BEIRUT — It is worthwhile viewing George W. Bush’s presidency from a different perspective than America’s performance abroad, for example by reviewing the efforts and fate of those around the world who partnered with Washington. A rich and often moving account of one such perspective has recently been made available by former Jordanian Foreign Minister and Ambassador Marwan Muasher.

His recently published book, The Arab Center: The promise of moderation, (Yale University Press, 2008) provides a rare peek into several core determinants of the condition of Arab societies and the wider Middle East. These include the personal sentiments of Arab senior public figures, complex diplomatic interactions among Arab, Israeli and American government officials, and attempts to change the Arab world from within.

This book is worth reading for both the valor and the failures it describes, and for outlining the vulnerable state of Arab moderation in a region in which extremism is the hallmark of Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Americans alike. Muasher’s personal political memoir of the period from 2001-2006 covers episodes in which he was personally involved. It has the credibility, factual specificity and reflective, often self-critical, analysis that official government statements and authorized histories usually lack.

The story he recounts of the fate of Arab moderation and the Arab Center — the core being Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia — is as instructive as it is sad. It is instructive because it reveals a valiant, persistent and impressive attempt by some Arabs to engage the United State and Israel in serious peacemaking, or to launch an Arab-defined political reform process.

Jordan’s experience teaches useful lessons. It affirms the importance of being able to speak to all parties, even the ones you disagree with. It highlights the value of taking initiatives, and not waiting for others to define your fate for you. It confirms the importance of collective Arab action and coordination. And it surprisingly reveals how the United States, even in the Bush years of attack dog morality, is open to dialogue and compromise, including in some cases on issues related to its ties to Israel.

The tale is ultimately sad, though, because the Arab Center to date has failed in the two core goals that Muasher describes in much detail: to engage the United States and Israel in making peace, and to undertake Arab political, economic and social reforms. Moments of hope and some impressive breakthroughs — such as the 2002 Arab Summit peace plan, the agreement on the Roadmap, or the 2004 Arab Summit reform document — were all quickly followed by disappointment, and renewed conflict.

Muasher’s personal response to being an Arab ambassador in Israel is the most moving part of the book; his account of the diplomatic negotiations related to Arab-Israeli peace-making is the most informative, incisive and useful; and his brief assessment of why Arab reform efforts failed is potentially the most important in the long run.

He notes with the sort of honesty that is uncommon among Arab officials that Arab moderates were squeezed between George Bush and Osama Bin Laden, both of whom in their own way wanted to change Arab governance systems. If the Arabs did not change themselves, someone far away would make the changes for them.

Reform is needed, he acknowledges, because the absence of gradual political modernization has saddled the Arab world with corruption, an absence of secular and national political parties, and intimidation and depoliticization of the Arab street that has become dominated by Islamists.

His list of why the Arab world has not reformed is refreshing. It includes issues like education reform, oil, Arab-Israeli wars, lack of democratic parties, blind allegiance, and the absence of checks-and-balances.

A few important factors are not addressed in this book, such as the central role of Arab security agencies and the general militarization of Arab society and governance, and how the post-2001 prevailing Arab official alliance with the United States in the “global war on terror” retarded key thrusts for change in the region. Issues of state and leadership legitimacy are also left for others to deal with.

Despite these understandable omissions, Muasher’s book is worth reading for helping us understand more profoundly why the Arab Center failed. Today, we enjoy neither peace nor democratic reforms in the Arab world. The Center’s failure weighs heavily on every Arab family, and extremism fills many of the spaces left in its wake.

The center will rise and try again, I have no doubt, because the vast majority of Arabs are centrists and moderates at heart. When the next serious attempt is made, political actors in the Arab region and abroad should heed Muasher’s call for peace and reform to move forward together, with the sort of credibility and support that were missing in recent years. This story is not over.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 September 2008
Word Count: 799
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BEIRUT — In this week marking the seventh anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the United States, three noteworthy events related to the US and the Middle East caught my eye: Al-Qaeda’s number two man Ayman Zawahiri released a new videotape; Republican Party vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin started her foreign policy education by meeting with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an extremist organization that puts Israeli interests above American interests; and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was meeting and dealing with the heads of state of Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, three of the most authoritarian figures in the world, not just in the Middle East.

Why is this worldwide web of extremism noteworthy? It helps clarify that the terrorism scourge persists because its root causes continue to thrive. Those causes are multiple, complex, and ever changing, and relate primarily to events in four orbits: the Arab-Asian region, Europe, Israel, and American foreign policy.

It is impossible in analytical or historical terms to separate the four main strands of sentiment and policy that have given birth to the contemporary Salafist terrorist movements we all suffer today: dictatorial or merely corrupt and incompetent Arab and Asian governments; violent and colonial Israeli policies; hypocritical and Israeli-influenced American policies that often manifest themselves in warfare; and, the consequent, more recent, phenomenon of demeaned and disoriented young Arab-Asian immigrants in Europe, often second and third generation immigrants.

None of these four principal reasons by itself is likely to cause a person to become a terrorist. The combination of two or more often drives otherwise normal young men or women to embrace wild ideologies that promise an escape from the degradation, confusion and despair that define their lives.

The two principal accusations and complaints against the United States in most of the Arab-Asian region were vividly on display this week, as if the Washington establishment were asking Ayman Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden to emerge and make an appearance, which Zawahiri did.

Those accusations are: 1) US foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict is hopelessly skewed towards Israel and shows no desire to return to any semblance of even-handedness. And, 2) Washington is most comfortable supporting Arab dictators and life-long presidents, totally disregarding both its own rhetoric about ‘promoting democracy’ and the rights of hundreds of millions of Arab-Asian citizens to fundamental human rights and a decent life.

These two foreign policy traditions in Washington combine with a deadly homegrown modern Arab legacy of political authoritarianism and state-run incompetence to create the volatile mixture that generates terror on a large and recurring scale.

Terrorism is a symptom of other ailments and distortions, and a tool that fanatics use to express themselves and change conditions in society. It is not an ideology that springs out of purely religious milieus. It can be defeated and eliminated only if its underlying causes are recognized and seriously addressed.

Two major trends have remained constant since that terrible day of death and destruction on 9/11: First, those who practice terror in the lands and the wider orbits of the Middle East and South Asia continue to proliferate and dissipate, making it harder to stop their criminal acts. Second, the American-led “global war on terror” persists in a mistaken emphasis on police and military actions to tackle problems that only get worse — in part because of the political foreign policies that Washington pursues.

Sarah Palin’s first foreign policy journey to AIPAC and Condoleezza Rice’s swan song last journey to three North African Arab dictators suggest that the American political establishment — or at least its Republican side — has learned nothing in the past seven years.

Another interpretation is that Republicans and all Americans know this, but do not care — because they can live with the violence and volatility that define the Arab-Asian region and their relations with much of it. I don’t think this is the case, though, because most Americans prefer peace over war, friendship over rancor, and lawful good governance over rampant criminality.

In the end, the combination of native Arab-Asian dysfunctional governance, exported American hypocrisy, and sustained Israeli aggression creates openings that sick men like Ayman Zawahiri exploit with glee, and some success. There should be no surprises that he and his ilk continue to do this, because the underlying conditions that allow terrorists to breed remain fertile.

Seven years after 9/11 and an American-led “global war on terror” that has cost trillions of dollars, not only do the formative forces of terror persist virtually unchanged from 2001; in some cases (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Algeria) they are more acute than ever before. The really sad thing is that Sarah, Condoleezza, Ayman and Osama all think they are doing just fine, while the rest of us pay the price for their respective and distinct intemperance.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 10 September 2008
Word Count: 801
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BEIRUT — Regional and international players have been meeting in Damascus for thousands of years, to do one of two things: make war, or make a deal. This week’s four-way summit of the leaders of France, Syria, Qatar and Turkey in Damascus perpetuates the age-old tradition of deal-making — in this case bargaining over strategic assets and positions, rather than fine-thread carpets.

Bargaining to strike a deal in Damascus, whether in the world of commerce or politics, is defined by a few basic rules: the process takes time; it often requires third parties to come in and out of the picture like catalysts in a chemical equation; some gains are not calculated immediately but materialize later; and, a deal is consummated only if all sides obtain their key demands in a win-win situation.

This week’s Damascus meeting testifies dramatically to the changing Middle East, which has become incredibly complicated in view of the many conflicts that are now entangled in a single large regional dynamic. It also points to greater changes ahead, because of Syria’s contradictory position on some core issues related to Iran, Lebanon and Israel.

The most striking common denominator in this gathering comprises the roles of France, Qatar and Turkey as important new diplomatic mediators in the Middle East, filling the large gap left by the United States, which has increasingly marginalized itself by its own mistakes and biases. The United States, Europe — and the UN to a lesser extent — have dominated diplomacy on Israel-Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, but they have systematically failed to achieve breakthroughs. The 2006 Israel-Hizbullah summer war reminded everyone of the terrible carnage that will surely occur when simmering tensions erupt into war. The Iraq war revealed how conflict in one area spills over into and destabilizes other parts of the region. Last year’s brief war between the Lebanese army and the Fateh el-Islam radical Salafist group pointed to the new terror threats the entire region faces.

The vacuum created by the United States’ diplomatic auto-demotion is being filled quickly, so that the regional conflicts do not erupt into active warfare. Qatar, Turkey and France are the main players offering to mediate; others also seek roles, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. The focus on Damascus now is solely because Syria has its hands in almost every major conflict in the region — Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Israel, for starters. It must be engaged and placated to an extent, to prevent a deterioration that results in widespread war and destruction.

Syria’s reasonable demands can be met, such as regime survival, territorial integrity, a return of its occupied Golan Heights, and no political intrigues or military threats emanating from Israel or Lebanon. Wider goals of dominating Lebanon and Jordan are not reasonable and will be resisted. Many Lebanese understandably remain unsure how far the major international and regional players will go to preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty, should Syria try to regain control or major influence there.

The two big players watching the Damascus talks are Iran and Hizbullah, and this is where Syria’s position seems untenable. Syria cannot realistically claim it is interested in negotiating permanent peace with Israel while also maintaining its strong alliances with Iran and Hizbullah. A Syrian-Israeli peace is a strong possibility in the coming two years, and if it happens it will trigger Lebanon-Israel peace talks, and major changes in Hizbullah’s strategy and behavior in Lebanon. Syria cannot credibly make peace with Israel while supporting those who resist and fight Israel.

The prevalent international view is that today’s diplomacy aims to separate Syria from Iran. That is unlikely to happen in the short run, but certain to happen in the longer run. The Syrian-Iranian strategic relationship is an unnatural one, and is also untenable for very long in the face of possible Syrian-Israeli ties.

Syria is bargaining to regain its land, and its place in the heart of the Arab world, rather than remain it its quarantine ward. The prospects of peace with Israel, a secure Assad-led regime, normal ties with the major Western and Arab states, and large injections of development aid have all the trappings of a deal that must appeal to Damascus. Syria will work towards this goal slowly and steadily, according to the established rules of bazaar bargaining — without making abrupt and major concessions, or humiliating its many partners. It will change slowly, and also will seek to have others change with it.

The most intriguing thing going on in Damascus is not about Syria alone. It is rather that events in Damascus could be a harbinger of what could soon take place in Iran — where they also know carpets, and when to strike a reasonable deal before the good buys, and your bargaining power, disappear.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 08 September 2008
Word Count: 795
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BEIRUT — The agreement signed 30 August 2008, which sees Italy apologize and pay $5 billion in compensation for its colonial rule and misdeeds in Libya, is a powerful example of why it is so important to acknowledge that which many of our friends in the West constantly tell us to put behind us: history.

History matters, and endures, and its consequences constantly must be grasped, not ignored. In this case, we witness neither the end nor the resumption of history, but the neutralization of one aspect of history as a fractious force of resentment and discord.

History for many in the West — especially the history of West’s colonialism and imperialism in Asia, the Middle East and Africa — is something to skim through in a high school class, and then to relegate to the past as irrelevant to today’s conflicts and tensions. For many people in the former colonized world, however, history is a deep and open wound that still oozes pain and distortion. Libya is a classic example of colonialism’s twisted and enduring legacy of nearly dysfunctional states governed by corrupt and often incompetent elites, whose people never have a chance to validate either the configuration of statehood or the exercise of power.

History is very much an active force in much of the Middle East today. It manifests itself, for example, in the form of bitter memories of the West’s behavior in the past (Iran, Palestine), and explaijns the lot of poor and fragmenting countries that have never made a coherent transition to stable statehood, legitimate sovereignty, or credible governance.

A major reason for the mess and mediocrity that define so many Arab-Asian-African countries is their unnatural birth at the hands of retreating European colonial midwives. Because they were manufactured by fleeing European occupiers, many countries in our region have enjoyed neither the logic of a sensible balance among natural and human resources, nor the compensatory vitality that comes from self-determinant and truly sovereign states.

Made in Europe cars and shoes are wonderful; made in Europe Arab states are unnatural and embarrassing.

The Arab world remains ignominiously the world’s only collectively, structurally and chronically undemocratic region in large part because it experienced an unnatural birth, and could be maintained in its current format only through the pacifying force of hard security states. Not surprisingly, the former European colonial powers continue to sustain and benefit from the bizarre Arab order of turbulent, often violent, and sometimes vicious, statehood that they left behind when they fled our shores.

The Italian-Libyan agreement is fascinating for what it reveals about a belated acknowledgment in at least one European country — always elegant Italy — that colonialism damaged and retarded the native land and its people. This is a noteworthy and noble act, for which the Italians and their government are to be congratulated. It takes courage and humility to undertake such an agreement, admitting, as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi did, “complete and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era.”

He continued: “In the name of the Italian people … I feel the duty to apologize and show our pain for what happened many years ago and which affected many of your families.”

Among the things Italy regrets were its killing thousands of Libyans and uprooting thousands of others from their homes. Italy will spend $5 billion to help compensate for its historical misdeeds, in the form of $200 million of investments per year in Libya over 25 years, including building a highway across Libya from the Tunisian border to Egypt. Italy will also clear landmines dating back to the colonial era, and has already returned an ancient statue of Venus stolen during colonial rule.

While Italy should be commended for this acknowledgment and apology, at the same time troubling dimensions to this agreement deserve wider scrutiny. In return for its gesture, Italy expects to reap great rewards, in the form of multi-billion dollar contracts, and tighter security controls over flows of illegal immigrants. And so Italy expects to continue enjoying benefits from an unequal historical association with the land and people it once directly colonized.

Equally troubling, such agreements help to maintain in power leaders like Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who next year celebrates 40 years in power. There is very little to show for his leadership, other than a legacy of intensely erratic and wasteful governance matched only by its longevity. If there were a prize for modern Arab mismanaged statehood and squandered wealth, Libya would win it hands down, with close competition from countries like Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq.

Yet the West continues to manipulate, reward and protect these hapless societies. And it seems quite obvious to many of us in the Middle East, that this is only a new and disguised form of colonialism.

For ordinary Arab people, the endless pain of an unsatisfying relationship with European colonial powers endures, in new and more elegant forms.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 03 September 2008
Word Count: 826
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GENEVA — If you think the Middle East is already a source of trouble for itself and the rest of the world in the form of violence, extremism, refugees and illegal immigrants, hold on tight, because rougher days are ahead. Discussions with researchers and executives of leading international organizations, as I have just had during a working visit to Geneva, unambiguously reveal the problematic position of the Middle East region amidst the complex, interconnected stresses the world faces.

The crisis of food prices and availability, in particular, may be the straw the breaks the back of many camels — in this case vulnerable states and societies. Communities and some countries could slowly unravel in years to come, under the combined, cumulative stress of five simultaneous crises:

• Higher prices and curtailed availability of basic foodstuffs;
• Higher energy prices that will raise the cost of almost every other service or product we buy;
• Increasingly scarce and poorer quality water;
• Population growth rates that outpace the economy’s ability to generate new jobs for a disproportionately young citizenry; and,
• A national environment characterized by political crises, active wars, intermittent terrorism, and low-quality governance that is increasingly dominated by security agencies and considerations.

The added degenerative factors of the continuing battle with Israel and the arrival of Western armies on a semi-regular basis make things worse in the short run. The new food crisis provides that fractional added amount of gloom that will cause people who heretofore have coped with their four other ailments to enter a psychological environment of helplessness and despair.

Ordinary people can weather political strife, war, water shortages, energy stress and low incomes, but they will not endure passively if they cannot reasonably feed themselves.

This will be a problem in many Arab quarters outside the small oil-rich Gulf states and the 10 percent wealthy, elite who populate the region. The food and nutrition situation is actually satisfactory now, except for Yemen, Sudan, and pockets of malnutrition elsewhere. UN-FAO data indicates that around 13 percent of Arabs are undernourished, which is below the global average of 14 percent.

The problem is that there is little room to absorb more stress in most family budgets. The Arab world is highly vulnerable to food price increases, for both structural and policy-related reasons. Our region imports 50 percent of its food needs and is thus highly vulnerable to price and supply difficulties. Agricultural patterns tend to favor wealthy commercial food importers and traders, rather than farmers who produce food.

The Arab world lacks credible, equitable, efficient safety nets to cushion the vulnerable and the poor. The capacity of Arab governments to address the looming threat is miniscule, because much of the region’s current vulnerability reflects policy incompetence at a very high level over many years.

Researchers predict that food prices on average will continue to rise for some years, given the known causes of recent price increases — globalized supply and demand factors, fuel costs, speculation, and policy decisions. They will eventually stabilize, and could decline again, given how supply-and-demand economics works; but the coming years of high prices have to be navigated and endured if we hope to emerge standing on our feet when reasonable food prices return.

The troubling implications for the Arab region are a more intense struggle for basic life-sustaining resources, and an aggravation of the slow state fragmentation and occasional collapse that have defined the region since the mid-1980s. Non-oil-producing states and government authorities will slowly contract to serve their own employees, cousins, patrons and clients. Larger and larger segments of society will be left to obtain their basic needs from groups that step up to fill the spaces that states vacate.

Non-governmental organizations, tribal groups, militias, religious societies, and sectarian or ethnic organizations will play more important roles in all sectors of life — providing basic human needs, security, representation, identity and opportunity. The private sector, criminal syndicates, foreign donors, international relief groups, and neighborhood charitable societies will plug many service gaps.

Hungry, thirsty and weary of repeatedly winning the gold medal of dysfunctional statehood, some Arab states will continue to fray at the edges and fragment from the center. They will regain solvency and integrity when their own people redefine an internal balance of power that provides the combination of legitimacy, credibility, and efficacy in public authority that is often lacking today. The food crisis will not in itself cause all these likelihoods, but it will speed them up.

There is an alternative, though. Responsible Arab officials could avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, address this crisis before it strikes, and come up with policies that serve all citizens equitably for a change. For once, can we ask our Arab policymakers for some competence? If they do not respond responsibly, and rely on the usual combination of police power, foreign aid, and negligence, some of them are likely to lose their states along with their jobs.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 September 2008
Word Count: 816
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DOHA, Qatar — In the world of nation-states, the small Arab emirates and states of the Gulf region have been peculiar beasts since their birth in the middle of the last century, in the wake of the retreating British. Their transformation into wealthy, glittering, bustling city-states in a matter of decades, in some cases, has been impressive — and perhaps unprecedented in the entire history of human civilization.

The Gulf city-state sheikhdoms remain largely unstudied, though. Their chosen course of breakneck speed, foreign- manned socio-economic development and growth, and their unique brand of overnight nationalism anchored in cities that barely existed decades previously, deserve analysis in their own right, and also for what they might teach other Arab countries.

A century ago, sheikhdoms like Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and a few others were tiny fishing ports, smuggler depots, imperial fuelling stations, or Bedouin encampments. They had miniscule and often nomadic populations, without urban traditions or distinct national identities. Today, they are mostly independent states and some are global financial powerhouses, yet they remain incongruous.

These dazzling centers of seemingly endless growth are defined by massive new public and private building projects, hundreds of soaring tower buildings, entire new urban quarters and towns built virtually overnight. They contain slightly fantastic commercialism and entertainment, ambitious projects in the fields of education, research, museums, and culture. At the same time, these are countries without politics, and are largely devoid of any institutions of civil society – through which private citizens can gather in various associations to debate, analyze and advance their own societies.

They have some institutions like elected parliaments, semi-elected or nominated advisory councils, local assemblies, municipal councils, political associations, and private media. Yet in no case do any of these institutions shape significant national policies, and when they become too feisty they are usually shut down for a while.

What is most odd but also clearly the case, is that there is little demand among the indigenous populations to change this situation. Perhaps it is not so odd, though, given that the ruling families and their governments have used the bountiful oil and gas wealth to provide their citizens with all their basis needs, and to allow many of them to become very wealthy without exerting too much effort or taking too many risks.

Most of these statelets are now experiencing a second oil-fuelled boom, following the 1970s-90s burst of income, spending and growth. High prices and global demand for their energy has provided them with cushions of cash that are being invested in a manner that should see them remain wealthy for decades to come.

The faster they develop, though, the more obvious become the sharp polarizations between the Gulf region and the rest of the Arab world. The Gulf is an oasis of wealth, growth, innovation, order and stability, while much of the rest of the Arab world suffers increasingly serious political violence, ethnic and sectarian tensions, corruption, mismanagement, and rickety states. The implications of the growing gap between the Gulf Arabs and the rest of the Arabs are unclear, but probably will be consequential.

As energy and food prices continue to rise in the years ahead, alongside worse water deficits, much of the Arab world beyond the Gulf is likely to suffer more internal stresses. More Arab countries and individuals will look to the pool of money in the Gulf to help rescue them. The Gulf states historically have been generous in offering assistance to poorer Arab countries in the form of loans, grants, and investments; but they will not wish or be able to use their money as a primary means of interaction with the rest of the region.

Qatar offers perhaps the most intriguing example of how these states might evolve politically as they start to shed their traditional diplomatic conservatism. Qatar is the first Gulf state to behave like a non-Gulf Arab country, in terms of making bold moves on the regional stage. It has successfully mediated intra-Lebanese disputes, played host to Hamas for a while, established diplomatic ties with Israel, assisted reconstruction in Lebanon and Palestine, and maintained active diplomatic ties with Iran — where the emir of Qatar traveled for official talks last week.

Other novel aspects of its policies include funding and hosting Al-Jazeera television, allowing the United States to base its regional military headquarters in the country, welcoming branch campuses of half a dozen quality American universities, and fostering several institutions to promote democracy and human rights in the region.

These are all young initiatives, whose longevity and impact remain to be seen. But they reflect a very different style of bold political conduct in a region that remains politically conservative and minimalist, despite having transformed itself in just decades from a largely barren backwater to a dynamic engine of Arab economic investment, efficient planning and execution, orderliness, and modernity.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 27 August 2008
Word Count: 809
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BEIRUT — Jordan is the great survivor in the Arab World, so when it starts shuffling its diplomatic cards, it means there is something going on worth watching. More specifically, when the Jordanian Intelligence Department chief holds political talks with a top Hamas official — as just happened — we should anticipate important changes ahead in the Arab world.

This is not a purely bilateral or local matter. It suggests that both are looking out for their own best interests, by making preliminary moves to adjust to changing circumstances in the region. Also, when the director of intelligence does politics, it signals that whatever is going on is worth watching.

The Jordanians threw Hamas out of the country a few years ago soon after King Abdullah II assumed office, and ever since then two major trends have defined their ties. The first is that Jordan has seen Hamas (and Hizbullah) as significant strategic threats because of their close ties with Iran. At one point a few years ago I heard from senior officials in Amman that they feared Hamas and Hizbullah would fire rockets and attack Jordanian targets in retaliation for any possible Israeli attack against Iran. For several years now, Jordanian officials would tell anyone who cared to hear that Iran and its friends were a huge strategic threat to the entire region.

That struck me as rather far-fetched, reflecting a highly exaggerated Jordanian perception of a threat from the Iran-Hamas-Hizbullah trio. That exaggeration was probably a result of Jordan being influenced too much by Israeli and American views — both of which are deeply flawed because of their almost total lack of contact with or deep knowledge of what Iran-Hamas-Hizbullah and their friends stand for — or aim to achieve.

The second Jordanian policy was to side firmly and operationally with President Mahmoud Abbas in his political show-down with Hamas in Palestine. Jordan has provided Abbas political support and significant security assistance. It also gave him the illusion of major Arab support in the battle against Hamas. As in fearing Iran and allies, in this policy Jordan was heavily constrained by its heavy dependence on the US for financial aid and security support. Reliance on Western support has been one of the bedrocks of Jordan’s success as a state since its independence in the middle of the last century. The policy is often unpopular with Arab nationalist, Islamist and leftist circles, but it has worked well and served Jordanians handsomely, making the country one of the most stable and rational in the Arab world.

These two principles, defining Jordan’s attitude to Hamas in recent years, today seem weak, if not total failures. The need for an adjustment in Amman’s policy probably reflects the realization that pursuing failed policies is a foolish way to behave. Resuming normal ties with Hamas is a dramatic change of policy, but drama to preserve Jordan’s security and stability seems much preferable to a failed strategy of siding with Israel and the United States against the obviously strong and growing Islamist forces in the region.

Jordan’s reconsideration of relations with Hamas may also hint at underlying changes in Palestine and in the Hamas-Syrian-Hizbullah-Iran camp. In Palestine, President Abbas has fared badly in his domestic struggle against Hamas, and simultaneously he has not achieved any breakthrough in his American-backed peace negotiations with Israel. The likelihood is that Hamas will do well in upcoming elections for parliament, and perhaps even for president, in the Palestinian territories.

The Jordanian monarchy, government and intelligence service do not operate by hunches alone. They have excellent insights into sentiments in their and surrounding societies, by a combination of good intelligence sources and regular quality polling. Unlike Israeli and American officials who are mostly ignorant of trends in large swaths of the Arab world, the Jordanians have their ear to the ground and rely on solid analyses of current and expected future trends.

Their exploration of resumed normal relations with Hamas suggests to me that we should keep our eye on possible slow changes in the Hamas-Syria-Iran relationship, and a new phase of nationalist leadership in Palestine in which Hamas plays a larger role. This is a welcomed development, for two reasons: It suggests that both Jordan and Hamas are being realistic rather than romantically idealistic about the realities of their world, and it could promote new diplomatic possibilities on the now dim Hamas-Israel horizon.

Changes in strategic relationships tend to occur gradually in the Middle East, as actors sense that regional ties may be changing and adjust accordingly, to ensure that they are not left dangling in the air without friends or allies. So the meetings between Jordanian intelligence officers and Beirut-based Hamas officials may be as important for what they signal about Iran, Syria, Israel and Palestine as for what they tell us about Hamas and Jordan.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 25 August 2008
Word Count: 803
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BEIRUT — The memorandum of understanding for easing sectarian tensions signed in Beirut Monday between Hizbullah and an obscure Lebanese Salafist (Sunni fundamentalist) Islamist movement isn’t likely to have a major impact on anything.

But it is highly symbolic in revealing the constantly evolving line-up of major political actors throughout the Arab world. Key forces in the Arab world are very different from what they were a generation ago, and new actors keep emerging, representing different constituencies, and embracing new tactics and strategies.

Dealing with this new line-up of players in the region by applying old rules — from the Cold War or the Arab-Israeli conflict of the 1970s to 90s — only generates failure and frustration. There is indeed a “new Middle East” being born, as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice predicted in mid-2006, but its contours and protagonists are very different from what she had in mind.

These days, any attempt to address the many issues that define the Middle East and its often tense relations with the West will get nowhere unless it comes to grips with changing political sentiments, activism, legitimacy, and representation throughout the region. This is especially relevant for those who experience persistent failure, or stalemate, or just befuddlement in their dealing with the Arab world. And that would include Israel and the United States — but increasingly, Europe.

Lebanon provides perhaps the region’s most clear example of this evolution, as symbolized by this agreement between the leading Shiite group, Hizbullah, and the Belief and Justice Movement (BJM) — a rather obscure Sunni Islamist Salafist movement, headed by a cousin of a much more renowned Lebanese Salafist leader (who quickly criticized the agreement as meaningless).

The accord signed between Sunni and Shiite Muslims acknowledges that this fracture is the most dangerous in Lebanon and the wider Arab region right now. In the past half-century, recurring fault-lines in Lebanon appeared variously between Christians and Muslims, Palestinians and Lebanese, Syrians and Lebanese, Israelis and Lebanese, or Arab Nationalists/leftists and pro-Western conservatives. Today, aggravated by the Iraq war, but also anchored in older local trends, Sunni-Shiite tensions are the most immediately troubling domestic tension in the region.

The Hizbullah-BJM document banned and denounced all forms of sectarian incitement and “any aggression by a Muslim faction on another Muslim faction,” and also called for confronting the “American agenda.” Its particulars are less important than its symbolic affirmation that Shiite empowerment and Sunni Salafist self-assertion are among the most popular movements spreading throughout the Middle East. It also dramatizes the reality that four other trends or groups that had dominated this region for much of life since the 1920s — secular and leftist-nationalist political parties, government-centered parties, Western-oriented elites, and military regimes — have lost their glamour, impact and credibility.

These four groupings have been vacated in the realms of legitimacy, services, and allegiance, and have been replaced to a large extent by Shiite and Sunni Islamists, some dominant tribal forces, and the private sector. Where Sunni or Shiite Islamists come into contact with foreign armies — Iraqi and Palestinian mainly, but also Lebanese in the 1980s — they also don the mantle of resistance or liberation movements.

Sunni Salafist Islamist movements are most diverse in their ideologies and tactics. They range from criminal terror groups like Al-Qaeda, and smaller cousins like Fateh el-Islam, to community-based peaceful movements that focus on education, charity, and other faith-based service activities that are as popular among American presidential candidates in the United States as they are among Islamists in the Arab world.

What does this mean in everyday life? If you are a stranger walking around South Beirut or South Lebanon with a camera today, you will have to clear your movements with Hizbullah. If you do the same in parts of Tripoli, you will need to do the same with an assortment of Sunni Salafist movements. If you try this in the Jordanian provinces, tribal groups will enquire about you. In central Damascus or other Syrian towns, the security services will check you out. In Dubai, Bahrain or Doha, you will likely encounter a person offering you a cell phone deal or a 30-year low-cost mortgage on a new apartment overlooking a replica of Windsor Castle.

This triumph of Arab sectarianism, security services, and commercialism coexists in a constantly evolving equilibrium of political power, service delivery, military power, and social representation in the Arab world.

Today, assorted Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon make a little deal, mirroring big tensions among them around the Middle East. Tomorrow, the deal might be between labor unions and security services in Egypt; or the American army and tribal leaders in western Iraq; or between the Israelis and Hamas; or militants and the education minister in Yemen — or other new players who will keep emerging from the sands and the urban shadows.

Such will be the case as long as Arab statehood is thin, citizenship is undefined, security is erratic, and basic human services are weak.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2008
Word Count: 824
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BEIRUT — When I returned to live and work in Lebanon some years ago, a wise Lebanese friend advised me to go to Tripoli in north Lebanon if I really wanted to understand the complex forces that drove the country and the region. He was right, as I discovered on several visits to the city. Today that advice is more valid than ever, though sadly the Middle East ’s prevailing politics and ideologies often assert themselves violently.

Here is what Tripoli these days allows you to grasp in one fell swoop:
• the richness and variety of Middle Eastern political culture;
• the complex linkages between local groups and regional and world powers;
• the intersection among economics, religion, ethnicity and ideology;
• the consequences of the convergence of social deprivation and political marginalization;
• the prevalence of violence as a means of expression by Middle Eastern states, opposition groups, and foreign powers;
• the expanding phenomenon of small, localized terrorist groups; and,
• the frailty of the modern Arab state.

As far as I can tell, only the Chinese and Ethiopians are not represented in Tripoli. Everyone else who deals in politics and warfare seems to be a player.

The August 13 bomb in central Tripoli that killed and injured scores of soldiers and civilians was the latest in a string of violent incidents that have increasingly plagued north Lebanon. In the previous two months, local groups largely identified as “pro-government Sunnis” and “pro-Syrian Alawites” have clashed violently, requiring the intervention of the army to separate them. Last summer, the Qaeda-inspired Fateh el-Islam group fought a prolonged battle against the Lebanese army in Nahr el-Barid refugee camp, leaving hundreds dead and the camp demolished. Many Lebanese accuse Syria of unleashing Fateh el-Islam in Lebanon, which the Syrians deny.

The continuing violence in and around Tripoli partly reflects a shift in the center of gravity of Lebanon’s convoluted governance system, from the previous heartland of street fighting and occasional bombings and assassinations in the Beirut and central Mount Lebanon areas. But the forces at play in the north are not merely a spillover from a fatigued and pacified Beirut. The underlying conditions that allow the current political violence to happen have percolated and grown for nearly half a century.

Salafist Islamist movements, for example, have expanded slowly and steadily since the 1960s, mostly focused on non-violent educational, religious and charitable activities. They reflect in part the wider trend of local religious movements that step in to offer services when modern Arab central governments lack the legitimacy or efficacy needed to meet their citizens’ basic needs, in terms of political representation, social services, identity expression, or — in the worst cases — basic physical security. They are also in keeping with the particularly Lebanese tradition of configuring political participation and representation in sectarianism and ethnicity. And they distribute their allegiance and alliances across the political spectrum, making these movements as much about politics as about faith.

The violent Islamist offshoots like Fateh el-Islam, the former Dinniyeh Group, Usbat el-Ansar, and others are a more recent phenomenon. They are partly anchored locally in north Lebanon and some refugee camps around the country, and partly reflect the injection of extremist ideologies from abroad, usually via the radicalizing influences of jihadist movements in Afghanistan and, most recently, Iraq.

Interestingly, various Lebanese have charged that mainstream Salafist Islamists or some of the radical armed groups have received financial support from two opposing quarters: Syria (because it allegedly wants to destabilize and control Lebanon), or Hariri-allied Lebanese quarters and some Arab and Western governments (who allegedly seek to counterbalance or even confront the power of Hizbullah-Syria-Iran). The fact that both accusations seem credible shows just how messy this situation is.

All the negative forces that have transformed the contemporary Middle East into a region of violence, instability and confrontation can be seen at work in north Lebanon: festering and lawless refugee camps, a weak Arab state, populations that turn to religion when modern statehood does not provide for their basic needs, weak local economies that create masses of impoverished people who are susceptible to mobilization by demagogic or extremist movements, and direct external interference by Middle Eastern and Western countries.

That several recent incidents in north Lebanon have targeted the army is particularly troubling, especially since the armed forces in Lebanon have emerged in the past 15 years as both a symbol and a valued, functioning manifestation of the Lebanese people’s desire to reinvigorate their unified state and central government. How quickly Lebanon achieves stable, satisfying statehood seems to depend on four issues: the status of bilateral relations with Syria following the visit of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman to Damascus last week; the ability of the upcoming national dialogue to resolve the imbalance and incongruence between Hizbullah’s significant military capabilities that are outside the authority of the state; the fate of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the state of Iranian-Western and Iranian-Arab ties.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 18 August 2008
Word Count: 826
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Beirut — Few observers expect the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations between the governments of Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert to achieve any significant breakthrough during the remaining months of President George W. Bush’s term. One reason for the low expectations from the negotiations spawned by the Annapolis meeting in the United States last November is the low-key mediating role of the United States itself.

Ample experiences since the 1970s suggest that active external mediation is essential for success, due to low trust among the main protagonists and the need for foreign security guarantees and development aid that typically seal a peace deal in this region. Whatever happens in coming months, the stage is set for the next American administration to play an active role in Arab-Israeli peace-making — should it decide to do so.

The odds are that it will, for two key reasons: Arab-Israeli peace-making can impact positively and quickly on almost every other American national interest in the Middle East, and American abstinence from peace-making — as during the past eight years — contributes to aggravating multiple local conflicts and radicalizing trends throughout the region.

If the next American administration takes the plunge, it will have a timely, honest and very practical handbook on which to draw for guidance. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has just published a compact but rich little book entitled Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (USIP, 2008, 190 pp). It is the work of a study group of respected scholars and former officials who reviewed America’s involvement in Arab-Israeli peace-making during the last three administrations, covering the Bush-Clinton-Bush eras since 1990.

Headed by former ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer and USIP senior research associate Scott B. Lasensky, and including William Quandt, Steven Spiegel, and Shibley Telhami, the group interviewed some 150 officials and activists in the United States and the Middle East to assess their views of Washington’s role as a mediator since the end of the Cold War. They identified “an alarming pattern of mismanaged diplomacy…both strategic and tactical… US involvement has been characterized by fits and starts, errors of omission and commission, and fundamental weaknesses in policy formulation and execution. Rhetoric all too often has replaced action…Opportunities were squandered, potential breakthroughs missed, and meaningful advances stalled unnecessarily.”

Noting that Arab-Israeli peace is a strategic American interest and that Washington’s direct involvement is indispensable for success, the study gives George H.W. Bush’s administration higher marks than the Clinton or George W. Bush teams. It then offers ten lessons learned that should be required reading for any American or other external mediator in the Middle East.

The most important ones are: US policy should be made in the United States, not in foreign countries (like Israel, it specifically said). The United States should take initiatives and not only respond to openings, and should transcend incrementalism and aim instead for an end-game, not shying away from offering its own proposals.

Washington should play a strong role as monitor of compliance with agreements reached. Policy should be made and implemented through a diverse and experienced negotiating team. Broad and bipartisan domestic support is needed for successful US policy-making but policy should not be “held captive to the agendas of domestic groups” (where the study group again pointed out examples of inordinate influence of pro-Israeli groups).

Special envoys are useful if they are credible with all parties, enjoy White House support, have a broad mandate and operate within a strategic diplomatic context (Dennis Ross was one of the envoys mentioned by name as not being seen as credible by all sides).

Washington should use its full diplomatic toolbox judiciously (summitry, economic aid, unofficial diplomacy, assurances and understandings), with strategic objectives in mind, and not only to buy time.

The report’s gently devastating critique of actual American performance is coupled with a call for US re-engagement, with several recommendations: the next US administration should make Arab-Israeli peace-making a high priority based on a strategy to end the conflict, by locking in the gains of the past while balancing bilateral with multilateral efforts, using nontraditional diplomacy, and reassessing the utility of existing mechanisms such as the Quartet.

A final note addresses the “fact of life” that “Israel plays an outsized role in US politics and diplomacy.” The challenge is how to use the US-Israeli special relationship to promote peace for all by crafting a “fair and effective US role”, rather than diminishing that special relationship.

The report calls on the next administration to use experts who are as familiar with Arab societies as they are with Israel, so as to “restore the US role to its historical purpose of helping the parties to achieve their core requirements.”

The USIP should be commended for this study that reflects the best American tradition of honest self-assessment anchored in facts, rather than partisan ideology. The next administration would do well to read it and ponder its recommendations seriously.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 13 August 2008
Word Count: 816
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