BEIRUT — The agreement among all the Lebanese political leaders to hold talks in Doha, Qatar, and keep meeting until they resolve their current political impasse will probably bring peace and quiet to Lebanon for a period of time — certainly months and perhaps even years.
Skepticism abounds, though, alongside signs of hope and maturity. Speaking for myself, this is the third time in my life that I have lived in Beirut — 1958, 1975 and 2008 — when the country has been scarred by internal fighting and the entanglement of foreign powers and troops.
A complex matrix of issues defines the current situation. Local, regional and global power relationships all have to be sorted out, and the three levels are deeply intertwined. I see two core issues at stake here, and everything else is footnotes:
(1) If the central state does not meet its citizens’ needs, how does the state work out a credible balance of power with indigenous groups and powerful armed organizations like Hizbullah — who do respond to citizen needs more efficiently?
(2) Is Lebanon mainly an Arab-Islamic-Middle Eastern society integral to Syrian and Iranian interests, or is it a more Western-oriented, liberal society that sits more comfortably in the American and French orbits?
In both cases, the central issue is the relationship between Hizbullah and the state. Last week’s fighting and political crisis in Lebanon revolved around the government’s decision to curtail aspects of Hizbullah’s security system, to which Hizbullah responded with a fast and decisive show of force that overwhelmed the Hariri camp and other March 14 groups allied to the government.
Two red lines, previously viewed as sacred, were broached: when the government tried to interfere in Hizbullah’s telephone system — vital for the group’s security network; and, when Hizbullah and allies used force against fellow Lebanese. Those two new actions clarified the main issues that have to be discussed and resolved in Doha and beyond. Yet the Doha talks are hindered by the persistent problem that hovers over all issues in Lebanon today: the sense among many pro-government Lebanese that Hizbullah is being used by Syria and Iran for those two countries’ purposes.
These people argue that Syria wants to regain control of Lebanon and stall or stop the international tribunal that would bring to justice those to be accused of killing the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and a dozen other personalities. While Iran wants to be able to use Hizbullah and its formidable military and logistical capability in any potential confrontation with Israel or the United States.
These are very serious charges, to which Hizbullah remains vulnerable because it persists in using ambiguity as a strategic weapon in dealing with its foes and critics. The fact is that many Lebanese simply do not trust Hizbullah, and that sentiment has increased since the fighting last week.
Hizbullah’s emergence as the single most powerful military-political group in Lebanon is augmented by its alliance with the prominent Christian leader Michael Aoun. The Hizbullah-led alliance of these and other smaller groups demands a greater say in the cabinet and parliament, which are designed to reflect power balances among the country’s main sectarian and religious groups. A significant reconfiguration of the traditional power-sharing system must be undertaken.
This can probably be done in a manner that all Lebanese can accept. What remain problematic are the underlying issues of Hizbullah’s arms, and the influence of Iran, Syria and the United States. Therefore, for long-term peace and security to prevail, the Doha talks would have to agree on fundamental structural reform of the Lebanese governance system, and the ideological values that define the country.
A real shift in the balance of power among the country’s main confessional groups means that Christians and Sunnis in particular would give up some power in favor of Shiite Hizbullah and its allies. They are reluctant to do so without some guarantees on the status and use of Hizbullah’s arms. This in turn requires Hizbullah to clarify its future stance on its arms, its relationship to Israel, and other important issues.
When either side relies more on its external support to overcome internal pressures, the other side becomes more confrontational and daring. The result is the Lebanon we have today, which keeps having to turn to external assistance to resolve political confrontations that are also heavily caused by other external assistance in the first place.
The real issue, then, also becomes clearer: the viability, credibility and legitimacy of Arab statehood. Lebanon — as a weak state — has led to the birth of groups like Hizbullah, who provide services that the weak state cannot offer its citizens. Hizbullah now is a parallel state. How can the state and Hizbullah coexist? This is the central issue around which all others revolve. It is also an issue that plagues many other Arab governments, as the years ahead are likely to show.
Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.
Copyright © 2008 Rami G. Khouri
—————
Released: 16 May 2008
Word Count: 809
—————-
For rights and permissions, contact:
rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.212.731.0757