Turkey is in a historically critical phase concerning its present and its future. Much of the debate is focused on one crucial question: Can Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan consolidate power around his person and cadres loyal to him or will he face increasing difficulties ensuring control over key institutions?
Given the apparent lack of exit strategy for him as Turkey’s “system crisis” deepens, the question seems intractable. The situation is one of unprecedented limbo for Turkey and its political class.
What adds to the dilemma is the type of balance between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its minor partner the National Movement Party (MHP) on the one hand and the opposition bloc on the other.
A poll by one of the few reliable pollsters, Ankara-based Metropoll, indicated that the AKP-MHP alliance has 51% favourability while the secular main opposition Republican People’s Party does not draw more than 25% favourability. Its nationalist opposition partner, the Iyi party, has fallen below the critical 10% threshold needed to enter parliament and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party polls just above that level at 11%.
Discontent among the voters, because of economic hardships, brews beneath the surface. Those who oppose moves to send troops to Libya are slightly more than 50% of the public. The controversial Canal Istanbul project is another issue that doesn’t seem to convince large numbers of voters in the massive Greater Istanbul Municipality area.
Yet, as pointed out by Metropoll director Ozer Sencar to Ahval News, the “concerned voter” bloc within the AKP is not convinced by what the opposition offers as a political alternative.
This snapshot is good news for Erdogan. It gives him time to construct a future in his favour but, as Canal Istanbul, Libya and East Med examples show, the “plunge first, think later” mindset, seems to hardly stir the bureaucracy in Ankara and a sense of despair gains ground.
Turkey’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, voiced such “deep establishment concerns” in a meeting with journalists recently. Kilicdaroglu has a deeply rooted background as a bureaucrat in Turkish state apparatus; thus his remarks have particular pertinence.
For the first time, he said, “Turkey’s dependency on Russia is increasing. We are dependent in energy up to 60% to Russia. This is wrong. More important, (Russian President Vladimir) Putin began shaping Turkey’s foreign policy. Especially in Syria and Libya, Putin’s words have the final say.”
In another part of the meeting, Kilicdaroglu is said to have raised alarm over Erdogan’s steady attempts to take full control of the Turkish judiciary and persistent restructuring of Turkish Armed Forces.
The stalemate in the balance of power between the government and the opposition blocs in Turkey, coupled with a toothless parliament, creates a dangerous vacuum that may lead to a crash unless Erdogan pays attention to the calls for a return to responsible policies and abandons his bellicose moves in the region.
A report by the RAND Corporation shed light on the minefield-like crossroads where Turkey finds itself. Based partly on the Pentagon’s insider assessments, it warned: “Turkey’s assertive foreign policy moves include support for political Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood — a group viewed as terrorists by Gulf monarchies and Egypt — and its bid to claim a share of the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon wealth.”
Equally important, the 243-page report argues that mid-rank officers in the Turkish Armed Forces are “deeply worried” about purges that have taken place since the botched coup in 2016 and that this may lead to another disruptive attempt. Erdogan is aware of this, it adds.
RAND outlines four scenarios ranging from a Turkey remaining somewhat part of the Western alliance to a full-scale “de-anchoring” of its previous alliances and moving towards Russia and China but leaves a question mark on Erdogan’s map towards 2023 — the year of the centennial of the Turkish Republic.
What is clear is that his assertive, adventurist, crisis-oriented policies have begun to accumulate negative energy beneath Ankara’s political fault lines.
Yavuz Baydar is a senior Turkish columnist, and news analyst. A founding member of the Platform for Independent Journalism (P24) in Istanbul, he has been reporting on Turkey and monitoring media issues since 1980. A European Press Prize Laureate in 2014, he is also the winner of Germany’s ‘Journalistenpreis’ in 2018.
Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global
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Released: 28 January 2020
Word Count: 660
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