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Patrick Seale, “How Israel Manipulates US Policy in the Middle East”

April 30, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

On April 23, a senior Israeli officer, Brig Gen Utai Brun, head of research at army intelligence, made a serious accusation against Syria. In a lecture at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, he declared: “To the best of our professional understanding, the Syrian regime has used lethal chemical weapons against gunmen in a series of incidents in recent months…” General Brun gave no evidence for his accusation and produced no physical proof, but he added that the Israel Defence Forces believed Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on several occasions, including a specific attack on March 19.

As it happened, General Brun made his accusation against Syria during a three-day visit to Israel by America’s new Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel—a man whose appointment Israel’s supporters in the United States had sought to prevent. Some Jewish organisations had come close to calling him anti-Semitic. Only by eating humble pie did Hagel manage to have his appointment confirmed. He now clearly hopes to put an end to his quarrel with America’s pro-Israeli lobby.

On this his first visit to Israel as Defence Secretary, he announced that Israel was to receive a rich haul of advanced U.S. weapons—air refuelling tankers, cutting-edge radar and the V-22 Osprey ‘tiltrotor’ aircraft, an advanced plane so far denied to all other US allies. But Hagel’s generous gesture was to no avail. Although Israel was evidently delighted with the weapons, this did not inhibit it from accusing Syria of using chemical weapons—clearly in the hope of provoking a U.S. attack on that country.

Unpleasantly surprised by General Brun’s claim that Syria had used chemical weapons, Hagel declared the very next day—on April 23 — that he had discussed Syria’s chemical weapons with Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon, but that neither of them had said that Syria had actually used such weapons. “They did not give me that assessment,” he said. Clearly, Hagel was angry that Israel was putting pressure on the United States to intervene in Syria. The Israeli authorities may well have thought that Hagel, still recovering from the beating pro-Israelis had given him in Washington, would not dare dispute Israel’s assessment.

What was Israel trying to achieve by inciting the United States to attack Syria? It would undoubtedly like President Bashar al-Assad to be replaced by a more pliant figure. But Israel is also worried that Jabhat al-Nusra, a violent branch of Al-Qaida, might come to power if Bashar were to fall. By accusing Syria of using chemical weapons, Israel’s goal seems to have been to trigger an early American armed intervention with the double objective of ousting Bashar from office, while preventing his replacement by the redoubtable Jabhat al-Nusra.

Israel is well aware that Obama—having pulled American forces out of Iraq and planning to do much the same in Afghanistan by 2014 — is most reluctant to commit US troops to yet another war. Nevertheless, by accusing Assad of using chemical weapons, Israel was clearly hoping to lure Obama into a Syrian campaign. Obama had, in fact, laid himself open to just such pressure by saying that any Syrian use of chemical weapons would cross a “red line.”

Moscow was quick to leap to Syria’s defence. On April 28, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the Russian journal Global Affairs, wrote: “Moscow does not believe that Assad may use chemical weapons: he is not a madman to ask for such trouble.”

In fact, Israel’s objectives may have been even wider than triggering an American attack on Syria. For the moment, it is greatly satisfied that most of its Arab neighbours are in deep trouble.

  • Syria is in the grip of a civil war, which has already claimed more than 70,000 lives.
  • Iraq seems to be on the verge of major Sunni-Shi‘a clashes, while still struggling to recover from America’s long occupation.
  • Iran is under painful sanctions because the United States suspects it—on little evidence—of developing nuclear weapons.
  • Egypt is on its knees, wholly preoccupied with its own economic problems, and in no mood to endanger its peace treaty with Israel.
  • Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf States seem more worried by Iran than by Israel.
  • Israelis are also delighted that, thanks to President Obama’s mediation, the United States-Israel-Turkey coalition has been restored, and is set to be a powerful force in Middle East affairs.

All this is very good news for Israel. Nevertheless, its dominance is not total.

It still faces something of a challenge from the Iran-Syria-Hizballah axis. Iran may be facing severe sanctions, but it is far from defeated. Assad’s Syria may be in dire straits, but it is fighting back, and continues to enjoy strong Russian support. Hizballah, Lebanon’s robust Shi‘a movement, may be under intense pressure from militant Sunni groups, but it remains the most powerful force in Lebanon.

Aware that their attempts have—for the moment—failed to push the United States into an armed confrontation with Syria, Israeli spokesmen are already back-tracking. In New York, Yuval Steinitz, minister of strategic and intelligence affairs, was reported as saying on April 29: “We never asked, nor did we encourage, the United States to take military action against Syria.” Iran, he declared, not Syria was the “problem No. 1 of our generation.”

These exchanges demonstrate Israel’s efforts to incite the United States against Israel’s enemies—and also the speed with which it withdraws when its covert efforts fail to produce the hoped for results. Israel is well aware that the United States is at present extremely reluctant to attack either Iran or Syria. Israel may, therefore, have to content itself with continued U.S. pressure on these two countries—short of actual war. The truth is that Israel may well think that its most threatening enemy today is neither Iran nor Syria, but rather Hizballah in Lebanon. It was Hizballah that fought Israel to something like a draw in 2006 and which, to this day, represents its most dangerous neighbour.

It is interesting to note that Israel’s only armed intervention so far in the Syrian civil war occurred on Saturday, April 27, when it attacked a convoy making its way to Hizballah in Lebanon from Syria’s chemical weapons facility, the Scientific Studies and Research Center at Barzeh near Damascus. Israel’s evident fear is that any acquisition by Hizballah of Syrian chemical weapons would give the Lebanese Shi‘a movement considerable immunity from attack.

By insisting that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons, General Brun’s aim seems to have been to persuade the United States to destroy both the Syrian regime and its Hizballah ally. Israel wants no limits on the extraordinary freedom it has long enjoyed to attack its neighbours at will and never be hit back. From Israel’s point of view, if America could be persuaded to do the job for it, so much the better. If not this time, another occasion will surely arise.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 30 April 2013
Word Count: 1,146
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Patrick Seale, “Time for a Settlement in Syria”

April 23, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

Most objective observers of the Syrian conflict now realise that neither President Bashar al-Assad nor his enemies can hope to win an outright victory. By continuing to fight, they are simply exhausting themselves and ruining their country.

The war has torn Syria apart, caused vast loss of life, displaced a large part of its population, inflicted great physical damage, and even threatened the country’s continued future as a state within recognised borders.

President Assad’s enemies have seized control of large parts of the north and east of the country, as well as of several border crossings with Turkey. About half of Aleppo—the country’s second city—is in rebel hands. But the regime is fighting back, and has recently scored some successes, although at great cost to the civilian population.

Well over a million panic-stricken Syrians have fled the country and taken refuge in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and even, further afield, in Egypt. The number is increasing by the day. Another ten million people—about 40 per cent of Syria’s population—survive as best they can in rebel-controlled territory. Most rebel fighters remain encamped in their home areas, which they hope to defend against regime troops. But, as they lack anti-aircraft weapons, they are unable to protect their civilian populations from bombardment by government planes.

Created when Britain and France divided the Middle East between them after the First World War, the Syrian republic is now in danger of falling apart. What are the choices? Either the antagonists will persist in their life-and-death struggle, or they will decide to seek some sort of a compromise, which could save their country from possible partition. However, if the fighting continues, it will undoubtedly bring an end to Syria’s traditional role as a major player on the Middle East scene, and as the one Arab country which has been able to hold a ruthless and ambitious Israel more or less in check. That is the choice facing both the regime and its enemies.

Unfortunately, the latest developments do not seem to favour an early settlement of the Syrian crisis. In recent weeks, Moaz al-Khatib, a former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, emerged as the head of an exiled opposition body called the Syrian National Coalition. Sickened by the violence which was destroying his country, he declared that he was prepared to negotiate with the Syrian government—without first insisting that Bashar al-Assad step down. Hard-liners have angrily contested this moderate position. After much discussion and controversy, Moaz al-Khatib was forced to step down.

He has been replaced—it would appear only for the next six months—by Georges Sabra, 66, a Syrian Communist of Greek Orthodox background, who has been active in opposition politics since the 1970s. He was jailed in Syria for eight years from 1987 to 1995, before going underground. His appointment is probably intended to wean some Christians away from Assad’s regime. But, although a brave man, Georges Sabra is not a major political figure. He may not have the necessary political weight or negotiating skills to contribute to a resolution of the conflict.

In fact, unlike Moaz al-Khatib, he has bitterly refused any compromise or negotiation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This is not an intelligent or constructive attitude, since it would seem that neither side can hope to win a decisive victory. The time has surely come for Syria’s antagonists to seek a compromise which will save their country from further calamities.

External powers have contributed to the present disaster. They, too, must decide whether to press forward in the hope of making gains which might bolster their own interests, or whether, on the contrary, they should encourage the warring factions in Syria to put up their guns and come to the conference table.

After more than two years of often savage war, with the loss of at least 70,000 lives and possibly many more, it is surely time to find a way out of this destructive conflict. The only sensible solution would seem to be a negotiation between the regime and its enemies under the joint auspices of both the United States and Russia, the two major external powers who, by taking sides, have so far served to keep the conflict alive.

Both Washington and Moscow are now beginning to understand that continued fighting is no longer in their interest, since the only beneficiary would be Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al-Sham (the Front for the Defence of the Syrian People), a rebel force which has emerged as the most ruthless, the most disciplined and—because of its blind devotion to militant Islam—the most ideological of all President Assad’s opponents. It is, in fact, none other than Al-Qaida, under the assumed name of Jabhat al-Nusra. This violent Islamist movement has distinguished itself by slaughtering prisoners and carrying out dozens of devastating suicide bombings across the country, including several in central Damascus itself.

Jabhat al-Nusra was widely believed to be planning a major assault on Damascus in the coming weeks. But this attack seems to have been put temporarily on hold, as the Jabhat wrestles with the problem of having been identified as an outgrowth of Al-Qaida.

In Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere—and also in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states—the will to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad is still there. But there is beginning to be some hesitation in helping the opposition destroy the Syrian regime if it means putting Al-Qaida in power in its place. It is clearly in no country’s interest—whether in the East or the West – for this violent movement to entrench itself in Syria and further destabilise an important but already fragile region.

Appalled by the widespread turmoil, many Syrians are anxious to spare their country further destruction. One organisation which, from the very start, refused to take part in armed conflict, and which has pressed for negotiations with the regime without preconditions, is the so-called National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. Its main spokesman, Haytham Manna, has from the beginning opposed foreign intervention in Syria. He has repeatedly appealed for a negotiated solution to the Syrian war. He has bitterly opposed the recent decision taken in Istanbul to form a Syrian government in exile, as well as the move, driven by Qatar, to give Syria’s seat in the Arab League to the opposition. For long, Manna was virtually ignored. But, as casualties have mounted in Syria and as a cruel stalemate seems to be taking hold, his National Coordination Committee has gained ground and is at last beginning to be heard.

It is surely time for Syrians to unite to save their country from further senseless destruction.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 23 April 2013
Word Count: 1,109
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Patrick Seale, “Embattled Assad Enjoys a Stroke of Luck”

April 16, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

A public dispute between two prominent Islamic fighting groups—one in Syria, the other in Iraq—has given Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad a moment of much-needed relief. Although it is too early to say for certain, we may be witnessing a crucial moment in his battered fortunes. Fears about the sort of regime that might come after him seem to have aroused doubts among his Western critics about the wisdom of overthrowing him—at least for the time being.

As the armed struggle in Syria enters its third year, Assad’s most dangerous opponent is undoubtedly Jabhat al-Nusra, a highly-disciplined Islamic force several thousand strong which, since its formation early in 2012, has scored notable victories in the north and east of the country under the leadership of its shadowy commander, Abu Muhammad al-Golani. One of its recent successes has been to capture Raqqa in eastern Syria, the first capital of Syria’s fourteen governorates to fall to Islamic rule.

Jabhat al-Nusra has emerged in recent weeks as the most ruthless, the most disciplined and—because of its devotion to Islam—the most ideological of Assad’s opponents. It has inspired great fear in the population by slaughtering prisoners and carrying out dozens of devastating suicide bombings, including several in central Damascus itself.

This fighting group was long suspected of closely resembling Al-Qaida, the radical and violent Islamic movement which, since the death of its founder Osama bin Laden, has fallen under the control of one of his former colleagues, the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri. In recent months, Al-Qaida managed to establish a clandestine branch in Iraq where—with the evident blessing of Al-Zawahiri himself—it assumed the ambitious name of the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’, under the leadership of a certain Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Needless to say, Iraq’s embattled Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has no tolerance whatsoever for such an overt challenge to his authority and is evidently committed to rooting out all such threats, especially when they come from dangerous Sunni terrorists in his domain.

Such was the situation when, to universal surprise, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced on April 9 that his Iraqi Islamist movement had merged with Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra to form a new grouping to which he gave the ambitious name of ‘Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Levant.’ He even went so far as to claim that the ties between the two movements were of long standing, since they had been formed by men—many of them Syrian jihadis—whom the Assad regime had encouraged to go to Iraq to fight American troops there from 2003 to 2011. Once the Americans had departed, some of these men had made their way back to Syria, where they formed Jabhat al-Nusra, turning their guns on their former benefactors in Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Indeed, to demonstrate the close bonds between the Syrian and Iraqi Islamic fighters, Al-Baghdadi went on to say that Al-Qaida in Iraq had been making a monthly contribution to Jabhat al-Nusra’s budget in Syria, and had itself chosen Abu Muhammad al-Golani to lead it, after advising him on the plans and strategy needed to defeat Bashar al-Assad.

This announcement from Iraq has clearly come as a most unwelcome shock to Jabhat al-Nusra. While admitting its allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Syrian opposition movement has hurried to make clear that it had no prior knowledge of Al-Baghdadi’s announcement and that it had not been consulted or briefed about it. Evidently deeply embarrassed, it insisted that it totally rejected the notion that Syria and Iraq form a united Islamic state under a single Islamic ruler. In continuing the fight against Bashar al-Assad, it was evidently determined to use its own name and its own flag—and avoid being tarnished by too close an association with Al-Qaida.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, the mysterious Abu Muhammad al-Golani, is clearly well aware that the statement by Iraq’s Al-Qaidi leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has done him no good at all. To be labelled an Al-Qaida affiliate in today’s climate is by no means an asset. On the contrary, it has served to alert the Western world that Al-Qaida is the hidden force behind the Syrian uprising and that it stands to benefit—and perhaps even come to power—if and when Bashar al-Assad were to fall. This realisation seems to have caused the United States and its Western allies to pause in their campaign against Assad’s regime. In other words, Al-Baghdadi seems inadvertently to have done Assad a great service.

The crisis has demonstrated that many of Assad’s opponents in Syria have no intention to be cast as hard-line Islamists. Indeed, Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition and a former Imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, was quick to declare on Facebook that “The bottom line is that Al-Qaida ideology does not suit us.” He seemed to be saying that, while a majority of Syrians wanted freedom, they had no wish to replace Assad’s authoritarian but essentially secular rule by that of an ultra-fundamentalist Islamic dictatorship.

A recent study by Yezid Sayegh, of the Carnegie Middle East Centre, has shown that “significant swathes of Syria’s 1-1.5 million civil servants, 2-2.5 million members of the ruling Baath Party, and the 2.5-3 million strong Alawi community who provide the backbone of the security services and armed forces” are far from ready to abandon the Assad regime. Syria’s minorities—Alawis but also Christians, Druze, Ismailis and other smaller communities—make up some 30 per cent of the population. The prospect of an Al-Qaida victory arouses fears among many of them that their lives would be in danger. But it would also be unwelcome to many Sunnis, especially the more liberal among them—including prominent men such as Moaz al-Khatib himself.

For peace to return to Syria, some reconfiguring of power relationships between its different communities will evidently be necessary. The intelligence services and officer corps, dominated by Alawis over the past several decades, will need to be restructured so as to give moderate Muslims a greater share of power. External powers, Arab and non-Arab, will need to put their ambitions and rivalries aside and join forces in presiding over a Syrian settlement, which will keep fanatics of all communities at bay. Ancient minorities will need to be protected. The more than one million Syrian refugees that have fled the country will need to be brought home and rehoused. Massive financial aid, very probably from oil and gas-rich Gulf States, will need to be provided to rebuild Syria’s shattered towns and villages.

It will evidently require statesmanship in Washington and Moscow, as well as in overheated European and Middle Eastern capitals, to bring the slaughter in Syria to an end and rebuild the country as a peaceful haven for its rich mixture of communities. For the moment, however, this vision remains little more than a dream.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 16 April 2013
Word Count: 1,140
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Patrick Seale, “Can the United States Strike a Deal with Iran?”

April 9, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

The latest round of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 held in the Kazakh capital of Almati on April 5-6 is said to have been the frankest and most detailed so far. For the very first time, the talks included a direct U.S.-Iranian exchange of some 30- to 40-minutes — between Wendy Sherman, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Dr Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and secretary of its Supreme National Security Council. Sherman is reported to have asked Jalili a series of specific questions to which he is said to have responded in considerable detail.

Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, who chaired the P5+1 group of delegates — from Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States plus Germany—admitted that the two sides remained far apart “on the substance” of the negotiations. But she was by no means gloomy or dismissive. “We have talked in much greater detail than ever before,” she said, “and our efforts will continue in that direction…. For the first time that I’ve seen, [there was] a real back and forth between us, where we were able to discuss details, to pose questions, and to get answers directly.” The participants, she said, would now “go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process.” She would be in touch with Dr Jalili — in a matter of “days, not months” — to see if the gap could be narrowed and how to go forward.

For its part, Iran was said to be eager to schedule a new meeting, but, given the considerable differences between the two sides, the P5+1 said they wanted to avoid “talks for talks’ sake.” It therefore seems unlikely that there will be another round of negotiations before Iran’s important June 14 elections, which will bring Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial 8-year presidency to a close.

If one were to listen to Catherine Ashton, the outlook for a deal with Iran would seem reasonably hopeful. But is this a true picture? The major uncertainty concerns America’s intentions. It is by no means clear whether Washington truly wants a deal with Iran or whether its covert aim is to bring down the Islamic Republic. Certainly, this is Iran’s profound suspicion, which is not altogether surprising considering its long quarrel with the United States, which extends back to the birth of the Islamic republic in 1979. Just as many people in the United States suspect that Iran is spinning out the talks to gain time for its covert nuclear programme, so a great many Iranians believe the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith. They suspect the United States is using the pretext of Iran’s nuclear programme to impose ever more crippling sanctions on it with the aim of bringing down the Islamic regime. There is certainly no indication yet that the United States recognises that a deal with Iran must inevitably require a degree of compromise — very probably one allowing the Islamic Republic to enrich uranium for industrial purposes under strict international supervision.

Catherine Ashton is patently well-intentioned. She seems to have managed to dispel some of Iran’s darkest suspicions. Whereas much American comment about Iran is hostile, she has given every indication of wanting the talks to succeed. Breaking with the U.S. tendency to portray Iran as a sinister adversary, she has made a real effort to befriend Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief negotiator, to understand his concerns and break with the language of condemnation and threat too often adopted by U.S. officials and commentators. It is by no means clear, however, whether the United States government shares her positive approach. There are powerful forces in the United States which do not want a deal with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

For one thing, Israel, which exerts considerable influence over America’s Middle East policy, wants to close down Iran’s nuclear industry altogether and makes no secret of its readiness to use force to achieve this aim. It is totally opposed to any compromise which would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium. Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, has been quick to dismiss the talks at Almaty as a waste of time — indeed as a failure.

“This failure was predictable,” he declared. “Israel has already warned that the Iranians are exploiting the talks in order to play for time while making additional progress in enriching uranium for an atomic bomb. The time has come for the world to take a more assertive stand and make it unequivocally clear to the Iranians that the negotiations games have run their course.” Steinitz — and, behind him, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu — have pressed the United States to set a red line for Iran, insisting that it totally abandon its civilian nuclear programme. The excitable Steinitz has even said the closure must take place “in a few weeks, a month” at the most. He has warned that Iran would face immediate attack if it failed to do so!

U.S. President Barack Obama has adopted a cooler tone, arguing that it would take at least as year, if not longer, for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. But it is by no means clear how far he can depart from Israel’s more pressing agenda. In the circumstances, the negotiations behind the scenes between the United States and Israel may well be as important as those between Iran and the P5+1 — if not more so.

Iran has always insisted on international recognition of its ‘right’ to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its home soil. From the start, this has been its position of principle. “What we are insisting on is our right to enrich,” Saeed Jalili told the press. “This is equally true for 5 percent or 20 percent. You know well that 20 percent enriched uranium is used for medical purposes. One million Iranian patients are using those isotopes… Today the fuel is exclusively used for humanitarian matters, medical purposes, exclusively peaceful purposes.” Jalili explained that Iran’s proposals required recognising “our right to enrich and ending behaviours which have every indication of enmity toward the Iranian people… In consideration of our new proposals, it is now up to the P5+1 to demonstrate its willingness and sincerity to take appropriate confidence-building steps in the future.”

Nevertheless, at Almaty, the Iranian delegation showed some flexibility in suggesting that, as a “confidence-building” measure, Iran might be prepared to freeze production of some of its enriched uranium if, in return, the West were to lift its economic sanctions. Iran, however, seems unlikely to agree to close its enrichment plant at Fordo, buried deep in a mountain, unless its legal right to nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is acknowledged.

Does this indicate that Iran and the P5+1 are at a dangerous stalemate? It is to be hoped that the departure from office next June of Iran’s pugnacious President Ahmadinejad will ease the way to an international agreement, which will spare the region the horrors of war.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 09 April 2013
Word Count: 1,157
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Patrick Seale, “Grave Threats to the Middle East”

April 2, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

The Middle East is experiencing a period of unusual violence and instability. Careful observers of the region are well aware that a major restructuring of regional power relationships is taking place which, if carried further, could have radical consequences. It might even result in a redrawing of the frontiers of the states created by the Western powers almost a century ago after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.

The present situation is one of great complexity marked by a number of vicious and overlapping power struggles. Consider for a moment the impact of the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation, engineered to universal surprise by U.S. President Barack Obama during his visit to Israel last month. Three years of Israeli-Turkish hostility were suddenly brought to an end when, prompted by Obama, Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu apologised for the Israeli attack on a Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, which had sought to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza in May 2010. It will be recalled that Israeli commandos had stormed the ship, killing nine Turks on board.

An immediate result of the American-brokered reconciliation was the creation of a U.S.-Israeli-Turkish coalition, united around the goal of bringing down President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus. Indeed, on the eve of Obama’s visit to the Middle East, his newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry had given a clue to American objectives when—referring to Assad’s determination to cling on to power—he had said: “My goal is to see us change his calculation.”

However, Assad’s overthrow may be no more than the first objective of the new U.S.-Israeli-Turkish coalition. Its wider aim would seem to be to destroy the Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah alliance which has managed, over the past 30 years, to impose limits on the regional ambitions of both the United States and Israel. Indeed, the alliance is now under threat since each of its members finds itself in great difficulty: Iran is under painful economic siege by the United States and under threat of military attack by Israel; Syria is in the throes of a hugely destructive civil war; while Hizballah, bereft of its two major allies, finds itself on the defensive, even in Lebanon its home territory.

In other words, the new US-Israeli-Turkish coalition would seem to be on the verge of achieving a spectacular success which would confirm its status as the dominant regional axis. However, all is not smooth sailing since this new power grouping faces a challenge from a rival Russian-Iranian-Syrian axis which—with support from Iraq, China and even from distant Algeria—is determined to prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime and the emergence of a new U.S.-dominated system in the Middle East.

This power struggle between the two major groupings – United States-Israel-Turkey versus Russia-Iran-Syria – is by no means the only game in town. For one thing, the partners in the first coalition do not share exactly the same objectives. The United States detests Iran’s independent stance and wants to bring it to heel, with a view to ending Tehran’s challenge to America’s regional hegemony. Israel’s ambitions are more specific: It is determined to put a stop to Iran’s nuclear activities—which it suspects are not entirely peaceful—in order to protect its own regional monopoly of nuclear weapons.

As for Turkey, it had ambitious hopes, before the present crisis, of heading a regional grouping to its south composed of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Visas between them were abolished. Turkey evidently hoped to extend this alliance to the Gulf States in the belief that a land route across Syria would help its businessmen win major construction contracts in the affluent oil-rich Gulf.

These ambitions have now proved illusory. Instead, Turkey finds itself facing two distinct threats—from a huge flood of Syrian refugees and from Syria’s ambitious Kurds who dream of uniting with Turkey’s own Kurds in a bid for regional Kurdish statehood. To head off this threat, Turkey has been making unprecedented overtures to its own Kurds which, if successful, could lead to the release of the Kurdish leader Abdallah Ocalan from his island prison where he has languished since his capture in Nairobi (Kenya) by Turkish Special Forces in 1999. Last month, on the occasion of the Kurdish New Year, Ocalan called on Kurdish rebels to lay down their arms, a move which seemed to herald a new departure in Kurdish relations with Ankara, and could even lead to the Kurds being given a measure of autonomy in Turkey.

Syria lies at the heart of a brutal power play. Its destruction and dismemberment could rewrite the rules of the regional game and might even threaten some of the borders of the new states which emerged after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire nearly a century ago. Lebanon, for one, finds itself in extreme danger. Any change of regime in Syria would threaten its fragile stability by upsetting the existing balance of power between its rival communities. Jordan is also under threat. Weak and vulnerable, it has been unable to resist pressures to join the U.S.-Israeli-Turkish campaign against Bashar al-Asad. Indeed, some of Syria’s enemies are now being armed and trained in Jordan. Yet, at the same time, a massive influx of Syrian refugees is threatening Jordan’s precarious internal balance. Indeed, if Israel continues its seizure and settlement of the Palestinian West Bank, Jordan might one day have to cope with a new flood of Palestinian refugees. Every Jordanian remembers the lapidary phrase of the former Israeli leader Ariel Sharon: “Jordan is Palestine.”

It is evident that the region faces a period of enormous turmoil, with potentially far-reaching consequences for its stability and prosperity. Such are the dangers that, instead of fighting each other, the United States and Russia should join in imposing a ceasefire on the warring parties. No doubt some extremist groups will want to continue fighting but they should be isolated and curbed, while all those ready to talk should be brought to the conference table. The aim should be to encourage a peaceful change of government—perhaps even of regime—in Damascus, in such a way as to rebuild the shattered country, bring the refugees home and guarantee the protection of Syria’s ancient and numerous minorities.

If the major powers fail to impose something of this sort—with generous financial help from the Gulf States for the rebuilding of Syria—it is easy to predict even greater communal violence, the flight of even more refugees, together with the massacre of vulnerable communities. This would not only destroy the Syrian Arab Republic, as we know it, within its present borders, but could have catastrophic consequences for the whole region.

 

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

 

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Released: 02 April 2013

Word Count: 1,108

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Patrick Seale, “Obama’s Middle East Visit Dashes Arab Hopes”

March 26, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

President Barack Obama’s brief visit to the Middle East has given the Arab world a brutal lesson in power politics. Every word he uttered in Israel, every gesture he made, served to illustrate the unprecedented closeness of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, as well as his disregard for Arab interests and his evident reluctance to give the Palestine cause any serious or sustained attention.

Rarely if ever has an American President shown such intense concern for Israel’s welfare and such casual indifference for the Arabs.

The visit to Israel and its Arab neighbours marks an important moment in Obama’s presidency. It sends a clear message that he is not prepared to engage in a fight with powerful pro-Israeli forces deeply entrenched in American government and society. To the Arabs, it signals that resolving the Palestine problem is no longer his priority. He seems prepared to leave it to the next incumbent of the White House, whoever that might be.

No doubt John Kerry, America’s new Secretary of State, will go through the motions of addressing the Palestine problem for a while, but it would be naïve to expect any real progress without vigorous and sustained presidential attention, and that now seems highly unlikely.

Many Arabs had thought that Obama, on this his first presidential visit to the region, would give fresh impetus to the search for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement — even at this eleventh hour. Their disappointment has been bitter. They had failed to grasp how the evolving power relationships — in the region itself and also in Washington — had undermined their interests and hardened the resolve of Israel’s land-hungry leaders not to give an inch.

The truth is that the Arabs’ attention over the past two years has been fully engrossed by the political upheavals in their own societies. Revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, as well as the bitter civil war in Syria, have absorbed Arab attention, virtually blotting out everything else. The Arabs have failed to grasp that their revolutions — whatever promise they may hold of a better future — have for the moment at least gravely weakened them, reducing their influence on the international stage.

It is, therefore, not surprising that, on this visit to the Middle East, Obama felt no obligation to calm Arab fears or help the Palestinians towards their longed-for independence. Instead, he devoted himself entirely to celebrating Israel’s achievements as the region’s most powerful and dynamic actor — as well as hailing its ever closer ties with the United States. No doubt he felt free to flatter Israel and offend the Arabs because of the lamentable state in which much of the Arab world now finds itself.

As a handsome parting gift to Netanyahu, Obama brokered a peace deal between Turkey and Israel, putting an end to the three-year feud between them. It will be recalled that their quarrel dates back to May 2010 when Israel attacked and boarded a Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, which was seeking to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Nine Turks on board the ship were killed. During his visit to Israel this month, Obama persuaded Netanyahu to issue a public apology to Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, together with a promise of compensation, thus putting an end to the quarrel.

The sudden and dramatic Israeli-Turkish reconciliation has come as a bitter blow to the Arabs. They had thought that their alliance with Turkey would help them stand up to Israel. Instead, Obama has brokered an alliance between the United States, Israel and Turkey which is intended to dominate the region and dictate terms to the Arabs.

Indeed, the Arab heartland has rarely seemed so weak and vulnerable:

• Egypt is today close to bankruptcy, a condition which severely limits its regional influence. Once the most powerful Arab country, it is today a victim of long years of authoritarian rule and of a population explosion. When Nasser’s Free Officers took power in 1952, there were about 18m Egyptians; today there are 85m. Egypt desperately needs international credits and is dependent on American support to get them. It cannot afford to show sympathy for Hamas in Gaza since the United States — pandering to Israel — considers it a terrorist organisation.

• Iraq has far from recovered from the American invasion of 2003, engineered and driven by pro-Israeli neo-cons, and from the nine-year occupation which followed. Now under Shia leadership, and allied to Iran, it is a long way from recovering its once influential place in Arab affairs. It has virtually lost control of its Kurdish territories and is being torn apart by Sunni-Shia strife.

• Syria is in the grip of a brutal civil war, which threatens to overthrow its secular Ba‘thist regime, in power since 1963. If the regime is toppled, Syria could then be ruled by hard-line Islamists who are leading the revolt against President Bashar al-Asad. More probably, however, the country could be partitioned into small confessional units, each looking desperately to its own defence. So great is the human and material damage Syria has suffered in these past two years that it seems unlikely that it will recover its long-standing role as a barrier to Israeli power in the Levant.

• Under Israeli pressure, the United States is subjecting Iran to a cruel siege. This has greatly enfeebled the Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance which, over the past three decades, had attempted to keep Israeli power in check. Today the alliance is in grave danger of collapse: Iran is battling against crippling sanctions, Syria faces dismemberment, while a nervous Hizballah contemplates the potential loss of its two external patrons. In Jerusalem on March 21, Obama blatantly embraced Israel’s point of view by calling on foreign governments to brand Hizballah as a ‘terrorist organisation’. Blinded by their fear of Iran and puffed up by their vast income from oil and gas, a number of Arab Gulf states have also joined in the effort to dismantle the Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance and rob it of its regional influence. They may live to regret it.

What sense, therefore, can one make of the overall picture? How to explain Israel’s arrogant self-confidence and its cold-hearted refusal to allow the Palestinians a mini-state of their own? Part at least of the answer must surely lie in Egypt’s insolvency; in the deep divisions in Iraqi society, scarred by a decade of conflict; in Syria’s cruel civil war; and in Iran’s struggle to survive harsh American sanctions.

By all accounts, Arab public opinion has been shocked by Obama’s extravagant love affair with Israel. It was not what the Arabs had expected. In their innocence, they had thought the American President would put on a show of neutrality and do his best to promote a settlement of the Palestine problem. They had not realised — or had forgotten — how little influence the Arab voice has in Washington and how their own long-running and still unfinished revolutions have sapped their energies and undermined their international influence. The awakening has been rude.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 March 2013
Word Count: 1,148
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Patrick Seale, “Forgotten Victims of the War on Terror”

March 19, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

Barely a month after Al-Qaida’s devastating 11 September 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York and on the Pentagon near Washington, a maddened and enraged America attacked and invaded Afghanistan. The aim was to punish Afghanistan for giving shelter to Al-Qaida, a radical Islamic group responsible for the unprecedented terrorist assault on the United States, which killed nearly 3,000 people.

Hell bent on revenge, U.S. President George W Bush proclaimed a Global War on Terror. The 21st Century thus began with a great outburst of violence and counter-violence, which a dozen years later shows little sign of abating.

The American war on Afghanistan shattered much of that country, killed hundreds of thousands of its citizens and is still unfinished a dozen years later. The United States and Britain then attacked Iraq in 2003. The reasons for doing so were fraudulent because Iraq had had nothing to do with Al-Qaida’s terrorism. But pro-Israeli neo-cons in the U.S. administration seized the chance to destroy a leading Arab country, which might have challenged Israel’s regional hegemony. By the time the United States finally withdrew in 2011, Iraqi civilian casualties were estimated at well over one million and material destruction immense. As the country wrestles with the painful task of political and physical reconstruction, it has fallen victim to Sunni-Shia quarrels, which threaten to tear it apart once again.

Under President Barack Obama, the United States has continued to kill Muslims it considers hostile — in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other places across the globe, usually resorting to strikes against distant targets by pilotless armed drones. Large numbers of innocent civilians have been among the casualties, inevitably stoking violent anti-American feeling among relatives and friends of the victims.

These violent events across the Middle East — which are now spreading to the Sahel in North Africa — have dominated the first years of this century. One way or another, they have all been triggered, and been publicly justified, by Al-Qaida’s 9/11 assault on the United States. Yet an inescapable fact is that a great many victims of these retaliatory wars were innocent Muslims, who had nothing to do with Al-Qaida but were swept up in the security frenzy of the time.

Over the past dozen years, many Muslims in Britain and America have faced discrimination, harassment and years of incarceration without trial just because they are Muslims. The secret war against them has passed largely unnoticed and unreported, largely because opinion is still outraged by Al-Qaida’s violence. But their plight — and the devastating impact it has had on their wives and families – caught the attention and aroused the conscience of the British writer Victoria Brittain. Her book, Shadow Lives, which examines the painful lives of these victims of counter-terror, is a heart-wrenching work to which she brings the passion and the careful investigative skills which made her reputation on the British daily newspaper, The Guardian.

With barely suppressed anger, she describes how, after 9/11, George W. Bush and Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair launched “what was effectively an anti-Muslim crusade” — including the right to arrest, indefinitely detain or deport anyone, even if they had committed no crime, as well as massive surveillance of mosques and Muslims. Britain, America’s close ally, was swept up in the hysteria which was to condemn many an innocent Muslim to long years of incarceration and their families to untold misery.

Guantánamo Bay in Cuba was, Victoria Brittain writes, “the centrepiece of the reaction to 9/11, and remains the symbol of how half a century of international conventions on torture, prisoners’ rights, rendition and other aspects of international law were simply over-ridden by the US government and its allies.” In the name of national security, anti-terrorist laws were passed which meted out gross injustice. Thousands of men were captured, many of them entirely innocent, in what she describes as “a vast fishing expedition across the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and from Bosnia to Gambia.” They were sent to Guantánamo where they were held beyond the reach of U.S. law, without habeas corpus, in conditions that were flagrant violations of international law. The Geneva Conventions were set aside. Torture was widely and systematically practiced. She describes how, in Guantánamo, men were “stripped naked in front of females, held in freezing containers, kept awake for as long as 20 hours a day” and were subjected to repetitive interrogation. Her book is, in fact, a passionate indictment of the cruelty and stupidity of the war on terror.

Most of the men at Guantánamo were held there on very slight evidence. They were victims of a “steamroller of propaganda” by the U.S. and UK governments and their media allies. Stoking fear of Muslims had become a profession. Even before 9/11, Arabs and Muslims in the United States were victims of what the author calls “a general manufactured climate of fear… often linked to efficient and well-funded pro-Israeli lobbyists.”

Of Victoria Brittain’s many painful case studies, I have space to mention only two. Ghassan Elashi was chairman of America’s largest Muslim charity, the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. In July 2007, he and four colleagues from his Foundation were charged with “material support” for Hamas, described as a foreign terrorist organisation. They had sent some $12 million to Gaza, earmarked for orphanages and community welfare groups. Although the groups they were helping were not on any government terrorist list, the prosecution claimed they were fronts for Hamas. Elashi was sentenced to 65 years in jail. The impact on his family was devastating.

Sami Al Arian, a professor of engineering at the University of South Florida and outspoken campaigner for Palestinian rights, was indicted in 2003 on multiple counts of “material support for terrorism.” In a 2006 trial, after nearly three years in solitary confinement, the jury acquitted him of half the charges, while they were deadlocked on the others, with ten jurors to two wanting to acquit. He took a plea bargain on one count, agreed to deportation and should have been freed the following year. But he was then charged with criminal contempt when he would not testify in another trial. In 2009 he was released to house arrest, where in three years he was allowed to leave his apartment twice — for his daughters’ weddings.

In Britain, too, many men were arrested after 9/11 as part of a worldwide intelligence swoop on Muslims. They were assessed as “risks to national security” and held for years in high security prisons on secret evidence that was not disclosed to their lawyers and about which they were never interrogated or charged. As Victoria Brittain comments, “indefinite detention felt like torture to them and as life suspended for their frightened wives.”

Shadow Lives is an important book which will awaken righteous rage in many readers — or reduce them to tears.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 19 March 2013
Word Count: 1,116
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Patrick Seale, “Can Syria Be Saved from Destruction”

March 12, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

The two-year civil war in Syria has reached a highly critical juncture. Either the antagonists will persist in their life-and-death struggle or they will decide to seek some sort of a compromise — imperfect, of course, like all compromises — but which would put an end to the blood-letting and save their country from partition and ultimate destruction as a major player on the Middle East scene. That is the choice facing both the regime and its enemies.

External powers have contributed to the present calamity. They, too, must decide whether to press forward in the hope of making gains which would bolster their own position or whether, on the contrary, they should encourage the various warring factions in Syria to put up their guns and come to the conference table.

The one mildly encouraging factor in a very bleak overall situation is that the United States and Russia seem, at last, to be coming round to the view that the best way to prevent a disastrous partition of Syria — which would be a formula for unlimited guerrilla warfare — would be to preside jointly over a democratic political transition. A necessary first step towards such an outcome would be to stop the killing by imposing an arms embargo on both sides of the conflict. A second step would be to exclude all those diehards who refuse to compromise and bring together patriots from all camps who wish to save their country from further bloodshed and destruction

We are still, alas, some way from such a happy solution. The immense human and material damage of the past two years will not easily be forgotten — or forgiven. More than a million Syrians have fled to safety in neighbouring countries. Several million more have been internally displaced. The cost to the country has been incalculable. The death toll has crept up to around 70,000.

Syria has been a major player on the Middle East scene for the past five decades. Its demise — for that is what we are witnessing — is bound to have far-reaching consequences. How will Syria’s collapse affect the future power structures of Middle East politics? And what does the future hold for other players who are involved in the conflict? Neighbouring states – such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar — have all been drawn into the struggle, one way or another. We are living through a period of great regional uncertainty, but who would dare predict what the outcome will be?

It seems that the Syrian rebels who rose against the regime of President Bashar al-Asad two years ago may have been influenced by the Western intervention to overthrow Colonel Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. They may have been misled by the Libyan example into believing that, if they rebelled, the West would rush to their aid. This was, very probably, their biggest error. They are still bitterly complaining of the lack of external support for their revolution and are pressing for more. Some Syrian opposition fighters are now being armed and trained by Western instructors in neighbouring countries, but not on a scale which might tilt the balance decisively against the regime.

At the start of the conflict, President Bashar seems to have been misled into thinking that his nationalist stance and his opposition to Israel would protect him from a popular explosion of dissent. In retrospect, perhaps his greatest mistake was a failure to understand where the explosive forces lay in Syrian society itself. If he knew they were there, he failed to act to defuse them.

Who are the foot-soldiers of the Syrian revolution? First of all, they are the semi-educated urban unemployed, victims of Syria’s population explosion in recent years. When I wrote my first book about Syria in the 1960s (The Struggle for Syria, Oxford University Press, 1965), there were four million Syrians; today there are 24 million. Syria is not a rich country. Compared to the Gulf sheikhdoms — or indeed to Saudi Arabia, Iran or Turkey — it is very poor indeed. There are large numbers of young people in Syrian cities today for whom there are no jobs.

In even worse shape are the rural victims of the worst drought in Syria’s recorded history which, from 2006 to 2011, forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to leave their land, slaughter their animals and move to poverty belts around the cities. In 2009, the UN and other agencies reported that more than 800,000 Syrians had lost their entire livelihood as a result of the great drought. To save their lives, and the lives of their children, they fled to the cities.

In retrospect, it is clear that President Bashar and his government did not do enough to help the drought-stricken peasantry or to create jobs for the urban unemployed. Their urgent priority should have been to launch major programmes to help these two categories of victims. Syria could probably have secured financial help from Gulf States or international organisations, if it had asked for it. Instead, the regime focused on promoting tourism, on rehabilitating the old cities of Damascus and Aleppo, on a nation-wide network of museums; on encouraging the use of the internet and other social media. These policies, admirable in themselves, benefited a small new affluent class, but did little for the desperately poor in the cities and the countryside, who most needed help.

One might add that President Bashar’s attention seems to have been focussed less on internal problems and more on external threats and conspiracies against Syria — a mind-set he inherited from his father, the former President Hafiz al-Asad who ruled for 30 years from 1970 to 2000. We must not forget that, after the 1973 war, Egypt’s removal from the Arab line-up — as engineered by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — exposed Syria and Lebanon to the full force of Israeli power. Indeed, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 attempted to expel Syrian influence and bring Lebanon into Israel’s orbit. In response, Hafiz al-Asad worked to form the ‘Resistance Axis’ of Iran, Syria and Hizballah, which was partially able to hold Israel’s regional ambitions in check.

President Bashar has had to deal with situations at least as threatening as any faced by his father. Had the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 — as planned by the pro-Israeli neo-cons — been successful, Syria would have been the next target. Syria then faced a series of dangerous crises: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006; the destruction of Syria’s nuclear facility in 2007; Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008-9.

All these aggressions were rightly seen by Damascus as regime-threatening crises. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that when the uprising started in Deraa in 2011, the Syrian regime seems to have interpreted it as yet another external conspiracy against it, rather than a cry of anger and despair by its own much-tried population. The hope is that the lessons of these many crises will have been learned and that Syrians will now unite to rescue their country from the abyss.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 12 March 2013
Word Count: 1,166
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Patrick Seale, “Can Europe Help the Middle East?”

March 6, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

The Middle East is experiencing some of its greatest political upheavals since the creation of the Arab state system after the First World War. Right across the region, regimes have been toppled and authority challenged. In one country after another, people have gone down into the street in their tens of thousands to demand jobs, bread, respect, an end to corruption and police brutality, a greater say in how they are governed. In several Arab countries, secular Arab nationalism has been discredited while political Islam, long suppressed, has re-emerged to the front of the political scene.

In reacting to these events, the European Union has tended to leave the initiative to the United States. There were, of course, some exceptions. France, for example, played a leading role in spearheading the international intervention in Libya and more recently in Mali. But, on the whole, in dealing with major problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the dispute with Iran over its nuclear programme, or the highly destabilising civil war in Syria, the European Union has preferred to leave the initiative to the United States.

Problems have arisen, however, because of America’s close relationship with Israel. For several years now, the Israeli tail has wagged the American dog in the Middle East — and Europe has meekly followed along. This has not been good for the reputation of several European countries, Britain in particular. In the explosive climate created by the Arab revolutions of the last two years, it is surely time for Britain and the European Union to recover their freedom of thought and action in dealing with the Middle East

The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has festered for the past 65 years, remains a factor of immense instability. Today, the two-state solution is moribund, if not actually dead. A last minute attempt must surely be made to bring it back to life, or the consequences could be extremely dangerous for the Middle East and for European interests in this important region. Britain has a historic responsibility for the tragic state of affairs. Instead of keeping silent, Britain should be making a big and noisy fuss about the cruel oppression the Palestinians are suffering — under occupation on the West Bank and under siege in Gaza. It is surely time for the UK, and its European partners, to press for Palestinian statehood at this eleventh hour, even if it means threatening Israel with sanctions. As Israel’s major trading partner, the EU could apply considerable pressure, if it were able to summon up the courage and the political will to do so.

Israel’s present course is ultimately suicidal. It is a small country which depends on generous American aid and protection. But its long-term survival must surely depend on its ability to reach an accommodation with its Arab, Iranian and Turkish neighbours. This can be achieved only by halting and reversing its theft of Palestinian land and allowing the emergence of a small Palestinian state living alongside it in peace, security and prosperity. Israel’s reward would be normal relations with all 22 Arab states.

Britain made a blatant mistake ten years ago when the then Prime Minister Tony Blair joined the United States in the invasion of Iraq. The war was planned by a group of pro-Israeli neo-cons embedded in George W Bush’s administration — notably Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith at the Pentagon and David Wormser in the Vice-President’s office, among many others. The French and the Turks were wise enough to stay out of the war. Israel wanted Iraq destroyed because, after the Iran-Iraq war, it thought it might one day pose a threat to Israel’s eastern front. So Iraq, a major Arab state, was shattered and hundreds of thousands of its citizens killed. Millions more were displaced or driven into exile. It is still a long way from recovery.

An unforeseen consequence of the war was to unseat the Sunnis from power in Baghdad and replace them with the majority Shia community. This meant that Iraq could no longer play its traditional role as a Sunni counterweight to Shia Iran in the Gulf region. This development has caused some of the smaller Gulf States to take fright at the prospect of falling under Iranian hegemony. The shift in the regional power balance has also worried the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the major Arab state in the region.

Having managed to persuade the United States to destroy Iraq, Israel then shifted its attention to Iran, another potential challenger to its regional supremacy. Israel has campaigned tirelessly to get the United States to join with it in an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities — or, better still, for the United States to do the job alone. Israel has not hesitated to depict Iran as a terrorist state and its nuclear programme as a threat to all mankind.

In his first term as President, Obama was able to resist Israel’s intense pressure for war against Iran. But he only managed to do so by imposing crippling sanctions on Iran, and forcing the Europeans to follow suit. Sanctions have more than halved Iran’s oil exports, shattered its currency, cut it off from international banking, and inflicted great hardship on its population.

There are now, at long last, some timid signs of a more rational approach to the Islamic Republic. The recent talks in Kazakhstan between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany appear to have had some limited success and are due to be followed up soon by further negotiations. The obvious solution is for Iran to be allowed to enrich uranium to a low level for peaceful purposes under strict IAEA safeguards, in exchange for a lifting of sanctions.

But Israel is seeking to torpedo any such compromise. It wants to close down Iran’s nuclear industry altogether. It doesn’t want any of its neighbours, near or far, to acquire even the possibility of a modest deterrent capability. As we all know, Israel is a major nuclear power with an elaborate arsenal of well over a hundred nuclear weapons, numerous long-range delivery systems and a second strike capability in the form of nuclear-armed submarines. It wants the freedom to hit its neighbours at will and never to be hit back.

In Syria, the United States and some of its allies seem to be edging towards supplying weapons and equipment to opposition fighters. Of these, by far the most effective are radical Islamic groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, linked to Al-Qaeda. The United States and its allies are thus in the paradoxical position of fighting Al-Qaeda across the world but supporting it in Syria. They will undoubtedly live to regret it. The Syrian conflict should be brought to an end as soon as possible. The way to do this is not to arm one side against the other, but to deny weapons to both sides. A ceasefire must be imposed by the United States and Russia, backed by all the other external parties who have been feeding the flames of war. This is what the great majority of the martyred Syrian population is longing for.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 06 March 2013
Word Count: 1,180
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Patrick Seale, “Turning Back the Islamist Tide in North Africa and the Sahel”

February 26, 2013 - Jahan Salehi

France’s offensive against Islamists in northern Mali is approaching what it hopes is a final phase. Having driven Islamist fighters out of the main cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, French troops are now besieging the mountainous redoubt of Ifoghas close to the Algerian border, where Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other armed Islamists are said to be dug in. Right across the region, the Islamists are on the defensive, but they are fighting back with ambushes and sudden armed incursions deep into areas already captured by the French. The guerrilla war threatens to be long and hard.

An unforeseen consequence of the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi by the Western powers has been the return home to Mali and Niger and other countries of the Sahel of thousands of men — many of them Tuareg– whom Qadhafi had recruited into his armed services. Most of them returned with weapons plundered from Qadhafi’s arsenals. This is what triggered the crisis in Mali.

In early 2012, a Tuareg force, named the Azawad national liberation movement, or MNLA, chased out the Malian army and proclaimed independence in northern Mali, an area bigger than France, which they call the Azawad. The Tuareg, an ancient Berber-speaking race, have risen repeatedly in the past against the government in the capital Bamako, only to be crushed or fobbed off with empty promises of development. Had Bamako had the sense to concede autonomy to the Tuareg long ago, both the Islamist invasion and the war to oust them could most probably have been avoided.

But hardly had the Tuareg celebrated victory than they in turn were ousted by Islamist fighting groups, which had roamed the deserts of the Sahel living off large-scale smuggling and hostage-taking. French President François Hollande has vowed to destroy the Islamists of northern Mali – a task in which France is now receiving help from the United States and from West African troops. The United States has set up a new drone base in Mali’s eastern neighbour, Niger, to provide French troops with intelligence and keep an eye on regional threats, as well as on the flow of weapons from Libya. The French are also using Niger’s airport to fly men and equipment into Mali.

Mali’s Islamists have not yet been defeated but they are now on the run. Smashing them, however, will not resolve the country’s main puzzle, which is how to deal with the Tuareg’s demand for independence in their traditional northern homeland. When the Tuareg’s MNLA was overwhelmed by Islamist groups, Niger deployed 5,000 men along its 800 km border with Mali, and managed to prevent Islamist militants from entering its territory. It has now contributed 680 men to MISMA, the West African military force which has rallied to the support of France’s efforts in Mali

Niger, a vast poverty-stricken country of 15m people, has done its best to keep the Islamists at bay. As in Mali, many of its young men went to work in Libya or were recruited into Qadhafi’s forces. But, when they flooded back home after Qadhafi’s overthrow, they were not allowed to bring their weapons with them. Instead, they were disarmed by the Niger army at the border. This led inevitably to numerous skirmishes, but has greatly contributed to the country’s stability. Unlike Mali, Niger has managed to defuse the Tuareg problem by integrating them into political life. The Tuareg are said to number about 10% of the Niger population.

In several other countries, Islamists are in trouble. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated regime of President Muhammad Morsi is struggling to rescue the state from bankruptcy. In Tunisia, the Islamist party Ennahda is still in the driving seat, but is has faced enormous pressure from street demonstrations following the assassination on 6 February of a left-wing opposition figure, Chokri Belaid. Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, himself the number two of Ennahda, resigned, after failing to persuade his party to allow him to form a government of technocrats. He has been replaced by a moderate Islamist, Ali Larayedh, who spent 14 years in Ben Ali’s jails, but who seems determine to keep Jihadi violence at bay, which he describes as the greatest danger facing Tunisia.

In Libya, hard-line Islamists are said to be on the defensive, although Ansar al-Sharia — the Islamist militia believed to be responsible for last September’s attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi in which the Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed — is said to remain active among unemployed youth.

Resolutely anti-Islamist, Algeria is one of the last secular Arab nationalist regimes in the Arab world. Its army bears the scars of a cruel ten-year civil war against the Islamists which, from 1990 to 2000, killed close to 200,000 people. This prolonged ordeal conferred great powers on the country’s secretive Department of Intelligence and Security, headed by General Mohamed Lamine Mediene. When last January an Islamist group seized a major gas plant in Algeria’s southern desert, taking numerous hostages, Algerian Special Forces promptly routed the attackers, killing most of them. But many hostages perished also.

When the guns fall silent in northern Mali, the government in Bamako will have to decide what to do about the Tuareg and how to satisfy their longing for independence. In an interview with the French daily Le Monde on 22 February, the interim Prime Minister Diango Cissoko declared his firm opposition both to Tuareg independence and to Islamic extremism. “It is out of the question,” he said, “to speak of federalism” with the Tuareg population of the north. He rejected all discussion with “those who envisage the division of the territory.” The farthest he would go was to say that he was open to dialogue about local development and a measure of decentralisation. This is unlikely to satisfy the Tuareg.

One of the many problems Mali faces is the lack of a strong or united central government in Bamako. Power is shared between Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, a rebellious officer who toppled the government of Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra in a coup last year, and Prime Minister Django Cissoko who took office on 11 December 2012. Of the two, Sanogo is by far the stronger. He controls the Defence Ministry and intelligence agencies and has just been given the key job of overseeing the reform of both the army and the security agencies by the interim President Mahamadou Issoufou. Whereas the President and Prime Minister strongly support the French action against the Islamists, Captain Sanogo is on poor terms with the French and is opposed to foreign intervention.

One way or another, the Islamists in North Africa and the Sahel are being defeated, but only substantial international aid and real economic development will keep them permanently at bay. The truth is that the best defence against the Islamists is economic and social development. The real threats to the region come not from Islamists but from unemployment, poverty, banditry, the availability of weapons and the incapacity of governments to ensure their countries’ development and security.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 February 2013
Word Count: 1,169

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