BEIRUT — After four weeks of violent but inconclusive warfare, there were almost as many diplomats as missiles flying overhead in Beirut in the last few days, signaling a shift from fighting to negotiating, as the war’s true dimensions and stakes suddenly become more evident. This is not one war, but five, and in the political arena they will all be fought simultaneously.
On the surface, the situation seems clear. Israel and Hizbullah have effectively fought each other to a draw, despite Israel’s huge advantage in military power and its savage will to pummel all of Lebanon. Destroying Lebanon and slowly eroding Hizbullah’s capacity to fire missiles would entail a very high political cost for all concerned, and so diplomacy must take over now.
The first draft of the UN resolution to end the war agreed by the French and Americans is significant but flawed. It is significant because it mentions all the key issues that are important for both sides and that have not been resolved through war: occupied lands, cross-border attacks, return of prisoners, mutual respect of sovereignty and the 1949 armistice line.
The resolution is flawed because it favors Israel on all the key issues: It says Hizbullah started the conflict; it demands unconditional return of onlyIsraeli prisoners; it allows Israel to keep attacking and does not demand immediate Israel withdraw from south Lebanon, or subsequent Israeli withdrawal from the Shabaa Farms area that Lebanon says is Lebanese land; and, it demands an international force in south Lebanon and disarmament of Hizbullah before all of Lebanon’s legitimate demands are met.
The Lebanese government decision Monday to send 15,000 troops to the south — once Israel withdraws — will spur movement towards a more balanced resolution. This is an important signal that Lebanon and Hizbullah are prepared to respond to reasonable and legitimate demands by the international community, but only if Lebanese demands are met simultaneously.
Still, the problem is that a cease-fire and political resolutions on this front solve only one of our five wars around here. The other four wars are:
* the coming internal battles inside Lebanon to define the country’s future character and orientation;
* the continuing antagonism between Israel and regional players like the Palestinians, Syria, Iran and probably a majority of Arab public opinion;
* the struggle for legitimacy and leadership between established Arab regimes and powerful non-state actors like Hizbullah and Hamas; and,
* the global tug-of-war over the soul and identity of the Middle East, symbolized by the tensions between the United States-Israel-United Kingdom-led camp and the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah-Hamas-led camp.
Most of the key actors in this conflict see themselves fighting these five wars simultaneously, even though Lebanon-Israel is the only active battleground. Lebanon and Israel should be able to resolve their bilateral disputes as easily as Jordan and Egypt resolved theirs with Israel. But a weak Lebanese government in recent decades has precluded such a step because of Syrian dominance of Lebanon, repeated Israeli attacks and occupations in Lebanon, the rise of Hizbullah, and the Lebanese sect-based consensual governance system that inherently breeds a weak central government.
Israel has repeatedly used its military power in the past 40 years to stop attacks against it from south Lebanon, always to no avail. Hizbullah’s impressive performance to keep fighting and attacking during the past month suggests that a historic turning point has been reached: In a narrow but ferocious engagement, an Arab force has militarily fought Israel to a draw, and thus perhaps neutralized Israel’s historical reliance on its military deterrence to impose its will on its neighbors. This may be why Israel is attacking civilian installations throughout Lebanon, making a wasteland of the country: a lesson to anyone else who might consider challenging it militarily. This strategy probably will not work either, because savagery, like occupation, only begets resistance and defiance.
Hizbullah will emerge stronger politically from the cease-fire diplomacy if Israel is forced to comply with the key Lebanese demands of exchanging prisoners, leaving Sheba Farms, and stopping cross-border flights and attacks, in return for no more attacks against Israel from Lebanon. If and when Israel is no longer a threat to Lebanon, Hizbullah will no longer need to remain an armed resistance movement beyond the control of the government.
Israel and the United States now focus their energy on preventing Hizbullah from emerging from this war strengthened politically — because a stronger Hizbullah with widespread support in the Arab world and Iran would make the Israeli-American position in the other four wars immeasurably more difficult. Hizbullah in Lebanon is the embodiment of all five wars, which is why it must be defeated forever in Israel-American eyes, as well as those of many Lebanese and other Arabs who mistrust Hizbullah and fear its local and regional aims.
The last month suggests that destroying Hizbullah is not easy, which is why the political battles now shaping up will be so important. They will see the five wars in this region being fought simultaneously, unlike this one-front Lebanese-Israeli clash.
Rami G. Khouri is editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, published throughout the Middle East with the International Herald Tribune.
Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 08 August 2006
Word Count: 830
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