When Turkey’s political elite square off next year in the country’s general election, one element of the democratic process is almost certain to be absent: political debates. The televised airing of ideas and differences, ubiquitous in many Western democracies, has not been a feature of Turkish politics since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was first elected prime minister in 2002.

In Erdogan’s “New Turkey,” the lack of political debating has absolved leaders from working for people’s votes and disenfranchised an already sceptical electorate. Put another way, the longer politicians stay away from the lectern, the shallower Turkey’s democracy becomes.

The spectator sport is known as political debating first appeared on Turkish television in 1983. At the time, millions were drawn to their screens to watch as politicians defined and defended party platforms. The primetime tradition of watching public servants duel with words got so popular that it trickled down from national politics to the local level.

As elsewhere, debates have made (or destroyed) Turkish politicians’ careers. Erdogan himself rose to national prominence on the debate stage. In the 2002 campaign for prime minister, a primetime debate on TV propelled the then-Istanbul mayor and Justice and Development Party (AKP) chairman to the country’s highest office, as Erdogan bested the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal.

In 2007 a debate sank the aspirations of AKP vice-chairman Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat, who resigned from his post two months after his 95-minute debate with CHP parliament member Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. Kılıcdaroglu, who was later made chairman of CHP after trouncing Ankara mayor Melih Gokcek in another debate, accused Firat of corruption. It was political theatre at its most informative and entertaining.

Since then, it has been quiet at the podium. Despite several invitations from challengers, Erdogan, a skilled orator, has stayed away from the debate stage. Former editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News, Murat Yetkin, says Erdogan even banned other AKP members from appearing in televised debates themselves. The prohibition on debates is yet another erosion of Turkey’s democratic freedoms and further evidence of Erdogan’s political consolidation.

The ban on politicians debating on screen is especially domineering in Turkey, where television is the main source of information and news. For instance, KONDA, an Istanbul-based polling company, found that 67 percent of Turks first learned about the 2016 coup attempt from television. Indeed, Turks spend most of their free time watching TV. A 2020 report from the TV Audience Research Company estimated that Turks spend four hours and 33 minutes a day watching television. Of course, not everyone is tuned into news 24/7, but the amount of time spent watching television demonstrates how central the small screen is in most households.

And yet, news coverage in Turkey is decidedly partisan. Ilhan Tasci, the CHP party representative on Turkey’s broadcasting watchdog, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK), exposed the fact that opposition parties get almost no airtime. During the 2018 election campaign, which ran from April 17 to May 6, public broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Company gave no airtime to the Kurdish-linked Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), three hours and four minutes to the CHP, and 36 hours to AKP.

Compounding these concerns, half of all eligible voters for the upcoming general election will have little or no memory of ever seeing a televised political debate. Members of Generation Z, some five million people born after 1997, 16 percent of the electorate, will cast their first vote in a national election next year, while Millennials, born after 1981, make up 33 percent.

The last time Turkey’s voters saw anything resembling a political debate was in 2019, a staid and stiff on-screen meeting between AKP’s Binali Yıldırım and CHP’s Ekrem Imamoglu campaigning to be the mayor of Istanbul. Neither man engaged directly with the other. There was no hard talk, no substance, nothing that would have influenced the outcome of the mayoral election.

Given this two-decade decline in Turkey’s debate scene and evidence from other countries that such events have little impact on election outcomes, it is worth asking whether the demise of Turkey’s on-screen political sparring even matters. Worth asking, but hardly worth answering.

Put simply, the disappearance of transparent political discourse has excluded entire generations of voters from the political process and prevented young people from fully grasping their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Millions of voters have come of age never witnessing a politician work for their vote or being publicly called out for their wrongdoings. Subconsciously, Turkey’s young voters have been trained not to expect politicians to deliver on their promises, or to even make them.

Turkey’s lack of political “liyakat” (competence) and the eradication of public accountability are perhaps the biggest shifts in the country’s political landscape since AKP came to power. Voters have grown accustomed to Turkish politicians avoiding public scrutiny or engaging with the opposition. Today in Turkey, politics are a black box.

Unfortunately, what that has produced is a monolithic narrative empowering a single opinion at the expense of many voices. Erdogan’s position on public debates is a key cause of this trend. As candidates get ready to do battle in next year’s general election, voters will need to cast their ballots based on what is said in public, but even more importantly, on what is not.

Alexandra de Cramer is a journalist based in Istanbul. She reported on the Arab Spring from Beirut as a Middle East correspondent for Milliyetnewspaper. Her work ranges from current affairs to culture and has been featured in Monocle, Courier Magazine, Maison Francaise and Istanbul Art News.

Copyright ©2022 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 31 January 2022
Word Count: 877
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In January 2011, a few days after the return of the head of the Islamist Ennahda Movement Rached Ghannouchi to Tunisia from his self-exile in London, hundreds of demonstrators gathered on the Habib Bourguiba Avenue in downtown Tunis. They raised their voices in favour of a secular state and expressed their concern at the return of Islamists from abroad, noting that the people’s budding revolution should be led by younger faces and by those who have lived in the country through its various phases and those who were better positioned to understand the grievances of Tunisians, in general and the youth, in particular.

Most of the demonstrators at that time were young Tunisians, in their twenties and thirties. They had believed then in better days and had high hopes for a modern republic that would pull the country out of its many crises and uphold social rights and freedoms.

Unfortunately, the high hopes were not to be realised.

More than ten years after that small gathering on the Habib Bourguiba Avenue, the country is reeling under its worst political and economic crises since the 1956 independence from France. In the last couple of years, these crises were exacerbated by the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and a record surge in infections.

The gradual descent of the republic into the abyss of anarchy and injustice is just so bitter and hard to swallow for Tunisians, who have always looked back with pride at their history and achievements when it comes to development and modernisation. In fact, Tunisia, which was once known as one of the most progressive countries in the Middle East, is now beyond recognition, its brighter face fading into political disputes, endless polemics about constitutional prerogatives and useless debates about the role of religion in politics.

The late leader Habib Bourguiba, who was president of Tunisia from 1957 to 1987 after leading the country to independence from France, wanted this republic to rise as a model for citizenship, progress, scientific development, economic growth, modern education and women’s liberation. He certainly failed to install political freedom and pluralism at a time when very few viewed these issues as a priority and a prerequisite for the creation of a strong nation. Bourguiba did, however, set this republic on the right track for modernisation and anchored a belief in Tunisians’ ability to create “miracles.”

Alas, 21 years after Bourguiba, a nemesis of Islamists, passed away, these hopes were dashed. The Tunisian leader, himself, warned Tunisians on many occasions about the detrimental role of political Islam and the destructive project of Islamists. Some listened to him. Others were either driven by blurry-eyed openness to all forms of political currents including Islamists or blinded by the duplicitous discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly their Tunisian offshoot, represented by Ghannouchi and his disciples.

Since Tunisia’s 2011 uprising, Ennahda has played the cards of revolution and religion to lure in voters, particularly those from poor and working class neighbourhoods and marginalised regions, promising them a better future in which the dreams of youth can be realised and justice achieved.

But after the party’s rise to power, senior Islamist leaders, particularly Ghannouchi, looked at power as a trophy, dividing the spoils of the conquest among themselves while working to maintain control over state institutions through alliances, coalitions and political manoeuvres against their opponents and friends.

After numerous shocking political events, including the assassinations of leftist leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013 and the gradual isolation of the late President Beji Caid Essebsi later in 2016, Tunisia began to see Ennahda’s true face, viewing the party as too unstable and fragile to help in any way counter the challenges the country faces.

False promises of employment and modernisation coupled with growing corruption and calls for compensation for all Ennahda members for so-called years of oppression, opened Tunisians’ eyes to the Islamist movement’s real agenda, a raw monopoly of power and reaping of personal benefits.

Now, as Ghannouchi’s castle of sand steadily melts away and the truth behind Ennahda’s opportunist pursuits emerges, the Islamist movement is facing one of the toughest challenges since its creation in the 1980’s.

On Sunday, Tunisian President Kais Saied ousted the Islamist-backed government of Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspended the Islamist-controlled parliament with help from the army.

The president’s action followed months of deadlock and disputes pitting him against Mechichi and a dysfunctional parliament, as Tunisia descended into an economic crisis exacerbated by one of Africa’s worst COVID-19 outbreaks.

Of course, the Ennahda Movement and its leader Ghannouchi, now in their weakest moment since their return from exile, are crying foul and warning Saied’s action is endangering the so-called democratic system of 2011 which they introduced and shaped in a way that guarantees their political dominance.

So, what happened in Tunisia?

For sure, what happened was not a coup, as Islamists and their allies are claiming, nor a suspension of the democratic process. It is rather a rectification of the course of the democratic transition so as to pull the country out of the abyss of Ennahda’s malicious and short-sighted control over state institutions.

So far, no one can accurately spell out the intentions of the president in the absence of a clear roadmap that would detail the next steps he will take. However, one thing is certain: Tunisians want Islamists out. They want the Ennahda project to fade out from the political and social landscape. They also want justice as they hope to see the Islamists held accountable for ten years of political mismanagement, de-construction of the state, corruption and wealth accumulation.

Tunisians also want justice to be served against those who were involved in the assassinations of Belaid and Brahmi, especially after a group of lawyers pursuing evidence in the 2013 killings said they have uncovered information that incriminates the Ennahda Movement.

Tunisians want more than all of that. They want the electoral law to be amended in a way that would obstruct Ennahda’s control over the political scene again. They want competent people not political charlatans to be brought aboard. They also hope for the 2014 constitution to be amended and for the political system to be reviewed.

These very demands were raised by the president himself earlier in June, when he called for a dialogue with political parties on creating a new political system and amending the 2014 constitution, which he described as “with locks everywhere”, in an effort to ease the ongoing political crisis.

The president’s comments, however, fell on deaf ears at the time, with Ennahda, increasingly emboldened by its growing control over the government, rejecting any talks about the issue.

Saied, who decided to act on Sunday, probably lost patience with Ennahda’s intransigence. But, unlike Saied, Tunisians have lost patience with everything, including the disastrous role played by Ennahda in the country and the performance of most other political parties, regardless of their ideologies or affiliations.

Soon after Saied’s announcement of Sunday’s decisions, large crowds quickly poured into the streets to express support for his moves, reflecting their anger at Ennahda. In every city, people were spontaneously celebrating perhaps what they considered an end to the Islamist nightmare.

In my city in north-eastern Tunisia, I must confess I celebrated Saied’s decisions too, years after I lost hope about seeing this country free from Islamists’ control. I celebrated without thinking, like all compatriots, without asking about what might happen next and without fearing the possible violence that Ennahda and its allies might provoke to regain control and protect their interests.

We all celebrated but we did not celebrate a return to a one-man rule. We were not hailing the president as a hero as much as we were rejoicing that an era, marked and smothered by political Islam, was over.

Now, a few days after the Saied’s decisions, we feel more cool-headed and we are all waiting to see if the president will listen to the people and if he will guarantee this republic a future that is free of opportunism, dogma, corruption and the use of religion for political purposes. Time, maybe, for the long delayed dreams to be fulfilled.

Iman Zayat is the Managing Editor of The Arab Weekly.

Copyright ©2021 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 10 August 2021

Word Count: 1,356

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CAIRO – The Mediterranean countries allied under the cover of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum have moved to a more realistic stage after announcing the transformation of this project into a regional organisation that aims to counter Turkish harassment and officially turn Egypt into the natural gas capital of the region.

On Tuesday, representatives of Egypt, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Jordan and Israel concluded, in Cairo, an agreement to officially convert the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum into a regional organisation. The Palestinian representative missed the meeting which was held via video conferencing.

This move represents an important development for Cairo in its multifaceted dispute with Ankara. Through this step, Egypt has achieved a strategic goal that enables it to become a regional energy centre and a major gas capital in the eastern Mediterranean, and gives it advantages due to its good infrastructure in this field.

Observers said that the members of the fledgling organisation will strengthen their cooperation through developing projects to connect their electricity grids via underwater cables in the Mediterranean extending from Egypt to some European countries, projects that strengthen the idea of cooperation in all forms of available energy such that the deficit in one type of energy experienced by one member country could be compensated by the abundance of the same energy in another member country.

But this move also constitutes a blow to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions in the Mediterranean. Turkey has been trying to disrupt this cooperation by all means and methods, such as signing two naval and security memoranda of understanding with the Libyan Government of National Accord months ago to use them as a pretext for gas exploration operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which was established in January of last year, has become the first international organisation that brings together gas producers, consumers, and transit countries in the world into one entity, unlike many similar international bodies whose membership is limited to exporting or importing countries.

This shared vision gives influence to all actors and those involved in the production and trade of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean region, in order to coordinate policies aimed at developing a sustainable regional market for gas and to address the ambitions of some countries that see that they have a right to the natural riches of the Mediterranean but without respecting international laws and regional agreements.

Political experts and decision-making circles believe that the fledgling organisation will contribute to supporting and financing the existing and new infrastructure for gas, such as pipelines and export facilities in member states, reducing the cost of production and transportation, and ensuring a steady supply of gas at competitive prices to markets at the heart of Europe and elsewhere from the eastern Mediterranean.

The forum is credited with establishing an advisory committee for the gas industry last November as a permanent dialogue platform between governments and stakeholders, including investors, gas dealers and financing institutions.

The step establishes important pillars for peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean region, and collectively would repel Turkey’s aggression in case it violates the rights of any of the member states, as Turkey continues its provocations against both Greece and Cyprus, as well as its many skirmishes with France.

Supporters consider the organisation to be a significant historical development that would consolidate the values of peace and cooperation in a tense region, through the efforts of the forum to make energy resources a motive for ending conflicts in the region, especially the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Turkish-Greek conflict.

The forum also opens promising prospects for cooperation to countries wishing to deal with its assets and objectives in a flexible manner and without infringing on the rights of others or appropriating their wealth.

East Med Gas Forum supporters assert that the most important characteristic of the forum, compared to many similar organisations, is that it is open to any country or regional or international organisation to join, as long as the prospective member adopts the values and objectives of the forum and wants to participate in cooperation for the well-being of the entire region, without resorting to force.

It is expected that the forum will draw great international interest in the foreseeable future, especially from the Mediterranean countries that have not joined yet, such as Lebanon, Syria and Libya, and perhaps Spain, Portugal and Algeria, and from world importers of gas, such as India, China and Japan, and even Turkey may find itself forced to join at a later stage and submit to its conditions.

France had already requested to join the forum earlier this year, and the United States has become a permanent observer, which gives the forum important international weight.

French and American energy giants, such as Total, Noble Energy and ExxonMobil, have already obtained licenses to extract gas in the countries of the region, which makes Paris and Washington very likely to resort to their military capabilities in the Mediterranean to defend the interests of these companies should the need for such a step arise in the future.

Some observers point out that transforming the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum into a full-fledged international organisation represents a strong blow to the ambitions of Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in eastern Mediterranean gas. Turkey had already received such a blow with the signing on August 6 of a borders demarcation agreement between Egypt and Greece. Before that, Italy and Greece had already signed a similar agreement.

Observers add that there is a tangible shift in the US position towards Turkish policy in the eastern Mediterranean, based on the resumption of arms exports to Cyprus, and the signs of a deal whereby oil production and exports will be resumed in Libya, in exchange for pressure on Turkey in Libya.

Transforming the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum into an international organisation formally protects the interests of its member states, and contributes to the vigorous pursuit of economic integration between them, based on gas and electricity production and trade projects.

The success of the new organisation depends on future developments in the political and geopolitical situations in the eastern Mediterranean, which are experiencing a high degree of uncertainty and instability at the moment, as a result of deep disagreements and chronic conflicts in the region.

This in turn raises major questions about the opportunities available to the East Med Gas Forum countries to make the best use of the promising gas discoveries and reserves. It also raises important questions about the possibility that the institutionalisation of the forum would lead to further escalating the conflicts with Turkey.

Furthermore, the current conditions of the natural gas market in the European Union and global gas prices represent a major challenge for the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Organization, as international gas prices have recently dropped, due to the slowdown in global demand.

In the event of a normal return to production in global markets, the forum countries will be forced to enter into intense competition with Russian, American and Qatari gas exports, which is the second big challenge that represents a major test of the forum’s effectiveness and its ability to develop a creative vision that enables it to compete internationally.

Dr Ahmed Qandil is an Egyptian researcher in Asian affairs.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 23 September 2020

Word Count: 1,196

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The announcement of a ceasefire by the rival factions in the Libyan conflict sparked cautious optimism, amid fears that its implementation could be stalled due to the likely emergence of differences over details.

The head of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj, and the Speaker of the Libya House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, issued two statements on Friday, declaring a ceasefire across the whole of the Libyan territory.

The two statements included a call for “the resumption of oil production and export, and blocking its revenues in a special account at the Libyan Foreign Bank, which will not be touched until a political settlement is reached in accordance with the outcomes of the Berlin Conference, and with the guarantee of the UN mission and the international community.”

The two statements reflected consensus on a number of points, including the issue of oil revenues and making Sirte and Jufra regions a demilitarised zone. But divergences on some details regarding the contested regions, which were the focus of escalation during the last period, may impede the implementation of the agreement.

Political analyst Jalal Harchaoui, a researcher specialising in Libyan affairs at the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague, wondered if “this declaration was fully achievable.” He believes that “its implementation is likely to be difficult,” noting that there are several regional powers that may play a destabilising role in the agreement.

It is clear that there are concerns about the commitment of the Tripoli government (the Government of National Accord) to the ceasefire, as it might simply take it as a truce to give Turkey time to rearrange its cards in Libya, and to fragment the regional position rejecting Ankara’s interventions. This is why a complete ceasefire would be the appropriate formula for any agreement that may occur.

According to observers, Turkey’s experiences of ceasefires in Syria confirm that Ankara is good at using them to manoeuvre. Besides, it wants to resort to a temporary truce in order to absorb regional and international anger.

Some analysts view the Tripoli government’s approval of the ceasefire with suspicion. They attribute its acceptance of the ceasefire to the pressures it is experiencing, whether externally or internally, especially the financial crunch caused by the stoppage in oil exports.

Observers say that the devil lies in the details of implementing the ceasefire and the necessary security arrangements regarding the demilitarised zone, and in how to prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections next March.

Al-Sarraj stressed that “achieving an actual ceasefire requires that the areas of Sirte and Jufra become demilitarised, and that the police forces of both sides agree on security arrangements inside the two areas.” Aguila Saleh, however, did not even mention Jufra and only suggested that “the city of Sirte be the temporary seat for the new Presidential Council, bringing all Libyans together and closer, provided that an official police force from various regions would secure the city, in preparation for the unification of state institutions as a basic consensual stage of the process of construction, provided that military arrangements are completed according to the UN-sponsored negotiation track (5 + 5), whose outputs will be binding once they are agreed upon and officially announced.”

While Aguila Saleh stressed the need for the police forces to be “official security forces,” that is to say, they must have national police badge numbers since before 2011, observers do not rule out that the Government of National Accord would not hesitate to provide militia elements who recently underwent some training in policing in order to prepare them for this particular task and offer them as regular police forces.

It is unlikely that the army, which has not commented on the agreement, will agree to withdraw from Sirte and Jufra before receiving guarantees that GNA mercenaries and militias will not be part of the forces which will secure the demilitarised zone. There are expectations, however, that the army will demand to leave negotiations regarding Sirte and Jufra till last and not start with them as the Islamists and Turkey want.

Aguila Saleh’s statement reflects an endeavour to transform the city of Sirte into a political capital that does not belong to any of Libya’s three historical regions: Tripoli, Barga and Fezzan. However, it is unlikely that the GNA, and behind it Ankara and Washington, will be open to the idea, given that Tripoli believes that the central region belongs to it and will not easily let go of it, especially since most of the oil fields and terminals are concentrated there.

The Libya Revival bloc led by the Parliament’s envoy to the European Union and the African Union had proposed to United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, an initiative aiming “to declare the city of Sirte a demilitarized zone under the control of the United Nations, and to freeze all battle fronts in order to avoid the risk of an imminent regional clash between the two largest armies in our region, namely the Turkish army and the Egyptian army.”

Since the Libyan Army’s withdrawal from Tripoli, Turkey has been threatening to launch a war to seize Sirte, Jufra and the oil terminals, which was met with a clear Egyptian threat to counter any attack on them.

Several Western powers were receptive to Friday’s developments as they feared a conflagration in Libya would force them to take sides in the conflict. They find the ceasefire agreement a convenient solution to satisfy the GNA and Turkey without having to openly broach the thorny topic of Syrian mercenaries in Tripoli for the moment, and without having to put pressure on Khalifa Haftar after his approval of resuming oil production and export a few days ago.

Mona el-Mahrouki is a Tunisian writer.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 24 August 2020

Word Count: 948

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TUNIS — As US presidential candidate Joe Biden continues to lead in the polls, foreign powers are preparing for a change in leadership style and policy orientation in the White House.

If some like Iran are pinning their hopes on a change of US leadership, others are fretting over the prospect.

Among those most concerned about a potential change of course in Washington is Turkey, whose President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has remained on relatively good terms with current US President Donald Trump and had a rocky relationship with the former vice-president.

Whereas Trump has offered little resistance to Erdogan’s foreign policy goals or human rights record, Biden has been a steadfast critic of the Turkish leader, challenging him on everything from his hostility to the Kurds to his contentious role in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As vice-president, Biden often angered the Turkish government by highlighting its clampdown on free expression and voicing support for Kurdish nationalist movements that Erdogan branded as “terrorist” groups and worked tirelessly to squash.

In 2014, Biden even sparked a diplomatic row between the US and Turkey when he publicly suggested that Ankara had helped facilitate the rise of ISIS in Syria (comments he later apologised for.)

While the presumptive Democratic nominee has since been more cautious, he has nevertheless continued to be a thorn in Erdogan’s side, pushing for more aggressive US action to tame Turkey’s ambitions at home and in the region.

A new polemic has erupted in recent days over an interview Biden gave with the New York Times editorial board nine months ago during which  he described the Turkish leader as an “autocrat” and said the US should support Turkish “opposition leadership” in their bid to defeat him.

“I’m still of the view that if we were to engage more directly like I was doing with them, that we can support those elements of the Turkish leadership that still exist and get more from them and embolden them to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan,” Biden told the reporters in November 2019. “Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

Predictably, Biden’s remarks drew furious backlash from the Turkish political establishment at the time, and they are coming under further scrutiny as the US election draws nearer.

On Sunday, Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin issued a harsh rebuke of the former vice-president’s remarks, writing on Twitter that Biden’s analysis of Turkey “was based on pure ignorance, arrogance and hypocrisy” and that “the days of ordering Turkey around are over.”

“If you still think you can try, be our guest. You will pay the price,” Kalin wrote.

Turkish government-controlled media also honed in on Biden’s remarks, warning that they “obviously do not portend sunny skies for Turkish-American relations in the event he is elected President.”

“Such overtly hostile comments towards Turkey’s democratically elected leadership creates questions about Biden’s knowledge and his capacity to make intelligent judgements on key issues,” Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency said.

While there are a range of reasons Turkey would be loath to see a Biden presidency, his firm support for the Kurds, both inside and outside Turkey, is Ankara’s greatest concern, argues foreign affairs writer Bobby Ghosh.

“It is the Democratic candidate’s longstanding sympathy for the Kurds, in Iraq and Syria, that will cause Ankara the greatest anxiety, should he become president,” wrote Ghosh in Bloomberg. “…An American president sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism would represent a serious headache not only for Turkey, but for all countries with Kurdish minorities, such as Iraq, Syria and Iran.”

Trump, who has fostered relatively warm ties with Ankara during his time in office, has exploited the discord between Ankara and his Democratic rival ahead of a tough November election, recently suggesting that Biden would likely be outmatched as president by strong foreign leaders such as Erdogan.

“Let’s face it, Joe’s shot,” Trump said during a Fox News interview on Monday. “You’re dealing with people that are very sharp. You’re dealing with world-class chess players in the leaders of these countries. I know them all. We do very well with all of them,” he added, singling out Erdogan.

While Trump’s popularity has taken a hit due to the US’s coronavirus crisis and economic downturn, he has gained some ground in recent months and is taking steps to prevent mail-in voting options that are likely to favour Biden.

Biden currently leads Trump by some 4% of registered voters nationwide, according to a recent CNN poll, and holds a narrow advantage in key battleground states that will likely decide the election.

If Biden wins the presidency, Turkey would likely face greater US pressure, but it remains to be seen how far the former vice-president would go to realise the foreign policy vision he has long advocated.

Stephen Quillen is an Arab Weekly correspondent in Tunis.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 19 August 2020

Word Count: 796

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Official Russian media reported that President Vladimir Putin issued “orders” to negotiate with Syria over handing additional installations and maritime areas over to the Russian army. It was an interesting way of putting things. It certainly depicted a new reality in Syria that many in the region, notably Iran and its proxies, refuse to take note of. As usual, they prefer to escape this reality!

This new reality is represented by the existence of agreements, or more accurately, specific understandings that make Russia the sole guardian over the Syria we once knew, or what was left of it. Russia has decided to expand its zone of direct control in Syria and it will get what it wants. Contrary to Iran’s dreams, Moscow will not leave any room for Iranian presence along the Syrian coast, just for the sake of confirming who the boss is in Syria and that it is up to Russia, not Iran, to determine Syria’s future role in the region.

It seems clear that there is some sort of Russian-American understanding regarding Syria. There is, in addition, an American blessing for a Russian-Turkish-Israeli understanding on the future of Syria. This understanding is based on the premises that the situation in Syria cannot continue as it is and that Iran has no place in Syria. If Iran’s goal is to support the minority regime that Bashar Assad symbolises, then all that can be said now is that this system exploded from within.

The evidence for this division is the recent rift between the two branches of the ruling clan, the Assads and the Makhloufs. In a surprise reversal of fortunes, the Assads decided to simply lay their hands on Rami Makhlouf’s fortune. It is rather difficult to estimate the actual size of this fortune, just as it is difficult to determine who among the two rivals will emerge victorious. For the moment, the Assads have the upper hand, but the Makhloufs still enjoy a rather distinctive status among the Alawites. Besides, with his fortune stashed away behind dozens of front companies in Europe, the Gulf, Russia and many of its satellite countries, Rami Makhlouf is not out of the fight yet.

In any case, Syria’s future now must be looked at from the angle of the Russian-Israeli-Turkish understanding that America has blessed. The American blessing is due to several reasons, including that the administration of US President Donald Trump is now more concerned than ever with the US’s domestic problems in an election year. It has enough on its plate right now with the coronavirus pandemic and its economic impact and, more recently, the fallout over the police killing of an unarmed black man in Minneapolis, Minnesota’s largest city.

As busy as it is, the American administration will never steer far away from the Syrian file, which it considers an integral part of the Iranian file. Evidence of this American interest is the enforcement of the Caesar Act. This is a very brutal act that imposes tough sanctions on the Syrian regime and anyone who deals with it. Russia will no doubt take this matter into consideration, given that the primary goal of the act is to bypass the United Nations Security Council and its resolutions, where Russia and China have been able to protect the Syrian regime for a long time through their veto powers.

The one party that made time work for it in the Syrian crisis is Israel. Turkey as well to some extent, but its role in Syria was characterised by passivity. Turkey has missed all of its opportunities since the Syrian revolution to intervene in a way that would allow it to play a positive role in protecting Syrian citizens. It is true that it opened its frontier to hundreds of thousands of Syrians fleeing the regime and its oppression, but it is also true that, like Israel, it wagered on the crisis eroding with time and on arriving on the Syrian scene by 2021.

By mid-2021, Bashar Assad will find it difficult to secure another term for himself, even by cheating in the elections. What will do in the Syrian regime is the horrible and very real economic crisis. It is so bad that Lebanese Hezbollah is no longer concerned with saving the Syrian regime militarily but has moved on to saving it economically, even at Lebanon’s expense!

Pending mid-2021, Russia’s strategy is to collect as many playing cards as possible in the Syrian game in order to become the sole decision maker in the country. That’s when Bashar Assad will discover that he has become powerless and that a bankrupt Iran will not be able to save him again. That’s also when Putin will be starting to collect the dividends of his country’s huge investment in Syria, especially since September 2015 when it sent its planes to the Hmeimim base, supposedly to stop the opposition from invading and controlling the Syrian coast.

In a nutshell, there is a new game in Syria in light of the Turkish occupation of a border strip in the north of Syria and Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights that it has been occupying since June 1967 … that is for 53 years now!

How far will the US-Russian understanding on Syria reach? This is the big question in light of the coming in force of the Caesar Act, which is bound to have terrible and far-reaching repercussions, not only inside Syria, but also on any entity that wants to deal with the Syrian regime, including Russia, China and European companies.

Putin’s “order” to the relevant authorities in his country to negotiate an expansion of the Russian presence in Syria, just a few days before the coming into force of the Caesar Act, is definitely no coincidence. It is also no coincidence that this order came in light of an understanding with Turkey and Israel with an American blessing, and at a time when all Iran can do is display useless acts of defiance like sending five oil tankers to Venezuela, a country with one of the largest oil reserves in the world.

The rules of the game in Syria have changed while the Syrian regime has missed all the opportunities it has been given to rehabilitate itself. This June 10, 2000, will mark the twentieth anniversary of the death of the founder of the current regime, Hafez Assad. Today, Syria is paying the price of his heir’s inability to establish Arab and international relations that truly serve Syria’s interests. Instead, he preferred Iran’s embrace. What we are witnessing today in Syria is the culmination of a series of miserable regime failures that made various powers, headed by Russia, think about how to have greater control of a part of Syria. And we know that the Israeli and Turkish occupations of parts of Syria are not going to disappear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

Khairallah Khairallah is a Lebanese writer.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 02 June 2020

Word Count: 1,149

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TUNIS — France is moving to regain its lost influence in Tunisia, in a move seen as an attempt to break its isolation in Libya, especially after recent gains on the ground made in western Libya by Islamist militias backed by Turkey.

French Foreign Minister John-Yves Le Drian expressed his concern Wednesday that “a Syrian scenario is being played out in Libya,” describing the situation as “very disturbing.”

On Tuesday evening, Tunisian Defence Minister Imed Hazgui discussed by phone the situation in Libya with his French counterpart, Florence Barley. The Tunisian minister stressed his country’s opposition to all forms of foreign interference in Libya, and reiterated Tunisia’s call for a Libyan-Libyan solution to the conflict.

The French minister expressed satisfaction at  the current state of relations between Tunisia and France and pledged to further develop them with the aim of developing a joint long-term plan, according to the Tunisian statement.

Barley also invited her Tunisian counterpart to head the Tunisian delegation to the 28th session of the joint French-Tunisian Military Committee to be held in Paris in late September.

The two ministers discussed ways to strengthen Tunisian-French military cooperation in various fields, especially in training officers, exchanging expertise and upgrading military equipment.

Since 2011, the US, and to a certain extent Turkey, have had a virtual monopoly on military cooperation and training agreements with Tunisia. Both countries have provided arms and equipment to the Tunisian armed forces, a development reflecting France’s declining influence in the domain.

The United States’ main contribution has been in the field of surveillance. Washington has provided and installed surveillance systems on the Tunisian-Libyan border, an electronic monitoring system along the Tunisian coastline and a highly sensitive long-range radar and camera monitoring stations extending from the Tunisian-Libyan maritime border to the Tunisian-Algerian border.

Tunisian political analyst Mustafa Abdelkabir said that Tunisian-French relations are important for Paris, which explains why the French defence minister insisted on the need to strengthen military cooperation.

He told The Arab Weekly that “the important strategic location of Tunisia and its geography are important to Paris and to all countries that have a military interest in Libya.”

“What has been happening recently in Libya seems to indicate that an international military showdown will most likely be taking place soon in Libya, especially after the recent developments due to the increased Turkish role in Libya that led to the takeover of the Al-Watiya base by the GNA forces,” Abdelkabir said.

A few reports have pointed out that Turkey has begun taking concrete steps to establish a permanent military presence in Libya by taking complete control of the Al-Watiya strategic airbase. Turkish designs are seen as having American blessings, which would be a serious blow to France’s plans in western Libya.

Paris has thus joined ranks with Greece and Cyprus and opposed the agreement to demarcate the maritime borders between the Islamists’ government in Tripoli and Turkey, even though the agreement does not represent a direct threat to its interests.

France is one of the major European countries opposed to Turkish intervention in Libya. It has criticised Ankara for breaching the international resolution banning the sale of arms to Libya and, with Greece, it is leading the IRINI operation to stop the flow of arms to Libya.

The French and Greek positions impede American and Turkish efforts to bring NATO onto the Libyan scene.

France supports the Libyan National Army (LNA) and has always worked to frustrate decisions and plans within the European Union seeking to condemn the LNA or its leader, Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Islamists in Libya accuse France of providing military support to the LNA. In 2016, they made a big case out of a plane crash that killed three French citizens onboard. The French authorities said at the time that its citizens were on an intelligence gathering mission.

France has been trying since 2011 to invest in Libya and get what it was unable to achieve during the time of the late leader Muammar Qaddai.

In 2010, France won a contract to develop the Nalut gas field in western Libya, but Qaddafi cancelled the contract with the French energy company Total following a legal conflict over the company’s sale of part of its stake to Qatar.

Experts speculated that the dead deal with Total may have been behind France’s rush in 2011 to topple the Qaddafi regime.

“France is one of the countries that has a great deal of weight on Libyan issues,” said Abdelkabir. “It is one of the first countries to call for toppling Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and found legitimate excuses for NATO forces to intervene in Libya even before the green light from the UN Security.”

“The French believe that they earned some merit by bringing down the Qaddafi regime and should have some priority in this file, but international competition is raging in Libya today with the multiplicity of foreign and international parties involved and the growing Turkish role and Russia’s entry on the Libyan scene … All the major powers are eying Libya’s gas, oil and natural resources,” he added.

America’s indirect support for Turkey’s intervention in Libya has raised speculation about the prospect of French support for Russia’s presence there.

A statement by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on Tuesday expressed real US concern about Russia repeating the Syrian scenario in Libya. The statement quoted US military leaders as warning against Russia seeking to turn the balance of power in the Libyan conflict in its favour.

Mona El-Mahrouki and Amna Jibran are Tunisian writers.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 28 May 2020

Word Count: 911

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CAIRO — The Suez Canal has been hit by a double blow. After absorbing the shock of stagnating global trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was hit by the steepest drop in oil prices in 18 years. Consequently, the canal is no longer as competitive as a corridor for global trade.

Three global shipping lines have already announced plans to reduce their operating costs by rerouting some of their cargo ships to take the route around the Cape of Good Hope. The concerned ships belong to the 2M alliance, which includes the Maersk Line of Containers, the MSC Line and the CMMA-CGM Line.

During the first quarter of this year, Saudi Arabia engaged in a fierce oil war with Russia after the collapse of the OPEC+ coalition grouping OPEC producers and allies from outside the organisation, led by Russia. This economic battle confused the oil market and pushed prices down to $19.33 a barrel of Brent crude by the beginning of April.

Developments near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have added to the canal’s burdens. The ongoing conflict in Yemen and a spike in pirate activity in the strait have added to Cairo’s contribution to the costs of securing access to the Red Sea through the strait, in order to protect its interests and secure its shipping lane.

As Cairo seeks to preserve its important shipping artery, blows to its canal have continued to come, this time from Cairo’s ally, Moscow. Indeed the Russians have plans to pull the rug from under the Suez Canal by enticing shipping lines to move their cargo through the northern shipping lane of the frozen Antarctic Ocean.

Moscow is wooing shipping lines by offering to pay for any possible damage to their ships if they take the northern lane. In fact, there are already plans to transport liquefied natural gas through the north.

Moscow’s enthusiasm is dampened by commercial carriers’ reluctance to pay double the cost of insurance required for the northern lane, which they have to add to the cost of hiring the services of icebreakers. Moscow, however, is not giving up and continues to tout the Arctic route, promising to make it a year-long open lane by 2030. And that is not good news for the Suez Canal.

Ahmed al-Shami, a marine transport expert, played down the impact of Russia’s impact on the Suez Canal. He pointed out that last year, only about 6.5 million tons of cargo went through the Arctic Ocean, while 1.2 billion go through the Suez Canal every year.

He also described the decision made by some global shipping lines to reroute ships around the Cape of Good Hope as a temporary measure and a way to pressure the Suez Canal to grant extra incentives. The canal can withstand this pressure, he said, while the shipping companies may end up revising their strategy because cheap fuel is only one small part of operating costs.

The 192km Suez Canal cuts travel time between Asia and Europe by an average of 15 days. In addition, the Suez Canal Authority grants incentives and discounts to container ships coming from the ports of north-western Europe on their way to south-east Asia and the Far East, reducing transit fees by some 17%.

Revenues from the Suez Canal represent around 23% of the revenues of the services sector exports and about 3.7% of the revenues of the general state budget, in addition to 7% of the current account flows to Egypt.

Adel el-Lemai, head of Port Said Chamber of Shipping, pointed out that Suez Canal revenues are going to be negatively impacted by the global economic recession, as many cargo shipments around the globe have been cancelled.

The Suez Canal accounts for about 12% of the total volume of global trade traffic. Forty-one thousand container ships plow the ocean waters around the globe, linking markets in Europe with Africa, Europe and Asia. To move between continents, these vessels have no faster and easier transit corridor than the Suez Canal.

Othman Shawky, former director of the port of Nuweiba, pointed out that despite the decline in global oil prices, the Suez Canal remains the safest and fastest passage for container ships.

He pointed out that the Cape of Good Hope route is fraught with navigational dangers emanating from severe storms and bad sea conditions, as well as ongoing conflicts in some African countries that drive up insurance costs for ships.

Mohamed Hammad is an Egyptian writer.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 26 May 2020

Word Count: 734

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WASHINGTON — The administration of US President Donald Trump has appointed Moroccan-born Belgian-American scientist Moncef Mohamed Slaoui as chief scientist of the committee tasked to develop coronavirus vaccines and treatments. Slaoui’s selection was based on his impressive academic and professional record and accomplishments in this field.

Slaoui has a confirmed track record of impressive results in the field of immunology and the discovery of several vaccines, including those against malaria, rotavirus, cervical cancer and pneumococcus. He also had a successful managerial stint heading the vaccine department at the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline between 2011 and 2016, during which the company succeeded in producing 24 new medicines and vaccines for advanced viruses. He also served on the board of directors of Moderna, the firm that conducted the first vaccine test used to treat a COVID-19 patient in America a few days ago.

Born in 1959 in the city of Agadir in southern Morocco, Slaoui now resides in the United States. He realised early on that real strength in the future will not be connected to intercontinental ballistic missiles or slow-moving and range-restricted tanks, but rather to research labs and pharmaceutical and vaccine companies.

Slaoui has an impressive academic track record. He left Morocco to France to pursue his university studies, then settled in Belgium where he studied molecular biology and graduated from the Free University of Brussels. He completed a PhD in immunology from the Free University of Brussels, and then migrated to the United States, where he completed his scientific and academic path in his field of specialisation by teaching and researching at Harvard Medical School.

As chief scientist of the COVID-19 vaccine team, Slaoui will have access to extensive research and experimental infrastructure in the US with the aim of quickly developing experimental vaccines during the first stage of dosage and safety testing. He will work with government partners to ensure that any safe and effective vaccine will be manufactured in sufficient quantities.

To move towards this goal, Slaoui and his committee will rely on available results and resources from the network of research programmes and clinical trials. The first priority for Trump’s team is to develop a safe and effective vaccine to stop the infection from spreading and prevent future outbreaks, in line with the new strategic plan of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which represents a comprehensive and coordinated effort to develop effective biomedical tools to combat COVID-19.

Slaoui will draw on his experience in the field to work with his team to adapt vaccines, treatments and methods previously used to treat the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and other severe coronaviruses, such as SARS, and apply them to the current pandemic.

Although developing an effective vaccine as quickly as possible is an important and strategic priority, Slaoui’s team will have to first identify and evaluate the effectiveness of drugs already approved for other diseases that have potential for treating COVID-19, in addition to extensive testing of new antivirals based on monoclonal antibodies.

Compound vaccines are a critical way to enhance public health coverage through coronavirus immunisation. In this context, and based on his research and experience, Slaoui believes that without having five or six vaccines grouped in one dose, it will be difficult to enter the game of the vaccine industry.

Despite Saloui’s appointment, the struggle continues over who will have the final say when it comes to manufacturing and marketing the new vaccine. The war against COVID-19 is a race for who will be first to corner the global strategic market of producing an effective and safe vaccine. Given the gravity and sensitivity of the new task force’s work, and given the visible conflict between Washington and Beijing, Slaoui will necessarily benefit from the official protocols of high-level security protection.

Slaoui, however, agrees with a number of other scientists that there is a much greater need for transparency on issues related to dealing with disease-causing organisms because of the possibility of their accidental release. The goal of transparency is to protect public safety at all levels and ensure that remedial actions are immediately taken in the event of an accident. What is important for these scholars is to avoid at all costs the atmosphere of a dangerous and unethical competitiveness in this domain between major powers, without ensuring the safety of all biological research labs, whether in China, the US or any other country.

Mohamed Mamouni al-Alawi is a Moroccan journalist.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 25 May 2020

Word Count: 728

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ISTANBUL — The coronavirus pandemic has offered Turkey the opportunity to try to improve ties with the United States so as to better cope with potential economic problems and defuse contentious issues in the relationship.

Ankara sent a military transport plane to Washington on April 28 carrying medical supplies for the fight against the coronavirus. It is the second such delivery to the US since the pandemic began earlier this year.

In a letter accompanying the supplies, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told his counterpart Donald Trump that Turkey wanted to develop its relations with the US “in all areas,” pointing to a joint decision to boost bilateral trade to $100 billion a year.

Erdogan’s letter also made clear that Turkey expects its support for the US against the coronavirus to dampen criticism levelled against Ankara in Washington.

“I hope that in the upcoming period, with the spirit of solidarity we have displayed during the pandemic, Congress and the US media will better understand the strategic importance of our relations,” the letter said.

He said he hoped that they acted “in a way that our common fight against our common problems necessitates.”

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo thanked Turkey via Twitter. “Americans are grateful for your friendship, partnership and support,” Pompeo wrote.

For Turkey, which has sent coronavirus aid supplies to many other countries, the show of support to the US has special significance as Ankara faces the prospect of new economic turbulence ahead.

It is also looking for US help at a time when ties between the two NATO allies are strained over differences in Syria and over Turkey’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 missile defence system.

Turkish officials said earlier this month that their country had held talks with the United States about securing a swap line from the US Federal Reserve and discussed other funding options to mitigate fallout from the coronavirus outbreak. In a swap, the Federal Reserve accepts other currencies in exchange for dollars. It has added temporary lines to central banks including those of Brazil, South Korea and Mexico but has made no decision in the case of Turkey.

Financial help from the US would be crucial for Ankara as Erdogan, who prides himself in having ended Turkey’s long history of relying on the International Monetary Fund, has ruled out calling on the IMF for help.

The Fund expects Turkey’s economy to shrink by 5% this year and unemployment to increase to 17% as the pandemic chokes economic activity and paralyses the country’s tourism industry, a key source of foreign currency. It would be Turkey’s second recession in fewer than two years.

Analysts have also raised concerns that a draw-down in foreign reserves could hamper Turkey’s response to the pandemic, increasing the need for external funding. The Central Bank in Ankara has been spending billions of dollars to shore up the Lira, a development that has depleted reserves. The bank’s reserves stood at $92.1 billion as of the end of March, a 14.5% drop since February, according to the state-run Anadolu news agency.

The draw-down has spooked investors, who worry that Turkey may not have enough of a cushion to shoulder a disruption in external financing.

“The main worry is that there is a pick-up in external debt repayments ahead while the tourism sector is not in a position to attract flows due to the lockdown,” Kaan Nazli, a senior economist and portfolio manager helping oversee $26 billion of assets at Neuberger Berman in The Hague, told Bloomberg. Despite the Central Bank’s efforts, the lira has lost almost 15% of its value against the US dollar since the start of the year.

Aykan Erdemir, senior director of the Turkey Programme at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think-tank, said the Erdogan government was aware of the economic dangers ahead.

“Erdogan fears the economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic more than the public health consequences, given his ability to control the flow of news and manipulate the case and fatality numbers,” Erdemir said via email. “At this point, the Turkish president is just beginning to feel the real pressure.”

“The Turkish government’s publicity stunts through televised coronavirus aid around the globe can offer no remedy to the country’s looming balance of payments crisis and the ensuing fallout from a currency meltdown,” Erdemir added.

The pandemic also offered Turkey a chance to cool down another point of friction with the US.

Earlier this month, Ankara said it had postponed plans to activate the S-400 batteries, bought from Russia for $2.5 billion, because of the coronavirus crisis. The reason given for the delay was unconvincing because the pandemic has not disturbed any other areas of Turkey’s military operations.

Under the original plan, Turkey was to switch on the Russian systems this month, making them operational. The US said activation of the S-400 could trigger economic sanctions. Washington argues that the S-400 can be used to spy on NATO military equipment and has said Turkey will not be able to buy a new fighter jet, the F-35.

By postponing the activation of the S-400, Turkey is giving the US more time to come up with an alternative plan that could see Ankara buying the US-made Patriot system. No new date to unpack the S-400, delivered to Turkey last year, has been announced.

Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly contributor in Istanbul.

Copyright ©2020 The Arab Weekly — distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 29 April 2020

Word Count: 886

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