BEIRUT — The Lebanese National Dialogue that kicked off in Beirut on March 2, has generated little interest beyond the country¹s borders. That may be shortsighted. For the unprecedented local gathering of leaders of 14 major Lebanese religious, ethnic and political groups mirrors two broad national challenges that confound almost every Arab country: legitimacy and leadership.
The disinterest outside Lebanon is perhaps understandable. There is something very provincial about mostly hereditary leaders of sects and tribes of a few hundred thousand people each making a big deal of gathering in the same room and shaking hands, after, in some cases, refusing to speak to each other for years, or fighting each politically and militarily.
Overcoming the political feuds of villages and adjacent valleys is not so heroic by most people¹s calculations. It is also slightly odd to hold this special gathering when two other fully representative institutions already exist to discuss such national issues: the elected parliament, and the cabinet of ministers which is sometimes presided over by the president.
But these Lebanese democratic institutions are immobilized precisely because of severe legitimacy and leadership constraints. So something resembling a traditional Arab tribal confederal council is called in order to discuss urgent issues: the investigation of the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; the interpretation and implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1559; the contested status of President Emile Lahoud; and, broad security and sovereignty issues related to arms held by groups outside the national armed forces, including Hizbullah and some Syrian-influenced Palestinian groups.
The legitimacy deficit is both institutional and personal. Elected parliaments throughout the Arab world have little credibility because they are usually elected on the basis of deeply gerrymandered electoral districts and laws that are designed to deliver a predictably pro-government majority, which they usually do (though increasingly this is being challenged by victorious Islamist oppositions). Parliaments also are generally powerless in the face of security-backed executive branches and strongmen.
The personal legitimacy deficit is embodied in Lebanon by the incumbent but increasingly irrelevant President Lahoud. His initial 6-year term was extended for three more years in 2004, according to the dictates of Syria, which then dominated Lebanese life. The majority in parliament, and probably in the country, sees his extension as illegal, inappropriate and illegitimate. Last month it launched a campaign to remove him from office through peaceful constitutional means. This critical test of political incumbency should concern other nervous Arab leaders with a low legitimacy quotient. Never before has an Arab citizenry simultaneously used the rule of law, the provisions of its constitution, and the force of a UN Security Council resolution to dismiss a sitting president.
A powerful constellation of forces at work in Lebanon today brings together three different elements: public opinion manifested in mass street demonstrations; a determined political elite; and, international pressure channeled through the legitimacy of the UN Security Council. That same combination a year ago quickly forced a Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon, held parliamentary elections, changed the government, launched an international investigation into the Hariri murder, and arrested four senior Lebanese security chiefs.
These forces have now focused on deposing President Lahoud, thus providing an existential litmus test of their own credibility and efficacy. If they mobilize and channel their political support effectively, and depose the president constitutionally, they would generate a rare, long overdue, example of self-generated political legitimacy in Arab public life.
This is also a test of Arab leadership. Lebanon is typical of Arab lands in having very erratic leadership qualities. Some of the best minds in the world are to be found here, but usually the political system prevents them from translating their personal brilliance into public good, or efficient, clean governance.
Poor leadership is partly a function of weak legitimacy of institutions and individuals. This in turn reflects the legacy of brittle, ill-fitting modern statehood that does not always coincide logically with the religious, ethnic or national identities of the citizenry. Most Arab countries were forged in the self-serving furies of predatory and then retreating European colonialism, in the period 1920-1960. Many of them limp into the 21st century battered and stressed, because national identity and power do not always coincide with citizen identity and rights.
Consequently, in this week¹s Lebanese National Dialogue at least three levels of leadership are being tested at once: the Saad Hariri-led ³March 14² majority in Parliament that has yet to assert itself nationally after the initial eviction of the Syrian army a year ago; the leaders of the many narrow sects, ethnicities and political tribes engaged in the dialogue; and, the overall national leadership in the cabinet, including the presidency, that must address pressing issues of reform, debt, security, corruption and governance.
This Lebanese dialogue will be historic for all Arabs if it generates a credible national decision-making process that raises leadership and legitimacy levels in Lebanon. That is why I hope it succeeds.
If it falls short, though, and comes up with vague compromises that perpetuate the status quo, it will simply be another exercise in provincial politics, with village headmen rising only to the higher status of political reality television entertainers.
Rami G. Khouri is editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, published throughout the Middle East with the International Herald Tribune.
Copyright ©2006 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global
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Released: 04 March 2006
Word Count: 855
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