AMMAN — It is just ten days since the terrible bombings of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, by the Iraq-based Jordanian terrorist and Osama Bin Laden ally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In talking with Jordanian political activists and analysts, average citizens and officials alike during that time, the security challenge and dilemma facing King Abdullah II become very clear. Can traditional security methods stop the inhuman murder of civilians that is Zerqawi’s trademark, or is a bold political leap needed to do the job?
Meeting this challenge could also be an opportunity, though. This requires the Jordanian leadership and society being as bold politically as they have been morally courageous in confronting terrorism and affirming their determination to take on and defeat Zerqawi and his ilk. Moral outrage and tougher security, though, will not get the job done, important as they are.
It is clear that Jordanian society faces much more than just a security problem emanating from Iraq in the wake of the Anglo-American invasion, occupation, and reconfiguration of that country. If this were approached mainly as a security problem, a solution will not be found. The Zerqawis of this world will kill innocent people for years to come, because they will tap an endless supply of willing suicide bombers in the current political context of tension, occupation, limited franchise, and widespread socio-economic stress and degradation throughout the Arab world.
This is also not only a Jordan-, Iraq- or Zerqawi-specific problem. The multi-tiered challenge in Jordan comprises the same set of state-building issues and political riddles that have confounded every other Arab government and society in the past half a century.
It is crucial in this respect to note two important, related but also separate facts: It is novel and significant that the Amman terror bombers were Iraqis who come from the current Iraq-based cohort of killers; but we must not lose sight of the wider dilemma that terror attacks by Arabs against their own or neighboring countries have been a chronic, even structural, problem since the mid-1970s, and Zerqawi entered the terror business against Jordan and other targets well before the Iraq war.
Furthermore, the core issue of contention is not religion. It would be a big mistake and diversion to frame this as a battle of religious thought, ideology, interpretation, leadership or legitimacy, as some Arab or Islamic leaders are tempted to do. This would play into the hands of Bin Laden and Zerqawi in the same way that George Bush and Tony Blair fell into the trap of waging a “global war on terror” that has also turned out to be a global recruiting poster and fountainhead for terrorists — with Jordan merely the most recent victim.
While Jordanians and many others understandably focus on security, religious ideology, Zerqawi and Iraq as immediate concerns, the core problem is deeper, wider and older than all these. It is the problem of political violence that was once directed at narrow targets within a few Arab countries, and has now morphed and expanded into political terrorism that crosses Arab borders and travels the world.
Jordan or any other country will not succeed if it responds to such terror by doing that which Arab states have always done: shuffling around officials cut from the same mold, and introducing tough new anti-terror legislation. The British government did just that in Northern Ireland for a quarter century, and failed when it sought to end terror and political extremism mainly through police tactics; it only succeeded when it brought political and economic solutions to bear on the terror that was, ultimately, a symptom of political, economic and nationalistic grievances. Israel similarly continues to learn the same lessons. There is no legislation harsh enough or security service tough enough to stop suicide bombers who target pizza parlors, bus stops and hotels. And if a guard and fence are placed around every one of these places, the bombers will attack hairdressers and sheep markets.
A more effective approach is needed, which is why Jordan — unlike, say, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, or Egypt — is so intriguing and potentially promising today, as it girds to raise the intensity of battle against the terrorists who have assaulted it for decades. This is because the multiple causes, consequences and potential deterrents of political terrorism may dovetail nicely with a set of current issues and trends within Jordan, possibly generating bold new policies that could provide that breakthrough antidote to political extremism and violence that has eluded the entire Arab world.
Specifically, three important factors in Jordan should be grasped today in a more clear and effective way if serious progress is to be made in the Hashemite Kingdom’s own running war against terror that has endured for decades: These are political reform, security reform, and, most importantly, the intersection between governance and security. Jordan has a rare, historic opportunity today to achieve that which no Arab country has achieved, or even dared to attempt: to deter political extremism and ensure its security through a political process that meshes into a single dynamic the imperatives of political reform, genuine democratization, economic growth and prosperity, equality for all citizens, and civilian oversight of the security services.
In my next column, I will offer some specific proposals on how Jordan could approach this delicate but critically important challenge, so as to aspire to become the first democratic, stable and prosperous Arab state.
Rami G. Khouri is editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star newspaper, published throughout the Middle East with the International Herald Tribune.
Copyright ©2005 Rami G. Khouri
—————-
Released: 19 November 2005
Word Count: 896
——————-
For rights and permissions, contact:
rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606