The absence of Arab arms in the attack on Libya is a matter of regret — and could have serious long-term consequences. It has allowed the beleaguered Libyan dictator, Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi, to portray the attack on him as an aggression by the ‘crusader’ West to seize Libya’s oil — an argument which may strike a chord with his tribal loyalists.
This is because the regime has kept alive memories of Italy’s brutal colonial regime in Libya between the world wars. Certainly, Libyans will find more convincing the claim that this is a Western colonial adventure than Qadhafi’s fiction that Al-Qaida has master-minded the ‘conspiracy’ against him.
The West’s record in the Arab world is by no means guilt-free. The criminal destruction of Iraq; the ongoing war in Afghanistan; the tolerance of Israel’s decades-long oppression of the Palestinians; the neglect of the tragedy in Darfur; the avid pursuit of commercial interests, of which arms sales are only a blatant example – all these weigh heavily against the West in the Arab and Muslim world.
Nevertheless, the Western intervention in Libya should be seen in a more favorable light. It seems to have been driven by genuine revulsion at Qadhafi’s 42-year history of human rights abuses against his own people, not to speak of his murderous forays into external terrorism, such as the downing of civilian aircraft. Among his countless brutalities, the massacre of some 1,200 prisoners in the notorious Abu Salim prison in 1996 is only one of the most flagrant.
Every effort should now be made to prevent the intervention in Libya from injecting further venom into the West’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world. The Arab states must be persuaded to shoulder more of the burden of bringing about a peaceful transition in Tripoli.
Early in the crisis, the Arab League spoke out in favor of a no-fly zone, but its words were not followed by action — either political or military. The Arab League gave the Western assault legitimacy — as did the UN Security Council Resolution in even greater measure — but the overall Arab contribution has been feeble. Amr Mousa, Arab League secretary general, has now voiced disquieting reservations about the West’s air strikes, apparently unaware that an effective no-fly zone requires the prior destruction of Libya’s air defences.
In order to prevent further civilian casualties and great material destruction, Arab states must now work to bring the fighting in Libya to a close. They must act to save Libya from what could be a protracted civil war.
Yemen may also need Arab mediation to oversee a peaceful transition from President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s 33-year rule to a new government in tune with the demands of the protesters. Yemen was ravaged by a civil war from 1962 to 1970, which ended only when an uneasy and unstable reconciliation was arrived at with the help of outside powers. Lebanon, too, suffered a destructive civil war, of which the baneful consequences of mistrust and enmity continue to threaten a relapse into violence. Its neighbors should be careful not to contribute to further instability.
In the case of Libya, a high-powered contact group should be formed, to mediate between the two sides and negotiate Qadhafi’s peaceful departure, without the need to inflict a military defeat on him. As well as Arab states, the proposed contact group might include a regional power such as Turkey, and perhaps even one or two countries — such as Germany, China or Russia — that abstained when Resolution 1973 was adopted by the Security Council authorizing intervention. Only a contact group of real weight would have a chance to bring about a peaceful settlement.
No Arab country has a greater interest than Egypt in the outcome of the Libyan power struggle. But it would seem that Egypt’s generals have been too preoccupied with managing the transition of power in their own country to think strategically about relations with their neighbors.
Egypt could have won the gratitude of the great majority of the Libyan people had it provided the rebels with early and decisive help — and not simply the few small arms it is said to have given them. It is not too late for Egypt to act, both militarily and politically, so as to pave the way for a close alliance with its neighbor — and perhaps even, at a later date, for some form of federal union, such as Qadhafi himself advocated when he first came to power.
Libya could greatly benefit from Egypt’s vast human resources, its wealth of skills, its experienced government institutions, as well as its cultural and educational establishments. Egypt, in turn, could benefit from Libya’s oil resources and from its thinly-populated land area, including its 2,000 kilometres of Mediterranean coastline. Together they could provide a formidable anchor and power-house for the Arab world.
There is little doubt that Qadhafi’s rule must soon come to an end. It is important, however, that the transition be handled without unnecessary violence, and in tune with the extraordinary awakening of the Arab peoples, which the world is witnessing from the Atlantic to the Gulf.
No regime in the Arab world will be immune from the explosion of protest and longing for freedom sweeping the entire region. To seek to repress the democratic movement by force will be as ineffective as seeking to contain a tsunami. Arab regimes which have so far escaped serious challenge should hurry to end police brutality, curb corruption, and allow their people to choose their own representatives in genuinely free elections. The use of force — and especially the killing of protesters — only adds fuel to the flames, as Syria is now discovering.
In addition to external mediation in Yemen and Libya, another urgent measure should be an attempt to negotiate an entente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. By sending troops into Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has asserted its authority in the Arabian Peninsula in defense of its national interests. If this intervention creates a moment of calm, the Bahraini ruling family should seize the opportunity to introduce real and far-reaching reforms.
In particular, it would be tragic if the crisis in Bahrain were interpreted as a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. Indeed, nothing could be more effective in calming tensions in the Gulf region than a genuine attempt at mutual understanding between those two powers — and indeed between Sunni and Shi‘i Muslims, a task to which religious leaders in both camps should urgently address themselves in a necessary spirit of conciliation.
Enlightened action by Arab leaders could yet spare their countries further turmoil and loss of innocent life. The fate of the region should not be left to external powers.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).
Copyright © 2011 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global
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Released: 21 March 2011
Word Count: 1,101
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