Donald Trump is using all his rhetorical skills to keep everyone’s eyes focused on him and on him alone. He is trying so hard precisely because it is increasingly evident to most politicians and public figures, in the United States and elsewhere, that he is constantly losing ground. More and more actors are ignoring his demands. This is most of all clear to donald trump himself.

So he does hurtful things to all and sundry simply to prevent others from assembling the votes for things that exclude mr. trump from the center of worldwide action.

He has closed down the U.S. government, or at least that part which has not yet gotten a renewed life of a few months. He has said that he is proud to have done it, to the dismay of almost all other political actors. He claims he will not relent until an absurd amount of money is voted for the construction of his beloved wall. The money will not be voted.

Why, I am asked, does he do this? The answer is so simple it begs being silly. He is doing it because there is nothing else that he can do that he can use to validate a claim that he matters.

He has flown off in utter secrecy to visit U.S. troops in Iraq. He says he is withdrawing U.S. troops totally from Syria and partially from Afghanistan. We shall have to see if he actually does this. Or whether, like the three previous U.S. presidents, he reneges.

But no matter for the present. In the present he is asserting that he matters. To be sure, he still is the president of the United States. He has certain powers that he can use. This is precisely what frightens people all around the world.

So, he offers the world a bargain: “Say that Trump matters even if you don’t believe it and I’ll retreat once again.” Consider what a futile game this is in fact. But no matter to mr. trump, who only wants to ensure his re-election in 2020.

Hurrah for dangerous games!

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2019 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 January 2019
Word Count: 349
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As the 2020 U.S. elections begin to be the major front-page concern of the media, there is increasing speculation about what will be the form it takes. Could Trump really be impeached? Will the Democrats move still further left or rather move back to the center? How strong is Trump’s base, and how faithful?

As someone who has argued for a long time that the United States has been in a steady and irreversible decline, I am constantly asked: “Well then, why isn’t Trump crashing?” And if he is, will the crash become more visible? And if it does, will it be a sudden smash, or simply a steady downward slide?

The issue of visibility is seen differently from within the United States and in the rest of the world. Let us take each in turn. Trump in his tweets gives an ambiguous answer. On the one hand, the call for making America great again implies there has been some decline, albeit a reparable one. The repair is what Trump claims to be doing.

On the other hand, the polls and the innumerable analyses of the situation point to less U.S. confidence in the future than before, even among Trump’s core supporters. The fact that Trump spends so much time attacking “fake news” shows that he is worried about the lower level of U.S. confidence. He seems to be spending much energy seeking to persuade everyone that a lower level of confidence results from a misreading of the data.

Thus far, within the United States, Trump’s decline is a matter of public debate, between and within all political tendencies. Most people are still seeing what they prefer to see.

The picture is quite different outside the United States. For one thing, people are having to cope with declines of one sort or another in their own countries – in England because of Brexit, in France because of the return of a long tradition of uprisings, in Russia and India because of economic tightness, in China because of the increased resistance to their own outward thrusts. In fact, it is hard to find a country that is not fighting its own decline. They are therefore not impressed with an argument that the United States is different.

They are so impressed with the reality of U.S. decline that they feel they have to do something about it. They are fearful of a sudden dramatic collapse of the U.S. currency. They think this could lead to rash war decisions. And they worry also that a currency collapse would hurt them as much as it would hurt the United States.

All this points to a combined effort to make sure that a U.S. crash takes the form of a steady slide rather than an explosion. But steady slide there will be.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 18 December 2018
Word Count: 466
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The short answer to the question is neither. As I write, one week before definitive counts in the U.S. elections, the consensus seems to be that they are too close to call. Most analysts believe this is a Trump election in two senses:

First, most voters are choosing their candidates for senator, representative, governor, or lesser offices as a function of their feelings for Donald Trump.

Secondly, the outcomes will affect profoundly Trump’s further political strength.

If the Republicans keep the Senate, they will be able to fill federal judicial offices with probable control for a long time to come. For the anti-Trump coalition this represents catastrophe.

If the Republicans keep the House, even by one vote, they will be able to ensure a fiscal program of their preference. In addition, a Trump victory would make far easier repressive behavior that the anti-Trump forces see as the great danger — another catastrophe.

If Republicans win the gubernatorial elections, they will be able to gerrymander electoral choices to their benefit for at least a decade — a third catastrophe.

Inversely, if the Democrats win the Senate, they can force more so-called moderate nominees to be appointed — ending a dream of the pro-Trump coalition.

If the Democrats win the House of Representatives, they can pursue harassing investigations of Trump and his people, thereby gaining more strength in the presidential elections of 2020 — catastrophe for the pro-Trump forces.

If the Democrats win gubernatorial elections, they can reverse much gerrymandering of the past to their benefit.

Of course, there could be results that are a mixture of these results, with uncertain consequences. Any loss for Trump will weaken still further his power within the Republican Party.

What is wrong with these analyses is the assumption of long survival of the victorious electoral behavior. Office-holders die. People are chased from office. The economic realities change drastically and with such change there often follows a change in political atmosphere, despite previous electoral results.

We must not forget that we are living in the chaotic fluctuations of a structural crisis of the modern world-system. Wild fluctuations are the basic reality. Nothing lasts too long. Catastrophe today, salvation tomorrow. Catastrophe then again.

To be sure, we must still vote as we think best to prevent short-term negatives. But the victories are necessarily short-term — important but never decisive.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 November 2018

Word Count: 387

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The only one who cares if Kavanaugh is appointed is Kavanaugh himself, who has wanted this job all his life. For everyone else, he’s just a pawn in what the others — Republicans and Democrats alike — really care about, which is the Senatorial elections this coming November.

The crucial thing is to have a majority in the Senate in order to appoint or not appoint a right-wing Republican to this lifelong job. If Trump or the Republicans in the Senate have to sacrifice Kavanaugh to achieve this, they will do it. What everyone is trying to figure out is what will swing a small number of voters in a small number of states, such that their party’s candidate will win a majority in the Senate. There is no consensus on the tactics required to do this.

I know everyone says that a defeat of Kavanaugh will be a great victory for the Democrats, and so it seems. But if they don’t gain the majority in the fall elections, Trump will simply nominate another ultra-rightist person. And if they do win the majority, Trump will have to appoint a more “moderate” person or he will not pass.

Kavanaugh knows this, which is why he’s so angry. And Senate Democrat Leader Chuck Schumer knows it too, which is why he’s being so cautious.  In the meantime, everyone is shouting loudly with rhetoric in which they half believe. But behind rhetoric there is always reality. And the reality is that Kavanaugh is just a pawn.

Did he engage in drunken attempted rape when he was 17, and did he then lie about it? The evidence that he did seems to me pretty strong.

But so what? If Trump appoints another ultra-rightist who is pure as the driven snow, will that be better? I don’t think so. So, as always, let us keep our eyes on the ball and not on the diversions.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 October 2018

Word Count: 318

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Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for Le Monde diplomatique, The Arab Weekly and The Washington Spectator, as well as expert commentary by Richard Bulliet, Rami G. Khouri and Immanuel Wallerstein.

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There are two things concerning Donald Trump about which everyone, friends and foes, seem to agree. No one can be sure what he will tweet next. And he wants to stay in power

Trump has made three risky geopolitical bets: He will get North Korea to denuclearize. He will be able to force Iran to renounce any attempt to have nuclear weapons. He will dismantle NAFTA to the benefit of the United States.

It is totally unlikely that he will achieve the first two at all. It is at best marginally possible that he will replace NAFTA with a more advantageous arrangement for the United States.

So then comes the second certainty. He wants to remain in power. If his bets all fail, what will he do to remain in power? Here there is no agreement, either among friends or foes. One group thinks he is pathologically mad and would pull down the world with him. The other group says that he would modify his priorities in order to remain in power.

So the risks turn out to be ours. Do we bet on his pathology or on his self-interest? If we choose the wrong one, we lose and lose in a big way. We cannot bet on both kinds of response from Trump. It is one or the other.

To resume: Trump will fail in his risky bets. He will respond in some way. But which? I tend to favor the self-interest prediction. But I’m frightened about being wrong.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 September 2018

Word Count: 275

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Most of us receive daily news by reading some set of headlines available to us. We tend to classify these headlines as good or bad news about our local community, our country, or the world as a whole.

But what is good news or bad news? The most obvious question to ask is: good news or bad news for whom? It is not at all simple to answer that question.

If we discuss the daily news with someone whom we think shares our values, our multiple identities, and our socioeconomic status, we often discover that this very compatible friend or neighbor had drawn different conclusions about whether a particular piece of news is good or bad. Obviously this other is including additional measures.

There are many questions about any sort of measurement of goodness. First of all, we probably have an implicit scale of one to ten. We probably search for news that is very high or very low and dump the rest as not important, calling it the Establishment.

That still doesn’t get us very far. Let us say we want an answer in terms of a left-right scale. Within a large field on the right or the left, there are always people who denounce others that claim “extreme” positions as practicers of sham or pretense. There seem never to be secure holding of the position furthest to the left or to the right.

Take some recent debates. Is a denunciation of Pope Francis good news or bad news for the left?

Are the maneuvers of Lula’s supporters to get his name included on electronic ballots good or bad for the Brazilian or Latin American left?

Are the so far successful efforts in South Africa to limit the support to Julius Malema a victory for the left or right?

Are China’s attempts to build a single trade path across much of the world an effort of the left or the right?

Should the left be applauding Trump’s efforts to disband NAFTA, a structure that the left had previously denounced, or be dismayed because it furthers Trump’s objectives?

Is BREXIT a left operation or an ultra-right one?

Each of these issues merits a long, detailed, comprehensive analysis. But is it worth it? Does it matter?

It matters to all who believe that the world-system is in structural crisis and that therefore the highly volatile and analytically obscure chaotic realities are in fact the essential battleground of the world left and the world right. Analytic clarity makes more likely a victory in the battle. Just reading headlines is simply not enough.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 September 2018

Word Count: 430

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I first met Samir in the early 1960s.I had read his early works, and they resonated with me.

I was passing through Dakar and asked if we could meet.
I don’t think he knew who I was or had read any of my writings.

Nevertheless, he graciously invited me to dine with him.
Very few of his admirers worldwide ever mention his graciousness.
For me, it is one of the key elements of his personality.

As soon as we began, we found how close were our views.
We both believed we were living in a capitalist world.
We both felt we had to organize to destroy it.
We both believed that Marxist thought remained essential.
But we both thought it was not a dogma and needed to be updated.

Shortly after that, I met Gunder Frank. He had read a draft of what would become volume I of The Modern World-System.
He was enthusiastic and offered to write a blurb for publication.
Then I met Giovanni Arrighi and found he too shared our views.

Giovanni, Gunder, Samir, and I thus became the so-called Gang of Four. We wrote two books together, in a special format.

Each book contained four individual chapters, giving our views on the topic. The books contained a common introduction that related the premises we shared. There was also a common conclusion indicating our differences.

The intention was to show that we agreed on something important. I’d say this was about 80% of the way. In treating our differences, there were various pairings on all the questions. Samir and I agreed the most.

Samir and I remained in very close contact in the subsequent years. He lived in an airplane circling the globe. I did not have his energy. But I remained always his comrade in the struggle.

There is only one struggle. We must transform the world.

In solidarity\Immanuel

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 20 August 2018
Word Count: 313
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This is the question that all anti-Trump individuals and groups are asking today, loudly and regularly. They are hoping of course for a positive answer, but they are not sure they will get one.

This is the question that Trump supporters and Republican politicians are asking in private, seeking reassurance that the answer is negative.

This question is debated as well by Democratic politicians, hoping to get a positive answer. They discuss it more publicly however than their Republican counterparts.

This is the question that most analysts seeking an answer un-influenced by political preference find it almost impossible at this point to give an answer that they do not hedge by pointing to multiple uncertainties.

But this is also the question to which individuals, groups, and politicians of all stripes and all levels of activity have to draw a conclusion fairly soon if they wish to achieve their objectives in the relatively short run. Most particularly, as the November 2018 elections in the United States approach, they find it harder and harder to evade a firm answer.

Finally, this is the question about which decision-makers in other countries also have to make a choice, or risk having the choice made for them and, as a result, one not to their liking.

In short, this is an impossible, but also inescapable question. In fact, the month of July 2018 has been a very bad month for Donald Trump, and leads me to suggest the ways in which his future is far less rosy than he would expect and wish. The person who probably agrees the most with this statement, but very privately, is Donald Trump himself.

One public issue for a long time now has been whether the Russian government intervened in some way in the U.S. elections of 2016, acting to aid him to become president. And, if they did, did Trump know of this and did he “collude” with their actions?

Several things in July made the situation worse for Trump. There was a very negative reaction to the fact of Trump’s one-on-one meeting; that it occurred at all, that Trump’s description of Russia’s President Putin seemed so sympathetic, and that Trump seemed to believe Putin more than he believed his own intelligence personnel.

The reaction was so strong and so swift that Trump backtracked on what he said and how he said it. He then undid the backtracking by inviting Putin to visit the United States. He again got a strong popular reaction because he seemed to be re-asserting confidence in Putin.

He then backtracked on the invitation, remitting discussion about it to a post-2018 electoral moment. The confusion caused by these back and forth statements increased the numbers within various constituencies who had previously been ready to give Trump the benefit of the doubt to cease doing so.

Worse yet, Trump’s repeated claim that a collusion with the Russians was fake news was suddenly confronted by hard data. Trump’s formerly ultra-loyal lawyer, Michael Cohen, secretly taped his conversations with Trump.

They seem to show Trump’s awareness of payoffs to prostitutes who have asserted he slept with them over a long period. Cohen is no longer willing to pay the price of a loyalty that is not reciprocated.

In this same month, Trump attended the NATO meeting of heads of state and government. He attacked openly almost all U.S. traditional allies. He threatened withdrawal from NATO if they didn’t conform to his demands.

Once again, uncertainty abounded as to what he would do. The European Union (EU) responded by entering into a very large common market arrangement with Japan, formerly one of the surest allies of the United States. Similarly, Canada responded to Trump’s tariffs with counter-tariffs, as did various West European countries. This exacerbated tensions within the EU between the “old” members and the now very nationalist East European members. But the East Europeans were not sure they could rely on Trump to defend them against perceived threats from Russia.

The tariffs also upset two U.S. groups of importance. One was the farmers whose products were directly affected by the counter-tariffs and also by the increased price of their products where they were still allowed to be sold without tariffs.

Trump was forced to allot funds to aid the farmers. This however was seen by the farmers as a short-run measure that would not hold over the longer run. And the short-term payments upset the ultra-right factions in the Republican Party. Trump was finding himself besieged on several fronts at once. And these various groups were less sure than ever that they could count on Trump to emphasize their primary concerns.

At this point, Trump very unexpectedly met with Jean-Claude Juncker speaking for the EU. They agreed to postpone any and all new tariffs until after the 2018 elections.

In effect, Trump abandoned for the moment the most serious action he had intended to make. In return, he received a very minor concession by the EU on soybeans. Trump proclaimed victory. To me it reads like a defeat, one that Trump had to paint in a different color.

If all this were not worry enough, a federal judge allowed a suit dangerous for Trump to continue in court. This suit argued that the so-called emoluments clause of the Constitution designed to counter corruption was being violated by the profits and advantages Trump was receiving through his properties, when these properties were used by foreign governments.

The suit will go on for many years. But the effect of this will be to force Trump as part of his defense to reveal much of his personal income, as well as that of his family. It could also force the release of Trump’s tax returns.

Meanwhile, he maintains that the denuclearization of North Korea is proceeding well. However, all that he has to show for it is the return of some remains of bodies lost during the war.

In Iran, Trump is still threatening war, and says he intends to renounce the agreement signed by the United States, despite the fact that the terms of the agreement are less porous than anything he hopes to get North Korea to sign.

Will Trump actually engage in military action? Even the Israelis are doubtful, as they attempt to create a situation that will force him to cease waffling. Bluffing in foreign policy is not a winning proposition. It reveals weakness, something Trump abhors.

The most positive result for Trump may be a negative one. He decided to enter the Republican primaries and endorse candidates, who then had to compete for Trump’s favor. His endorsement has made it possible for some ultra-right candidates to win. Many analysts, including it seems Republican establishment figures, worry that, as a consequence, the Democratic candidate for senator or representative or governor will win.

The bottom line is that the real actions of all the actors will be based on an appreciation of Trump’s strength and not his rhetoric. In July 2018 Trump was loud in rhetoric and hesitant in action. In another month or two, if this continues (and there is every likelihood it will), the negatives will overwhelm the pretense.

The final question then will be: if Trump is indeed in trouble, who will benefit?

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 August 2018
Word Count: 1,209
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On July 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known by his initials as AMLO, was elected President of Mexico by a sweeping margin. He won 53% of the votes. His closest rivals were Ricardo Anaya (of PAN) with 22% and José Antonio Meade (of PRI) with 16 percent. In addition, his party alliance, MORENA, won a majority of the seats in the legislature.

His victory has been compared to that of Lula in Brazil and that of Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain. But Lula did not come near having a majority of the votes, and his broad party alliance included reactionary groups. Corbyn is still struggling to maintain control of the British Labour Party and, even if he succeeds, faces a difficult election.

AMLO by contrast has probably the largest margin of victory ever of any contender in a multiparty relatively honest election. He will have no trouble remaining in power in the single six-year term permitted by the Mexican constitution.

So, why only two cheers? A look at Mexico’s history will clarify my reserve. The so-called Mexican Revolution of 1910 overthrew an oppressive and very undemocratic regime, which is why it is seen as the beginning of the modern state in Mexico. It did not, however, result in relative peace and stability. Quite the contrary! The two decades after that saw constant violent struggles between various armed militias, none of which were able to prevail.

However, following the assassination of a major candidate for the presidency, a de facto arrangement was able to bring about a certain degree of stability and greatly reduce the violence. The party that guaranteed this relative stability went through name changes and eventually became called the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI.

The system PRI evolved was based on Mexico’s constitutional requirement of an election every six years on July 1. The incumbent could have only one term. His successor was chosen by a behind-the-scenes negotiation among PRI leaders. The actual election was in effect a formality. With the exception of one politically radical period from 1936 to 1942, the PRI system of arranged elections resulted in governments with highly corrupt elites and ones that had little to offer to the bottom third to half the population.

The PRI system eventually reached a point of high popular discontent. It led to the emergence of a major challenger in the end of the twentieth century called the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). PAN was built on a Catholic base that was reacting to Mexico’s and PRI’s strong anticlerical program.

PAN won the election in 2000, thereby ending PRI’s monopoly of office. In addition to PRI and PAN there emerged also a social-democratic party called the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Mexico had now become a country of competitive elections. How much difference this make? Not all that much.

AMLO ran as the PRD candidate in 2012 but was cheated out of his majority. He fought hard against the “false” winner, but with little support from the PRD. AMLO now built his struggle for power out of a rejection of all three major parties.

Why wasn’t he similarly cheated in 2018? The 2012-2018 PRI government used extreme violence against the opposition. They shot and killed student protestors. This led to widespread uprisings from underneath that made it impossible for PRI to cheat the results once again.

AMLO put forth a truly left program. He ran on a platform of significant increase in material distribution to the very large poor underclass. He called for the ending of the so-called pensiones by means of which enormous sums were paid to ex-presidents. AMLO was advocating instead pensiones for the poor. This is where his program was similar to that of Lula with his Bolsa familiar and his Hambre cero. The difference is that AMLO cannot be ousted from power, as was Lula.

AMLO calls his proposal nini (neither nor). For those that are neither students nor workers, who constitute a very large group of young people. He calls for payments to them to survive while they obtain the skills through government programs that will make them employable.

The Latin American left has hailed AMLO’s election, seeing in his victory a possibility of re-igniting the so-called pink tide in Latin America that had had many reverses in the last decade. The United States is clearly worried and unhappy. Trump is already trying to co-opt AMLO.

I too hail AMLO’s victory. But I worry about the fact that, unlike Lula, he has shown little taste for becoming a Latin American and not merely a Mexican leader. He is in a very strong position in Mexico for the moment, but not one impervious to counter-pressures. He cannot really do it alone. He needs the Latin American left just as they need him. We shall have to see how he navigates negotiations over NAFTA.

Finally, just like all popular leaders who have fought hard and successfully to come to power, I wonder how much he reflects on the limitations of being a charismatic figure. Too much self-assurance has been the downfall of many a leftist populist leader. Nor has AMLO indicated much tolerance in the past for those who question the prudence of some of what he does.

So, two cheers yes — loud ones, with hope for the best.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 15 July 2018
Word Count: 885
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A prestidigitator is a public actor who seeks to make viewers believe that what they see is what he is really doing, but it is not. In the famous example, he saws the woman in half and then he shows you that she is still in one piece — due, he claims, to his exceptional magical skill.

Donald Z. Trump is an extremely talented prestidigitator. Using his constant flow of contradictory tweets and his ceaseless use of insults, both his core supporters and his fiercest opponents think they know what he is doing. But in fact they fail to observe the actual actions of Donald G. Trump.

He is said to be a megalomaniac who has little self-control. These characteristics are said to account for the fact that Donald V. Trump is constantly reversing his public positions. But this is misleading. Donald B. Trump is pursuing single-mindedly a program of destroying what he does not like and furthering what he does like.

Donald M. Trump tells his core supporters that he is fulfilling his promises to end or curtail very severely all migration to the United States, especially by Muslims and Latin@s. Their belief that he is doing this accounts for the passionate and virtually unlimited political support they give him. He has however accomplished very little about migration and doesn’t really care about it.

He is prestidigitating and is able to use this rightwing support to maintain a significant amount of support from centrist voters by projecting an image of moderation compared to still more outspoken purveyors of rightwing policies. He is however not at all moderate in his actions. He simply seeks to persuade the viewer of his moderate credentials.

Since Donald L. Trump is prestidigitating simultaneously with two strongly opposed bodies of voters, he gives the impression of inconsistency or instability. However, the reality is the opposite.

When Donald W. Trump is uncertain how to play the immediate game, he falls back on his standard complaint about fake news in the media. He shouts that the hostile media cannot even get his middle initial right. This is the utmost in prestidigitation because it is he who constantly uses a different middle initial.

Can this go on forever? He faces the dilemma of every magician — that someone reveals publicly the secret of his magic. He is particularly virulent when he believes exposure is imminent.  When magic is convincingly exposed as trickery, the prestidigitator loses all credibility and must take the first freight train out of town. Until then complaining about fake news sustains the game.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

Copyright ©2018 Immanuel Wallerstein — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 01 July 2018
Word Count: 427
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