of the concept of reform and can define specific desired reforms, but there is less consensus on priorities among economic, political, administrative, anti-corruption and other kinds of reforms. There is strong consensus on key issues: democracy is the best way to solve national problems; foreign intervention hinders Arab reform; and, solving the Palestinian problem is a prerequisite to defeating international terrorism. Many but not all feel the Arab-Israeli conflict hinders political reform.

A majorities of respondents thought the best system of government for their countries in one in which the governing authority is elected, guarantees political freedoms, and is held accountable and overseen by an elected parliament. An average of just seven percent thought government by religious clerics would best improve their family’s economic circumstances, while an average of nearly 50 percent thought democratic political systems were best suited for this.

Arabs, however, have mixed views about how serious their countries are about pursuing reforms (highest in Jordan, lowest in Lebanon), and agree that their countries should remain or become more open to the world. Strong consensuses exist on the importance of basic freedoms (speech, press, elections, thought, movement, joining political parties) for enhancing democracy, but views are much more mixed on whether basic freedoms are actually guaranteed in practice. Less than half feel they can take legal action against their government or its institutions or (Jordan and Morocco) participate in peaceful protests and sit-ins.

Views are more varied on social, religious and cultural issues, especially women’s status, parent-child relations and interpretation of religion (ijtihad). For example, strong majorities support equal rights for men and women in politics, employment, education and other core values, while a woman’s right to travel alone enjoys somewhat less support. Strong majorities support the right of religious minorities to practice their faith freely and, for the most part, for Muslim scholars to present differing interpretations of religion.

The full results will soon be available on the website of the CSS at the University of Jordan, and should be seen as yet another sign of ordinary Arabs’ foundation of life values that are democratic, pluralistic and tolerant, with strong specific commitments to freedom, accountability, justice and equality in almost every human and public realm. Those of us from and living in the Arab-Islamic region experience this reality daily, while many abroad — especially in post-9/11 America — tend to look at our world and see mainly hotheaded extremists or irrational killers.

This poll and others like it in the United States, for example, should remind us how important it is to look at both of our societies with a combination of accuracy and nuance that is largely missing from the public debate these days. Arab-Islamic and American societies both comprise killers and saints alike — masses of ordinary citizens with exemplary values, alongside minorities of zealots and criminals who do their deeds at home and abroad. Polling like this helps us grasp that complex reality. If assessed honestly, it can help us transcend the tendency of ideological zealots and intellectual skinheads in Washington, London and many Arab cities and Afghan caves alike, to perceive our two worlds in stark, black-and-white terms that are clearly not accurate or useful.

This poll is all the more hopeful because it is among the activities of the three-year-old and expanding Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), comprising 15 independent research centers and think tanks in the Arab world, Europe and the United States. The work and mere existence of ARI and other similar efforts that are not sufficiently appreciated abroad should help push us beyond the sterile and diversionary debate about whether Arabs, Islam and democracy are compatible. Rather, they should enhance the efforts of Arabs and colleagues abroad who work against great odds — including repeated Anglo-American militarism, Israeli colonial exceptionalism, and enduring Arab authoritarianism — actually to implement democratic forms and norms of Arab governance.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 23 April 2007
Word Count: 800
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AMMAN, Jordan — I’m not sure if it’s mere serendipity or anything more challenging, but every time I have come to Jordan recently, my trip has coincided with the visit of a senior American official. Three weeks ago I was in Amman at the same time as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and this week my fellow visitor to the Jordanian capital was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

These top officials from Washington seem less significant these days in many ways, due to a drop in global perceptions of the United States. Over a decade and a half since the Cold War ended, we hear less from leading American academics, polemicists, and entertainers who offer theories that explain the new grand order of the world. Most of those theories have tended to see the world from the US perspective, which is a perfectly normal sort of temporary self-infatuation, given the power of the United States globally.

We may be able, conversely, to identify new trends that reflect how the rest of the world looks at the United States. I can think of three principal criteria by which we can gauge how the world perceives American values (positively) and foreign policy (negatively): public opinion as measured by many credible opinion polls, the policies of foreign governments, and the manner in which senior American officials are treated by their hosts, the public and the media in countries they visit.

On all three counts, the United States is slipping in the eyes of the world. But I suspect we’re seeing something far more significant than just a normal rising curve of anti-American sentiments in response to America’s robust use of its power around the world. Several related trends seem to be converging and are most visible in the Middle East.

The first is the fact that most countries around the world — especially those the US tries to bully — have lost both fear and respect for the United States, a rather unusual state of affairs. This is reflected in the spirit of defiance and resistance that some countries display when confronted with American pressures, threats or active boycotts. Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela are the most common examples, though the behavior of giants like China and Russia also indicates that a growing number of important countries are prepared to go against American wishes.

This mirrors a second important point, which is the increasingly clear lack of practical options the United States and its allies can use in pressuring smaller countries to toe the line and comply with American dictates. Korean and Iranian nuclear developments reflect this point most sharply.

Active boycotts led by the United States also appear to have limited impact. The latest example of this fraying American clout is the boycott of the Hamas-Fateh national unity government in Palestine. Norway, Turkey, the Arab countries and many others have engaged the new Palestinian government. And according to an announcement by the Palestinian information minister on April 16, China and Switzerland have also said they would work with the unity government normally. Many other countries will follow suit. This is partly because if you are an impartial bystander and you are asked to join either the global political morality of the US and UK on one side or the Norwegians, Chinese and Swiss on the other, the Anglo-Americans will lose before the contest starts — given the badly dented perception of them around the world in the wake of their intemperate war-mongering of recent years.

Another trend that may be emerging is the possible broad polarization of two camps in the Middle East and the West. Many in the Middle East see the United States, Israel and many European states as a single political grouping, based most notably on their common policies on Iran’s nuclear industry, the Lebanon war last summer, last year’s Mohammad cartoons controversy, and the boycott of the Hamas-led Palestinian government. Consequently, large swaths of Arab, Iranian and Turkish public opinion — and many governments — are turning hostile to the United States in particular, and even to “the West” more generally. For Washington to alienate simultaneously the three largest Islamic publics in the region — Arabs, Iranians and Turks — is no easy feat. It will go down in history as another negative consequence of misguided Bush Administration policies that have been inordinately driven by Neo-Conservative zealots, pro-Israeli partisans, rightwing American Christian fanatics and other oddballs of a remarkably permissive American political culture.

When I visit Amman, I chat with my mother, my friends and many colleagues in media, politics, academia, the government and civil society. Maybe senior American officials who visit the Middle East regularly should make an effort to expand their conversational circle in order to connect better with the core of Arab and Middle Eastern public opinion that seeks cordial ties with the United States, instead of simply alienating greater and greater portions of it throughout the region.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 18 April 2007
Word Count: 819
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CAIRO — Three years ago on April 11, the late Egyptian thinker, economist, public servant and activist Dr. Said el-Naggar passed away after a long and productive life. I remembered him this week, on a visit to Cairo and discussions with Egyptian colleagues on the challenges and problems facing the Arab world, for which few solutions seem to emanate from Egypt any more — as they did in the past. However, Naggar’s ideas about modernization in Arab and Islamic societies still represent an enduring beacon of enlightened Arab thought.

Many of our colleagues around the world who ask in bewilderment about how the Arab world will ever get modern should consider for a moment this man’s ideas, which are widely if quietly shared by so many in the Arab world, though not always articulated in public.

Naggar, professor emeritus of economics at Cairo University, spent the last years of his life running the New Civic Forum in Cairo, a movement dedicated to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and secularism in Arab-Muslim societies. He saw the Forum as continuing the great tradition of reform and modernity that long defined Islamic society and thought. His immense knowledge and sense of justice also saw him continuing his public service as the elected representative of the Middle East on the appellate body of the World Trade Organization.

His activism was guided by the conviction that “secularization is the right path to progress, and it is perfectly compatible with the spirit and principles of true Islam.”

One of Naggar’s presentations — to a conference in Berlin in 2001 — was recently published by the New Civic Forum, before that body ceased to exist, falling victim, as so many others have done, to the prevailing malaise of state-dominated domestic Egyptian politics.

In his talk, entitled “A Social Science Approach to Modernization in Contemporary Muslim Societies,” he succinctly listed seven points that he saw as forming the basis for modernization. They are worth recalling today, given the continuing quest for a path of Arab-Islamic modernity.

The first point is the principle of social change — rather than static truth — in all institutions, including religious, social, technological and economic. The second point is recognition of the findings of the social sciences as the principal basis of social organization, and not to accept only the results of research in the physical sciences, as some Islamists do. This is imperative, as he notes, if Arab-Islamic societies hope ever to overcome poverty, underdevelopment and dependency on the West.

The third point is that Islam should never be interpreted in a way that makes it inconsistent with basic human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other such conventions. These human rights documents are universal precisely because they are the result of contributions by Western, Middle Eastern, Oriental and other civilizations, and not the private realm or any one of them.

Fourth, Naggar states, in a modern national state, citizenship rather than religious affiliation should be the source of all rights and obligations. This requires shedding inherited Ottoman traditions, which differentiate between civil and commercial matters that are governed by a single law for all, and personal status matters that are governed by different religious laws for different communities.

The fifth point is that a distinction should be drawn between a constitutional principle which is applicable to all citizens, and a program of a political party which expresses the views and preferences of a certain group. Provisions in Arab constitutions that draw on Islam as the main or only source of legislation, for example, should be reconsidered if they place certain non-Muslim citizens at a disadvantage.

His sixth point is that a majority that has the right to govern and legislate in a democracy cannot be based on religion, race or color. The seventh point is that Western civilization is not a geographical expression, but rather a state of mind entailing a rational approach to the solution of social problems, based on the findings of social science research.

“If Western culture is defined as a rational approach to problems, then it is not alien to Islamic culture,” he says, noting that the role of reason is placed on an elevated pedestal in the Koran.

Naggar makes a powerful and systematic case for modernity in Islamic societies, based on his seeing no contradiction between secularism and Islam. Three years after his death, his thoughts are more relevant than ever today, when some Arab-Islamic societies are caught in the grip of an increasingly tense face-off between so-called modern Western and traditional Arab-Islamic values. Naggar continues to stimulate and challenge us with his intellectual commitment to a brand of Arab-Islamic modernity that rejects such simplistic divisions, and instead seeks out those vast, endearing spaces where Western and Arab-Islamic societies not only coexist naturally, but enrich each other as well.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 16 April 2007
Word Count: 804
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NEW YORK — David Brooks’ latest column in the Sunday New York Times deserves a few thoughts from a colleague who has generally admired his work, but finds him now reflecting the troubling intellectual and ideological gap between the United States and the Arab world. One of the grave new threats that faces both these societies is the declining quality of public analysis and discussion of American-Middle Eastern relations, especially in the mainstream American media that has lived so cozily with the exercise of American military power in the Middle East in recent years.

I was particularly struck by this column because I read it on the last day of a two-week trip in the United States that allowed me to mix with a wide range of Middle East experts, scholars in various fields, and many other Americans. Everywhere, I encountered and sometimes engaged in a lively, healthy discussion on the deteriorating relations between various quarters of the United States and many people in the Arab-Islamic world. In all the discussions and encounters I had — including with many fine men and women at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, at the University of Chicago and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and in Philadelphia, Boston and New York City — the dominant tone was that American-Middle Eastern relations were in deep trouble and we needed to put our heads together to find a way out of the mess we had created.

I have had the exact same discussions with a variety or Arabs, Iranians, Israelis and Turks for many years, but for some reason this deeper reality of an ongoing quest for a rational problem-solving consensus rarely gets into the mainstream American media.

Brooks in his column wrote about his views after attending a weekend conference in Jordan that brought together Arab intellectuals and activists with leading American neo-conservatives. He concluded: “The events of the past three years have shifted their (the Arabs) diagnosis of where the cancer is — from dysfunction in the Arab world to malevolence in Jerusalem and in AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee].”

He saw Arab elites becoming less introspective, and instead “blaming everything on the villainous Israeli network. And so we enter a more intractable phase in the conflict, which will not be a war over land or oil or even democratic institutions, but a war over narratives… Americans, meanwhile, will simply want to get out. After 9/11, George Bush called on the US to get deeply involved in the Middle East. But now, most Americans have given up on their ability to transform the Middle East and on Arab willingness to change… What we have is not a clash of civilizations, but a gap between civilizations, increasingly without common narratives, common goals or means of communication.”

I’ve spent my whole life between America and the Arab World, and I strongly disagree. While Arabs do blame Israel and the United States for many of their contemporary ills (and the European colonial powers, also, not to forget that older culprit), they have also spent much of the last quarter century criticizing their own elites and power structures, and trying to figure out how to make things better at home.

Our civilizations share many common goals, and can use numerous means of communications should they make the effort. My experience in traveling through these fine American and Arab civilizations for my entire life is that Arab and American people share predominantly common values and goals. However, they are plagued by the problem of entangled relations in the Arab-Israeli-American web, and all-around poor quality political leaderships that verge on the morally deficient and criminally negligent, in the United States, Israel and Arab capitals alike.

Seeing only the Arab criticisms of the United States and Israel while ignoring the rest of this cycle, and sidestepping the impact of US and Israeli policies in the Middle East, is both factually inaccurate and politically inflammatory. Our most useful job as newspaper columnists is not to lounge in the ideological fog that mediocre statesmen and angry citizenries generate, but rather to cut through it, to make way for more complete, honest communication.

Powerful leaders like George Bush, Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice choose to inhabit worlds in which Arabs-Muslims suffer terrible faults that must be rectified by the values-changing and swamp-draining actions of the noble American armed forces. Arab dictators, extremists, and terrorists respond with equal ferocity and intellectual dishonesty.

Those who have the opportunity to shape and enrich the public debate should describe, understand, and repudiate all such fanaticism, not just be irritated and perplexed by it. Abdicating this responsibility four years ago proved terribly costly to all of us. We should avoid repeating that shortcoming by making a more rigorous effort to understand and describe our world in all its integrity and complexity, no matter how perplexing things may appear on any one weekend.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 10 April 2007
Word Count: 812
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CHICAGO — This past week has been filled with intriguing diplomatic activity in the Middle East in the form of American and British contacts with the three principal parties that Washington and London see as trouble-makers and bad guys, namely Iran, Syria and the Hamas half of the Palestinian coalition government. It is not yet possible to draw firm conclusions about the consequences of the past week’s contacts on the basis of the scanty available evidence, but some fascinating options seem to be in the air now that were not so plausible last week. The implications for American policy in the Middle East are particularly important.

The three principal contacts that occurred last week were the British-Iranian exchanges that led to the release of the 15 British sailors the Iranians had captured in the Gulf; a British diplomat’s meeting with the Palestinian Prime Minister from Hamas to seek the release of the abducted BBC correspondent in Gaza; and US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s talks with the Syrian leadership in Damascus. Also, in the same vein of diplomatic novelty where stern rigidity had once reigned, the US State Department declared that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not rule out holding bilateral meetings with Iranian officials at the next meeting of Iraq’s neighbors in Turkey later this month.

I have followed these events from two fascinating places in the United States — the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, where I have been lecturing, and the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where I attended an international conference on strategic threats around the world. In discussions with Middle East experts, scholars, foreign policy specialists, ex-officials and others who follow strategic threat issues around the world, it seems that the policy elite in the United States is in the midst of serious self-analysis and reassessment.

Behind the bravado and exaggerated confidence of President George W. Bush, many Americans who follow foreign policy issues exhibit a string of telling sentiments. They are aware of and uncomfortable with the isolated position the United States has worked itself into throughout the world. They are irritated and often angered by the constant criticism of US foreign policy they hear from most parts of the world. They are totally lost and clueless about what to do in Iraq, now that their government has brought that country and the entire Middle East to the brink of catastrophe, anchored in sectarian warfare. And, most importantly, they are debating very intensely the possible options and alternatives to the current hard-line American policy towards Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah and others who line up with them in defying and challenging Washington.

Last week’s events, coming so soon after high-level Saudi-Iranian meetings and flatfooted Arab and Israeli calls for renewed peace-making, hold out the simple prospect that talking with your foes, antagonists and nemeses is not only a real option, but also could be a productive one that is mutually beneficial. The release of the British sailors by Iran was a welcomed end to that episode, which was primarily a consequence of relying more on diplomacy and direct contacts than boycotts or military threats and maneuvers. The happy ending is important, but the process that led to it is also significant.

Iran is the most extreme example of the new attitude to the United States and the United Kingdom that has spread to many quarters of the Middle East in the past few years, especially since the Anglo-American attack on Iraq. It is characterized by a combination of defiance and resistance, anchored in an explicit, if slightly reckless, fearlessness that also is projected towards Israel. Many in the West characterize this as madness, irrationality, or incomprehensible extremism or fanaticism. Many in the Middle East, on the other hand, point out the limited options the US and UK have at hand to force a change in the policies of defiant Middle Eastern states or militant organizations.

The key question is, how should Western countries respond to this sort of behavior? A serious debate is underway in the United States about this point, reflecting primarily the perceived dangerous situation that Washington has created for itself and for the Middle East through its Iraq adventure. The Bush administration is not totally blind to this fact. It is not making any dramatic changes in its foreign policy, but it does appear to recognize that some adjustments and symbolic or logistical shifts must occur in what had heretofore been a rigid and aggressive foreign policy. This is due both to domestic politics and foreign policy consequences. Staying the course, for Washington these days, is a recipe for certain foreign policy catastrophe, and political exile for the Republican Party.

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global

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Released: 09 April 2007
Word Count: 784
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