John Stoehr is the editor and publisher of The Editorial Board, a contributing writer for Washington Monthly and the former managing editor of The Washington Spectator. He was a lecturer in political science at Yale where he taught a course on the history of modern campaign reporting. He is a fellow at the Yale Journalism Initiative and at Yale’s Ezra Stiles College.
You can view John Stoehr’s articles syndicated by us here
Nonprofit and reader-supported, the Spectator reports from the ground on the excesses of the public and private sectors that distort our politics and undermine democracy. Each month in print and every day at washingtonspectator.org, the Spectator delivers fact-based, uncompromising reporting on significant stories ignored by the mainstream press, and provides insight and analysis on trending developments in the news. The Spectator is published by The Public Concern Foundation, an educational foundation committed to a vigorous public discourse.
Immanuel Wallerstein (1930-2019), Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, was the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).
Professor Wallerstein received his PhD from Columbia University in 1959. He was the former President of the International Sociological Association (1994-1998), and chair of the international Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1993-1995).
He wrote in three domains of world-systems analysis: the historical development of the modern world-system; the contemporary crisis of the capitalist world-economy; the structures of knowledge. Books in each of these domains include respectively The Modern World-System (3 vols.); Utopistics, or Historical Choices for the Twenty-first Century; and Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms.
You can view Immanuel Wallerstein’s articles syndicated by us here
Rami George Khouri is an internationally syndicated political columnist and book author. He was the first director, and is now a senior fellow, at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Kennedy School of Harvard University. He is editor at large, and former executive editor, of the Beirut-based Daily Star newspaper, and was awarded the Pax Christi International Peace Prize for 2006.
He teaches or lectures annually at the American University of Beirut and Northeastern University. He has been a fellow and visiting scholar at Harvard, Mount Holyoke, Princeton, Syracuse, The Fletcher School at Tufts, Northeastern, Denver, Oklahoma and Stanford universities, and is a member of the Brookings Institution Task Force on US Relations with the Islamic World. He is a Fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (Arab East Jerusalem). He also serves on the Joint Advisory Board of the Northwestern University Journalism School in Doha, Qatar, Georgetown University’s Center for Regional and International Studies in Doha, Qatar, and recently completed a four-year term on the International Advisory Council of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
He was editor-in-chief of the Jordan Times for seven years and for 18 years was general manager of Al Kutba, Publishers, in Amman, Jordan, where he also served as a consultant to the Jordanian tourism ministry on biblical archaeological sites. He has hosted programs on archaeology, history and current public affairs on Jordan Television and Radio Jordan, and often comments on Mideast issues in the international media.
He has a BA and MSc degrees respectively in political science and mass communications from Syracuse University, NY, USA.
You can view Rami Khouri’s articles syndicated by us here
From Europe to the Middle East, Asia, and North America, The Arab Weekly delivers the news and opinions that inform and shape decisions. We provide insight and commentary on national, international and regional events through the focus of the Arab world.
Al Arab Publishing House, based in London, is led by Group Executive Editor, Haitham El-Zobaidi. Dr. El-Zobaidi as assembled an award-winning team of veteran journalists led by Oussama Romdhani, Editor in Chief. See more at www.thearabweekly.com.
You can view The Arab Weekly’s articles syndicated by us here
Richard Bulliet is Professor of Middle East History at Columbia University.
He writes about Muslim religious politics in both the contemporary world and in earlier periods of Islamic history. He first visited the Middle East in 1965. On his many subsequent trips he has spent time in virtually every region of the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. He has abilities in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish along with several European languages.
Bulliet has given several hundred interviews to the print and broadcast media. His commentaries have appeared in Newsday, The Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe, and The Arizona Republic, and he has served as a consultant on Islamic matters for Time Magazine.
His books include The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (2004, in press), The Columbia History of the Twentieth Century (ed., 1998), The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East (co-ed., 1996), Islam: The View from the Edge (1994), Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period (1979), The Camel and the Wheel (1975), and The Patricians of Nishapur (1972).
You can view Richard Bulliet’s articles syndicated by us here
On April 23, a senior Israeli officer, Brig Gen Utai Brun, head of research at army intelligence, made a serious accusation against Syria. In a lecture at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, he declared: “To the best of our professional understanding, the Syrian regime has used lethal chemical weapons against gunmen in a series of incidents in recent months…” General Brun gave no evidence for his accusation and produced no physical proof, but he added that the Israel Defence Forces believed Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on several occasions, including a specific attack on March 19.
As it happened, General Brun made his accusation against Syria during a three-day visit to Israel by America’s new Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel—a man whose appointment Israel’s supporters in the United States had sought to prevent. Some Jewish organisations had come close to calling him anti-Semitic. Only by eating humble pie did Hagel manage to have his appointment confirmed. He now clearly hopes to put an end to his quarrel with America’s pro-Israeli lobby.
On this his first visit to Israel as Defence Secretary, he announced that Israel was to receive a rich haul of advanced U.S. weapons—air refuelling tankers, cutting-edge radar and the V-22 Osprey ‘tiltrotor’ aircraft, an advanced plane so far denied to all other US allies. But Hagel’s generous gesture was to no avail. Although Israel was evidently delighted with the weapons, this did not inhibit it from accusing Syria of using chemical weapons—clearly in the hope of provoking a U.S. attack on that country.
Unpleasantly surprised by General Brun’s claim that Syria had used chemical weapons, Hagel declared the very next day—on April 23 — that he had discussed Syria’s chemical weapons with Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon, but that neither of them had said that Syria had actually used such weapons. “They did not give me that assessment,” he said. Clearly, Hagel was angry that Israel was putting pressure on the United States to intervene in Syria. The Israeli authorities may well have thought that Hagel, still recovering from the beating pro-Israelis had given him in Washington, would not dare dispute Israel’s assessment.
What was Israel trying to achieve by inciting the United States to attack Syria? It would undoubtedly like President Bashar al-Assad to be replaced by a more pliant figure. But Israel is also worried that Jabhat al-Nusra, a violent branch of Al-Qaida, might come to power if Bashar were to fall. By accusing Syria of using chemical weapons, Israel’s goal seems to have been to trigger an early American armed intervention with the double objective of ousting Bashar from office, while preventing his replacement by the redoubtable Jabhat al-Nusra.
Israel is well aware that Obama—having pulled American forces out of Iraq and planning to do much the same in Afghanistan by 2014 — is most reluctant to commit US troops to yet another war. Nevertheless, by accusing Assad of using chemical weapons, Israel was clearly hoping to lure Obama into a Syrian campaign. Obama had, in fact, laid himself open to just such pressure by saying that any Syrian use of chemical weapons would cross a “red line.”
Moscow was quick to leap to Syria’s defence. On April 28, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the Russian journal Global Affairs, wrote: “Moscow does not believe that Assad may use chemical weapons: he is not a madman to ask for such trouble.”
In fact, Israel’s objectives may have been even wider than triggering an American attack on Syria. For the moment, it is greatly satisfied that most of its Arab neighbours are in deep trouble.
All this is very good news for Israel. Nevertheless, its dominance is not total.
It still faces something of a challenge from the Iran-Syria-Hizballah axis. Iran may be facing severe sanctions, but it is far from defeated. Assad’s Syria may be in dire straits, but it is fighting back, and continues to enjoy strong Russian support. Hizballah, Lebanon’s robust Shi‘a movement, may be under intense pressure from militant Sunni groups, but it remains the most powerful force in Lebanon.
Aware that their attempts have—for the moment—failed to push the United States into an armed confrontation with Syria, Israeli spokesmen are already back-tracking. In New York, Yuval Steinitz, minister of strategic and intelligence affairs, was reported as saying on April 29: “We never asked, nor did we encourage, the United States to take military action against Syria.” Iran, he declared, not Syria was the “problem No. 1 of our generation.”
These exchanges demonstrate Israel’s efforts to incite the United States against Israel’s enemies—and also the speed with which it withdraws when its covert efforts fail to produce the hoped for results. Israel is well aware that the United States is at present extremely reluctant to attack either Iran or Syria. Israel may, therefore, have to content itself with continued U.S. pressure on these two countries—short of actual war. The truth is that Israel may well think that its most threatening enemy today is neither Iran nor Syria, but rather Hizballah in Lebanon. It was Hizballah that fought Israel to something like a draw in 2006 and which, to this day, represents its most dangerous neighbour.
It is interesting to note that Israel’s only armed intervention so far in the Syrian civil war occurred on Saturday, April 27, when it attacked a convoy making its way to Hizballah in Lebanon from Syria’s chemical weapons facility, the Scientific Studies and Research Center at Barzeh near Damascus. Israel’s evident fear is that any acquisition by Hizballah of Syrian chemical weapons would give the Lebanese Shi‘a movement considerable immunity from attack.
By insisting that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons, General Brun’s aim seems to have been to persuade the United States to destroy both the Syrian regime and its Hizballah ally. Israel wants no limits on the extraordinary freedom it has long enjoyed to attack its neighbours at will and never be hit back. From Israel’s point of view, if America could be persuaded to do the job for it, so much the better. If not this time, another occasion will surely arise.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).
Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global
Most objective observers of the Syrian conflict now realise that neither President Bashar al-Assad nor his enemies can hope to win an outright victory. By continuing to fight, they are simply exhausting themselves and ruining their country.
The war has torn Syria apart, caused vast loss of life, displaced a large part of its population, inflicted great physical damage, and even threatened the country’s continued future as a state within recognised borders.
President Assad’s enemies have seized control of large parts of the north and east of the country, as well as of several border crossings with Turkey. About half of Aleppo—the country’s second city—is in rebel hands. But the regime is fighting back, and has recently scored some successes, although at great cost to the civilian population.
Well over a million panic-stricken Syrians have fled the country and taken refuge in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and even, further afield, in Egypt. The number is increasing by the day. Another ten million people—about 40 per cent of Syria’s population—survive as best they can in rebel-controlled territory. Most rebel fighters remain encamped in their home areas, which they hope to defend against regime troops. But, as they lack anti-aircraft weapons, they are unable to protect their civilian populations from bombardment by government planes.
Created when Britain and France divided the Middle East between them after the First World War, the Syrian republic is now in danger of falling apart. What are the choices? Either the antagonists will persist in their life-and-death struggle, or they will decide to seek some sort of a compromise, which could save their country from possible partition. However, if the fighting continues, it will undoubtedly bring an end to Syria’s traditional role as a major player on the Middle East scene, and as the one Arab country which has been able to hold a ruthless and ambitious Israel more or less in check. That is the choice facing both the regime and its enemies.
Unfortunately, the latest developments do not seem to favour an early settlement of the Syrian crisis. In recent weeks, Moaz al-Khatib, a former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, emerged as the head of an exiled opposition body called the Syrian National Coalition. Sickened by the violence which was destroying his country, he declared that he was prepared to negotiate with the Syrian government—without first insisting that Bashar al-Assad step down. Hard-liners have angrily contested this moderate position. After much discussion and controversy, Moaz al-Khatib was forced to step down.
He has been replaced—it would appear only for the next six months—by Georges Sabra, 66, a Syrian Communist of Greek Orthodox background, who has been active in opposition politics since the 1970s. He was jailed in Syria for eight years from 1987 to 1995, before going underground. His appointment is probably intended to wean some Christians away from Assad’s regime. But, although a brave man, Georges Sabra is not a major political figure. He may not have the necessary political weight or negotiating skills to contribute to a resolution of the conflict.
In fact, unlike Moaz al-Khatib, he has bitterly refused any compromise or negotiation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This is not an intelligent or constructive attitude, since it would seem that neither side can hope to win a decisive victory. The time has surely come for Syria’s antagonists to seek a compromise which will save their country from further calamities.
External powers have contributed to the present disaster. They, too, must decide whether to press forward in the hope of making gains which might bolster their own interests, or whether, on the contrary, they should encourage the warring factions in Syria to put up their guns and come to the conference table.
After more than two years of often savage war, with the loss of at least 70,000 lives and possibly many more, it is surely time to find a way out of this destructive conflict. The only sensible solution would seem to be a negotiation between the regime and its enemies under the joint auspices of both the United States and Russia, the two major external powers who, by taking sides, have so far served to keep the conflict alive.
Both Washington and Moscow are now beginning to understand that continued fighting is no longer in their interest, since the only beneficiary would be Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al-Sham (the Front for the Defence of the Syrian People), a rebel force which has emerged as the most ruthless, the most disciplined and—because of its blind devotion to militant Islam—the most ideological of all President Assad’s opponents. It is, in fact, none other than Al-Qaida, under the assumed name of Jabhat al-Nusra. This violent Islamist movement has distinguished itself by slaughtering prisoners and carrying out dozens of devastating suicide bombings across the country, including several in central Damascus itself.
Jabhat al-Nusra was widely believed to be planning a major assault on Damascus in the coming weeks. But this attack seems to have been put temporarily on hold, as the Jabhat wrestles with the problem of having been identified as an outgrowth of Al-Qaida.
In Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere—and also in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states—the will to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad is still there. But there is beginning to be some hesitation in helping the opposition destroy the Syrian regime if it means putting Al-Qaida in power in its place. It is clearly in no country’s interest—whether in the East or the West – for this violent movement to entrench itself in Syria and further destabilise an important but already fragile region.
Appalled by the widespread turmoil, many Syrians are anxious to spare their country further destruction. One organisation which, from the very start, refused to take part in armed conflict, and which has pressed for negotiations with the regime without preconditions, is the so-called National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. Its main spokesman, Haytham Manna, has from the beginning opposed foreign intervention in Syria. He has repeatedly appealed for a negotiated solution to the Syrian war. He has bitterly opposed the recent decision taken in Istanbul to form a Syrian government in exile, as well as the move, driven by Qatar, to give Syria’s seat in the Arab League to the opposition. For long, Manna was virtually ignored. But, as casualties have mounted in Syria and as a cruel stalemate seems to be taking hold, his National Coordination Committee has gained ground and is at last beginning to be heard.
It is surely time for Syrians to unite to save their country from further senseless destruction.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).
Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global
A public dispute between two prominent Islamic fighting groups—one in Syria, the other in Iraq—has given Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad a moment of much-needed relief. Although it is too early to say for certain, we may be witnessing a crucial moment in his battered fortunes. Fears about the sort of regime that might come after him seem to have aroused doubts among his Western critics about the wisdom of overthrowing him—at least for the time being.
As the armed struggle in Syria enters its third year, Assad’s most dangerous opponent is undoubtedly Jabhat al-Nusra, a highly-disciplined Islamic force several thousand strong which, since its formation early in 2012, has scored notable victories in the north and east of the country under the leadership of its shadowy commander, Abu Muhammad al-Golani. One of its recent successes has been to capture Raqqa in eastern Syria, the first capital of Syria’s fourteen governorates to fall to Islamic rule.
Jabhat al-Nusra has emerged in recent weeks as the most ruthless, the most disciplined and—because of its devotion to Islam—the most ideological of Assad’s opponents. It has inspired great fear in the population by slaughtering prisoners and carrying out dozens of devastating suicide bombings, including several in central Damascus itself.
This fighting group was long suspected of closely resembling Al-Qaida, the radical and violent Islamic movement which, since the death of its founder Osama bin Laden, has fallen under the control of one of his former colleagues, the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri. In recent months, Al-Qaida managed to establish a clandestine branch in Iraq where—with the evident blessing of Al-Zawahiri himself—it assumed the ambitious name of the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’, under the leadership of a certain Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Needless to say, Iraq’s embattled Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has no tolerance whatsoever for such an overt challenge to his authority and is evidently committed to rooting out all such threats, especially when they come from dangerous Sunni terrorists in his domain.
Such was the situation when, to universal surprise, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced on April 9 that his Iraqi Islamist movement had merged with Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra to form a new grouping to which he gave the ambitious name of ‘Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Levant.’ He even went so far as to claim that the ties between the two movements were of long standing, since they had been formed by men—many of them Syrian jihadis—whom the Assad regime had encouraged to go to Iraq to fight American troops there from 2003 to 2011. Once the Americans had departed, some of these men had made their way back to Syria, where they formed Jabhat al-Nusra, turning their guns on their former benefactors in Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Indeed, to demonstrate the close bonds between the Syrian and Iraqi Islamic fighters, Al-Baghdadi went on to say that Al-Qaida in Iraq had been making a monthly contribution to Jabhat al-Nusra’s budget in Syria, and had itself chosen Abu Muhammad al-Golani to lead it, after advising him on the plans and strategy needed to defeat Bashar al-Assad.
This announcement from Iraq has clearly come as a most unwelcome shock to Jabhat al-Nusra. While admitting its allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Syrian opposition movement has hurried to make clear that it had no prior knowledge of Al-Baghdadi’s announcement and that it had not been consulted or briefed about it. Evidently deeply embarrassed, it insisted that it totally rejected the notion that Syria and Iraq form a united Islamic state under a single Islamic ruler. In continuing the fight against Bashar al-Assad, it was evidently determined to use its own name and its own flag—and avoid being tarnished by too close an association with Al-Qaida.
Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, the mysterious Abu Muhammad al-Golani, is clearly well aware that the statement by Iraq’s Al-Qaidi leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has done him no good at all. To be labelled an Al-Qaida affiliate in today’s climate is by no means an asset. On the contrary, it has served to alert the Western world that Al-Qaida is the hidden force behind the Syrian uprising and that it stands to benefit—and perhaps even come to power—if and when Bashar al-Assad were to fall. This realisation seems to have caused the United States and its Western allies to pause in their campaign against Assad’s regime. In other words, Al-Baghdadi seems inadvertently to have done Assad a great service.
The crisis has demonstrated that many of Assad’s opponents in Syria have no intention to be cast as hard-line Islamists. Indeed, Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition and a former Imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, was quick to declare on Facebook that “The bottom line is that Al-Qaida ideology does not suit us.” He seemed to be saying that, while a majority of Syrians wanted freedom, they had no wish to replace Assad’s authoritarian but essentially secular rule by that of an ultra-fundamentalist Islamic dictatorship.
A recent study by Yezid Sayegh, of the Carnegie Middle East Centre, has shown that “significant swathes of Syria’s 1-1.5 million civil servants, 2-2.5 million members of the ruling Baath Party, and the 2.5-3 million strong Alawi community who provide the backbone of the security services and armed forces” are far from ready to abandon the Assad regime. Syria’s minorities—Alawis but also Christians, Druze, Ismailis and other smaller communities—make up some 30 per cent of the population. The prospect of an Al-Qaida victory arouses fears among many of them that their lives would be in danger. But it would also be unwelcome to many Sunnis, especially the more liberal among them—including prominent men such as Moaz al-Khatib himself.
For peace to return to Syria, some reconfiguring of power relationships between its different communities will evidently be necessary. The intelligence services and officer corps, dominated by Alawis over the past several decades, will need to be restructured so as to give moderate Muslims a greater share of power. External powers, Arab and non-Arab, will need to put their ambitions and rivalries aside and join forces in presiding over a Syrian settlement, which will keep fanatics of all communities at bay. Ancient minorities will need to be protected. The more than one million Syrian refugees that have fled the country will need to be brought home and rehoused. Massive financial aid, very probably from oil and gas-rich Gulf States, will need to be provided to rebuild Syria’s shattered towns and villages.
It will evidently require statesmanship in Washington and Moscow, as well as in overheated European and Middle Eastern capitals, to bring the slaughter in Syria to an end and rebuild the country as a peaceful haven for its rich mixture of communities. For the moment, however, this vision remains little more than a dream.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).
Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global
Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, who chaired the P5+1 group of delegates — from Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States plus Germany—admitted that the two sides remained far apart “on the substance” of the negotiations. But she was by no means gloomy or dismissive. “We have talked in much greater detail than ever before,” she said, “and our efforts will continue in that direction…. For the first time that I’ve seen, [there was] a real back and forth between us, where we were able to discuss details, to pose questions, and to get answers directly.” The participants, she said, would now “go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process.” She would be in touch with Dr Jalili — in a matter of “days, not months” — to see if the gap could be narrowed and how to go forward.
For its part, Iran was said to be eager to schedule a new meeting, but, given the considerable differences between the two sides, the P5+1 said they wanted to avoid “talks for talks’ sake.” It therefore seems unlikely that there will be another round of negotiations before Iran’s important June 14 elections, which will bring Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial 8-year presidency to a close.
If one were to listen to Catherine Ashton, the outlook for a deal with Iran would seem reasonably hopeful. But is this a true picture? The major uncertainty concerns America’s intentions. It is by no means clear whether Washington truly wants a deal with Iran or whether its covert aim is to bring down the Islamic Republic. Certainly, this is Iran’s profound suspicion, which is not altogether surprising considering its long quarrel with the United States, which extends back to the birth of the Islamic republic in 1979. Just as many people in the United States suspect that Iran is spinning out the talks to gain time for its covert nuclear programme, so a great many Iranians believe the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith. They suspect the United States is using the pretext of Iran’s nuclear programme to impose ever more crippling sanctions on it with the aim of bringing down the Islamic regime. There is certainly no indication yet that the United States recognises that a deal with Iran must inevitably require a degree of compromise — very probably one allowing the Islamic Republic to enrich uranium for industrial purposes under strict international supervision.
Catherine Ashton is patently well-intentioned. She seems to have managed to dispel some of Iran’s darkest suspicions. Whereas much American comment about Iran is hostile, she has given every indication of wanting the talks to succeed. Breaking with the U.S. tendency to portray Iran as a sinister adversary, she has made a real effort to befriend Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief negotiator, to understand his concerns and break with the language of condemnation and threat too often adopted by U.S. officials and commentators. It is by no means clear, however, whether the United States government shares her positive approach. There are powerful forces in the United States which do not want a deal with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.
For one thing, Israel, which exerts considerable influence over America’s Middle East policy, wants to close down Iran’s nuclear industry altogether and makes no secret of its readiness to use force to achieve this aim. It is totally opposed to any compromise which would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium. Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, has been quick to dismiss the talks at Almaty as a waste of time — indeed as a failure.
“This failure was predictable,” he declared. “Israel has already warned that the Iranians are exploiting the talks in order to play for time while making additional progress in enriching uranium for an atomic bomb. The time has come for the world to take a more assertive stand and make it unequivocally clear to the Iranians that the negotiations games have run their course.” Steinitz — and, behind him, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu — have pressed the United States to set a red line for Iran, insisting that it totally abandon its civilian nuclear programme. The excitable Steinitz has even said the closure must take place “in a few weeks, a month” at the most. He has warned that Iran would face immediate attack if it failed to do so!
U.S. President Barack Obama has adopted a cooler tone, arguing that it would take at least as year, if not longer, for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. But it is by no means clear how far he can depart from Israel’s more pressing agenda. In the circumstances, the negotiations behind the scenes between the United States and Israel may well be as important as those between Iran and the P5+1 — if not more so.
Iran has always insisted on international recognition of its ‘right’ to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its home soil. From the start, this has been its position of principle. “What we are insisting on is our right to enrich,” Saeed Jalili told the press. “This is equally true for 5 percent or 20 percent. You know well that 20 percent enriched uranium is used for medical purposes. One million Iranian patients are using those isotopes… Today the fuel is exclusively used for humanitarian matters, medical purposes, exclusively peaceful purposes.” Jalili explained that Iran’s proposals required recognising “our right to enrich and ending behaviours which have every indication of enmity toward the Iranian people… In consideration of our new proposals, it is now up to the P5+1 to demonstrate its willingness and sincerity to take appropriate confidence-building steps in the future.”
Nevertheless, at Almaty, the Iranian delegation showed some flexibility in suggesting that, as a “confidence-building” measure, Iran might be prepared to freeze production of some of its enriched uranium if, in return, the West were to lift its economic sanctions. Iran, however, seems unlikely to agree to close its enrichment plant at Fordo, buried deep in a mountain, unless its legal right to nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is acknowledged.
Does this indicate that Iran and the P5+1 are at a dangerous stalemate? It is to be hoped that the departure from office next June of Iran’s pugnacious President Ahmadinejad will ease the way to an international agreement, which will spare the region the horrors of war.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).
Copyright © 2013 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global
—————
Released: 09 April 2013
Word Count: 1,157
—————-