Russia’s appointment of a new government drew the attention of many in the Middle East eager to see how the country’s foreign policy could shift. It soon became clear there would be few changes in that department because Moscow country reappointed as foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, a tough diplomat who has headed the ministry since 2004.
Days before the reshuffle January 21, Lavrov gave an indication that Russia would push its ambitious foreign policy, saying Russia would position itself as an important actor in foreign affairs.
“The world is clearly continuing to tremor,” he said during an annual news conference on Moscow’s policy abroad. “The key destabilising factor is the aggressive stance of a number of Western countries, most of all our American colleagues.”
Russia’s assertive foreign policy, the Kremlin has realised, is an effective way to invigorate Russians’ sense of patriotism and uphold public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin at home, even as much-needed funds continue to be diverted away from social programmes.
Domestically, Lavrov is the second most popular member of Russia’s cabinet, behind Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, but how much sway he has over the country’s foreign policy is unclear.
Many diplomats and experts say Putin is the sole mastermind of Moscow’s foreign policy and defence initiatives. That said, Lavrov is clearly the president’s most trusted aide and lieutenant in foreign policy, giving him serious influence over the country’s policies in countries such as Syria, Libya and Afghanistan.
Russia has been a major player in the Middle East at least since 2015, when it intervened militarily in Syria. By reversing the course of the Syrian civil war in favour of an old client, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Moscow’s message to other leaders and rulers in the Middle East was that it is a reliable partner. The intervention in Syria allowed Moscow to position itself as a valuable interlocutor to all parties to the region’s conflicts.
Rapprochement with Israel, however, was the most dramatic recent turnaround in Moscow’s diplomatic relations. Russia’s emergence as a major presence in Syria meant that the Israelis had no choice but to maintain good relations with Moscow. Some Israeli officials are hoping that Moscow will help them deal with the biggest threat their country faces from Syria: Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.
However, Israel’s expectations could push Moscow too far. Russia, after all, is Tehran’s ally in Syria despite differences that emerged between the two countries. Whatever disagreements Russians and Iranians may have on the ground in Syria, which include their support of rival factions in the Assad regime, they have succeeded in reducing them.
Going forward, Russia will do its best to maintain good terms with everyone, including Iran and its regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as Turkey and the Kurds, with Assad’s regime and its opponents.
The logic is simple: Russia sees no advantage in playing the role of regional policeman and sees every advantage in pursuing geopolitical and commercial gains without taking unwarranted risks.
This strategy contrasts with that of the United States which, as the dominant power in the Middle East, bears the cost of maintaining order and defending its strategic allies against security threats posed by Iranian expansionism or extremists from terror groups.
However, while the United States maintains dominance, particularly in the Arab Gulf region, Russia has strengthened ties with Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
In October 2017, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the first Saudi monarch to visit Moscow, a decade after Putin’s official visit to Riyadh. Then, at the opening of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz rubbed shoulders with Putin, another sign of close personal ties between the countries’ leaders.
For Moscow, the Arab Gulf is an opportunity and a lucrative defence market that can absorb Russian-made gear.
At the same time, upgraded relations between Moscow and Riyadh do not change the fact that Iran remains Russia’s partner of choice. Although the two countries’ interests are sometimes misaligned, Russia’s diplomatic, defence and trade ties with Tehran are better than at any point in history.
Still, one should not forget that Russia’s and Iran’s victory in Syria has led to a divergence of interests. While Russia wants to see Syria return to the status quo and reap the benefits of peace and reconstruction, Iran has been exploiting Syria as a platform for its expansionist aspirations and its campaign against Israel.
Riyadh, as a result, knows that its strategic interests lie in upgrading its relationship with Moscow. In addition to their stake in the outcome of the Syrian conflict and rivalry with Iran, the Saudis have a growing interest in coordinating oil production with Russia at a time when both are grappling with a surge in US energy production.
Russia’s return to North Africa is also significant, given the United States’ disengagement from the region. The relationship between Moscow and Cairo, interrupted in the 1970s with the latter’s pivot towards the United States, underwent a significant upgrade after the 2013 revolution in Egypt and the rise of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Criticised in the West for human rights abuses, Sisi found in Putin a key partner who can help him buttress domestic standing and prop up leverage vis-a-vis Cairo’s traditional ally, Washington. Egypt has also emerged as an important customer for Russian arms.
The relationship between Cairo and Moscow goes way beyond that to include the two countries’ influence in other parts of the Arab region, particularly Libya. There, Russia and Egypt have worked together in supporting the eastern-based Libyan National Army, led by Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar, in Libya’s civil war. However, divisions within Libya have multiplied and drawn in international players, including Turkey, France and Italy.
Moscow seems to be hoping to have a say in negotiations about the conflict and eventually re-establish commercial opportunities derailed by the ouster of former leader Muammar Qaddafi.
Despite the challenges Russia faces on the international arena and in the Middle East, Putin and Lavrov as a team have achieved a string of victories in the past year. Washington’s confused agenda provided an opening for Moscow to expand its clout in Syria, while Turkey purchased a sophisticated new air-defence missile system from Russia despite objections from the White House.
Last October, Putin fashioned a pact with Turkey to establish a buffer zone along Syria’s border, further raising Moscow’s profile as a power broker in the Middle East while weakening the United States’ influence.
These victories will encourage Russia to stay the course and stick to foreign policy fundamentals that have allowed it to grow into a diplomatic powerhouse. Lavrov’s experience and energy will further Russia’s defiant position and the geopolitical muscle it exercises within the UN Security Council.
Iman Zayat is the Managing Editor of The Arab Weekly.
Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global
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Released: 27 January 2020
Word Count: 1,123
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