ISTANBUL — It’s hard to get away from a central fact of Middle Eastern politics and statehood: the role of the military and security in the business of government and the exercise of public authority. This is a largely unaddressed issue in the otherwise vibrant galaxy of political and economic reform issues being debated throughout the Arab World and other Asian and African states.
The Arab world collectively remains the last non-democratic part of the world for several reasons, one of which is the military sector’s direct control of institutions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The role of the military in public life has been a basic influence on Middle Eastern statehood since the early 20th Century, shortly after the advent of modern independent countries in this region. In recent years, and in some countries, it has probably worsened, not improved, as assorted military institutions — the armed forces, intelligence agencies, police and internal security services — play a more dominant and public role in decision-making.
Turkey is an important and rare case study in how civilian-military relations can evolve over time — and generally peacefully — to allow elected civilian politicians to exercise greater control over the military. That process is still underway, with two steps forward followed by one step backwards, and an occasional sideward shuffle, reflecting both subtlety and bluntness in this pivotal struggle that has defined this region for much of the past century.
I have had the pleasure of spending a few days in Istanbul this week at a gathering of international investors and financial analysts. Their positive view of many profitable investments in Turkey seemed unperturbed by the dramatic show-down outside — on the streets, in court, and in parliament — between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the military-backed, largely secular opposition.
Historically, Turkey’s armed forces have overthrown governments and closed parliaments, worked closely with incumbent governments they liked, and also have largely come to terms with the mild Islamist AKP government, after forcing its predecessor Islamist parties out of office and out of existence. The country’s continued movement towards European Union standards has seen the civilian elected political establishment slowly whittle away the military’s power to interfere in politics.
The military and many allies in secular political circles have now balked at the prospect of AKP simultaneously controlling the parliament, the prime minister’s office, and the presidency, and they moved politically to stop the AKP candidate from becoming president late last month. An explicitly political process will determine the outcome of this struggle in the months ahead, to the envy of Arab lands where no such thing is likely to occur any time soon.
In the Arab world, the relationship between the military and the civilian political class is not so dynamic. It is also not discussed very much in public, which is one reason our Arab public sectors tend to be inefficient and dominated by the military. The relationships between the military and the civilian politicians of the Arab world are varied, with precise power configurations reflecting a wide range of factors: colonial histories, post-colonial trajectories, tribal social foundations, the nature and size of royal families, the intrusive role of foreign powers, and the domestic balance sheet of natural wealth and assets.
Most Arab military sectors played a constructive foundational role in the early decades of state-building, often being the central instrument of state-formation and national cohesion. The military coups that started to define Arab governance, as early as the 1930s in Iraq, slowly saw most Arab “republics” transformed into centralized security states by the early 1970s.
Security-military organizations operate largely beyond the scrutiny of civilian governments, with neither their budgets nor their activities subjected to any sort of serious oversight or accountability. Many Arab security agencies operate with honor, restraint and efficiency; some others have spilled over into gangsterism, mediocrity and corruption. Most security-military agencies in the Arab world feel they are the guardians of statehood, political governance, public order and national ideology all rolled into one. So it is not unusual to find security services vetting the appointments of university professors or newspaper editors, while they also hunt down terrorists and lesser mischief-makers.
The unexamined link between Arab governance and the military-security sector needs to be slowly loosened, and then broken completely. The security agencies must be allowed to play their important defense, intelligence and police functions, while civilian politicians elected by the citizenry define national policy and ideology. One of the few advantages of being the last autocratic region of the world is that we can learn from the transformation of those who democratized before us. An important starting point for such a change to occur peacefully is for citizens and public institutions to start discussing the exact nature of the military-civilian relationships in our countries.
Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.
Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 14 May 2007
Word Count: 797
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