BEIRUT — Mark this third week of March 2007 as potentially a historic moment of clarity on one of the most important political questions in the contemporary Arab world: How will this troubled, turbulent region make the transition from dictatorships and autocracies to more democratic, accountable systems of government, while the Islamist parties are the most popular forces around?
The answer seems to be: through coalition governments and transitional governments of national unity in which Islamists have a major but not the totally defining role.
In recent months, Islamists and Arab governments in several lands have confronted one another politically and occasionally fought it out in the streets. Now, having fought to a standstill and shown themselves to enjoy roughly equal power in society and among foreign supporters, they are trying the different approach of national unity or coalition governments. Lebanon and Palestine are the most interesting examples, and should be watched closely.
This may be the most important political test that Islamist movements have experienced in the Arab world in their modern history: trial by the fire of incumbency and accountability. We have had very few examples of Islamist groups winning power democratically, and being given the chance to exercise power by freely governing. A few cases of Islamists at local or municipal level can be studied from recent years, and they show mixed results; other examples include Islamist party cabinet ministers in governments in Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen and other countries, and their experience is also mixed.
Nowhere in the Arab world have we had a comparable experience to the ongoing incumbency of the Justice and Development Party that heads the Turkish government. There, the party’s Islamist credentials and rallying cry have been put to the test of actually governing, and responding to national needs. The party continues to adjust to the reality of incumbency and national accountability, seems likely to win another election, and will probably see its leader become president soon.
Arab Islamists will now be subjected to the same test and reality check. Hizbullah in Lebanon is on the verge of agreeing with its political foes on a national unity government that gives it and its allies (including some Christians) around one-third of all seats. In return for its ability to shape or block decisions on major, strategic issues, it will also find itself pressured to deliver practical answers to daily life issues that are high on the priority of ordinary citizens. Hamas in Palestine has just announced its national unity government with Fateh. It hopes to unblock the foreign financial boycott, and thus have more money with which to govern normally.
Both these major Islamist parties had gained power and respect over the years essentially by catering to their constituencies, which form minorities of their countries’ populations — and by resisting Israeli occupation and aggression. Hamas and Hizbullah both have some experience in local politics and service delivery, but not in national office beyond one or two narrow ministries that were always constrained by the majority will. They now must make two crucial transitions that they had toyed with in recent years: from dabbling in politics to full national governance, and from externally directed military resistance to internally directed social, political and economic services.
They have both met fierce opposition in making this change, from their three principal foes: domestic opponents among their fellow citizens, the Israeli government and people, and the United States with other leading Western governments. These are formidable odds to work against, but Hamas and Hizbullah have made headway and are now moving into coalition governments. They continue to succeed because they are credible at home, their domestic opponents are often corrupt and incompetent, and their foreign foes are grossly unfair and inconsistent.
Two aspects of the Islamist transition to mainstream democratic governance are important to watch: First, it is much more important to assess the local verdict on the Islamists in government than to ask what Israel, the United States or Europe feel about all this. Second, at the domestic level, the Islamists will be judged primarily by their record in formulating and implementing sensible policies and responding to their constituents’ needs, rather than in merely expressing popular grievances and repeating the ills of imperialism and the injustices of Zionism.
The weakness of Hamas, Hizbullah and other mainstream Islamists is their lack of coherent, detailed policy programs and practical answers to the pressing national challenges of Lebanon, Palestine and other Arab societies. These include quality and relevant education, job creation, investment promotion, equitable and sustainable economic growth, environmental protection, human rights enforcement, and regional peace and stability, among other issues.
Rockets, rifles, resistance, and communal self-assertion brought Hamas and Hizbullah to the point where they are now entrusted with a major share of governance. They must quickly show that they have answers and policies for the socio-economic and political issues that will improve the well-being of all their citizens.
Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.
Copyright ©2007 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 19 March 2007
Word Count: 817
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