BEIRUT — Almost every conversation I have had with friends and colleagues over the past few weeks on overall issues in the Middle East — Lebanon, the implications of Annapolis, Iraq, Iran and Palestine — has invariably led to a discussion about Syria and a slightly dizzying combination of hypothetical scenarios of its role in the region. The latest milestone on Syria’s road back from its marginalization in recent years was its invitation to, and presence at, the Annapolis meeting.
Typically, the Syrians played hard to get, demanded that the occupied Golan Heights and overall Arab-Israeli peace-making (not just bilateral Palestine-Israel issues) be included on the agenda, and, when these goals were achieved, sent a deputy foreign minister rather than the foreign minister that all other parties sent. The signal sent was vintage Syrian diplomacy: We are willing to play ball, but we also want to play a role in writing the rules of the game, and not merely respond to American-Israeli summonses, dictates, threats.
The Syria’s transformation — from an isolated gangster state in the eyes of many two years ago, to a cog in any Middle Eastern conversation or diplomatic endeavor today — is a reflection of Syria’s policies, but also of the interconnected nature of the Middle East’s many conflicts and tensions. Whether one likes or dislikes Syrian policies — there are valid reasons for both — Damascus today is a player in every single major contentious issue and active conflict in the region, including: Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, the war on terror, Russia’s continuing re-entry into the Middle East, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Its close working ties and medium-intensity alliances with Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah, in particular, give it strategic leverage vis-à-vis Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Iran.
How Syria plays its cards will determine if it carves out for itself a major role in the region and propels itself onto the path of sustainable national development, or messes up badly and descends into a suicidal spiral of self-destructive militarism and rejectionism. That Syria was invited to the American party at Annapolis, and attended, is a strong sign that it prefers to engage with the West and reap the benefits of such a move — primarily regime continuity and stability — rather than perpetually play the role of isolated Arab spoiler, Iran’s only Arab state ally, and American-designated state supporter of terrorism. Unlike most other Arab governments, it has been prepared to resist and defy American and other Western pressures and threats, including low-key unilateral American sanctions, while repositioning itself in the region to give itself assets and cards to play.
President Bashar Assad has completed his initial years of learning and consolidating power after succeeding his father seven years ago, and appears to have started playing some of the cards and assets he has accumulated, especially in Iraq and Arab-Israeli peace-making. On both counts, Syria has legitimate national security concerns, and much to gain from successful diplomacy that lets it maneuver into a win-win position of its own national self-interest with the strategic goals of the United States, other Western powers, major Arab states, and Israel. The era of smashing heads may soon be replaced with a time to make deals.
We will see a more significant focus on the prospects for Syrian-Israeli negotiations when the proposed follow-up to Annapolis convenes in Moscow in early 2008. The big question that comes up in every conversation about Syria these days remains intriguingly unanswered: Would Damascus abandon or significantly downplay its alliances with Iran, Hamas, and Hizbullah, in exchange for a fair peace with Israel, an end to threats by the United States, normalization with the West, and major economic development boosts?
Many Lebanon are concerned that Syria wants to regain its dominance over Lebanon through its Lebanese allies and proxies, and might get Western approval for this in any big regional bargain. Another looming issue is the fate of the UN-mandated investigation and tribunal on the assassinations of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others in Lebanon since February 2005. Many Lebanese are worried that the US-led West would downgrade the tribunal’s penetration into the upper echelons of the Syrian regime — if the evidence points that way, as many suspect it does — in exchange for Syrian cooperation on other issues where it can deliver, especially Iraq, Iran, and Israel-Palestine.
The art and beauty of the negotiated commercial or political deal in Middle Eastern history has always been two-fold: the bargaining process itself, and the outcome that must satisfy both sides, or all sides if more than two players are involved. Syria, the United States, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Palestine, Israel, Saudi Arabia, France, Russia and a few others have now embarked on one of the biggest deal-making enterprises in modern Middle East history. To understand and enjoy this spectacle, keep in mind that making a deal in the ancient bazaars of the Middle East — and Damascus has the oldest one around — includes a combination of showmanship, brinksmanship, threats, enticements, resistance, realism, pragmatism, and, above all, patience to wait out the other side.
Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.
Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 03 December 2007
Word Count: 840
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